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In our first article, we followed the steps of the Grand Egyptian Museum's construction and explored its technical department, responsible for the restoration of objects discovered by archaeologists. It's time to discover some of the treasures it holds. As soon as you push open the GEM's door, a majestic hall (the Atrium) of 10,000 square meters welcomes us under a glass roof and a grandiose staircase of 108 steps spanning an area of 6,000 square meters over 6 floors. The museum comprises 12 galleries and has a structure organized around three main themes: royalty, society, and beliefs, thus covering periods from the pre-dynastic era to the Greco-Roman era. A fabulous journey through 7000 years of history The Grand Hall is dominated by the colossal statue of Ramses II, discovered near ancient Memphis in 1820. 3000 years old, 11 meters high and weighing over 80 tons of red granite, the imposing statue seems to step forward to welcome us. Before the GEM, it stood at the entrance of Cairo's railway station in the square named after the pharaoh. It had to be placed inside the museum even before the hall's construction, as it was impossible to bring it through the doors due to its exceptional dimensions. As for the grand staircase, it is itself designed as a work of art and offers a breathtaking view of the pyramids. It is adorned with colossal statues of pharaohs, sarcophagi, and priceless objects arranged according to four precise themes following a spectacular staging: statues of kings and queens, places of prayer, the king's relationship with the gods, and finally the sarcophagi of kings and queens. At the top of the steps and all along the route, the highlight of the show is, of course, the breathtaking view of the pyramids. A Few Wonders The museum brings together the most beautiful treasures of ancient Egypt and contains thousands of pieces, all meticulously restored in situ, in the museum's laboratories. Furthermore, thousands of other pieces are awaiting their turn to be restored. Among these wonders is a floor dedicated to Tutankhamun. The young pharaoh, who died at 19, fascinates tourists worldwide as much as Egyptologists and other researchers. This is mainly due to the incredible treasure discovered intact in his tomb by archaeologist Howard Carter, whose discovery marked a decisive turning point in the history of Egyptology. Tutankhamun's treasure includes over 5000 objects displayed in 2 galleries spanning 7000 square meters. Among the fabulous pieces belonging to Tutankhamun is his famous funerary mask, a masterpiece of ancient Egyptian craftsmanship and goldsmithing. It is made of solid gold set with turquoise, lapis lazuli, quartz... and weighs nearly 10 kg. It was placed in the pharaoh's tomb to allow his soul to recognize his body in the afterlife. Also on display in the two galleries dedicated to him are his golden throne and his six war chariots, his three funerary beds, one of which is solid gold, and hundreds of objects (jewelry, amulets, clothing, etc.) intended to accompany him into the afterlife. The Boat of Khufu Another major attraction of the museum is the Khufu Boats Hall, where one can admire the pharaoh's solar boat, builder of the Great Pyramid. It measures 43.5 meters long by 5.9 meters wide and is over 4,600 years old. A symbolic object of Egyptian mythology linked to the cycle of Ra, the sun god, it is considered the oldest intact ship in the world. This masterpiece, made of cedar wood from Lebanon, highly prized in antiquity, was intended to transport the deceased king to the afterlife. It was found intact in a pit, but disassembled into 1224 pieces, like a puzzle. It took experts 10 years to reassemble it, as its mechanism contained neither screws nor nails. In our next article, we will study the museum's impact, a source of national pride, on Egypt's cultural influence and economy.

