Prospects of escalation in Iran: all indicators are red

The week that has just passed in the Middle East has been a crescendo of rhetoric and military action, culminating this Monday, April 6, in the end of the ultimatum issued by Donald Trump to the mullahs' regime, with the White House chief threatening to “annihilate” Iran's energy facilities. A week during which the American president was anything but stingy with declarations, the apotheosis having been reached on Saturday, when he gave the leaders in Tehran 48 hours to endorse the agreement he presented to them, failing which “hell” would descend upon them. Donald Trump asks them to “conclude a deal or open the Strait of Hormuz,” referring to negotiations based on the 15 points put forward by the Americans, which mainly concern the abandonment of nuclear and ballistic programs, as well as the cessation of funding for regional allies such as Hezbollah.

Second US pilot found alive

During this week, the American president blew hot and cold, as he has done since the beginning of this war against the mullahs' regime, sometimes giving deadlines of two or three weeks for the end of the conflict, or at other times favoring diplomacy by asserting that the Iranians “want to strike a deal at all costs.”

Except that at the end of the week, it was the Iranians who gave the impression of seeking escalation. On Saturday, they refused a 48-hour ceasefire proposed by the Americans, instead intensifying their strikes against Israel on the one hand, and especially against the Gulf countries on the other, where they targeted sensitive infrastructure, such as desalination plants and power plants (in Kuwait), as an example. At a time when strikes against their territory are also intensifying, an unusual incident occurred on Saturday, when a nuclear power plant in the south of the country was hit.

Furthermore, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (since they apparently now run the country) achieved a “moral victory” by shooting down an American F15 aircraft on Friday, with two commanders on board: one of them was quickly rescued by the American army; the second was found alive, but injured, on Saturday night (Beirut time), after a vast and very audacious 48-hour search operation conducted deep in Iranian territory by elite units of the American army, continuously supported by helicopters and reconnaissance planes flying over Iranian territory at low altitude.

The rescue operation carried out without incident for two days by US elite units was marked, in its final stage, on Saturday night, by a clash with elements of the Basij (the repressive “police” of the Pasdaran) who attempted at the last minute to preempt American forces to capture the commander of the F-15, whose position had been spotted by the US army. The Basij militiamen, however, suffered heavy losses and the elite unit managed to reach the commander and rescue him before withdrawing to a neighboring Arab country.

Intensive shelling against the Emirates and Kuwait

Returning to “conventional” military operations, the end of the week was marked by an intensification of missile and drone strikes against, notably, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, where the Kuwaiti army reported on Saturday the interception, in 24 hours, of 8 ballistic missiles and 19 explosive-laden drones. The Emirates, for their part, reported having intercepted in a single day, Saturday, 23 ballistic missiles and 56 drones!

But it is the Strait of Hormuz that remains the centerpiece of this armed conflict at the current stage, eclipsing all other issues raised by this war, such as the nuclear program and the regional positioning of the mullahs' regime. The Iranian gamble on the repercussions of closing this strategic waterway has paid off: rising fuel prices are already weighing on the economies of many countries and on purchasing power in places far removed from the center of the conflict in the Middle East. The Iranians even go so far as to claim they want to profit financially from passage through this strait. They have kept it closed for several weeks, allowing only the rare ships that have obtained their permission (notably Turkish and Indian ships) to pass, thereby reinforcing the impression of control they maintain over the strait. On Saturday, Iranian sources claimed to have targeted and hit an oil tanker “linked to Israel.”

Another escalation on Tehran's side: an Iranian media outlet reported on Saturday that oil exports from the highly strategic island of Kharg, the very island that Trump threatens to conquer, have increased despite the conflict.

