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On November 1, 2026, twenty years after construction work began, the Grand Egyptian Museum, or GEM, finally opened its doors. It is the sixth-largest museum in the world and the largest ever dedicated to a single civilization. During a Pharaonic inauguration attended by numerous heads of state, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi presented the new museum as a gift from Egypt to the rest of the world. A History Marked by Obstacles The story of the GEM began in 1992, when Egypt’s then Minister of Culture, Farouk Hosny, proposed the creation of a new museum to replace the old Cairo Museum, which had become obsolete. The project aimed to bring together Egypt’s invaluable archaeological treasures, previously scattered across various sites. The foundation stone was laid in 2002, but construction work effectively began only in 2005. The project was beset with numerous obstacles and delays, notably due to the Arab Spring in 2011 and the Covid-19 pandemic. It also faced significant financial challenges, with the total cost exceeding one billion euros. Ultimately, on November 1, following close international cooperation—both financial and technical—the museum finally came to life with a grand inauguration. A Museum Worthy of the Nearby Pyramids The museum is located on the Giza Plateau, facing the pyramids, and covers an area of 500,000 square meters, equivalent to 70 football fields. In 2002, UNESCO and the International Union of Architects jointly launched an international architectural competition for the museum’s design. Among 500 proposals, the Irish firm Heneghan Peng Architects was selected. The museum’s entire architecture is inspired by the pyramids. Its triangular façade, rising 60 meters high, is composed of alabaster and translucent glass panels that evoke the color of desert sands and change appearance depending on the time of day or night. It is adorned with hieroglyphs and pyramid motifs engraved with the names of 140 pharaohs. The façade is visually aligned with the three nearby pyramids, and the entire structure harmoniously integrates the sacred geometry of the pharaohs within a modern architectural framework. The museum also benefits from cutting-edge technology designed to preserve, enhance, illuminate, and protect its twelve galleries. A Global Center for Conservation and Research Beyond serving as a showcase for the extraordinary history of ancient Egypt, the GEM positions itself as a major scientific hub, featuring a world-class archaeological research and conservation center. Covering 32,000 square meters, it is the largest and most sophisticated center dedicated to the restoration of archaeological artifacts worldwide. Operational since 2010, it includes 19 ultra-modern laboratories equipped with digital microscopes, X-ray and 3D imaging machines, spectroscopic technologies, and DNA identification systems. A total of 120 internationally trained conservators work there. Thanks to these exceptional technical resources, the GEM has played a crucial role in the transfer and in situ restoration of more than 57,000 artifacts from various Egyptian sites. The center also offers training programs for Egyptian and international art conservators, reinforcing its status as a reference center for heritage preservation in the Middle East. The complex also includes a conference center with a seating capacity of 1,000, designed to host international conferences and symposiums. It should also be noted that the museum was built with environmental sustainability in mind, using renewable energy sources that allow for energy savings of up to 60% and a reduction of water consumption by one third. A Museum for the Future The GEM does not merely preserve and restore the past; it reinvents it for future generations. It incorporates immersive technologies such as augmented reality, digital reconstructions, and interactive multimedia presentations, thereby adopting “the language of Generation Z,” according to Ahmed Ghoneim, Director General of the GEM. These innovations transform the traditional museum experience into a captivating journey through time. The museum also includes a 5,000-square-meter children’s museum designed to encourage learning through play using interactive screens. The GEM is therefore not only a sanctuary of heritage but also a vibrant space for intercultural dialogue and scientific research. After this brief overview of the creation of this extraordinary museum, it is time to step inside and discover some of the countless treasures it houses. This will be the focus of our next article: “Welcome to Ramses II.”