Lebanon and, more specifically, the Shiite community commemorated a few days ago the 25th anniversary of the death, on January 10, 2001, of the former president of the Supreme Shiite Council (SSC), Imam Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddine. The man who was, for more than two decades, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shiite community, succeeding Imam Moussa Sadr – who mysteriously disappeared during a visit to Libya in 1978 – left behind a political 'will' whose existence and true scope are ignored (or concealed...) by many Lebanese and foreigners, particularly in academic and journalistic circles. The historical and truly existential dimension of this legacy is highlighted by the dramatic developments currently unfolding in Lebanon and the region. More than ever, the Land of the Cedars and the Levant need the contribution to public life of a personality combining, like Imam Shamseddine, moral authority, open-mindedness, and a clear vision of current socio-political realities. At the end of his life, and although weakened by illness, he had recorded his memoirs and recommendations on cassette regarding the course of conduct that Shiites in Lebanon and the region should adopt. He particularly urged his co-religionists not to have a 'political project specific to Shiites' and to fight for their rights 'by integrating into the society in which they live'. Clearly, he subtly rejected the principle of exporting the Iranian Islamic Revolution initiated by the Pasdaran in the aftermath of Khomeini's rise to power in 1979. He particularly challenged, in this context, the system established by Khomeini, based on the authority of the Walih el-Faqih, namely the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution – in this case, himself and his successors – endowed, in his capacity as a direct descendant of the Prophet, with absolute and unchallenged decision-making power on strategic matters, including decisions of war and peace. By establishing such a political system, Ayatollah Khomeini had sown the seeds of chronic regional destabilization, the result of an autocratic power's behavior that would plunge the entire Middle East into chaos for over four decades. And for good reason: the Wilayat el-Faqih was designed to be an absolute reference authority not only for Iranians but also for all Shiites. In terms of religious practice, every Shiite group or individual must indeed choose their own spiritual leader. However, by granting himself power based on a divine 'legitimacy' (thus indisputable), the new Leader of the Islamic Republic (Khomeini, then Khamenei, currently) placed himself above all other religious authorities, serving, moreover – and this is where the problem lies – a transnational, expansionist, hegemonic, repressive political project that sanctifies violence as a mode of action. This Khomeinist 'graft' on the Shiite socio-political-religious body could only be a source of tension and conflict in the Arab world, under the weight of the 'exportation of the Islamic Revolution' and the divine power granted to the Supreme Leader. As a true visionary, Sheikh Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddine had seen the danger looming, clearly distancing himself from the foundations of Wilayat el-Faqih and the expansionist ambitions of the Pasdaran, much like the spiritual leader of the Shiite community in Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, Imam Moussa Sadr, and even Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, whom many Western observers mistakenly called the 'spiritual guide of Hezbollah', whereas, on the contrary, he challenged the divine power of the Walih el-Faqih and, consequently, expressed reservations about Hezbollah's conduct in Lebanon. More than twenty-five years later, events have illustrated the visionary nature of Sheikh Shamseddine's political legacy. In fact, it is on the basis of the 'Shiite-specific (transnational) project', denounced by the former president of the SSC, that the Iranian regime resorted to militiamen from Arab countries to brutally suppress its own people in bloodshed a few days ago. The slogan 'Neither Gaza, nor Hezbollah, we give our lives for Iran', launched by Iranian revolutionaries, alone summarizes the entire historical and existential dimension of the vision expressed by Imam Shamseddine. In this context, it primarily reflects the serious resentment towards Arab populations expressed by a large part of Iranian public opinion, which does not understand how the radical wing of the Iranian regime could spend tens of billions of dollars to maintain proxies in Arab countries while Iran faces an unprecedented severe socio-economic crisis. It is also on this same basis of the 'Shiite-specific (transnational) project' that Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, constantly prioritizes the supreme interest of the Iranian regime at the expense of the imperatives of building a strong and sovereign Lebanese state. He even went so far as to utter threats against Foreign Minister Joe Raggi (deemed too sovereignist!), not forgetting to brandish the specter of internal unrest if the government were to implement its decision to disarm Hezbollah… During one of his recent public interventions, President Joseph Aoun called on Hezbollah to 'reason,' which openly displeased Naim Qassem (the supreme interest of the mullahs' Iran requires it!). To stop such a suicidal drift by the pro-Iranian faction, an imperative step must be taken today, urgently: alignment with the recommendations, with the prophetic political legacy, of Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddine. Even if this must inevitably lead – they will have to admit it one day – to a genuine 'cultural revolution' to reshape their political doctrine developed in the mid-1980s...

