Mexico: after the Elimination of El Mencho, the Calm Before the Storm?

The Mexican army has killed Nemesio Oseguera “El Mencho”, leader of the Jalisco Cartel and Mexico’s most powerful drug trafficker, wanted by the United States with a $15 million reward.

Analysis with Dr. Edgar Guerra, jurist Emiliano Alba, and Levant Time correspondents, Maxime Pluvinet and Miroslava Salazar.

The Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection Omar García Harfouch (of Lebanese origin), accompanied by Claudia Sheinbaum, President of Mexico, during a press conference following the death of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho”, leader of the Jalisco cartel. (Gerardo Vieyra/NurPhoto via AFP)

Sunday, February 22, 2026: Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho”, leader of the Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Cartel, was killed by the Mexican army. The cartel's retaliation was almost immediate: roadblocks, vehicle fires, and acts of violence in the state of Jalisco as well as in several other regions of the country.

According to mapping carried out by the Dataint platform, violent events were recorded in at least 22 states, with a particularly marked impact in Jalisco, Puebla, Michoacán, Tamaulipas, and Baja California. The reaction following the operation highlighted the cartel's true scale in many regions: its territorial control, its presence in both legal and illegal economies, and, above all, the solidity of its organizational structure and its capacity for immediate mobilization.

This turning point can be compared to the arrest of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, which occurred on the same day twelve years earlier.

“This is undoubtedly the most significant blow dealt to organized crime under President Claudia Sheinbaum's administration,” states Edgar Guerra, a specialist in organized crime, violence, and security, in an interview with Levant Time.

The hundred-headed hydra

The operation that led to the death of “El Mencho” is a double-edged sword. As Emiliano Alba, security and organized crime analyst, points out, in the short term, Claudia Sheinbaum's government can politically capitalize on this event as a victory in the fight against drug trafficking, thus sending a message to national public opinion and the United States: “Something has been done.”

However, the structural effects are of a different nature. “Concretely, we will witness a new reorganization within the cartel. Violent internal conflicts for succession are to be expected,” explains Alba.

Nemesio Oseguera held a central position within the CJNG and had no clearly designated successor. For Alba, the leader's fall represents a conjunctural vulnerability, but not a structural collapse. “It is a temporary operational weakness, but the organization remains,” he insists, recalling that the CJNG does not rely solely on a central figure, but on a consolidated apparatus, with territorial, financial, and political networks ensuring its continuity.

The analyst emphasizes that historical experience shows that the strategy of “decapitation” of criminal organizations often produces counterproductive effects: “Cutting off the hydra's head makes others emerge.” Fragmentation, territorial struggles, and violence related to succession are well-known dynamics in Mexico.

This observation is all the more relevant given that, according to Alba, the strategy of the Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection, Omar García Harfuch, had progressively moved away from targeted elimination of leaders to prioritize the dismantling of structures. “It was no longer about beheading cartels, but about attacking their political, financial, and territorial networks,” he specifies, referring to operations like Enjambre, targeting political alliances and institutional protection networks.

Two scenarios emerge: either the CJNG continues its activities without its leader, or it descends into an internal war for control of power. In the latter case, the impact on public security would be direct. “We would see an increase in homicides,” warns specialist David Saucedo to AFP.

The United States: the troublesome neighbor

For Edgar Guerra, the international context is crucial. “One cannot understand the security policy of Claudia Sheinbaum's government without considering the pressure exerted by the United States. The Donald Trump administration exerted strong pressure on Mexico: fentanyl seizures, increased migration control, reinforced operational requirements. All of this is part of the same set of demands.”

The Mexican government has also confirmed that the operation benefited from American intelligence support.

“This is not just a Mexican or Jalisco problem. It is a global problem,” emphasizes Guerra.

He adds: “The United States is among the main consumers of illicit drugs and one of the main producers of weapons. This fuels the economic and material incentives for drug trafficking. It is therefore a shared problem, but with clear structural responsibility on the American side.”

A never-ending war

The “war on drugs” is not new in Mexico. From Felipe Calderón's mandate to those that followed, direct confrontation with cartels has been a constant for almost twenty years. However, far from sustainably reducing violence, the country has gone through repeated cycles of criminal fragmentation, territorial recomposition, and expansion of illicit economies.

According to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 33,241 homicides were recorded in 2024, 71.8% of which were by firearms. Under Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), 122,462 assassinations were counted; under Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), 157,158; and under Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), 202,336.

Faced with this reality, Alba believes that an exclusively confrontation-based approach is insufficient. “Strategies against organized crime must be comprehensive. It’s not just about fighting organizations, but about restoring state authority in these territories and ensuring the safety of the population. This goes far beyond the use of force.”

Guerra shares this diagnosis: the problem is deeply institutional. “Politicians and local and regional officials protect these groups and have allowed their consolidation. Dismantling these protection networks will be essential.” To this is added a key factor: impunity. “Organized crime thrives in Mexico because impunity is structural. Without it, these organizations could not be sustained.”

In this context, the death of “El Mencho” does not constitute a decisive break, but a new stage in a prolonged conflict. More than an end, it marks the beginning of an internal recomposition often synonymous with increased violence.

As Alba summarizes: “We might witness a moment of calm, like a lull in the eye of the storm, but only in the short term. Then will come the reorganization.”

Thus, what appears today as a political victory could herald a new phase of violent reconfiguration. The question is no longer whether there will be consequences, but which ones, where, and with what intensity. For millions of Mexicans, the doubt remains: is this the peace before the storm?