In this series of articles, Levant Time traces the genesis, creation, and current operation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), of which Lebanon is a member. A prospective approach on what the Land of the Cedars could undertake, and the role it can play within this Union, will conclude the series. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is the direct heir to the Barcelona Process, and then to the project launched in 2008 by French President Nicolas Sarkozy under the title of “Mediterranean Union.” This initiative, approved by a large number of actors but rejected, or even criticized, by others – notably the countries of Northern Europe, led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who were wary of its outlines and implications – nevertheless presented two essential merits. The first was to allow the completion of a project, albeit under another name and in another form, but concretizing the creation of a “Union for the Mediterranean.” The second was to revive, by replacing it, a Barcelona process that was losing momentum, but by reversing its construction logic. The initial premise was based on the idea that co-development – both North-South and South-South – would create a free trade area for goods and know-how. South-South exchanges, in particular, were intended to help transform this region into a space of peace, cultural development, and social progress. It was presumed that politics would follow. This is precisely where the novelty and the attempt to revive the Barcelona Process, in another form, lay. While the latter can boast some successes in the economic field, its political and social components failed for a major reason: the difficulty of getting all the countries concerned to dialogue, due in particular to the impossibility of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to which were added underlying suspicions, especially around sensitive subjects such as immigration. President Sarkozy believed, not without reason, that the coordinated development of economies through common projects would allow dialogue to reopen at all other levels: political, social, and cultural. This approach immediately dismissed what some wished for, undoubtedly to marginalize this new idea, a proliferation of micro-projects. The impetus given to structuring projects was intended to offer a new chance to the entire region and, beyond that, to be an exemplary value. The Mediterranean Union was conceived as an association of member countries of the European Union, primarily the riparian states, and the countries bordering the Mediterranean, with the aim of designing and implementing common projects to foster the economic development of the region and the transformation of this area into a zone of peace. In 2008, the European Union had just expanded eastward with the accession of its 26th and 27th members, Bulgaria and Romania. Their integration was underway and was expected to be completed in the medium term. This enlargement, desirable in some respects, nevertheless appeared potentially excessive, at the risk of leading Europe to reconfigure itself into concentric circles, to allow a hard core to advance and to draw the other entities at a sustainable pace. In this perspective, these two countries should not be considered as belonging to the Black Sea area, but rather as the eastern marches of the European Union. The problems specific to the Black Sea were already very real, and their resolution did not depend, in the short term, on the European Union, but essentially on Russia. They depended above all on the capacity of each riparian state to resolve its internal difficulties, inherited from the implosion of the former USSR, as well as those related to the sometimes decisive presence of minorities. These issues primarily concerned the ability of these countries to establish democratic practices and to dialogue among themselves, without ignoring their geopolitical constraints and their immediate regional environment. Since the analysis of the Union for the Mediterranean will be addressed later, it is important not to integrate all the latent or proven problems into the perspective of creating a Union, whether it is first “Mediterranean,” then “for the Mediterranean.” The Mediterranean riparian countries already had enough to do with their own difficulties, without adding more distant problems, whose importance the future would show. These elements, among others, were sufficient to exclude the Black and Marmara seas from the envisaged perimeter. The Mediterranean adopted will therefore be that of geography textbooks. Next article: Birth of the Mediterranean Union, an ephemeral project that became the Union for the Mediterranean.

