Articles

Like all museums in the world, the National Museum of Beirut is the guardian of a history grappling with the throes of oblivion. However, it is not limited to this mission: it also aims to be rooted in the present and oriented towards the future. It was in this spirit that the idea of opening an annex center to the Museum was born, intended to promote contemporary Lebanese culture, art, and artists. This center also aimed to ensure the sustainability of the National Museum of Beirut by generating revenue from cultural and social activities, as well as space rentals, among other things. This idea of a center dedicated to contemporary art emerged within the National Heritage Foundation. The annex pavilion project was championed by three women: Mona Hraoui, Rima Shéhadé, and Salma Es Said, wife of Nuhad Es Said, after whom the center is now named. However, like many projects in Lebanon, it had to face countless difficulties before seeing the light of day. Obstacles to its Construction From the very beginning of its construction on land adjacent to the National Museum of Beirut, the center encountered a major obstacle: the presence of groundwater. To avoid any risk of collapse, this problem had to be addressed even before work began. Once this obstacle was overcome, the project could finally start. And yet, no: the Covid-19 crisis then erupted, imposing a new halt to construction until the end of the pandemic. As if that weren't enough, the Beirut port explosion added to the long list of trials the country has faced. To these tragedies was further grafted the financial crisis of 2019, which seemed to deliver the final blow to the project. But that was without counting on the tenacity of the pavilion's three patrons: Mona Hraoui, Rima Shéhadé, and Salma Es Said. The Pavilion's Construction To raise the necessary funds for the project's continuation, the National Heritage Foundation, under the presidency of Mona Hraoui, launched a fundraising campaign, staking its own credibility. In collaboration with the committee in charge of the pavilion, an initial sum was raised, but it remained insufficient. It was then that Salma Es Said provided the supplementary funding, posing a single condition: to make the pavilion 'a true jewel.' This requirement was fully met, under the careful supervision of Rima Shéhadé, down to the smallest details. The pavilion finally saw the light of day in September 2024. It was named the Nuhad Es-Said Pavilion for Culture, in homage to Salma Es Said's late husband, a great art enthusiast and culture lover. Architecture and Heritage The pavilion is the work of the renowned and award-winning firm Raëd Abillama Architects, which successfully designed a versatile space capable of hosting both exhibitions and cultural events. In his conceptual approach, Raëd Abillama drew inspiration from the original plans by Pierre Leprince-Ringuet and Antoine Nahas, architects of the National Museum, which was initially intended to comprise two wings connected to the main building. Only the left wing had been built. Abillama therefore realized the right wing as a natural extension of the main building, using the same materials and based on the Museum's historical plans. This new wing is connected to the Museum by the Emir Maurice Chéhab corridor, in homage to the one who helped save the Museum during the war. It was Lebanese interior designer Jean-Louis Mainguy who had the idea to give it this name, in recognition of the decisive role played by the emir in the protection of national heritage. The Beginnings The first exhibition hosted by the Nuhad Es-Said Pavilion for Culture was 'Portes et Passages' (Doors and Passages), the result of close collaboration between the National Heritage Foundation, BeMA (Beirut Museum of Art), and the committee in charge of the pavilion. Currently, the pavilion houses two exhibitions: • From Venice to Beirut. The World in the Image of Man – The Pavilion of Lebanon at the Biennale Arte 2022 • Impressions of Paradise The history of the National Museum of Beirut and its annex, the Nuhad Es-Said Pavilion, once again proves — if further proof were needed — that Lebanon survives only thanks to the initiative, passion, and determination of committed men and women.

