"Yemen Dawn": A Turning Point with Lasting Consequences (1)

From “Operation Decisive Storm” to “Yemen Dawn”

The distance between “Decisive Storm” and “Yemen Dawn” is not merely eleven years of war in Yemen. It is a political and strategic gulf that encapsulates accumulated failures, shifts in the balance of power, and changes in Yemen’s position within the regional conflict, culminating in a moment when the security of the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become an integral part of the calculations surrounding the war and its possible outcomes.

When Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, its stated objective was to restore internationally recognized authority and halt the Houthi advance following their takeover of Sanaa and their push toward Aden. The intervention appeared to be an attempt to prevent the collapse of a political and security arrangement that Riyadh considered essential to protecting its southern borders and preventing Yemen from becoming a base of hostile influence on the kingdom’s southern flank.

Yet the years that followed demonstrated that air superiority alone was insufficient to establish stable political authority, that recapturing positions did not necessarily mean restoring the state, and that weakening an adversary militarily did not automatically dismantle its ability to manage the conflict. The Houthis remained in control of Sanaa and large parts of northern Yemen, while the forces opposing them struggled with internal divisions and competing centers of decision-making. Meanwhile, the humanitarian and economic crisis continued to take its toll on Yemeni society.

The problem was not simply a lack of military power, but the gap between the war’s declared objectives and the ability to translate battlefield gains into a viable political settlement. This is where one of the most important lessons of the earlier experience lies: a state cannot be rebuilt merely by recapturing territory if power remains divided among competing forces and institutions remain hostage to military loyalties and regional calculations.

It is from this perspective that Operation Yemen Dawn, launched by Yemeni government forces in October 2026 with Saudi support, should be examined, against the backdrop of escalating confrontations along the western coast and in areas of strategic importance to shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

From Managing the War to Changing Its Terms

What distinguishes the present moment is that the battle is no longer confined to the front lines inside Yemen. The Yemeni front has become intertwined with Saudi Arabia’s security, the interests of international trade, and regional competition over maritime routes. Consequently, Bab el-Mandeb is no longer merely a geographical strait bordered by Yemen’s coastline. It has become a focal point in a security and economic equation extending far beyond Yemen itself.

This helps explain the shift in the center of gravity toward the western coast and the areas surrounding the strait. Recapturing these positions is intended not only to reduce the territory under Houthi control, but also to limit their ability to use Yemen’s geography as leverage against Saudi Arabia and international shipping.

This shift, however, raises a fundamental question: does Riyadh seek to recapture strategic positions and secure its borders and maritime routes, or is it attempting to reshape the Yemeni balance of power in order to impose a political settlement on different terms?

All three objectives may be pursued within a single strategy, but each involves different requirements. Securing a maritime strait can be achieved through a relatively limited military operation. Ending Houthi control over Sanaa, by contrast, requires a broader and more complex campaign, while building a stable settlement demands that Yemen’s internal divisions be addressed rather than merely changing the lines of territorial control.

This is the real test for Yemen Dawn: can it establish a connection between military force, political legitimacy, and the rebuilding of state institutions, or will the gap that characterized the previous years of war reappear?

Bab el-Mandeb: The Geography That Changed the Calculations of War

Developments on the battlefield show that control of the western coast has become a central focus of the fighting. But announcing the recapture of strategic positions does not, in itself, establish the reality of control on the ground, nor does it guarantee the ability to hold them. Coastal positions require forces capable of protecting supply lines and preventing the adversary from returning or threatening them from other fronts.

The exchanges of attacks involving Saudi facilities have also demonstrated that the confrontation does not run in only one direction. The greater the military and economic value of the targets, the greater the likelihood of retaliation across a wider geographical area. The battle could evolve from an attempt to secure shipping into a war of mutual attrition, in which military calculations become entangled with economic, aviation, and energy interests.

The question, therefore, is not simply who controls Bab el-Mandeb at any given moment, but who possesses the capacity to secure it sustainably and prevent it from being used as an instrument of political and military pressure.

The Houthis and the Dilemma Facing Their Opponents

The Houthis cannot be treated as a force that will cease to exist merely because it loses a few positions. Over years of war, they have accumulated combat and organizational experience, benefited from their control of institutions and extensive territories, and developed means of exerting pressure that extend beyond the ground fronts. Their relationship with Iran also adds a regional dimension to the confrontation, although it would be a mistake to reduce the entire Yemeni movement to that relationship while disregarding its local roots.

The challenge facing government forces is not simply to advance toward specific positions, but to turn those advances into a lasting change in the balance of power. This requires coordination among military formations, unified decision-making, political administration of recaptured areas, and attention to the local interests that influence whether fighting continues or stops.

Here lies the dilemma facing the anti-Houthi forces. The government and the Presidential Leadership Council are not the only actors involved. There are also southern forces with their own political agenda, military formations with distinct constituencies and interests, and local forces along the western coast and in Marib and Taiz. These actors may agree on confronting the Houthis, but they do not necessarily agree on the form of the future state or how power and wealth should be distributed within it.

Unifying these forces is not a secondary organizational matter, but a political and military prerequisite for any lasting transformation. Battlefield advances that are not supported by agreement on how recaptured areas should be administered could ignite new conflicts and reproduce existing divisions under different banners.

The Lesson Decisive Storm Left Unresolved

Experience has shown that the Yemeni war cannot be reduced to a confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, nor to a struggle between Arab and Iranian influence. It is also a crisis of the state, the collapse of a political transition, competition for power and resources, and a conflict between differing visions of Yemen’s future.

The comparison between Decisive Storm and Yemen Dawn should therefore not be based on the scale of airstrikes or the number of positions recaptured, but on the differences in their objectives, circumstances, and capacity to translate military force into political results. The first operation failed to end the war or rebuild stable central authority. The new operation, meanwhile, faces an even more complex test: regaining the initiative amid entrenched Yemeni divisions, cross-border threats, and maritime routes that have become part of the calculations shaping the regional conflict.

If Yemen Dawn represents a genuine turning point, it will not be simply because a military operation has begun or a front line has advanced, but because the balance of power may change in a way that opens a political path that was previously unavailable. If, however, military objectives remain disconnected from a project of state-building, this new round may end up merely shifting the lines of confrontation without changing the nature of the crisis.

This is where the more difficult questions addressed in Part Two begin: what does Saudi Arabia really want from the new war? What are the limits of Iran’s role? Can Yemen’s competing factions build a political partnership that transcends their differences? And what course could lead to ending the war rather than perpetuating it through another round of fighting?