Will He Strike, or Won’t He?

No one could deny Donald Trump his glamour! He has a knack for breaking his promises and, in doing so, keeping his audience on tenterhooks. So many bombshell statements, obsolete the moment they were uttered! But isn’t sowing anxiety and uncertainty among opponents and allies alike simply smart politics? The American president had publicly declared that Iran would not be attacked before the midterms. No one believed him, and the mullahs remained on their guard. Well, too bad for them if he kept his word and they failed to trust him.

Two irons in the fire?

What better way to unsettle an enemy than to sow confusion in its mind, and what could be more exhausting than prolonging its anxious wait?

This is how Trump operates: hadn’t he told the Financial Times on November 4 that he had no “immediate plans” to strike the Islamic Republic, while making clear in the midst of the discussions that he was ready to go to war if circumstances demanded it? It’s hard to know where you stand with someone so erratic!

Indeed, the American president always keeps two irons in the fire, and who could blame him? A master of coercive diplomacy, he combines military threats, punctuated by limited strikes, with continued indirect negotiations, currently being actively conducted by Qatar.

And since everything is carefully choreographed under Washington’s watchful eye, the strikes carried out by US forces on November 2, 6 and 9 against Qeshm Island, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, did not trigger the escalation many had feared. Tehran’s only response was to put up a threatening billboard: “We will kill Trump.”

Better two Washingtons than one!

Admittedly, from January 2027, “behind the apparent unity of American power, two Washingtons will now confront each other” (1). On one side, a president determined to assert his own decidedly idiosyncratic views; on the other, a Congress intent on regaining control by scrutinizing, amending and reining in the White House’s decisions. In this confrontation, Trump will still be able to exercise his constitutional veto, while Democratic senators will be unable to overturn it, lacking the two-thirds majority needed to “override” the president’s decision. That is where dealmaking, negotiations and horse-trading between the two centers of power will come into play.

It is easy to imagine the president shifting his policy in Kyiv’s favor next year to win over a congressional majority that, in return, would give him a freer hand in Hormuz or elsewhere.

When the mullahs pin their hopes on Congress

But does this mean Iran is out of the woods, or that it has had a lucky escape? No, gentlemen ayatollahs: even after January 3, Donald Trump will retain most of his national security powers, including the authority to order military operations against Iran.

Congress will certainly prevent him from having a completely free hand and will obstruct his initiatives. But never, ever will it be able to take his place or strip him of the power to continue military offensives.

Until the US midterm elections, Iran played for time and dragged out the negotiations. It got what it wanted: Trump’s defeat on the domestic front was confirmed. Nevertheless, the mullahs cannot declare victory just yet. Their country is caught in a trap: the naval blockade is now compounded by Task Force Iron Gate’s land blockade. And, last but not least, Trump will be all the more ferocious because he blames the Iran war for his dismal failure at home.

In the realm of probabilities…

Will the American president wait until Eisenkot has formed his government before ordering strikes, given his apparent preference for a lightning campaign over being drawn into a war of attrition?

Indeed, Trump needs spectacular victories to restore his standing and hold his own against the Democratic majority in Congress. For now, however, no one can predict how events will unfold. Still, in such an uncertain situation, it is reasonable to distinguish between what is probable and what is possible.

On the one hand, a modest agreement could be reached. Its scope would be limited, however: while it might pave the way for a temporary easing of tensions, it would not resolve the nuclear issue, much less that of freedom of navigation through the straits. Equally probable is a scenario involving only a series of targeted strikes with no significant impact on the stability of the wilayat al-faqih regime—a scenario that would not necessarily trigger a wider conflagration.

On the other hand, turning now to what is possible, an Israeli-American blitzkrieg is conceivable if Tehran were to cross a nuclear or chemical threshold deemed unacceptable, especially since Tel Aviv has not abandoned its ambition to reshape the Middle East. But the greatest danger is a spiral of violence that could sweep aside every precaution taken. An incident could happen at any moment, prompting retaliation, which would provoke a counterattack, and so on.

A tactical pause? (2)

An armed truce does not mean abandoning an all-out offensive for good. For, as bears repeating, the parties to the conflict are trapped in a cycle of escalation and one-upmanship in which every operation invites a response from the other side!

The mullahs would therefore be wrong to count on congressional Democrats to get them out of this predicament. They would do better to swallow their pride and offer their adversary an honorable—that is, victorious—way out. To save their country, they will be forced to concede what they consider essential. Yet they know full well that doing so would mean signing their own death warrant!

1-Zvi Bar’el, “Strike or Deal? What the Midterms Mean for Iran and Trump’s Next Move”, Haaretz, November 5, 2026.

2- Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, recently said that military operations were no longer necessary. Should we believe him?