For much of the past four years, global energy markets have appeared deceptively calm. Oil prices have fallen by more than half since their US$ 130 peak in 2022. Natural gas prices have normalized after the shock of the war in Ukraine. Renewable energy headlines dominate the narrative, reinforcing the idea that fossil fuels are gradually being relegated to history. At first glance, the world seems well supplied. Yet beneath this surface calm lies a far more unstable reality — one shaped by chronic underinvestment, physical depletion, geopolitical concentration, and rising structural demand. The global energy system today is not resilient. It is balanced on a knife edge. The Illusion of Oversupply At around $60 per barrel, oil prices suggest abundance. The International Energy Agency projects global oil supply growth of 3.1 million barrels per day in 2025, comfortably outpacing consumption. The consensus among analysts points toward continued weakness, reinforcing the belief that energy scarcity belongs to the past. But prices at these levels come with a cost. When oil trades below the marginal cost of new production, investment slows. Not immediately, and not dramatically — but persistently. Over time, this erodes the system’s ability to respond to shocks. In the United States, shale oil — the backbone of global supply growth over the past decade — is already showing signs of strain. Shale production was the primary driver behind America’s shift from being the world’s largest oil importer to achieving self-sufficiency and eventually becoming a net exporter. Today, shale dominates U.S. crude production, accounting for roughly two-thirds of total output, driven by technological advances such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, with the Permian Basin as the main contributor. However, when WTI trades below the marginal cost of new supply — currently estimated at $70 per barrel by Enverus Intelligence Research for U.S. shale, with all-in corporate breakevens closer to $62.50 according to Rystad Energy — investment inevitably contracts. Drilling activity has already begun to decline as prices fall below incentive levels. Because shale wells decline rapidly, losing up to 50% of their output in the first year, continuous drilling is required simply to maintain production. Today’s drilling weakness therefore translates into lower production tomorrow. Globally, conventional oil fields decline by 4 to 6 percent per year. Maintaining current output requires replacing millions of barrels per day annually. When investment falls short, shortages do not appear instantly. They accumulate quietly. This is how energy markets flip from surplus to deficit. And when deficits emerge, repricing can be violent. Natural Gas: The Logistical Fault Line The global energy system rests on a quadrangular equation: Oil remains the backbone, supplying roughly 30% of total global energy Renewables provide intermittent supply Nuclear provides baseload — slowly Natural gas delivers flexibility, reliability, and speed Natural gas has become central to modern electricity systems. It provides the responsiveness and stability that renewables cannot yet deliver at scale. Natural gas is uniquely sensitive to temperature — not because demand is speculative, but because heating and cooling are non-negotiable. Cold winters in Europe, North America, or Northeast Asia immediately tighten balances. Hot summers do the same through power demand. Gas fills the gap. Gas production is not immune to decline. Persistently low prices over the past two years have led to reduced drilling in dry-gas basins, capital reallocation toward oil-weighted plays, and deferred investment in pipelines and infrastructure. Unlike oil, however, the primary constraint for natural gas is not production, but distribution: pipelines, LNG terminals, shipping fleets, specialized storage facilities, and port infrastructure. Liquefied natural gas has globalized the market. Europe, having sharply reduced its reliance on Russian pipeline gas, now depends heavily on LNG imports. Asian demand continues to grow. The United States has emerged as the world’s largest LNG exporter, tying domestic gas markets ever more closely to global demand and logistical capacity. As a result, disruptions are no longer regional. They are systemic. Energy Demand Is Rising Again, Quietly While public attention remains focused on declining fossil-fuel demand driven by electric vehicles and the spectacular growth of solar power, a new driver of energy demand is emerging: artificial intelligence. The AI revolution is not only about chips and software. It is about energy. By 2030, global data-center electricity consumption is projected to reach between 950 and 1,600 terawatt-hours, driven primarily by AI workloads. For comparison, total U.S. electricity generation in 2024 was approximately 4,400 terawatt-hours. AI alone could increase U.S. power demand by more than 20% within five years. This energy must come from somewhere. Nuclear power