
From the Divided City to the Figures of the World: Immanence and the Aporias of the Universal


Bringing James, Neyrat and Benjamin into relation thus resolves nothing through the mere addition of perspectives. Rather, it makes a detour through Nietzsche necessary. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche suggests that the great philosophies bear, to some degree, the imprint of their authors’ involuntary confessions. His proposition does not authorize us to replace the examination of arguments with a psychological assessment of those who produce them. It shifts the question towards the values that make certain images of the world desirable, the drives that invest the categories of order, and the claim of those categories to free themselves from the conditions of their genesis. Conflict, then, is neither immediately a logical contradiction nor merely a clash of individual sensibilities: it also runs through the historical formation of the criteria by which certain things appear worthy of being known or saved.[11]
Nietzsche thus allows us to complicate James’s position rather than replace it. “Temperament” is no longer merely an individual preference for the world of facts or that of principles. The valorization of stability, unity, permanence or truth may form part of a history of valuations, a discipline of the body and an economy of forces. What is at stake is not the dissolution of argument into the value underlying it, but the question of what becomes of my arguments when the conditions under which they are articulated and the needs to which they respond themselves become open to question. A genealogy cannot take the place of logic; it nevertheless compels logic to confront the history of its uses and of the demands that have endowed certain forms of proof with prestige.
The distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy assumes particular importance here. It does not designate two psychic substances between which the Greeks supposedly divided their lives. It stages a tension between regimes of form, individuation, excess and deindividuation that tragedy articulates without abolishing them. Here I discover a Greece more tormented than the Greece of serene marble, a Greece whose intelligibility cannot be reduced to the emergence of demonstrative reasoning alone. The city, worship, song, the body and the cosmos meet there in a working-through of tensions that precedes and exceeds the textbook definition of philosophy.[12]
It is precisely from this Nietzschean genealogy that Ruth Benedict borrows some of her categories in Patterns of Culture (1934). The Apollonian–Dionysian opposition allows her to compare cultural configurations, rather than individual temperaments alone: collectively instituted ways of selecting experiences, assigning value to conduct and shaping affective expectations. This transfer is suggestive. It shifts James’s discussion onto a plane on which individual dispositions are caught up in the forms of social life. A society is not a collection of isolated psyches; it can valorize styles of existence, regimes of attention and modes of self-mastery that become the familiar conditions of experience.[13]
Yet this anthropological appropriation of Nietzsche calls for far more stringent caution than a mere correction of vocabulary would entail. Characterizing entire populations by means of types such as the “Apollonian” or the “Dionysian” risks substantializing cultures, attributing to them a unified collective personality and effacing the internal conflicts they contain. Criticism becomes all the more imperative when categories of psychopathology are applied to human groups: comparative analysis may turn into a classification of social worlds on the basis of imported diagnoses. Benedict’s powerful intuition (that values and affects have a cultural organization) therefore does not justify the typological closure of what it allows us to glimpse.
The Marxian turn does not follow James and Madelrieux in the manner of a sociological explanation finally coming to correct a psychology of temperaments. A class position does not refute a proposition, and the socially determined character of an attitude does not settle the question of its truth. The eleventh of the “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845) nevertheless raises a far more troubling question: in opposing the interpretation of the world to its transformation, does Marx intend to dismiss philosophy or to overturn the separation between theory and practice? I refuse to derive from it a summary condemnation of the vita contemplativa. Contemplation is not inaction; practice does not, by its exercise alone, acquire the lucidity that would enable it to understand what it accomplishes. This distinction matters all the more because Althusser’s successive and sometimes discordant readings shift the meaning of the Marxian formula rather than furnish it with a definitive interpretation.[14]
In his writings of the mid-1960s, Althusser assigns a decisive place to “theoretical practice” and to the conditions of knowledge production. The lectures delivered in 1967 and published under the title Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists already shift the question: philosophy is not an additional science; it intervenes in oppositions whose stakes run through the scientific field itself. “Lenin and Philosophy,” a lecture delivered in February 1968 and published in book form the following year, specifies this role of intervention and of representing politics within theory. Then Reply to John Lewis, first published in English in 1972 and in French in 1973, sets out the now canonical formula: “philosophy is, in the last instance, class struggle in theory.” The qualification “in the last instance” precludes deducing the truth of an argument directly from the social class of the person who formulates it; it equally precludes imagining that theoretical controversies unfold in a socially aseptic atmosphere. Yet philosophical intervention is still not political struggle transposed term for term: its objects, procedures and requirements of justification have a determination of their own.[15]
The trajectory does not end in 1973. In “On Marxist Thought,” a text written in 1982 and published posthumously, Althusser rereads the “Theses on Feuerbach” with a severity that belies the image of a faithful guardian of Marx’s last word. His verdict on the eleventh thesis is: “It’s beautiful, but it doesn’t mean anything.” The deliberately provocative objection is precise: philosophers have never ceased seeking to act upon the world, even if only to keep it as it is; and the famous injunction to transform it specifies neither the agent of transformation nor the conditions of its historical import. Althusser goes so far as to discern in these theses from Marx’s youth an idealism of praxis, precisely where an entire tradition thought it had found the definitive departure from idealism. This late reversal erases neither the work on theoretical practice nor the proposition of 1973. Rather, it lays bare the philosophical instability of their articulation, without warranting the retrospective projection of all the reservations of 1982 onto the young Althusser.[16]
What I find here is less a doctrine to adopt than a difficulty to keep open. The fact that philosophy can intervene politically does not warrant confusing the force of an argument with the balance of forces that conditions its circulation. The fact that its statements produce historical effects does not turn them into mere instructions for action. More profoundly, the Althusserian formula puts my hypothesis of cosmified social conflictuality to the test: it sharpens its conflictual dimension but cannot, on its own, account for the gesture by which a controversy over practice, causality or substance becomes an inquiry into the order of the world. The “last instance” does not take the place of cosmology.
