Judicial Independence in Lebanon

It is difficult to rebuild a state when citizens cannot be sure that the law applies equally to everyone. In Lebanon, the question of judicial independence is therefore far more than a debate for legal experts. It goes to the very nature of the state, public confidence in its institutions and, ultimately, our understanding of what equality among citizens.

The Lebanese Constitution established this principle long ago. Article 20 guarantees judges independence in the exercise of their functions. Yet there is a considerable gap between proclaiming a principle and putting it into practice through the day-to-day mechanisms that govern a judge’s career. Who appoints judges? Who transfers them? Who promotes them? Who inspects their work? Who imposes disciplinary sanctions? Who oversees the Public Prosecution? It is through these very practical questions that genuine judicial independence is determined.

A Long-Awaited Reform… Then Annulled

After years of debate, Parliament adopted a new law governing the organization of the ordinary courts on 31 July 2025, widely referred to as the Judicial Independence Law. The legislation marked a step forward: it gave judges a greater role in electing members of the Higher Judicial Council, expanded certain aspects of judicial self-governance and introduced new safeguards for judges.

Yet the law remained contentious. On 5 September 2025, President Joseph Aoun referred it back to Parliament. Among the objections was the authority granted to the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation to order the suspension of an ongoing prosecution. This provision was particularly sensitive: the judiciary may appear independent while remaining vulnerable if a higher-ranking judicial authority can halt a specific proceeding.

Parliament then reconsidered the text and adopted it again on 18 December 2025, removing the most controversial provision concerning the suspension of prosecutions. The legislation became Law No. 36 of 5 January 2026 and was published in the Official Gazette on 15 January.

Then came an almost paradoxical turn of events. On 25 February 2026, the Constitutional Council annulled the law in its entirety. Not because judicial independence was incompatible with the Constitution. Quite the contrary. The Council held that the Higher Judicial Council should have been consulted on the final version of the reform before it was adopted. In the Council’s view, this consultation was an essential procedural requirement stemming precisely from Article 20 and the principle of judicial independence.

The distinction is essential: Parliament is not bound to follow the opinion of the Higher Judicial Council, but it is required to seek it. In other words, Parliament retains its legislative authority, but it cannot fundamentally reorganize the judiciary without giving the institution concerned an opportunity to express its views.

Following the annulment, the legislative process resumed. The Higher Judicial Council was formally consulted and finalized its observations in the summer of 2026. This is therefore less a case of a reform’s definitive failure than an opportunity to take it forward on a firmer footing.

The Central Issue: Who Holds Power Over a Judge’s Career?

It is a common mistake to reduce judicial independence to preventing a minister or member of parliament from calling a judge. The most effective forms of influence are rarely so crude. They can be exerted much earlier in the process: through appointments, promotions and transfers, access to senior judicial positions or, conversely, the prospect of a career being stalled.

The annulled law itself illustrated this ambiguity. It strengthened the Higher Judicial Council but retained a role for the executive in appointing several of its ex officio members. For certain positions, the Council was required to put forward three candidates, from whom the Council of Ministers would select one. This represented a genuine improvement over the previous system, but the link with political power was not entirely severed.

The issue of judicial transfers is just as fundamental. Transferring a judge can be as effective a means of exerting influence as issuing a direct order. A judge who knows that a sensitive ruling could jeopardize a future posting is not in the same position as one who enjoys genuine security of tenure.

The Public Prosecution raises a particular difficulty. A prosecutor is not in the same position as a judge who sits in court and rules on cases: the Public Prosecution necessarily operates within a certain hierarchy. But that hierarchy must never become a means of shielding a particular individual or making an inconvenient case disappear.

The Opposite Extreme Must Also Be Avoided

It would nevertheless be dangerous to conclude that the solution is simply to hand all powers to judges. An independent judiciary must not become a closed professional body that selects its own members, manages its own careers, oversees its own disciplinary matters and is ultimately answerable to no one but itself.

The challenge, then, is to strike a balance: to ensure that judges are fully protected in the exercise of their judicial functions, while subjecting the judiciary as an institution to rules of transparency, professional competence, accountability and oversight. Independence does not mean impunity. And democratic oversight does not mean political subordination.

Ten Articles to Rebuild Judicial Independence

Article 1 – Judicial Independence

Judges shall perform their duties in full independence. In examining and deciding individual cases, they shall not receive instructions from any political, administrative, religious, judicial or private authority. Any attempt to interfere in an individual proceeding is prohibited and punishable by law.

Article 2 – Higher Judicial Council

The Higher Judicial Council shall consist of fifteen members: eight judges elected by their peers; two lawyers elected by the Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations; two law professors selected through a procedure organized among accredited law faculties; two independent figures elected by the Chamber of Deputies by a two-thirds majority; and the First President of the Court of Cassation.

Members shall serve a single, non-renewable term of six years. No government may remove a member before the expiry of their term, except pursuant to a final judicial or disciplinary decision.

