War in Iran: State of Play

In which direction is the war between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other, heading? This is a question that arises daily since the start of military operations, and to which many analysts and politicians, playing the soothsayers, have already hastily responded with certainty. However, it would be necessary to acquire a set of concrete data, difficult to obtain, in order to have precise answers to this question. It must be noted in this context that one often takes one's desires for realities, and analysts sometimes describe their own thoughts rather than analyzing tangible facts.

Military intelligence, whether American, Israeli, Iranian, or even Russian and Chinese, are the only ones capable of defining the situation of each party on the ground, knowing that in the past they have sometimes made serious errors of judgment. The set of data that must be acquired to evaluate the state of each belligerent as precisely as possible is innumerable, including: its exact losses; its ammunition stock for each piece of equipment; its battle plan and its flexibility; the course of its military action; the performance of each of its units engaged on the ground; the availability of its reserve combat units; the state of mind of its decision-makers at the senior military and political level; its economic and financial situation sector by sector; its dependence in terms of supply lines, or conversely its independence in terms of resources (human, agricultural, energy, industrial, financial, military…); its resilience; its sociopolitical situation and internal pressures; its will to continue the fight; its state of fatigue and its ability to carry out military and political maneuvers.

Dynamic data

The collection of all this information will always remain incomplete and will require the skillful use of artificial intelligence to draw credible conclusions. The fact remains that prudence is essential in terms of judgment and recommendations presented to decision-makers, whether they are called Trump, Netanyahu, or Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf. Each of them is surrounded by experts, but each also exercises their leadership within limits that cannot always be foreseen.

It should also be noted that these data are dynamic and subject to hour-by-hour changes. It is therefore difficult to draw a complete picture of the situation and to make precise forecasts. Gaps could be filled by the analyst's imagination, which itself depends on their experience, level of expertise, ideological tendency, and political affiliation. The analyst therefore risks having flaws in their estimations. Only those with enough experience and culture could issue a credible opinion, often characterized by prudence and modesty, neither overestimating nor underestimating the capabilities of one or the other belligerent.

Furthermore, recourse to the lessons of history could be useful. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (March 1954) is an example, knowing full well that it took place in a totally different context. The Communist Vietnamese had taken the French military base of Dien Bien Phu, which was a humiliating defeat for France. It was well known that Dien Bien Phu would have been saved, and Ho Chi Minh's Vietnamese defeated, had the United States intervened with its air force for one or two days, but Eisenhower believed that such an action would have pushed China to intervene as it did in Korea four years earlier. Moreover, he knew that the communists ideologically controlled the Vietnamese populations and also controlled the countryside. As a result, the war would have dragged on despite his intervention.

Fundamental questions

Based on this example, the following facts could be noted concerning the present case: the American-Israeli military superiority is undeniable; neither the Russians nor the Chinese will intervene alongside Iran; the Americans are setting up an international coalition to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz to reduce pressure on the global economy, despite European discontent; moreover, the Tehran regime does not control all its populations, much less the northern and southern rural areas of the country. In return, the unpopularity of the war in the United States risks compromising the second part of Trump's mandate.

The Iranian regime appears resilient, though unpopular, and press reports indicate that a sense of national belonging among Iranians maintains a minimum of cohesion under bombings. All this available data necessitates caution in evaluations. Furthermore, many questions remain without precise answers, except perhaps among military intelligence services, notably: what remains of the Iranians' asymmetric military capabilities? To what extent can these means still be harmful, however minimal they may be? Are the Russians and Chinese helping the Iranians or not? If so, what is the volume and quality of this aid, and its effectiveness in prolonging the conflict? Is time working against the Iranians, the Americans, or both? What is the true state of mind of the Pasdaran and the mullahs, and of the American command? Where does the will to fight stand in both camps? What about the weight of internal pressures on decision-makers in each of the two camps? …

Uncertainties are numerous. However, the following can be stated: the minimum expectation is that the Iranian regime will certainly be deprived of the resources it had for its regional expansion, which would considerably diminish its capacity for harm, and for a long time. At best, Tehran would change its attitude, hand over radioactive uranium to the International Atomic Energy Agency, cease its support for its regional instruments, and agree to limit its drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles.

The fall of the regime is not predictable at the current stage. Between these extreme expectations lie many eventualities, including the fragmentation of Iran into ethnic entities against a backdrop of instability and/or civil war, with spillover into neighboring countries.

One could therefore write whole pages on this in the absence of complete and precise data, however, the Arab world and ourselves will certainly have better days.