State Inaction Is Tantamount to Suicide
For the past week, a new war – the fifth in 34 years – has pitted Israel against Hezbollah. It is yet another war that the Lebanese people never wanted. All the agreements that ended the previous four wars proved to be little more than temporary truces, exploited by Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand and by Israel on the other to prepare for the next round of fighting. All of this unfolded under the watchful eye of the Assad regimes, father and son, and of Lebanese presidents and governments beholden to Damascus or Tehran, particularly during the tenures of Hraoui, Lahoud, and Michel Aoun.
The costs of these wars have been paid dearly, willingly by Hezbollah’s unconditional supporters, under the numbing effect of ideology; reluctantly by other Lebanese; and by Arab countries that financed reconstruction for both humanitarian and geopolitical reasons. The same scenario has therefore repeated itself for four decades: war, ceasefire, rhetoric of victory, the deterioration of Lebanon’s political authority, Hezbollah’s preparations for endless wars, mutual deception, and then war again. A proverb drawn from popular wisdom says that “a donkey does not stumble twice on the same stone.”
It is clear that President Joseph Aoun–who, under Article 49 of the Constitution, also serves as the supreme commander of the armed forces–and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and his government, who appoint not only the army commander but also all senior officers in the military and security institutions, constitute the first executive authority since 1990 to benefit from regional and international conditions conductive to reclaiming the sovereignty lost since 1968. They also enjoy unprecedented domestic support, as well as tangible Arab and international opportunities.
In November 2024, after 13 months of war, Hezbollah was the party seeking a ceasefire with Israel, with Nabih Berri leading the negotiations. The Mikati government agreed to the ceasefire only after being “authorized” to do so by Hezbollah. Thus, the very party requesting the ceasefire subtly portrayed itself as having accepted it magnanimously–while proclaiming victory and orchestrating a staggering campaign of denial. For the past 15 months, the new president, the prime minister, and members of the government have been manipulated by Hezbollah–either knowingly or through a disarming display of incapacity. From the outset, Hezbollah has renounced its commitments to implement Resolution 1701, with the backing of Nabih Berri.
The “divine party” used these fifteen months to reorganize itself with the help of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, under the watchful–or willfully blind–eye of the executive branch, without any mitigating circumstances. It exploited the blindness and short-sightedness of the sovereigntist parties, who were too preoccupied with legislative elections and competing over the division of parliamentary seats–seats that, in any case, made little difference in the face of strategic events, as demonstrated by the notably “brilliant” absence of the parliamentary Defense Committee.
This reorganization of the “Party of God” is now on full display, as if time has stood still since November 27, 2024. Our army suffers the consequences of the government’s inaction–or, one might say, the complicity of a significant part of the executive branch with Hezbollah–putting its credibility squarely at risk. The forceful decisions aimed at disarming Hezbollah, taken in August 2025, eight months after President J. Aoun’s inauguration and following the Salam government’s vote of confidence, gradually unraveled in the face of Hezbollah’s favorite pastime: patient and cunning tergiversation.
The army took time to present its plan for southern Litani, and its implementation dragged on. Today, all of this lies completely discredited, with the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Litani having returned to the status quo. In this context, a pressing question emerges: the president and the Council of Ministers had approved both the plan and its execution in southern Litani, raising no objections or comments on the timeline–despite clear warnings from international bodies regarding Hezbollah’s reorganization and Israel’s impatience. Yet willful deafness prevailed.
Obviously, the plan for northern Litani has become a complete joke–unless a miracle occurs. In this situation, who is to blame? The president? The prime minister? The government? The executive branch as a whole? Our army? It must be emphasized that the executive holds full authority over the armed forces. Yet the unfortunate custom in Lebanon since 1968 has been to make the troops bear the consequences of the executive’s inaction and political deadlocks. In 1973, after clashes between our army and the PLO in Saida, the officers responsible for southern Lebanon were transferred. In 1975, the executive’s inaction and the slide toward internal war led to the replacement of the army’s chief of staff, General Iskandar Ghanem. In 1984, fighting between our army on one side and the militias of the Amal Movement, the PSP, the PLA (Palestine Liberation Army), and the Syrian occupation forces on the other led to the dismissal of the army’s chief of staff, General Ibrahim Tannous…
Returning to our current situation, which bears no resemblance to previous ones, a vertical divide now separates Hezbollah and its supporters on one side, and all other Lebanese on the other, with Nabih Berri and his Amal Movement caught in evasive maneuvering. Two options present themselves: traditional inaction, or its opposite. In the case of inaction, the executive and legislative branches would become mere decoration, with nothing left to negotiate with Arab or international bodies–let alone with Israel. Conversely, if the executive chooses to act, unanimous Arab support is almost certain, regardless of the decision, especially given that Iran is currently attacking Arab countries strategically. European and American backing would also likely be assured–a rare occurrence, given that divisions between Washington and the EU are felt everywhere, except on Lebanon.
When the executive acts unambiguously, and when the president fulfills his role as supreme commander of the armed forces–taking matters into its own hands through the Higher Defense Council and supervising the troops’ every action on a daily basis–the forces will perform, as they have consistently done since 2000. When the troops’ mission is politically secured, even without full consensus, the results will almost certainly be tangible. As for the parliamentary Defense Committee, it could at least, even without unanimity, hold both the executive and the military accountable, ensuring that those responsible are made to answer for their actions.
Action, even with its uncertainties, is far less risky than inaction–especially when the region’s dinosaurs are at war. During World War II, Switzerland, although neutral and largely Germanophile, declared general mobilization, prevented Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy from using its territory or communicating through it, and established a military strategy to defend the mountain stronghold at the heart of the country. A similar strategy is certainly feasible in Lebanon, and without question, it is the executive–not the military–that must take responsibility for it. On this point, I quote Georges Clémenceau, physician and journalist, nicknamed “The Tiger,” Prime Minister and architect of France’s victory in World War I: “War is too important a matter to be entrusted to the military!”