The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus, signed on November 26, 2025, and endorsed by Decree No. 2108 of December 16, 2025, marks a major step in Lebanese maritime policy. Officially presented as a means to guarantee the exploitation of maritime resources, this agreement nevertheless raises deep concerns from legal and strategic perspectives. General Khalil Gemayel, an expert in maritime border delimitation, believes that this agreement, despite some advantages, remains largely unfavorable to Lebanon. It certainly puts an end to a long-standing dispute, but at what cost? According to him, one of the main achievements lies in the resolution of the maritime dispute that had pitted Lebanon and Cyprus against each other for nearly two decades. This legal clarification puts an end to a grey area that hindered any energy planning. He also emphasizes that the agreement officially extended the Lebanese maritime border with Cyprus from point No. 1 to point No. 23, now a maritime junction point between Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel. However, this extension was carried out using the Median Line Method, an approach that, according to General Gemayel, clearly favors Cyprus. He believes that the resolution of the dispute, despite its apparent importance, was made at the expense of Lebanese interests. An Unequal Agreement General Gemayel considers the agreement unfair to Lebanon due to the methodology adopted. He explains that the delimitation is based on a median line drawn between an island, Cyprus, and a continental coastal state, Lebanon. However, international maritime jurisprudence favors a three-stage methodology: the drawing of a provisional median line, the consideration of relevant circumstances, and then the conduct of a final Proportionality Test. He regrets that this approach was not applied, due to the absence of a proportionality test between the lengths of the opposing coasts. In this context, General Gemayel specifies that the relevant Lebanese coast extends for approximately 188 kilometers, compared to 103 kilometers for the corresponding Cypriot coast. This ratio of 1.82 in favor of Lebanon, versus 1 for Cyprus, should have led to a more balanced delimitation. According to his analysis, the non-observance of this principle resulted in the loss of approximately 2,600 square kilometers of Lebanon's exclusive economic zone to Cyprus. He adds that the 2025 agreement essentially adopts the same delimitation methodology as the one adopted in the agreement signed in 2007 between the two countries. This text, which had not been ratified or applied due to its imbalances, had remained frozen for nearly 18 years. An Institutional Contradiction General Gemayel highlights an institutional contradiction. He recalls that in 2022, a joint Lebanese ministerial commission was formed to examine the issue of maritime borders with Cyprus. This commission had recommended the adoption of the three-stage methodology and the consideration of proportionality between the coasts, explicitly recognizing that the median line was detrimental to Lebanon. Yet, in 2025, a new ministerial commission, composed of the same ministries, overturned the previous recommendations and validated the delimitation based on the median line. This is precisely the method that Lebanon had long rejected and which led to the freezing of the 2007 agreement. From Legal Agreement to Sovereignty Challenges Beyond General Gemayel's technical analysis, this agreement illustrates a recurring problem in international negotiations: the search for a quick and clear solution can come at the expense of technical principles and long-term strategic interests. The fundamental achievement of the agreement – the legal clarification of maritime borders and the end of the historical dispute with Cyprus – is undeniable and offers legal stability likely to encourage investment in maritime areas. However, the methodology adopted reflects a disregard for internationally recognized technical standards, particularly the final proportionality test. The use of the median line without adjustment for coast length indicates a political compromise, likely motivated by the desire to quickly conclude an agreement after 18 years of deadlock. This choice leaves Lebanon facing a tangible loss of exploitable maritime areas. This strategic choice, while providing clear borders, weakens future economic prospects, particularly concerning gas and oil resources. Finally, the discrepancy between the 2022 commission's recommendations and the 2025 final approval highlights a persistent governance problem in Lebanon: the continuity of the technical and institutional approach is sometimes sacrificed for the sake of opportunistic political decisions. The result is an agreement that provides border clarity but raises legitimate questions about the protection of national interests and the country's ability to adopt a coherent and sustainable maritime strategy.

Has obscenity become the driving force of History? A careful observer, following the thread of events, might well conclude that it has. For there is indeed something obscene in the way the contemporary world continues to celebrate its simulacra of order, even as the dikes— all the dikes—are collapsing on every side. True, the logorrhea remains; institutions proliferate. Grand speeches have perhaps never been so abundant. Yet they now drift in a disturbing void, ringing irredeemably hollow—when they are not swallowed by the formless mass of disinformation and the nauseating tropes of populism and identitarianism. Thus, we continue to speak of law, sovereignty, legitimacy, collective security, as though these were the worn-out vocables of a profane and nihilistic litany… all while almost fatalistically accepting that violence has once again become an acceptable variable of history. The architectures born from the ruins of the twentieth century—those that sought to contain force, discipline it, inscribe it within a minimum of shared rules—are today being methodically dismantled. This is not so much the result of ignorance as of a Mephistophelean will, a predatory and destructive premeditation. They are deemed too slow, too moral, too constraining for a world that once again claims permanent exception, unbridled power, identity as ultimate justification. The system born of San