The notion of the “Old Continent” refers to a Europe shaped by a long history, a plurality of peoples, and a singular spiritual depth. However, this Europe is not a fixed reality: it has been conceived, reconstructed, and reinterpreted according to different eras. Two visions allow us to measure its evolution and contemporary tensions: the one elaborated in the post-World War II period by Robert Schuman and Christian democracy; and the one described today by Chantal Delsol in L’Insurrection des particularités. Between these two moments, Europe has moved from a project of civilization based on reconciliation to an identity crisis marked by fragmentation and strategic impotence. In the immediate post-war period, Robert Schuman's thought was rooted in a traumatic historical experience. Europe emerged exhausted from two world wars born on its soil. The implicit motto that then inhabited consciences was simple, radical, almost existential: “Never again.” Never again fratricidal war, never again murderous nationalisms, never again the denial of human dignity. This absolute refusal to return to barbarism constitutes the moral foundation of the European project as conceived by Schuman, Adenauer, and De Gasperi, all from the tradition of Christian democracy. For Schuman, Europe is not primarily an economic or technocratic space, but a community of destiny founded on a certain idea of man. This anthropology is inherited from Christianity, not as an imposed dogma, but as a cultural matrix that shaped the European conception of the person, law, and power. It is in this sense that he affirmed, in a famous phrase: “Democracy will be Christian or it will not be” (1). Far from signifying a confusion between faith and politics, this phrase expresses the conviction that democracy cannot survive without a moral foundation recognizing the dignity of the human person, responsibility, solidarity, and the limits of power. The Declaration of May 9, 1950, concretely translates this vision. Europe will not be built by decree, but by concrete achievements creating de facto solidarity. It is not about abolishing nations, but about inscribing them in a superior framework capable of neutralizing their destructive impulses. The “Old Continent” is then conceived as a civilization aware of its Greco-Roman, Christian, and humanist roots, and determined to transform its tragic memory into a principle of lasting peace. Christian democracy thus proposes an original synthesis: unity without uniformity, plurality without confrontation, memory without resentment. Next article: The Insurrection of Particularities: A Europe Unarmed in the Face of History (1) René Lejeune, Robert Schuman, père de l'Europe, Fayard (p 169).

« Lebanon is distinguished by the unique proximity between the sea and the mountains. Lebanon's imposing mountain ranges stretch parallel to the Mediterranean Sea coastline, creating a striking geographical diversity that brings together magnificent beaches, green valleys, and snow-covered mountains in winter. » A typical introduction found in all Lebanese geography textbooks, describing a one-of-a-kind country, equally captivating for locals and tourists alike. It is therefore not surprising to see the massive influx of foreign nationals, particularly Syrians and Iranians (who, it seems, contribute to a sudden increase in the occupancy rate of certain hotels): Lebanon is paying the price of its success. It is true that we would have preferred to see Westerners or Arabs from the Persian Gulf disembark, but unfortunately, we do not choose our tourists, and it was indeed the ministry concerned that came up with the slogan « Ahla Bhal Tallé » without specifying the nationalities of the « tallé ». Indeed, it must be noted that the Syrians in question suddenly decided to visit the country starting in December 2024, with the vast majority of them preferring to settle at the borders, in the Beqaa Valley, known for its harsh winter climate and dry summer, but necessarily less harsh and dry than the political climate reigning in Syria, for those who, precisely, precipitously decided to set foot on Lebanese soil. The same goes for the Iranians who very recently – according to circulating information – invaded certain hotels, a more subtle variant than the invasion carried out in May 2008 by their local militia, but which remains troublesome, insofar as there might be certain individuals listed in the databases of Israeli 'swallows' whose buzzing never ceases to 'brighten' our days. At heart, these tourists of another kind will acclimate very easily in some of our regions. Indeed, there are beaches that meet their social and cultural criteria: unisex, very virile, where Mohammad Raad officiates as GO (Yelling Organizer), as entertainer it will be Hussein Hajj Hassan whose physique recalls that of Gordon Shumway (thus validating one of Michel Hayek's most ludicrous premonitions), and, of course, Naim Kassem as DJ, replacing the militia's David Guetta, the one who made the republic vibrate with his finger. It is regrettable, however, to note that Lebanon, as a host country, only receives second- or even third-tier personalities, while celebrities and other VIPs prefer to go east of the Berlin Wall (which is actually west for them), to Russia, despite the notorious fragility of balconies and the purgative effect of their teas. According to reports published by « World Population Review » at the end of 2025, Lebanon holds the position of first runner-up in the Arab world and fifth globally in terms of the prevalence of mental illnesses and psychological disorders. We're already an open-air madhouse, and if on top of that, we had to serve as an asylum for criminals….

