Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (11)

This series of articles aims to provide a clearer understanding of the current situation on the Lebanese scene in light of the past, setting aside passionate, ideological, or romanticized narratives that miss the realities on the ground, leaving readers to draw their own conclusions.

The previous ten installments examined a reinterpretation of events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through the Israeli army's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, up to the 2006 war and its aftermath.

The deployment of the Lebanese army — known internationally as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) — then under the command of General Michel Sleiman, to southern Lebanon was ordered by Fouad Siniora's government on August 16, 2006. This deployment, the first since 1968, was immediately launched at dawn on August 17 with the crossing of the Litani River via military Bailey bridges and improvised crossings, as the permanent bridges had been destroyed by Israeli bombardments.

Although the LAF were far less equipped than they are today and had significantly fewer troops, this rapid deployment marked a historic turning point by restoring, for the first time since 1968, a state military presence south of the Litani — territory that had been under Hezbollah's control since 2000. Approved by the Council of Ministers on August 7 and framed within UN Resolution 1701, the operation called for a maximum force of 15,000 soldiers supported by UNIFIL, which was itself reinforced and expanded from 4,000 to 15,000 personnel.

Deployment Details

The LAF quickly deployed an initial contingent of 9,500 troops south of the Litani within the first few weeks. Due to a shortage of active personnel, 5,000 reservists were called up to fill the gap.

The deployed forces consisted of four infantry brigades — namely the 6th^th, 10th^th, 11th^th and 12th^th brigades — initially reinforced and supported by the commando regiment, independent regiments, and engineer regiment detachments.

The initial maneuver phase of the deployment included the progressive securing of main road arteries and key towns, notably Marjayoun, Tyre, Nabatiyeh, and Bint Jbeil, on a tight schedule. The crossing of the Litani and the initial establishment of tactical positions took place on August 17, followed by a gradual takeover of major traffic hubs that continued through the end of August.

The deployment was officially completed on October 1, 2006, coinciding with the near-total withdrawal of Israeli forces, with the exception of the disputed area of Ghajar — a Syrian village in the occupied Golan Heights whose residents are either Syrian nationals or stateless individuals with no recognized identity, and who have illegally extended their village into Lebanese territory since 1975.

This Israeli withdrawal was the second following that of the year 2000. On a structural level, the Lebanese army established a dedicated command for the area south of the Litani — something that had not existed before August 2006 — with its headquarters initially based in Tyre before being relocated to the Marjayoun barracks, overseeing tactical planning, logistics, and the local chain of command.

Operational cooperation was closely synchronized with UNIFIL, with LAF units moving into specific positions as the Blue Helmets confirmed Israeli withdrawal from those points.

Logistical and security missions were intensive: engineer units deployed Bailey bridges supplied by the United Kingdom to cross the Litani, cleared road axes of mines, disposed of unexploded ordnance, and secured approach routes, while dozens of fixed and mobile checkpoints were established on all roads leading to the south to control the flow of vehicles and people. fournis par le Royaume Uni pour franchir le Litani, procédé au déminage des axes routiers, traité les munitions non explosées et sécurisé les approches, tandis que des dizaines de check-points fixes et mobiles ont été implantés sur tous les itinéraires menant au Sud pour contrôler les flux de véhicules et de personnes.

The stated political and operational objective was clear: to restore and assert Lebanese state sovereignty over the area, prohibit any parallel authority, and proceed, in accordance with the mandate, to seize illegal or openly visible weapons south of the Litani River.

This mission generated considerable hope, but also foreshadowed anticipated tensions on the ground regarding the status of Hezbollah's weapons and the effective implementation of the state's monopoly on arms.

The compromise between the State and Hezbollah, and the role of Émile Lahoud

As far back as the 1990s, first as commander-in-chief of the army and later as president of the republic until 2006, Émile Lahoud played a central role in shielding Hezbollah's arsenal, acting as the movement's primary institutional, military, and legal guarantor against disarmament, and framing its illegal weapons—by any measure—as a complement to the supposedly limited capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

When the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1559 in 2004, demanding the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, including the pro-Iranian one, Émile Lahoud erected an institutional shield against any enforcement targeting Hezbollah.

Leveraging his presidential mandate—extended solely by the will of Syrian diktat—and faced with the impossibility of finding a legal status for Hezbollah, Lahoud used his platform to declare that the resolution did not apply to the pro-Iranian party, describing it as a "national liberation movement" and a "resistance" rather than a militia, thereby granting it a degree of legitimacy.

This stance blocked administrative and military attempts to catalogue or seize Hezbollah's weapons, and prevented any coercive implementation of its disarmament.

During the July 2006 war and the government deliberations surrounding Resolution 1701, Lahoud positioned himself as the unyielding defender of Hezbollah's strategic interests at the highest level of the state—even though the government in power at the time was historic: it was the first to be formed after the end of 30 years of Syrian occupation of Lebanon, and the first to include both Hezbollah ministers and ministers openly hostile to Syria, making it a national unity government.

The prime minister was Fouad Siniora, from the sovereignist March 14 coalition, which held a majority of the 24 ministerial posts. The government also included five ministers from the Hezbollah-Amal coalition led by Nabih Berri, along with other ministers aligned with Émile Lahoud.

During the tense cabinet sessions of August 2006, when the government majority sought a clear mandate for the army to confiscate weapons south of the Litani, Lahoud drew an absolute red line.

Under his pressure, relayed by his allied ministers and the five Hezbollah-Amal coalition ministers, the government endorsed an operational compromise dubbed the "doctrine of invisibility."

Under this doctrine, the army could deploy to the South but would not conduct systematic searches of private property or carry out forced disarmament as long as weapons were not openly displayed in public.

This effectively undermined the implementation of Resolution 1701 from the very outset, sowing the seeds of the conflict to come.

In his capacity as president and supreme commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Lahoud ensured that the orders transmitted to the army commander-in-chief, General Michel Sleiman, included no mission to seize weapons caches—thereby guaranteeing that Hezbollah's military infrastructure, much of it underground or concealed, remained intact.

Backed by Syrian influence — still significant in Lebanon despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory — Émile Lahoud provided Hezbollah with a "state umbrella" that offered not only political protection but also rhetorical cover.

Lahoud used his power to block institutional processes, allowing the pro-Iranian party to first preserve, and then throughout the following decade, consolidate and expand its arsenal without fear of intervention by the Lebanese security apparatus.

This strategy had the lasting effect of entrenching Hezbollah's role, under the guise of national defense rhetoric and the preservation of its illegal arsenal, which came to be seen as an accepted — if not legitimized — feature of Lebanon's strategic landscape.

Read more on this topic:

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war in whose interest? (10)

Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (9)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (8)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (7)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (6)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (5)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (4)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (3)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (2)

Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (1)