The Houthis Expose the Weakness of the Islamic Republic

The threats issued by the Houthis in Yemen against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and maritime traffic serving its ports have neither political nor military prospects. It is simply impossible for the Houthis to carry out their threats to impose a blockade on Saudi ports.

In reality, through their grandiose but hollow rhetoric, the Houthis have squandered the opportunity to become a full participant in Yemen’s political process, a process aimed at reaching a political settlement that excludes no party.

By openly aligning themselves with the Islamic Republic, they have effectively removed themselves from that political process. They have demonstrated, quite simply, that they are Iranians rather than Yemenis, and that any hope they might regain even a minimum sense of national consciousness was always misplaced. Such expectations amounted to nothing more than a waste of time.

Over the past few years, particularly since the Saudi-Iranian agreement brokered by China in March 2023, the Houthis had exercised a measure of restraint, projecting an image of neutrality. They sought to maintain dialogue with Riyadh while avoiding any form of provocation. Those exchanges, whether direct or indirect, were intended to establish a framework for coexistence between the two sides.

Then, almost overnight, when the Islamic Republic in Iran, or more precisely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), decided to escalate militarily, the Houthis, through their leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, revealed their true nature: they can be nothing other than an instrument of Iran.

They chose to become part of Iran’s offensive against the Arab Gulf states and Jordan, an offensive that reflects an unprecedented level of Iranian bankruptcy. In doing so, the Houthis demonstrated that they are nothing more than another branch of the IRGC, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon.

To be sure, they are capable of disrupting shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, with the help of Somali pirates who can be hired to carry out specific missions. But that is a far cry from possessing the ability to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the indispensable gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

The reason is straightforward: the Houthis do not control the Yemeni port of Mokha, which commands maritime traffic through Bab el-Mandeb. They lost Mokha in the autumn of 2014, when Yemeni forces drove them out of the country’s south, including that strategic port. It is no secret that those local forces, which also expelled the Houthis from Aden, Mokha and several positions in Shabwa province, enjoyed the backing of the United Arab Emirates, whose Yemen policy was clear from the outset: to prevent the Houthis from taking control of the entire country, and particularly the south.

Sooner or later, the international community and regional powers will have to return to Yemen, a country of exceptional strategic importance for at least two reasons.

The first is that Yemeni territory could provide a corridor for oil pipelines that would bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The second is that, unless such pipelines can carry oil across Yemen to the Red Sea or the Arabian Sea, neither the countries of the region nor the wider world will be able to tolerate Iran’s continued presence in Yemen indefinitely. Put simply, the international community cannot afford to allow Iran to keep disrupting navigation in the Red Sea from Yemeni territory.

It is no secret that the Islamic Republic is determined, through the Houthis, to maintain its presence in Yemen and use it to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and strike vessels transiting the passage on their way to the Suez Canal. That is indeed the Houthis’ intention. Yet their loss of control over the port of Mokha deprives them of the means to carry out those threats.

It should also be recalled that the Houthis have controlled Sanaa and a substantial part of Yemeni territory since 21 September 2014. Nothing better illustrates Iran’s determination to preserve its presence in Yemen than its recent insistence on violating the restrictions imposed on Sanaa International Airport. Tehran dispatched a civilian aircraft there under the pretext of transporting a Yemeni delegation to attend the funeral of the late Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Nor did Iran stop there. The Houthis suddenly launched a campaign against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accompanied by explicit threats, after a long period of calm and dialogue with Riyadh. During that period, the Houthis had obtained certain gains, either directly or through the mediation of the Sultanate of Oman.

The question today has two dimensions. The first concerns the Houthis’ actual ability to carry out their threats against Saudi Arabia and maritime traffic in the Red Sea. The second concerns the bankruptcy of the Iranian regime.

As for the first, the Houthis remain capable of targeting merchant vessels and oil tankers transiting the Red Sea, particularly because they control the strategically vital port of Hodeidah on its coastline. Iran, meanwhile, has chosen to direct its aggression against the Arab Gulf states and Jordan rather than confront the United States or Israel directly. Tehran targets Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman, while assigning the Houthis the task of attacking Saudi Arabia. Yet it does not dare lay a finger on a single American warship sailing in the Gulf.

Ultimately, the Houthis’ threats are nothing more than a manifestation of Iran’s bankruptcy, a bankruptcy beyond which there is no deeper collapse. These threats, made at the expense of Yemen and the Yemeni people, reveal that the end of the Iranian regime is inevitable. It is now only a matter of time, after the Houthis exposed the weakness of the Islamic Republic and the depth of its bankruptcy.