plants have long lead times. Solar energy, while growing rapidly, still represents only around 5% of total electricity generation, and is expected to reach roughly 20% by 2050. Natural-gas infrastructure is complex and slow to develop. Oil therefore remains, for now, the cheapest and most immediately available source of energy. The result is a paradox: even as the energy transition accelerates, energy demand is becoming more rigid — not less. Concentration of Marginal Supply: Where the Fault Line Lies The United States is both the world’s largest consumer and the world’s largest producer of oil. It is effectively self-sufficient. China, by contrast, is the second-largest consumer, at roughly 16 million barrels per day, and the world’s largest importer. It relies on a diversified set of suppliers including the Gulf countries, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Asian producers such as Indonesia, Brunei, and Myanmar. Until recently, China imported roughly 400,000 barrels per day from Venezuela, around 4% of its consumption — a flow that ended abruptly on January 3, 2026. In 2025, Iran ranked as China’s second-largest crude supplier in 2025, exporting 1.61 million barrels per day, or nearly 20% of China’s total imports. The greatest vulnerability in the global energy system lies not in demand, but in the concentration of marginal supply. Outside the United States, spare production capacity is extraordinarily concentrated. As of late 2025, OPEC+ spare capacity stood near 4 million barrels per day, roughly 4% of global consumption. On paper, this appears comfortable. In reality, it is not. Saudi Arabia controls approximately 2.4 million bpd The UAE controls around 850,000 bpd Iraq controls roughly 320,000 bpd Together, three countries hold around 70% of global spare capacity. Most other producers are already operating near maximum output. This concentration turns spare capacity from a buffer into a single point of failure. Concentration of Logistics: Where Geopolitical Risk Lies Nowhere is fragility more evident than in the Middle East. 20% of global oil consumption and a critical share of global LNG exports transit the Strait of Hormuz every day— a narrow maritime corridor between Iran and Oman with no realistic alternative. Any disruption, even temporary, would immediately expose how thin global buffers truly are. With Iran’s clerical regime facing its most serious internal and external pressures in decades, the risk of asymmetric escalation cannot be dismissed. Among the most consequential scenarios would be an attempt to disrupt maritime traffic through the strait. Such an event would represent a genuine Black Swan for global energy markets, forcing a sudden repricing of both oil and natural gas, particularly during peak winter demand in the Northern Hemisphere. A System Priced for Calm, Not Shock The prevailing narrative assumes stability: stable supply, manageable geopolitics, and a smooth energy transition. History suggests otherwise. Energy markets do not fail gradually. They fail at the margin — when low investment constrains long-term supply, when new technologies drive unexpected demand surges, and when high production and logistical concentration renders the system fragile. Under such conditions, shocks have outsized effects. Today, that margin is uncomfortably thin. Donald Trump’s renewed focus on Venezuelan oil — and potentially Iranian oil tomorrow — can also be interpreted through the lens of China’s strategic dependence on imported energy. The world is not short of energy yet. But it is dangerously short of resilience.

The now-iconic image of a young woman setting fire to the portrait of Ayatollah Khamenei to light her cigarette says it all, symbolically speaking: the Iranian theocracy is dead and buried. It is only a matter of time. Admittedly, the Iranian authorities can still repress, arrest, torture, rape, execute, and massacre with impunity, as they have done repeatedly since the Green Movement of 2008. Yet the wall of fear has definitively collapsed this time, as evidenced by the regime’s loss of control over several cities, an unprecedented development since the Islamic Revolution itself. The clerical regime is drawing its last breath. The narrative that sustained it since 1979 has been drained of all substance, and the power derived from it had long survived only through coercion, fear, and the mechanical invocation of a mythologized past in which almost no one still believed, save perhaps a handful of Qassem Soleimani’s devotees in Lebanon and Iraq. What the world is witnessing today is nothing less than the exhaustion of a political model that has ceased to generate meaning for decades. The contradiction is now frontal. On one side, a power structure irreversibly entrenched in an increasingly dictatorial logic, frozen in a political theology reduced to a purely instrumental function, serving as a cover for a system of corruption coupled with rigorist hypocrisy. Perversion elevated to a governing creed. On the other, a