Is this Iranian attitude, primarily the successive denials of negotiations with the Americans and the refusal of a 48-hour ceasefire, a sign of increased radicalization among Iranian leaders? Little information filters through on the internal political situation in Iran, but a significant clue in this regard is perceptible in the reactions to an article, though measured, written in “Foreign Affairs” by former Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. He believes that Iran “has the upper hand in this conflict,” having been able to resist the assault against it, which, according to him, led to “the failure of both belligerents to force the regime to capitulate.” He emphasizes that Iran should use this situation not to continue the fight and cause even more devastating destruction, but to negotiate and offer to “voluntarily limit its nuclear program and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, in exchange for the lifting of all sanctions.”

The hostile reactions to this article illustrated the polarization resulting from this war, but the most significant reactions were the extremely virulent ones from radical Iranian conservatives who went so far as to consider Zarif “naive” or even a “traitor,” accusing him of wanting to send signals of weakness in the midst of war. Meanwhile, the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, remains invisible.

In short, the Iranians give the impression of wanting to push their two enemies to their last entrenchments. To negotiate better or in a headlong rush? What is (are) the possible scenario(s) for American military intervention next week? Knowing that the US Army Chief of Staff was dismissed this week by War Minister Pete Hegseth, in favor of a figure “who better implements President Trump's policy.” A sign of hardening on the American side as well.

In any event, the coming week gives the impression of being a turning point in the war.

In Lebanon…

On the other front, that of Lebanon, the same atmosphere of escalation reigns between Hezbollah and Israel. The Shiite militia is conducting actions parallel to those of its Iranian patron, incessantly launching rockets, missiles, and drones on northern Israel and on Israeli positions within the territory. For its part, the Israeli army practices a scorched-earth policy in border villages, while extensively bombing numerous regions. The number of killed continues to rise, with over 1400 victims since March 2.

A dangerous development occurred at the end of the week, Saturday evening, confirming the trend of increasing involvement of the Bekaa in the conflict: Israeli threats to strike the Masnaa border crossing, between Lebanon and Syria, forced Lebanese security forces to evacuate the post urgently. Why attack the Lebanese-Syrian borders? More or less realistic suspicions of arms smuggling for Hezbollah? The Minister of Public Works and Transport, Fayez Rassamny, denied that the border crossing was not well controlled. A desire for a blockade? Time will tell.

Note a strange coincidence: on March 28, Syrian authorities discovered and closed a tunnel that crossed the border, and which, according to them, was used for smuggling by Hezbollah…

During the past week, the resistance of the Christian villages in South Lebanon has been widely discussed: a decision to “reposition” the Lebanese army as the Israeli advance progressed drew very virulent criticism against the 'Great Mute' concerning what appears to be an abandonment of these populations who risk their lives to remain attached to their land. The army justified its initiative by the desire not to be encircled, assuring that it would keep soldiers stationed.

If the Lebanese army is in the crosshairs of the belligerents in the South, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is too. On March 30, three Indonesian peacekeepers were killed in a strike. Three other Indonesian peacekeepers were injured a few days later. Less than a year before its definitive departure, at the end of 2026, UNIFIL's role is once again being questioned.

Another episode raised many questions this week: while Hezbollah continues to display absolute certainty in its fight and to extol the heroism of its fighters, the Israeli army published videos of interrogations it claims are of detainees from this party, captured during fighting in Lebanon. Their confessions provide evidence of very low morale, of fighters who question the meaning of their commitment but admit they cannot “say no” to the party… It is obvious that the veracity of these documents can be questioned, but their publication causes an electric shock.

The future of Lebanon seems more confused than ever, and a possible escalation in Iran would add to the real uncertainties and apprehensions of the Lebanese. Another country seems to be gradually weakening, even if it is not in open war like Lebanon: Iraq increasingly gives the impression of being an open scene for the ongoing conflict. In addition to attacks against American interests that the authorities cannot curb, the first kidnapping of an American national, a journalist, by the pro-Iranian “Kataeb Hezbollah,” took place in central Baghdad, which speaks volumes about the de facto situation imposed, there too, by factions subservient to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.