After defining the geographical scope of the Mediterranean Union and explaining why adjacent seas and non-Mediterranean riparian countries were excluded, the Baltic and Nordic Councils and their objectives will be presented in order to identify what brings them closer to this Union and the differences in their respective goals. The geographical boundaries of the Mediterranean Union were precisely defined: the Mediterranean Sea, delimited by the Straits of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles, as well as the Suez Canal. The countries concerned included those forming what may be called the European Mediterranean arc (including Portugal, by virtue of its language, history, and culture), as well as the southern and eastern riparian countries, numbering sixteen: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey; for the Adriatic: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, and Montenegro; and finally Mauritania, for a reason similar—though not identical—to that justifying Portugal’s inclusion. The initiator intended that the Mediterranean should not appear as a mere continuous succession of countries surrounding an empty space, but rather as a living space of production and human, commercial, and cultural exchanges, composed of the Mediterranean Sea and the countries bordering it. It was conceived as an inseparable whole: a union of countries, thus of lands, but also a union of these lands with the sea—the central space that connects them. Yet it appears that the objectives assigned are essentially land-based. None directly concern the sea. At the time, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded that this project include all twenty-seven countries of the European Union. To avoid any confrontation, French President Nicolas Sarkozy had to modify the project by integrating all EU member states and adapting its name in order to remove any ambiguity. It is nonetheless sometimes useful to revisit the different phases in the creation of a process in order to understand the reasons for its successes or failures and, consequently, the difficulties encountered by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in progressing at the desired pace. We shall see that it is not a failure, but perhaps—at least in part—a victim of the constraints inherent in its macro-structure, of the kind Europe is well known for producing. Two institutions are presented here: the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which bears a distant resemblance—through its ambitions and objectives—to the Mediterranean Union (or the UfM), and, for the record, the Nordic Council. The latter will be dealt with very briefly, as it is not centered on or around the Baltic Sea in its vocation. The Council of the Baltic Sea States This Council was established in 1992 at the initiative of Germany and Denmark to promote cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, particularly in the areas of security and the environment. It plays the role of a regional cooperation platform addressing civil, environmental, maritime, and societal issues. It is a regional forum bringing together ten states—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Sweden—of which all but Iceland and Norway are members of the European Union. Countries such as France also hold observer status at the national level. Its secretariat is based in Stockholm. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine altered certain aspects of the Council, notably with the suspension of Moscow. Its objectives are to: * promote regional identity and cooperation around the Baltic Sea; * foster sustainable and prosperous development of the region; * ensure a safe and secure region (civil security, protection of people, cross-border cooperation); * guarantee environmental protection and democratic resilience; * encourage human contacts and balanced economic growth. Its fields of action notably include maritime protection, the sustainable maritime economy, combating human trafficking and organized crime, as well as education, youth, and culture, with an enhanced role in European regional cooperation in Northeast Europe. The Nordic Council Created in 1952, the Nordic Council, along with its ministerial counterpart established in 1971, aims to strengthen cooperation among the Nordic countries across a wide range of fields (mobility, environment, culture, society). Its vision is clearly oriented toward political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation and integration. It constitutes a model of democratic regional union. The Council brings together Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, along with their autonomous territories (Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Åland). Its headquarters