Palestinian Camps: The Risk of a Backlash Against the Governance Plan

The governance plan for Palestinian camps in Lebanon cannot be viewed as a conventional administrative or security project. It proposes a transformation in the nature of the relationship between the Lebanese state and Palestinian society, seeking to move from a reality marked by disorder, multiple centers of authority, and weapons beyond state control to one based on the rule of law, human security, and institutional partnership.

Yet, however important this transformation may be, it cannot be achieved merely by launching the plan or announcing agreement on its objectives. Interests and networks of influence have developed over many years amid the absence of unified authorities and the weakness of institutions. These networks may perceive the implementation of the plan as a direct threat to their sources of influence and privileges, making them likely to resist change or attempt to obstruct it.

Fundamental Red Lines

The first concern is the possibility of challenging the legitimacy of Lebanese state authority by rejecting the principle of extending state control over the camps or treating the state's monopoly on arms as an issue open to negotiation outside constitutional institutions. Palestinian camps are not areas beyond Lebanese sovereignty, nor can their historical and political particularities justify the continued existence of a security order parallel to that of the state.

The second concern relates to Palestinian positions that may reject the handover of weapons or the removal of armed manifestations, based on political or factional considerations or calculations related to the balance of power within the camps. Here, a distinction must be made between the right of Palestinians to preserve their national identity and representative institutions and the continued presence of armed formations outside the framework of the Lebanese state. The former is a right and a national necessity, while the latter raises questions concerning state sovereignty and the security of camp residents and their surrounding communities.

More dangerous than publicly declared positions, however, may be the networks that have accumulated financial, economic, and social interests through the persistence of lawlessness. The presence of weapons does not merely generate political and security influence. It can also give rise to networks involved in supplying weapons, financing armed groups, recruiting individuals, and providing services and benefits linked to the rentier economy that emerges in environments characterized by disorder and the absence of the rule of law.

Conflicts of Interest

These interests would be affected not only by the handover of weapons but also by the establishment of institutions capable of regulating resources and powers, and by the transfer of decision-making authority to legitimate bodies subject to accountability. Resistance to the plan may therefore not always take the form of direct political opposition. It may assume more complex forms, ranging from obstructing agreements, stirring fears, and fueling divisions to attempting to undermine trust between the Lebanese and Palestinian sides or portraying governance as an attack on Palestinian national existence and refugee rights.

It is essential to recognize that the plan does not target Palestinian society or its national identity, nor should it become a means of diminishing Palestinians' civil and social rights. On the contrary, its success requires freeing camp residents from the dominance of weapons and networks of vested interests, and providing them with safer and more dignified living conditions, while respecting the right of return and rejecting permanent resettlement.

This is where the responsibility of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the legitimate Palestinian leadership becomes particularly important in safeguarding this process, by unifying the Palestinian position, providing political backing for an understanding with the Lebanese state, and ensuring that the camps are not held hostage to factional rivalries or calculations tied to the interests of armed forces. The Lebanese state, for its part, is responsible for ensuring that its measures are balanced and that the extension of its authority is accompanied by improvements in rights, services, and institutions, so that addressing the security issue does not become a new source of tension.

The six-month consultation period should not be treated as a mere procedural deadline preceding the plan's approval, but as a political and social opportunity for dialogue and understanding, for broadening the basis of partnership between Lebanese and Palestinians, and for moving from a logic of confrontation to one of harmony and consensus. This requires involving camp residents, their institutions, and their social representatives, rather than reducing Palestinian representation solely to political forces and factions.

The risks facing the plan are real, but they do not mean that its implementation is impossible. The change that is so urgently needed will not come without resistance, particularly when it affects interests that emerged and persisted in the absence of the state and its institutions. Yet these risks cannot be addressed through isolated security measures, but rather by building a broad Lebanese-Palestinian consensus, protecting legitimate authority, providing guarantees of rights, and prosecuting networks of illicit interests in accordance with the law.

The success of the governance plan requires sustained political will and careful follow-up during and after the consultation period, leading to final government approval and then to effective implementation. The issue is not merely one of managing the camps, but of ending an exceptional situation that has lasted far too long and building a new relationship between the Lebanese state and Palestinian society, founded on sovereignty, the rule of law, partnership, and human dignity.

The real challenge lies not in announcing the plan, but in protecting its course from forces that may see its success as the end of their interests and influence, and in turning the next six months into an opportunity to consolidate consensus rather than a period in which change can be obstructed.