Beneath the Umbrella…?

The latest Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo at the beginning of this month, carrying the movement’s responses to the High Commissioner of the Peace Council, Nikolay Miladinov’s questions as well as his ever changing proposals. This time, the delegation was not headed by Khalil al Hayya, who nevertheless conveyed a firm and unwavering position on the issue of the exclusive control of weapons, stressing that any such step could only be implemented gradually, according to a timetable tied to a clearly defined political process guaranteeing the Palestinian people’s right to self determination and the exercise of their sovereignty. At the same time, the movement demanded payment of all outstanding sums owed to the civil servants who had served under its government through the “Gaza Administration Committee,” while seeking to maintain its role throughout the transitional period.

Israeli positions, for their part, continue to reject any arrangement that would allow Hamas to retain a military wing once the transitional period comes to an end.

Functional Power Sharing

The fragmentation of the Gaza Strip into two distinct zones is becoming increasingly entrenched. To the east lies the theater of Israeli military operations. To the west lives the overwhelming majority of the population, under the authority of Hamas’ security apparatus and police, surviving amid the remnants of tents, the ruins of demolished homes, and the meager remains of food, water, and medicine.

In that part of the territory, Hamas exercises authority, collects taxes, and manages commercial activity with a handful of traders whose business practices are no less ruthless than Hamas’ security apparatus is in its dealings with the population. Whenever the issue of weapons and their exclusive control in the Gaza Strip arises, it is worth recalling that the Trump administration, together with the Turkish and Qatari mediators, came to the conclusion that Hamas should retain its arsenal until the transitional period has been completed.

The equation is therefore a simple one. Israel rejects Hamas’ weapons, while the movement has hardened its demands regarding the exclusive control of arms to the point of seeking both collective and individual guarantees for the future. Meanwhile, Nikolay Miladinov shuttles between the parties in an effort to weave together an agreement capable of satisfying both Israel and Hamas.

According to this intractable equation, and in line with the instructions of the US administration, with Israel’s approval, the Gaza Administration Committee is to begin its work in the eastern part of the Strip, under the direct control of the Israeli occupation forces, although no timetable for implementation has yet been established.

Hamas would thus continue to exercise authority over the western part of the Strip, resulting in a dual authority that can only be understood as an expression of functional power sharing between the two sides. This arrangement only deepens the population’s suffering, locking it into a state of stalemate and deadlock, while food security, water supplies, and healthcare continue to collapse at an accelerating pace, leaving disease, hunger, and thirst to ravage the people of Gaza. They find themselves simultaneously under the tutelage of the Peace Council, the occupation of the Israeli army, and the rule of Hamas.

By adopting the resolution establishing the “Peace Council” on 17 November 2025, the United Nations Security Council did not intend to place the Palestinians under President Donald Trump’s tutelage. Rather, its purpose was to bring an end to a war of extermination that had become detrimental to Israel’s interests and international image, while authorizing the deployment of an international force to help the people of Gaza survive the genocide they are enduring.

Eight months have passed since the Peace Council was established, yet negotiations remain stalled at the implementation of the first of the twenty points set out in the Trump initiative.

Red Lines

The fifth round of negotiations has concluded without the slightest meaningful progress. The red lines of both sides remain irreconcilable, reflecting a fundamental deadlock between Israel and Hamas over the issue of the exclusive control of weapons and the future of governance in the Gaza Strip, while both await the change in the Palestinian Authority’s leadership following the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for the end of this year.

After every setback in the negotiations, Egyptian diplomacy steps forward with fresh proposals aimed at keeping the talks alive. Its objective is to prevent Israel from evading its international obligations and from imposing a new reality in the Gaza Strip by turning the Palestinian Egyptian border into an Israeli Egyptian border, with all the strategic implications such a transformation would have for Egypt’s national security as well as for the Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty.

From this geopolitical standpoint, Egyptian diplomacy is working to strengthen the role of the Palestinian National Authority and secure both its political and institutional presence. It has succeeded in reviving the Agreement on Crossings, restoring the official Palestinian presence with European participation as well, and securing an agreement for the deployment of fifteen thousand police officers, in three successive waves, in order to help safeguard people’s lives in the Gaza Strip. To this should be added the symbolic participation of the city of Deir al Balah in the municipal elections held a few months ago.

Cairo remains more determined than ever to prevent the negotiations from collapsing, despite the wishes of Benjamin Netanyahu and his generals. To achieve this objective, Egyptian diplomacy employs both flexibility and firmness in its dealings with all parties, including Israel.

Working alongside the three mediating states, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, Cairo is closely monitoring the evolution of the conflict between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv, as well as the still open possibility of a return to levels of violence that could erupt once again, however tightly they may be contained. The upcoming political and electoral processes in the United States and Israel could yet produce outcomes that would undermine the prospects for a broad international and regional peace process.

At the same time, Turkish and Qatari policies are following a different course. They seek to forge a new relationship between Hamas and the White House administration, drawing on their long experience with radical political Islamist movements, particularly the Afghan Taliban movement. That experience, long regarded by Khaled Meshaal, a member of Hamas’ Political Bureau, as a model to be emulated, could help reshape the movement and reintegrate it into the Palestinian political system.

Without the flexibility shown by both the previous and the current US administrations, Hamas’ leadership would hardly have pushed its negotiating demands so far. Its strategy rests on the expectation that Ankara and Doha will succeed in rehabilitating its role in the Palestinian cause. This, in turn, would enable the White House to impose its own terms on both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, thereby lowering the ceiling of the national aspirations the Palestinian people would be willing to accept. This game has continued ever since the Sharon government facilitated Hamas’ rise to power through its 2007 coup against Palestinian legitimacy. If this game continues to guarantee the same outcome, why shouldn’t it be played again?

A Drop of Water

As Israel continues to block the entry of humanitarian aid, the crisis over access to clean water grows ever more severe. Every day, the Gaza Strip requires 140,000 cubic metres of water to meet the needs of drinking, hospitals, and food. The United Nations continues to warn of the collapse of water security, while Hamas, for its part, shows neither in its rhetoric nor in its conduct the slightest concern for the people. To Hamas, weapons matter more than a single drop of water.