I therefore sometimes turn the Marxian formula around in order to shift its meaning: philosophers, too, have transformed the world in different ways. They have not necessarily transformed it because they made revolutions, or even because their doctrines inspired political programmes. They have modified the categories through which the world became intelligible, and sometimes the categories on the basis of which its transformation became thinkable. This efficacy is neither certain nor univocal. Emancipatory concepts have at times served forms of domination; ontologies forged in hierarchical societies have at times nourished ways of thinking about freedom. A philosophy does not derive its political meaning once and for all from the circumstances of its birth.
It is from this tension, rather than from any claim to define an essence, that I venture the guiding hypothesis of this essay: I propose to regard philosophy as a cosmified social conflictuality. The adjective “cosmified” does not mean that human beings project the quarrels of their cities onto the heavens: that would be to assume that the very problem the adjective is meant to help pose had already been solved. It names a more difficult undertaking: the never complete and never innocent conversion of the tensions of historically shared existence into problems concerning order, substance, becoming, causality, being and the conditions of knowledge. In turn, cosmological or metaphysical answers may reorganize what human beings think possible in their social relations. What is at issue, therefore, is not a sociological origin that would explain all philosophy, but a double displacement between a history of conflicts and a history of the categories of the world.
Two terms, so often taken to be antonyms, will guide this inquiry: the conflictual and the cosmic. The former names neither a warlike substance diffused throughout all beings nor an automatic virtue of discord; it indicates incompatibilities whose forms vary depending on whether they concern interests, reciprocal ways of affecting one another, institutions or propositions. The latter designates neither the heavens as imagined by ancient societies nor the mere object of the astrophysical sciences: it concerns the ways in which a mode of thought articulates an order of the real and is itself encompassed, situated or decentered by that order. Their encounter becomes philosophically fruitful provided we acknowledge that no resemblance in vocabulary proves a continuity of structure. From the polis to the cosmos, the displacement may be polemical, analogical, causal or critical; it is precisely these operations that need to be identified.
Scientific cosmology makes this precaution indispensable. The conflict between two astronomical models is not in itself the pólemos of Heraclitus, nor the political confrontation of the Machiavellian umori. Ptolemy can achieve remarkable computational power by means of geometrical arrangements whose coherence is distinct from that of an Aristotelian physics of places and motions. The Copernican shift will alter the relations between observations, mathematics and physical claims without the mere substitution of one centre for another exhausting that transformation. The history of an image of the cosmos is also the history of the instruments through which certain incompatibilities become discernible.[17]
[11] Friedrich Nietzsche, Par-delà bien et mal, § 6; La Généalogie de la morale, preface. For Par-delà bien et mal: original title Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886); for the Généalogie: Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887).
[12] Friedrich Nietzsche, La Naissance de la tragédie (1872), §§ 1–4 and 21–25.
[13] Ruth Benedict, Échantillons de civilisations, Paris, Gallimard, 1950 (Patterns of Culture, 1934), chapters devoted to the so-called Apollonian and Dionysian configurations. Benedict’s use of cultural typologies drawing on Nietzsche and psychopathology is now debated because of the risks of essentialization and of generalizing to heterogeneous collectivities.
[14] Karl Marx, “Thèses sur Feuerbach” (1845), thesis XI; text published by Engels in 1888. First German publication: appendix to Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, Stuttgart, J. H. W. Dietz, 1888.
[15] Louis Althusser, Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants (1967), Paris, François Maspero, “Théorie” series, 1974 (lectures delivered in 1967); “Lénine et la philosophie,” lecture delivered on 24 February 1968, Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, vol. 62, no. 4, 1968, pp. 127–181, then Paris, François Maspero, 1969; Réponse à John Lewis, Paris, François Maspero, “Théorie” series, 1973, p. 11 (original English version in Marxism Today, October–November 1972).
[16] Louis Althusser, “Sur la pensée marxiste” (1982), in Sur Althusser. Passages, Paris, L’Harmattan, “Futur antérieur” series, 1993, pp. 11–29, notably the passage devoted to the “Thèses sur Feuerbach.” This late manuscript should be distinguished from the autobiographical text L’avenir dure longtemps (1992); on the reassessments of the Feuerbach question, see also “Notes sur les Thèses sur Feuerbach,” Magazine littéraire, no. 324, 1994, pp. 38–42.
[17] Claudius Ptolemy, Almageste, translated by Nicolas Halma, Paris, 1813–1816; Nicolaus Copernicus, Des révolutions des orbes célestes, translation, introduction and notes by Michel-Pierre Lerner, Alain-Philippe Segonds and Jean-Pierre Verdet, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2015 (De revolutionibus, 1543); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1957. For Copernicus, see Book I, chapters 5–11, on the motions of the Earth and the ordering of the spheres.



