Francisco and Bretton Woods is deliberately and systematically hollowed out, reduced to a piece of diplomatic stage scenery. Consequently, freed from all inhibition, calls for empire multiply, in diverse yet convergent forms. Whether draped in the garb of nation, civilization, security, or faith matters little: the logic is the same. That of a world fragmented into spheres of influence, where the rule applies to others; where force becomes political language; where the human being is relegated to collateral damage. All ideological differences fade behind a shared brutality. In such a framework, the rise to extremes becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, justifying each actor’s conduct. The serpent devours its own tail—until nothing remains, neither of the serpent nor of what surrounded it. In such a landscape, it must be acknowledged that peoples count for very little. Beyond opinion polls, they are invoked, instrumentalized, sacrificed to higher designs that largely escape them. Some more visibly than others. Iran today crystallizes this moral collapse. An entire society—aware, courageous, culturally dense—faces a repression of cold, repetitive, almost industrial violence. And in response, the world watches, expresses intermittent outrage, then accommodates—quietly. The diplomatic prudence of some serves as an alibi; the strategic calculations of others override any ethical imperative. As though freedom could wait. As though certain lives were worth less than regional balances or energy interests. Yet what is unfolding in Tehran, as in Ukraine or Gaza, transcends a regime, a crisis, a single country. It raises once again the question of the very meaning of international order. What is a system worth if it no longer protects those most in need? What does the rule of law mean when it fades the moment it becomes costly? At what point does universalism cease to be a principle and become a conditional discourse, subject to power relations and the moods of the mighty? How can the order of the human—freedom as constitutive of the human person—be restored without further shattering what is already broken? These questions are as old as the world. But in a system stripped of all safeguards, they become obsessive. The reality is that we may have entered that dreaded moment when culture continues to produce forms, images, and discourse, while civilization itself ceases to believe in what it proclaims. A “end of culture,” to borrow George Steiner’s expression, which—though not yet spectacular, for evil often manifests itself through banality—is nonetheless pervasive. Moral fatigue deepens; reference points blur; criteria collapse; language is hollowed out within a continuous flux of images, slogans, and selective indignations. Reason wavers. Has it been defeated, or has it simply withdrawn for lack of defenders? It hardly matters. The outcome is the same. In this void inhabited by monsters—and how long this long night of emptiness has become—identities harden, violence legitimizes itself, fear becomes the foundation, the matrix of politics. The world rediscovers, with horror—or perhaps with weariness—the old reflexes it believed buried: withdrawal, hatred, fascination with strongmen, contempt for freedoms in the name of security. Globalization has not produced the universality once hoped for; it has often accelerated fragmentation, atomization, the erosion of social bonds. Everywhere, societies struggle to generate shared references, without which there can be neither living culture nor coexistence. If the nuclearization of power relations is once again in vogue, the nuclearization of human relations and minds has already occurred. There has been no balance of deterrence here. From Washington to Moscow, from Tel Aviv to Tehran and Ankara, the race toward the atomization of humanity is unanimous. Faced with this failure of states—largely rooted in increasingly narcissistic and paranoid collectivities—a new responsibility asserts itself, whether we like it or not: that of a transversal global public opinion. Not an emotional crowd. Certainly not. Nor a trinket morality. But a consciousness capable of crossing borders, rejecting implicit hierarchies of compassion, naming the unacceptable wherever it occurs. A public opinion that does not merely comment, but restores accountability, reality, an ethical framework for international relations. One that reminds us that not everything is equivalent. That not everything is negotiable. That a scale of values still presides over the destiny of this planet—even if it struggles to exist. Or else that humanity has decided it no longer wishes to live together in peace within a shared space, and must therefore destroy the principles that bind it, in the name of petty differences and anxieties. This may sound like naïveté. Yet it is not utopianism. In any case, what is left to lose, before the entire world becomes, as at the dawn of the twentieth century, a vast field of ruins, a gigantic mass grave? Inventing a new order does not mean dreaming of a pacified or reconciled world. It means reintroducing limits, restoring a cost to violence, reaffirming that human dignity is not an option but a vital requirement. It calls for a civilizational awakening—fragile, conflictual, imperfect, yet necessary. Not to promise paradise, but to prevent the banalization of hell. Otherwise, the moral cost of silence and inaction will be too high—for everyone. The fall into violence is never a historical inevitability. It is always a choice. So is renewal.