society in motion, driven by a youth that no longer sees itself as the heir to a revolution, but as the captive of a regime. Vitality on the march. The more the world became modern, connected, and porous, the more the Islamic Republic retreated into an authoritarian and archaic understanding of politics. This youth, eviscerated decade after decade, uprising after uprising, endlessly sacrificed on the altar of the revolution and its exportation, now aspires to something else. And nothing can obstruct its hunger for progress. The gap had become irreducible. All appeals to the sacrosanct “unity to preserve the revolutionary achievement,” long the regime’s survival mantra, could no longer suffice. That so-called unity no longer functioned as a higher principle capable of justifying sacrifices imposed in the name of nation or Islam. When severed from freedom, unity ceases to be a binding force and becomes an empty injunction, even a form of symbolic violence. Iranian society is no longer willing to indefinitely suspend its aspirations in the name of an order that guarantees neither justice, dignity, nor a future. Yet the regime continues to operate as though the revolution remained an unquestionable absolute. It persists in denying social reality in the name of revolutionary primacy, as if the founding act of 1979 were sufficient to legitimize power forever. In truth, long ago, by refusing to confront reality, that revolution had transformed into a dogma, then into an apparatus of domination. The rupture is now complete, even if a monolithic regime like the one in Tehran will never be able to grasp it. What initially gave Khomeinism its strength was not so much the promise of an Islamic order as the denunciation of a power perceived as illegitimate because subordinated to the West. The Shah’s alliance with Western powers provided the revolutionary movement with a clearly identifiable adversary, allowing heterogeneous ideological and social currents to rally around a common rejection. The revolution thus presented itself as a reclaiming of national sovereignty. Before Khomeini decided to turn it into a gulag. That lever is now inoperative. The West is no longer the symbolic anchor of the conflict, as it had been designated in 1979 to mobilize opposition to the Shah’s repressive regime. It is neither a model to emulate nor a structuring enemy. The Iranian regime is defective without it. It is defective in and of itself. By relentlessly accusing the West of orchestrating the current protests, the authorities commit a double error: they deny the political autonomy of their own society, and they paradoxically reveal the extent of their internal bankruptcy. In doing so, they accelerate their own downfall by displaying a total disconnection from reality, exactly the mistake Assad made in 2011 at the outset of the Syrian revolution. Today, the Iranian regime is confronting Iran’s new reality. Its name is freedom and modernity, though not necessarily in a Western mold, despite the regime’s crude attempt to portray it as such in order to fabricate a pseudo-unity against the protesters. Khamenei and his acolytes seem to ignore that Iran’s history long predates 1979, and that Persia is far too proud to adopt ready-made models. It will forge its own path to modernity, far removed from the perverse and criminal obsequiousness of the clerics and their absurd anathemas. Moreover, the accusation of “collusion with the West” does not bolster the regime’s legitimacy. It further erodes it. It amounts to admitting that the authorities are incapable of generating endogenous consent and survive only by inventing imaginary enemies to mask their radical disconnection from real society. Demonizing the youth, portraying it as manipulated or alienated, is an implicit acknowledgment that the bond between rulers and ruled has been severed. This rupture is also moral. The Iranian authorities long ago abandoned the principles that grounded legitimate sovereignty in both Persian tradition and classical political thought: dâd o dahéch, justice and generosity. In abandoning them, they necessarily undermined âbâdâni, prosperity, and lost khérad, wisdom. A power deprived of justice, generosity, and wisdom is, sooner or later, doomed to be overthrown. It has succumbed to the inflation of its own ego to the point of madness. It must fall. Indeed, excess has become the norm. Repression is now a mode of governance; security obsession has replaced any political vision. Violence, exercised without restraint, reflects not strength but profound fear: that of a regime that knows its authority no longer rests on consent, but on inertia and coercion. The vilayat e-faqih retains no legitimacy outside the corrupt or ideological circles it governs, or a few bands of indoctrinated Arab Shiite populations at the heart of the ruined satrapies of the Middle East. In this context, freedom, âzâdi, ceases to be an abstraction. It becomes a vital necessity. When justice is no longer guaranteed, revolt ceases to