Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (5)
This series of articles will allow for a better understanding of the current situation in light of the past, moving beyond impassioned, ideological, or romanticized rhetoric that misses the mark, leaving the reader to draw their own conclusions. Furthermore, it is high time to seriously counter the sterile rhetoric of resistance, not with counter-rhetoric, but with serious work by promoting the rule of law, which can only be established through sovereignty.
In the previous four installments, we revisited the events that shaped Hezbollah’s rise following the Taif Agreement, its first two wars with Israel, and the grinding war of attrition it has waged for more than a decade.
Stage 7: Hezbollah-Israel Talks in Berlin
Following German mediation with Iran, at the request of Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, Hezbollah and Israel entered into indirect talks in Berlin over a possible Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The first round took place on March 1 and 2, 2000, followed by a second on March 7. German mediators shuttled between the two delegations.
The Israeli delegation was headed by Uri Lubrani, then Israel’s coordinator of operations in Lebanon. Acting on Barak’s instructions, Lubrani agreed during the second round of negotiations to meet all of Hezbollah’s demands: the Israeli army would carry out an unconditional withdrawal, and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) would be left to its fate. In return, Hezbollah would take control of the border area and ensure calm along it.
Washington and Tehran – both represented at the talks by senior envoys – endorsed the arrangement, as did France, which was informed at a later stage. According to Yossef Bodansky(1), the Iranian representative at the negotiations initially refused to believe the extent of the Israeli concessions until they were confirmed by the German mediators.
Still according to Bodansky, who recounts the episode in his book The High Cost of Peace, Barak and Lubrani kept the agreement reached with Hezbollah secret for two months, informing the Israeli military only on the eve of the withdrawal. The SLA, likewise kept in the dark, was coordinating troop rotations with the Israeli army in the security zone, under the assumption that General Antoine Lahd’s(2) forces would eventually take over positions there. Lahd himself, having been told that the withdrawal would take place in July 2000, as publicly state by Barak, was making preparations accordingly. He had obtained assurances of financial and logistical support from Tel Aviv, as well as promises of air cover after the withdrawal.
Until May 23, the day before Israeli troops pulled out, Barak continued to maneuver carefully to keep the SLA entirely unaware of the Berlin agreement.
He was determined to fulfill his campaign promises and extricate Israel from the Lebanese quagmire without facing domestic pressure or appeals from Lahd, above all in order to negotiate a peace agreement with Syria without the burden of military pressure in South Lebanon. By that stage, Hezbollah’s military capabilities had been significantly strengthened through weapons shipments from Tehran via Syria. Israel, reassured by this arrangement, appeared prepared to leave the security zone in Hezbollah’s hands, convinced the group would maintain calm along the border.
Syria, however, found itself deprived of a key instrument of pressure on Israel, while Lebanon remained the principal loser. The real beneficiary was, in fact, Iran, which had just secured a powerful lever in Lebanon and even in Syria. Washington and Tel Aviv seemed to have accepted the existence of the mullahs’ regime, judging that the risks, whatever they might be, would be reduced following Israel’s withdrawal.
Washington failed to perceive that this regime, still reeling from its eight-year war of attrition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, remained capable of disseminating its ideology among the region’s minorities – not only to consolidate its influence there, but also to sustain internal tensions, divert these states’ attention from their domestic challenges, and, above all, prevent the re-emergence of a strong Iraq on Iran’s doorstep.
Moreover, in order to further polarize an Arab world moving tentatively toward peace with Israel, the mullahs sought to derail that process by inflaming already existing anti-Israeli sentiment. Their ambition was to assume leadership of the fight against the Jewish state through Hezbollah, Hamas, and Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, to reinforce Iran’s role as an indispensable regional power, and to ensure the survival of their own regime.
Israeli-Syrian peace talks ultimately collapsed on March 26, three weeks after the Berlin agreement, following the failure of the Geneva meeting between Hafez al-Assad and U.S. President Bill Clinton, who proved unable to bridge the gap between Damascus and Tel Aviv.
Stage 8: May 24, 2000 – Israel’s Complete Withdrawal from South Lebanon
The withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon took place in a rushed and almost chaotic manner, the order to pull out having been issued only the day before. On the night of May 23–24, 2000, Israeli forces unilaterally evacuated South Lebanon.
Domestically in Israel, the end of the occupation brought an end to daily casualties, but in much of the world – and particularly in Lebanon – the departure was widely perceived as a victory for Hezbollah. From that point on, Iran found itself endowed with a direct line of confrontation with Israeli territory through Hezbollah, while also gaining near-direct influence over Lebanon’s internal affairs.
Contrary to the initial fears sparked by a statement by former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who had threatened to “kill the members of the SLA in their beds,” the Israeli withdrawal was not followed by a campaign of violent reprisals by Hezbollah against civilians in the former security zone. However, some properties belonging to SLA members were looted or taken over, including General Lahd’s residence. In parallel, Hezbollah and Amal Movement officials met with Christian religious leaders in South Lebanon to reassure them that the “victory” belonged to all Lebanese, not to a single faction. This initiative formed part of a broader strategy of calculated restraint, adopted by Hezbollah to refine its public image and strengthen its national legitimacy.
The Fate of the SLA’s Men
When the Israeli army withdrew, around 7,000 members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and their families fled to Israel, fearing reprisals. Some later emigrated to Canada, the United States, and Europe. Others eventually returned to Lebanon, including roughly 2,700 who were tried on charges of collaboration, despite the fact that the SLA had originally emerged from the ranks of the legitimate Lebanese army.
This force had originally been established under an official directive issued in 1976, with the mission of securing part of the border area against armed Palestinian organizations. Cut off from its command structure and later backed by Israel, it gradually evolved into an autonomous force, first adopting the name “Free Lebanon Army” before becoming the South Lebanon Army.
The prison sentences handed down to those who returned ranged from several months to three years behind bars. These Lebanese believed they had been legitimately defending their land and their communities. Under Lebanese law, however, they were deemed collaborators, while for Hezbollah they were viewed as agents of Israel.
An estimated 3,500 former SLA members still live in Israel. Officially registered as “Lebanese” in Israel, they were granted Israeli citizenship in 2004. All still have relatives in Lebanon, most of them in villages located only a few kilometers from the border. (to be continued)
(1) American political scientist and author. He served as director of the United States House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare from 1988 to 2004 and authored several books on the Middle East.
(2) Commander of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) at the time and former general in the Lebanese army.
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Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4)
Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3)