The irony of history is that the American show of force in Venezuela on the night of January 3-4 marked the beginning of a new episode of “planetary destabilization” against which Pope Leo XIV had warned a few days earlier, in his Message for the 59th International Day of Peace on January 1, 2026. “In relations between citizens and rulers,” the Sovereign Pontiff affirmed, “it has come to be considered a fault not to prepare sufficiently for war, to react to attacks, to respond to violence. Far beyond the principle of legitimate self-defense, this antagonistic logic is, on a political level, the most current factor in a planetary destabilization that is becoming more dramatic and unpredictable every day.” In terms of “destabilization” and “unpredictability,” the United States couldn't have done better! Certainly, Venezuela had been “marked for so many years by drug trafficking and corruption,” according to Father Georges Engel, a missionary priest quoted by Olivier Bonnel on Vatican News. As a result, no one will truly regret Nicolas Maduro, elected on January 10, 2025, for a third term deemed illegitimate by the majority of the international community. Nevertheless, the actions of the United States are not justified. In fact, reacting to the show of force, during the Angelus on January 4, the Pope carefully avoided taking a position in the conflict, contenting himself primarily with stating that “the good of the beloved Venezuelan people must prevail over all other considerations.” This calibrated position is characteristic of Vatican diplomacy, which always places itself above the conflicting parties, to defend what it deems essential, even if it means being accused of putting the aggressor and the aggressed on the same level. The essential and the subsidiary The “essential” in question follows in the Pope's message. It is about “overcoming violence and committing to the path of justice and peace, by guaranteeing the country's sovereignty, ensuring the rule of law enshrined in the Constitution, respecting the human and civil rights of each and all, and working together to build a serene future of collaboration, stability, and concord, with particular attention to the poorest who suffer from the difficult economic situation.” This form of diplomacy, where state sovereignty, constitutional rules, and human rights nonetheless occupy their place, is that of “active neutrality”; a conduct of distancing from geopolitical “axes” similar to that which the Maronite patriarch wishes to see Lebanon adopt. This diplomatic path is also referred to in Vatican language as “diplomacy of the common good.” Its means are those of dialogue, “unarmed and disarming” means, to borrow an image from Leo XIV, which differentiates it, for example, from UN diplomacy, whose levers are of a completely different order. Active Neutrality, Not Passive “Active neutrality” means that the Holy See does not take sides with one camp against another, without, however, remaining passive or “neutral” when fundamental rights are violated. Thus, in October 2023, in a public statement, Cardinal Parolin expressed deep concern regarding the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, qualifying the ongoing actions as potentially constituting a "genocide". Having no economic or military interests, the Holy See can thus judge a situation based on ethical principles, while promoting dialogue and always proposing non-violent solutions to conflicts. Often, in parallel, the Vatican will act behind the scenes, with discretion and constancy, in the direction of non-violence. From the particular to the general This does not prevent Vatican diplomacy from rising, in its fundamental reflection, from the particular to the general. In the message on the World Day of Peace, a plea from the Vatican against arms proliferation and the armaments industry is noted to this effect. This plea takes into account, this year, the introduction of algorithms and nuclear deterrence into conflicts, to show that this new development, whose ravages are observed in the Middle East and Europe, undermines the very foundations of all civilization and leads humanity to the brink of the abyss. “We are even witnessing,” the document adds, “a process of shirking responsibility by political and military leaders, due to the increasing ‘delegation’ to machines of decisions concerning the life and death of human persons. This is an unprecedented destructive spiral of the legal and philosophical humanism on which all civilization rests and by which all civilization is protected.” Philosophical and Legal Humanism What exactly is this “legal and philosophical humanism” raised by Leo XIV? On a philosophical level, it is to affirm that human beings have an inherent dignity, which does not depend on their utility, wealth, or strength; it is also to affirm that the human person is endowed with reason and freedom, and therefore responsible for their actions; finally, it is to affirm that society, politics, and science must serve humanity, and not the other way around. These concepts, deeply rooted in Christian anthropology, correspond to the affirmation of faith that every human being is created in the image of God and that human dignity is therefore inalienable, even in situations of weakness (illness, poverty, old age, or fault). On the legal level, humanism means that law exists to protect the human person, and not merely to organize power. This implies, in particular, the rejection of laws that treat human beings as mere objects (commodities, tools, data), especially in production relations. This is a critique of purely technical or utilitarian legal systems, as well as the idea that “everything legal is just.” As we can see, the Church bases its judgments on very clear principles. Some believe that our era is "apocalyptic" and see in what is happening a sign of the "end times." But there is no need to go that far to judge. As Saint Augustine, a master of thought for Pope Leo XIV, assures us, men are free, responsible, and accountable for their actions. They will be judged by their fruits. Which does not prevent our era from being indeed unsettling.