Article 3 – Appointments and Promotions

All judicial positions subject to appointment or promotion shall be filled according to criteria published in advance, relating in particular to competence, integrity, experience, seniority, productivity and professional performance. The Higher Judicial Council shall give reasons for its choices. Appointment by decree shall be the formal act implementing the Council’s decision and shall not allow a different candidate to be substituted for the one selected in accordance with the legally prescribed procedure.

Article 4 – Security of Tenure

No judge may be transferred without their consent before completing five years in their assigned post, except in the case of an accepted promotion, an objectively justified reorganization of the judiciary or a final disciplinary sanction. Any such exception must be justified in writing and may be challenged before a court.

Article 5 – Autonomy of the Public Prosecution

The Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation may issue general guidelines on criminal policy. Any instruction concerning an individual case must be in writing, reasoned, entered into the case file and subject to review. No one may order the shelving, suspension or discontinuation of a prosecution for the purpose of protecting a particular individual.

Article 6 – Independent Judicial Inspection

The Judicial Inspection shall perform its duties independently of the Minister of Justice. It shall oversee the functioning of the courts, delays in proceedings, integrity, conflicts of interest and compliance with professional obligations. It may not impose disciplinary sanctions on a judge on the grounds of their interpretation of the law or assessment of the facts in a judicial decision, unless a separate disciplinary offence has been established.

Article 7 – Disciplinary Proceedings and Appeals

The authority responsible for investigating judicial misconduct shall be institutionally separate from the authority responsible for imposing sanctions. Judges shall be guaranteed the right to be heard, access to their case files, legal representation and the right to appeal before an independent judicial panel. Final disciplinary decisions shall be reasoned and made public, with due regard for privacy.

Article 8 – Budgetary Autonomy

The judiciary shall have its own dedicated budget. The Higher Judicial Council shall prepare the judicial budget proposal, which shall be incorporated into the draft state budget and submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for approval. Budgetary decisions and their implementation shall not be used to influence the handling of individual cases or the careers of judges.

Article 9 – Transparency and Asset Disclosure

Judges holding senior positions shall periodically declare their assets and interests, in accordance with the law. Any significant change in assets that is manifestly inconsistent with declared income may trigger an investigation by the competent authority, subject to the presumption of innocence and respect for the rights of the defense.

Article 10 – Merit Over Affiliation

No judicial appointment, assignment, promotion or transfer may be made conditional, directly or indirectly, on a judge’s sectarian or political affiliation, except where expressly required by the Constitution. Judicial positions shall be filled on the basis of the criteria of competence, integrity and experience established by law.

What This Framework Would Change

The proposed framework would not diminish Parliament’s powers. Parliament would retain its authority to pass laws and approve the budget. The government would continue to govern, and the president of the Republic would continue to exercise the powers conferred by the Constitution. But none of these authorities could turn judicial careers into instruments of reward, punishment or political bargaining.

The Higher Judicial Council, for its part, would acquire genuine autonomy without becoming an exclusively corporatist body: lawyers, academics and independent figures would also take part in its composition. The Judicial Inspection would conduct investigations, while a separate panel would rule on disciplinary matters, with the right of appeal preserved. Powers would thus be divided to prevent any single institution from simultaneously controlling judicial careers, investigations and sanctions.

Ultimately, the reform should help break with a deeply entrenched Lebanese practice: treating certain state positions as the preserve of particular sectarian communities or political factions. The judiciary cannot become genuinely independent if, whenever an important post falls vacant, the first question is still: which community or political camp is entitled to it? Judges must reclaim a simple institutional identity: they are not representatives of a community. They are judges for all.

A Matter of Foundations

Lebanon does not lack laws. What it often lacks are mechanisms capable of protecting the law from those who happen to wield power. That is precisely the role of an independent judiciary.

The events of 2025-2026 can be seen in a different light: not simply as a failure, but as a reminder. The Constitutional Council made clear that judicial independence cannot be built by disregarding the institutional safeguards that protect the judiciary itself. It is now up to the legislature to go further, addressing not only the procedural flaw but also the structural dependencies that remain.

The judiciary must be independent of political power, without itself becoming a power beyond oversight.

Only then will Article 20 of the Constitution cease to be a promise and become an institutional reality. This may well be one of the essential foundations on which the Lebanese state can be rebuilt.

References

– Lebanese Constitutional Council, Decision No. 1/2026 of 25 February 2026, concerning Law No. 36 of 5 January 2026 on the organization of the ordinary courts.

– Law No. 36 of 5 January 2026 on the organization of the ordinary courts, Official Gazette, No. 3, 15 January 2026.

– National Human Rights Commission – Lebanon, Annual Report 2025, section “Independence of the Judiciary.”

– Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026 – Lebanon, section “Judicial Independence.”

– L’Orient Today, February 25, 2026, “Constitutional Council Overturns Law on Judicial Independence”; July 3, 2026, “Judicial Independence Bill: Higher Judicial Council Finalizes Its Comments.”

Bernard Raymond Jabre is a Financial Analyst and a Cycles Specialist.

bjabre@aleph.bz