A Political and Military Memo
For some time now, a significant portion of public opinion has been accusing the army – and/or its commander-in-chief – of failing in its duty, if not outright mutinying against the government that tasked it with dismantling Hezbollah’s military arsenal.
The Lebanese Army has thus become a favorite target for certain journalists, bloggers, and social media activists, even as it is admired – and nearly deified – by their counterparts in the opposing camp. The absurdity – and the sheer inadmissibility – of the situation lies in the fact that today’s admirers were yesterday’s fiercest critics, blaming the army for every ill. They accused it of “collaboration” with American “imperialism” – a clichéd label casually affixed by just about anyone to whatever they happen to dislike – in reference to military cooperation between Lebanon and the United States, even though, without American assistance, our army would have been rendered inoperative, given the paltry defense budget.
These neo-admirers of the military institution now join the ranks of its perennial devotees, who smother the troops in their embrace. Those who discredit the army under all circumstances – and they are many – claim it has never protected them, overlooking a century-long record of sacrifice, particularly since the 1960s. To be sure, they sometimes invoke valid arguments, pointing to the public conduct of certain service members, the televised appearances of some retirees, and other criticism. They focus on minutiae while deliberately overlooking the essential.
All of this has turned the Lebanese army into a subject of media spectacle, which is harmful in every respect. Certainly, reform in security and defense is necessary, but such a task falls within the remit of the legislative authorities, who are competent in the matter.
Our army should not meddle in politics. Yet, national deadlocks and the failures of the political authorities have placed it squarely at the center of public attention. Thus, since 1958 – and following the mini-civil war of that year – the military has been thrust onto the political stage, for which it was wholly unprepared. Few of its members ever truly adapt.
Back to the army’s operational aspect, it receives – in addition to American military aid – further support from various European and Arab countries. Iran – so cherished by Hezbollah, its unconditional allies, and its seasonal supporters (elections oblige) – has never seriously offered assistance to our military institution, despite a doctrine that emphasizes defending the country against any aggression, including from Israel. Tehran has provided only superficial military aid to the army, reserving its substantial support for Hezbollah, notably next-generation of anti-tank missiles, drones, and other weaponry of all kinds, in addition to financial assistance.
The military institution has not maintained an effective presence in southern Lebanon since 1975 – a vacuum that has led to the current situation. This absence was largely dictated by the Syrian occupation, particularly from 1990 onward. Since that year, the presidents installed at Baabda were under Damascus’s sway, which forbade them from asserting national sovereignty in the South. President Émile Lahoud, whose friendship with his Syrian counterpart, Hafez Assad, was close, carefully ensured through successive governments that the regular forces did not deploy southwards following Israel’s total withdrawal on 25 May 2000. The pretext was that the Shebaa Farms remained occupied, and that our army should not act as Israel’s border guard. In doing so, he facilitated Hezbollah’s deployment in the region, under the guise of liberating these farms – a move that cost us the devastating 2006 war and the now-famous words of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: “If only I had known.” A year later, the Fatah al-Islam organization – an Al-Qaeda offshoot – occupied the Nahr El-Bared Palestinian camp north of Tripoli, plotting to establish an Islamic emirate in northern Lebanon loyal to Osama bin Laden.
When the army confronted Fatah al-Islam – which had planted a bomb on a bus in Ain-Alak, in northern Metn, killing civilians, conducted bank heists, and killed 29 of our soldiers within a single hour, Hassan Nasrallah declared, verbatim: “The Palestinian camps are a red line.”
At the time, however, the army defied this ultimatum and defeated the terrorist organization at the cost of 170 martyrs. Simultaneously, Hezbollah was besieging the Serail and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora through a sit-in that had dragged on for months – a clear attempt at a palace coup.
Later, in 2008, the political deadlock propelled General Michel Sleiman to the presidency. He completed his term while being blamed for every ill by Hezbollah. Unlike his predecessor, Sleiman had refused to submit – and, most significantly, had developed a defense strategy aimed at restoring the state’s sovereignty, a deadly sin in the eyes of the militia, as it could have threatened its very existence.
In 2016, after reaching an agreement with the sovereigntists, Hezbollah and its allies installed Michel Aoun at Baabda. From the very start of his mandate, Aoun ensured that the development of a defense strategy – one that his predecessor Michel Sleiman had put on the table – was blocked, claiming that strategies are fluid and that drafting one would be a futile exercise.
He subsequently declared on several occasions that the army was incapable of defending the country. When, during the summer of 2017, the troops locked horns with the Islamic State (ISIS) in the Battle of Fajr al-Jurud – emerging victorious and preparing to launch the final assault against the group – total victory was aborted on President Aoun’s orders. ISIS fighters were evacuated by bus to Syria following an arrangement between Hezbollah and the Islamic State. A month later, in October 2017, Michel Aoun – a steadfast ally of Hezbollah, and almost certainly at its behest – told the press: “Lebanon’s economic situation does not allow for equipping the army, and there are reasons why weapons cannot be exclusively in its hands,” adding that “a solution in the Middle East will lead to a settlement of Hezbollah’s weapons issue.”
At present, the government has taken commendable positions regarding the restoration of sovereignty. However, the troops are not executing them, as such a mission requires constant oversight by the executive – a factor that remains absent. The executive dithers or proposes obsolete initiatives.
In conclusion, everyone wants the army’s mission to align with their own desires, using it as media fodder – positively or negatively – to boost their own notoriety. The true party to be held accountable remains the executive branch, encompassing both the Council of Ministers and the President, as well as Parliament – provided its Speaker, Nabih Berri, allows it, and respects the separation of powers. Montesquieu must be turning in his grave.