Towards a lasting "status quo" in the Middle East

Regardless of the political and media debate surrounding the content of the US-Iran agreement, recent developments have made it increasingly clear that new dynamics are taking shape across the region. Their defining feature may well be turning the page on the long-standing and deep-rooted conflict between Washington and Tehran and replacing it with a framework for managing their differences according to parameters markedly different from those that prevailed in the past. It is in this context that Iran’s insistence on “bringing the state of war between the two countries to an end can best be understood”.

The Iranian ruling establishment demonstrated remarkable pragmatism by agreeing to enter direct negotiations only weeks after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose moral, religious, political and military authority occupied a central place within the Islamic Republic. In doing so, it broke with the doctrine that had shaped Iranian policy for more than forty-five years, ever since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power, the formulation of the regime’s governing principles at home and its policy of exporting the revolution, along with its enduring description of the United States as the “Great Satan.”

Despite the heavy losses it suffered in the two successive wars, Iran appears to have capitalized on the distinctive temperament of US President Donald Trump, always in pursuit of major deals and eager to project the image of a leader capable of achieving unprecedented breakthroughs. His readiness to wage war against Iran, encouraged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, led him to entertain lofty expectations that quickly proved unattainable. The sheer magnitude of American power does not automatically translate into immediate results.

In practical terms, Tehran emerged from the war with gains that exceeded even its own expectations. Sanctions on Iranian oil are expected to be lifted after years of restrictions, part of the country’s frozen financial assets will be released at a time when they are urgently needed, and discussions are underway over the creation of a $300 billion reconstruction fund. As for the very issues for which the war was fought, namely the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program and the Iranian proxies, they have ultimately been deferred to the negotiating table. And who has mastered the art of patient, long-term negotiation better than those who weave carpets?

Without underestimating the devastating impact of the country’s economic and social crisis, the Iranian regime has long grown accustomed to living under political and economic pressure, even if it now seeks to free itself from those constraints more than ever before. From Tehran’s perspective, simply weathering this storm without collapsing amounts to a victory in itself. Despite the elimination of senior leaders and the extensive destruction inflicted upon numerous strategic civilian and military facilities, the regime has remained intact.

It also became clear that Washington’s expectation, even if it was probably never a serious one, that the Iranian people would rise up against their leadership as soon as the war began, was badly misplaced. Israel had promoted that assumption in Washington to strengthen the case for war, despite the absence of any solid evidence to support it. Whether the Iranian public’s retreat from protest reflected a surge of national solidarity in the face of foreign aggression, or whether it simply gave the regime an opportunity to regain its footing in the midst of the conflict, the outcome remains the same. The Iranian regime did not waver, while all those living abroad who had already straightened their ties in anticipation of returning home were left facing a profound and lasting disappointment. The regime’s prospects for survival have, in fact, become stronger than before, making any discussion of its collapse unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Above all, Iran “discovered” a major, perhaps even decisive, card that it had long threatened to play: the Strait of Hormuz. Experience has shown that merely brandishing that card can work to its advantage, even without going so far as to impose a toll on ships passing through it, as it had hoped to do. Trump, like the West more broadly, attaches enormous importance to the uninterrupted flow of oil and the smooth passage of oil shipments, given their far-reaching impact on the global economy.

The issue is no longer simply one of winners and losers. Rather, it points to the emergence of a new political trajectory whose defining feature may well be a regional status quo, in other words, a form of coexistence between Washington and Tehran, however far from friendly. The coming days will reveal what this means for the region’s other outstanding issues, including Lebanon and Hezbollah’s weapons. Those who assumed that the fall of Iran would automatically lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah will likely have to reassess that assumption and adopt a more realistic approach, centered on the search for a US-sponsored regional settlement capable of resolving this longstanding dilemma and ensuring that the monopoly over arms rests exclusively with the Lebanese state, which alone should hold the authority to decide questions of war and peace.

Such an outcome, however, also requires Washington to rein in its unruly ally, Israel, whose actions routinely exceed political, moral and even geographical boundaries, occupying territory here, bombing there and carrying out targeted assassinations elsewhere. The expression “clip the claws” is not intended as a slight against Israel. Rather, it reflects the nature and depth of US-Israeli relations, as well as the difficulty, at least for now, of creating meaningful distance between the two allies.

Should such a settlement fail to materialize, Lebanon will enter an even more delicate phase, marked by Israel’s refusal to withdraw militarily and Hezbollah’s refusal to surrender its weapons in light of what Tehran has achieved. The important thing is to ensure that this regional status quo does not evolve into an explosive and draining reality for Lebanon.