be disorder and becomes salutary. The level of injustice reached in Iran is now too high for the demand for order, long privileged at the expense of freedom, to continue functioning as a stabilizing principle. Order without justice is no longer perceived as protective, but as oppressive, unstable, deficient. The ongoing de-Khomeinisation does not necessarily imply the disappearance of all religious references from Iran’s public space. It signifies the end of a model in which religion, instrumentalized by power, claims to govern against society. What is collapsing today is the revolutionary utopia itself. Under the weight of economic regression, costly imperial adventures, systemic corruption, and ideological totalitarianism, political Islam, transformed into a project of hegemony over the individual, the community, and society, has lost its ability to respond to the expectations of a complex, educated, and connected population. It no longer produces cohesion, only resentment. It no longer inspires dreams or exaltation. It has been reduced to its simplest form: a hideous vampire feeding on the blood of a community in the name of a personal power project. That insatiable Nosferatu is the vali e-faqih. And it is high time it ended up in the dustbin of history. Or better yet, that it disintegrates into smoke under the gaze of its worst nightmare: the rebellious, free smile of unveiled Iranian women.

There are ample reasons to recoil from the term debellatio. This barbaric legal concept denotes, in international law, the subjugation of a state and its eradication through armed violence. It refers to a situation of complete military, political, and legal annihilation of a given country as a result of devastating warfare—such as that experienced by Carthage at the end of the Punic Wars, or Nazi Germany at the fall of Berlin in May 1945. And what about Lebanon? Is it not at risk of meeting a similar fate, supposedly in the name of the “acts of resistance” of the Hezb? Normalization, but at what cost? Does this mean that the Abraham Accords, in order to bind our country to their triumphant convoy, require a prior debellatio—that is, the subjugation of recalcitrant territories to the pax americana? These international agreements, concluded in 2020 between Israel and several Gulf states, indeed set in motion a process of diplomatic, economic, and security normalization between Arab regimes and the Hebrew state. In doing so, they relegated to fierce opposition the advocates of the so-called “axis of resistance” (al-mumana‘a), namely Iran and its three “H’s”: Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah.* Once this process was launched, Lebanon would sooner or later be forced to choose its path. Yet the Hezb cannot accommodate such an “expedient,” which takes no account of the interests of its Iranian patron. It will therefore play the role of the spoiler, preventing any forward movement until a compromise is reached between the United States and the Islamic Republic of the mullahs—if such a compromise ever materializes. Needless to say, in the ongoing arm-wrestling match, Iran’s nuclear program has already supplanted the Palestinian question, now relegated to the sidelines. Natanz, Fordow, and other nuclear sites have become the principal stumbling blocks on the road to regional de-escalation. A paradigm shift Let us restate the issue: if the Abraham Accords threaten to cost us dearly as Lebanese, it is because they steer us toward normalization—something that would “upend the traditional balance based on Arab solidarity,” a solidarity cemented by hostility toward Israel. In short, were these Accords to be implemented, they would usher in a genuine paradigm shift. That said, the Hezb, which holds the Lebanese state by the throat, cannot come to terms with abandoning armed struggle. Unless it receives a direct order from Tehran, it will not lay down its weapons: they constitute its very raison d’être and define its modus operandi. From its recalcitrant perspective, it is preferable to resist in support of Iran, and to embrace the martyrdom of Gaza, rather than submit to the demands of peace. The allure of ruins One nuance, however: with regard to the Hezb, the concept of debellatio can only be invoked metaphorically. From a legal standpoint, it does not apply, since the Party of God is not a state, but merely a politico-military organization. Yet this valid objection is, in reality, little more than a rhetorical dodge. For it overlooks the fact that this Iranian-backed party has penetrated and entrenched itself at every level of Lebanese state. In its escalation, might it not be tempted to drag our country into a maelstrom—an impetuous whirlpool that sweeps everything in its path? Whether in the form of a direct clash with Israel, a confrontation with the Syrian regime, or, worse still, a senseless and devastating civil war. The Hezb’s fascination with rubble hardly needs to be emphasized. * Syria no longer appearing on the list of subservient actors.