are in Copenhagen. Its core objectives are to promote an integrated Nordic area—free movement, equality, sustainability, and innovation—and to uphold democratic values and regional solidarity. The Nordic Council does not include Germany or the other EU member states. It is nonetheless mentioned to demonstrate that geographically constituted institutions, bringing together certain EU countries around common projects with non-EU countries within a defined geographical area, coexist and operate actively. They likely function more smoothly than the UfM, which is vast and perhaps too heavy to carry and to operate dynamically. Only the Council of the Baltic Sea States can be compared to the Mediterranean Union, as both are structured around a maritime ensemble based on riparian countries. The objectives of the Baltic Council, however, do not match the scale of those of the Mediterranean Union. Yet the latter, despite encompassing the Mediterranean Sea—along with an Adriatic component and an Atlantic opening—remains devoid of truly maritime objectives. The Mediterranean Union was short-lived. It gave way to the Union for the Mediterranean, which exists today. This is essential for Mediterranean peoples. Lebanon has its rightful place within it. Next article: The transformation of the Barcelona Process into the Union for the Mediterranean (3/5) Previous article: Mediterranean Union: what became of the Barcelona Process? (1/5)

Do not count your chickens before they are hatched. The Tehran regime has not fallen; and even if it has been weakened, it is not on the verge of collapse. While the demonstrations and riots that have erupted in Iran’s cities—led by academics, women, bazaar merchants, and other segments of society—are noteworthy, one may well ask whether they have surpassed in scale those that toppled the Shah in 1979. Yet these convulsions and protests could suddenly reach an unforeseen level of gravity, and it would not be illusory to bet on their success, as the German chancellor has openly suggested. Even in the event of an Israeli or American strike! Still, we are unlikely to witness any time soon the rout of Iran’s politico-clerical elite, nor that of its mamluks—the Pasdaran and the Basij*. These are not people who will take flight in the face of unarmed protesters. Moreover, Ayatollah Khamenei, even weakened by illness, is not Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who was easily overthrown in 1953 by a coup engineered by the American CIA and the British MI6 to restore Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Short of the regime turning against itself, the country’s future will be decided on the barricades. The regime’s heavyweights will not relinquish their hold, and the Revolutionary Guards have only one desire: to settle scores with the internal enemy. All these actors have far too much to lose from a change in power. And having been deeply implicated in corruption and repression, where could the barons and pillars of the state seek refuge? In China or the Russian Federation—Venezuela being presumably off-limits to them? That said, under external pressure the ruling class may jettison some ballast. It could even curtail the authority of the Supreme Leader, or make concessions on the nuclear issue, but it will not relinquish power. Let us be clear: a hostile cyberattack, or even an American bombing campaign without boots on the ground, is not capable of toppling the reviled regime. Once again, it will be up to the people who have taken to the streets to wrest victory by force. An initially asymmetric civil war, as was the case in Syria, therefore remains likely. In such a scenario, Russian and/or Chinese intervention should not be ruled out, if only to counterbalance Israeli and American interference. And Lebanon, then? That said, we are not out of the woods: if blood is to be spilled in the provinces of the Islamic Republic, one should expect a conflagration in Lebanon. For should it find itself threatened at its very core, the regime of the mullahs would not hesitate to set the entire Middle East ablaze. Yes, a suicidal decision cannot be excluded on the part of those who have been sliding downhill for less than two years and are living in a staggering state of denial. Hence the call to stay alert and vigilant. * If their current strength reaches 200,000 soldiers, one must not lose sight of the fact that “at least 2 million Pasdaran, and as many Basij members, have undergone the harrowing experience of the front. This brotherhood of arms explains the subsequent influence of their networks of demobilized veterans’ solidarity throughout the social body.” Jean-Paul Burdy, “Iran: A Militarization of the Regime by the Revolutionary Guards,” Middle East Magazine, January 10, 2024.