Lebanon: the Price of War and the Suspended State

Since the outbreak of the latest military escalation on the southern border, Lebanon has found itself at the heart of the regional picture as a theatre of open confrontation, reviving longstanding questions about its role, the limits of its decision-making autonomy, and its capacity to bear the cost of engagement in conflicts that far exceed its borders. Against this backdrop, a fundamental question presents itself: how is one to assess the merits of this confrontation from a strictly Lebanese perspective, in light of the consequences it has produced on the military, economic, and social levels?

The field data points to a considerable cost. Vast areas of the South suffered serious damage to infrastructure and private property, while waves of internal displacement affected hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, further burdening host regions and an already deeply strained state grappling with a severe economic and financial crisis. Key productive sectors, agriculture and tourism foremost among them, were also badly hit at the very moment when the Lebanese economy was in most need of any opening for recovery.

Assessments diverge, however, when it comes to actual military gains. Some argue that engagement in the confrontation forms part of a broader deterrence strategy, anchored in regional balances, and that it aims to impose new equations or consolidate existing ones. Others contend that the results have produced no qualitative shift in the balance of power, and that the outer limit of political outcomes remains close to pre-ceasefire arrangements — or even to a return to the practical effects of those arrangements as they stood before the latest escalation — which raises questions about the relationship between the cost incurred and the results achieved, all the more so given that this escalation itself unfolded within wider regional interactions and logics that extend well beyond the strictly Lebanese framework.

This divergence of assessment reflects, to a considerable degree, a fundamental disagreement about Lebanon's position within the regional conflict. Is it a direct party endowed with an independent margin of decision, or a link in a broader network of alliances in which local and regional calculations are inextricably intertwined? The answer is not merely theoretical: it bears directly on how the war is understood and how its utility is judged.

On the domestic front, the escalation has revived the debate on the role of the state and the limits of its authority. The question of the monopoly on arms and the prerogative of decision over war and peace remains among the most sensitive in Lebanese political life. One camp holds that concentrating this power within state institutions is a sine qua non for strengthening sovereignty and building lasting stability. The other argues that security realities and existing balances impose different formulas, and that any serious approach to this issue must take into account the mutual fears and apprehensions among Lebanon's constituent communities.

This debate is not new, but recent developments have lent it renewed sharpness. Experience has shown that the plurality of decision-making centres generates serious challenges in terms of internal coordination and crisis management, while also affecting Lebanon's position in its external relations, whether with regard to the diplomatic track or its capacity to benefit from international support.

This question is bound up with a broader interrogation about the nature of the political system. Since the adoption of the Taëf Agreement, foundations were laid for the reconstruction of the state and the reinforcement of its institutions, yet implementation has remained deeply uneven, under the combined effect of internal complexities and shifting political balances, both local and regional. This variable-geometry application has contributed to keeping essential questions — sovereignty, institutional reform — in the realm of perpetually open and unresolved debate.

Beyond the question of sovereignty, there is the matter of citizens' trust in the state. Successive crises, from the financial collapse to the fallout of war, have eroded this trust and driven large segments of the Lebanese population to rely on alternative networks to meet their needs. This in turn undermines the possibility of building an effective social contract, founded on a relationship of reciprocity between the state and its citizens, grounded in rights and duties.

It is within this framework that one can understand what is sometimes described as a certain "selectivity" in the application of laws or in the approach to public affairs. This selectivity is partly the product of distrust towards institutions, or of the feeling among certain groups that the rules are not applied equally. Yet it simultaneously contributes to weakening the very idea of the state as a common and unifying point of reference, making any attempt to establish stable rules of governance all the more difficult.

At the regional level, what is unfolding in Lebanon cannot be separated from a broader context shaped by the interactions between international and regional powers. The experience of recent years across several arenas of the region has demonstrated how internally fragile states can be transformed into arenas where these conflicts intersect and overlap. Lebanon appears, in this configuration, to be particularly exposed to the influence of these balances, by reason of its internal composition and the entanglement of its external relations.

It is within this same framework that the recent announcement of a ceasefire between the United States and Iran must be situated — a fifteen-day halt brokered by Pakistan, intended to open a negotiating process between the two parties with the aim of reaching a settlement to the crisis between them. This process, however, raises a series of questions for Lebanon, since it remains unclear whether this agreement concerns it directly or indirectly. It also raises the question of Lebanon's place in such arrangements, at a time when it has no official representation at the negotiating table, while the Lebanese state should in principle be the sole authority empowered to negotiate on its behalf. This situation illustrates a persistent problem related to the limits of national sovereignty: matters that directly concern Lebanon are being addressed within external negotiating frameworks without the state holding the role that should rightfully be its own.

Faced with this picture, the choices on offer are neither simple nor clear-cut. A realist approach requires acknowledging the intertwining of internal and external factors, and recognising that any path out of the crises demands a balanced treatment of these factors, on the basis of consolidating the state — not indulging or undermining it. This entails, on one hand, strengthening state institutions and their capacity to manage sovereign dossiers and public services, so as to guarantee a just state, bound by the rule of law and ensuring equal rights; and, on the other, working to reduce internal polarisation and build a minimum of consensus around fundamental questions, in order to reinforce national legitimacy without eroding the role or sovereignty of the state.

In the final analysis, Lebanon's recent war raises far more questions than it answers. It reveals the scale of the price that engagement in open-ended conflicts can exact, and casts fresh light on structural questions relating to the state, sovereignty, and the social contract. While readings and assessments remain divided, the central challenge remains that of turning this experience into an opportunity for a rethinking of choices — rather than allowing it to become one more episode in the spiral of recurring crises.