In Iran, two parallel scenes are unfolding today. Two scenes that do not cancel each other out, but rather exacerbate the critical situation: streets seething with sporadic but persistent protests, and an authority that responds with increasingly brutal repression, carried out jointly by the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader. This parallel does not reflect balance, but rather fear. Regimes confident in their power do not need such a level of sustained violence, while regimes in crisis know that any security breach could lead to their collapse. However, the most serious question concerns not only the Iranian regime's ability to withstand internal pressures, but also the repercussions of any instability or potential collapse on the entire region. Iran has never been a country isolated from its crises, but rather the center of a transnational network of influence, carefully constructed over more than four decades. Any crack at the center will inevitably have repercussions on the periphery. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the regime has rested on a clear equation: an ideological legitimacy that takes precedence over the popular will, and an effective instrument of repression that protects this legitimacy by force. Today, the first pillar is eroding with the expansion of social, economic, and political protests, while the second is weakening, as the Revolutionary Guards are forced to act as a domestic police force rather than an instrument of regional expansion. This paradox is not a mere detail, but a structural flaw that strikes at the very heart of the Iranian project. Every hour the Revolutionary Guards spend suppressing domestic dissent is an hour lost for exerting influence abroad. Every escalation of domestic security measures increases the cost of the regional project—politically, financially, and morally. Consequently, increased repression does not necessarily mean that the regime will be stabilized; It could rather indicate that the country is entering a prolonged period of attrition, where the crisis is being managed, but far from resolved. In this context, two main scenarios emerge regarding the outcome of the Iranian crisis. The first is that of a regime that manages to contain the demonstrations through excessive violence, while preserving the cohesion of state institutions and the Revolutionary Guards. In this case, the regime does not collapse immediately, but is forced to retreat to the regional stage, and the absolute priority becomes maintaining domestic power. The second scenario is that of repression that could fuel unrest, leading to large-scale demonstrations and plunging the country into an uncontrollable spiral of escalation. This could pave the way for a political collapse, rapid or gradual, but with profound consequences. In Yemen, this development directly affects the Houthi movement. This group, whose rise was linked to Iranian support, will see its Iranian funding, weaponry, and expertise diminish. As the crisis in Iran intensifies, resources allocated to external issues, particularly those of lesser strategic importance, will be reduced. Consequently, the Houthis may be forced into a political agreement guaranteeing them a minimum of influence, or they risk internal disintegration under the pressure of the war, the economy, and the local social fabric. In Iraq, the impact of the Iranian withdrawal will be more complex. The militias linked to Tehran, accustomed to operating under the aegis of a powerful regional coalition, will be forced to redefine their role. Without unconditional support, divisions will emerge between factions seeking to "Iraqi-ize" the decision-making process and those favoring escalation to preserve their gains. In this context, the intensification of repression in Iran, initially a source of strength, becomes a weakness, as it deprives these forces of their symbolic and political cover and opens a breach—albeit a perilous one—allowing the Iraqi state to regain some of its sovereignty. Lebanon, by its very nature, absorbs the repercussions of regional crises even more rapidly. Hezbollah, as the most organized extension of the Iranian project, will be directly affected by the reduction in Tehran's funding and support capabilities. With the intensification of repression in Iran, the party is losing some of the moral legitimacy that has long served to justify its transnational ideological role. This reality presents it with a double dilemma: either maintain its arsenal in the absence of regional protection, or reposition itself politically within the Lebanese state. In this context, the question of the political calendar in Lebanon appears crucial. Holding elections at the height of Iran's incomplete withdrawal could give pro-Tehran forces an opportunity to regroup. Many believe that any technical postponement, given the decline in funding and military support—especially after the "war of support" and the devastation it caused without a clear prospect of reconstruction—could accelerate the erosion of the Shiite duo's popular base and reveal the extent of the social crisis facing their supporters. Here, the debate is no longer merely constitutional, but fundamentally political, linked to the evolving balance of power in the region. At the regional level, the convergence of growing protests and fierce repression in Iran signals the beginning of an unstable transitional phase. The Gulf States are observing cautiously, aware that Iran's weakness could be an opportunity to restructure regional security, but also carries a risk of chaos. Israel sees Tehran's focus on its domestic affairs as an undeniable strategic advantage, but fears the potential for escalation. Turkey, for its part, is preparing to fill any potential vacuum, particularly in Syria and Iraq. The intensification of protests in Iran, met with unprecedented repression by the Revolutionary Guards, does not mean the regime has won the battle. Rather, it has entered a protracted phase of attrition. At this stage, the question is no longer simply when the regime will fall, but how, at what cost, and at whose expense in the region. The fall of the Iranian regime, should it occur, would not be an event to celebrate, but a perilous moment demanding strong nations and astute political elites. Without them, the collapse of this center of power could degenerate into widespread chaos… with no alternative.