Bogota, Colombia, by Maxime Pluvinet An impromptu development that occurred in the middle of this week could significantly impact the ongoing events in Latin America. A thaw in relations is (timidly) emerging between the United States and Colombia, as relations between the two countries have been particularly tense for several months. Accused by Washington of facilitating the actions of drug traffickers in the American continent, particularly targeting the United States, Colombian President Gustavo Petro was recently targeted by American sanctions. This bilateral tension escalated significantly following the 'blitz' operation carried out on January 3rd in Caracas by American forces. This intervention led to the arrest by a US commando unit of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who was then extradited to the USA. Following this aggressive attack, President Donald Trump pointed the finger at the Colombian head of state, implying that he could be one of the next targets in the fight against drug trafficking. But an unexpected development occurred on this front in the last forty-eight hours: just as President Petro was preparing to deliver an incendiary speech and heavily criticize the Trump Administration, a telephone conversation took place between the head of the White House and the Colombian president. According to reliable sources in Bogota, this telephone conversation took place in a relaxed and serene atmosphere. As a result, Petro's speech was much less virulent than observers had expected. In diplomatic circles in Bogota, it is indicated that this turnaround marks the beginning of a thaw between the United States and Colombia. A process of frank discussions and talks would have been initiated 'with the blessing of Saudi Arabia and certain European countries,' according to diplomatic circles. A meeting was notably held at the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a representative of the Trump Administration. « This is a first step on the path of a long bilateral dialogue process that must cover several dossiers of primary importance, including the lifting of sanctions against President Petro, who should be able to travel to Washington to conduct negotiations with President Trump, » affirms a high-ranking diplomatic source in Bogota. This dynamic, if confirmed and brought to fruition, will undoubtedly introduce a significant new element into the delicate geopolitical chess game currently being played out in the American continent.

The question of the Iranian regime's future today arises not as a theoretical question, but as a consequence of the unprecedented accumulation of internal crises and external pressures since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. However, the importance of this question lies not only in the fate of Tehran, but also in the repercussions of any change within the Iranian decision-making center on its regional structures, notably Hezbollah in Lebanon, considered the most successful model of a 'functional weapon' beyond Iranian borders. First: The nature of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah The impact of any upheaval in the Iranian regime on Hezbollah cannot be analyzed without a precise description of the nature of the relationship between the two. This relationship: • Is not a circumstantial political alliance. • Is not limited to financial or military support. • Is based on an ideological, organizational, and strategic link. Hezbollah emerged in the context of the export of the revolution and developed according to the doctrine of the 'Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist' (Wilayat al-Faqih), which confers a supranational character on its supreme authority. Therefore, any modification within this center of authority affects not only the level of resources, but also the legitimacy of its role, function, and decision-making power. Second: The Iranian regime between security resilience and structural erosion The Iranian regime demonstrates a clear capacity to control the population through: • The cohesion of the Revolutionary Guards. • Control over key sectors of the rentier economy. • The management of repression at a calculated cost. However, this cohesion masks a structural erosion manifested by: • A decline in popular legitimacy. • The rupture of the social contract. • The transformation of ideology from a mobilizing force into a burden. • A silent division within the elites between the logic of the state and that of perpetual revolution. This model, structurally, resembles historical ideological systems that did not collapse at the height of protests, but rather when they lost the ability to manage their internal contradictions. Third: Historical Comparison – Lessons to Apply 1. The Soviet Union The Soviet Union did not collapse as a result of a direct popular revolution, but rather due to: • Prolonged economic exhaustion. • The inability to reform ideology from within. • The loss of control over the periphery before the collapse of the center. Proxy parties in Eastern Europe did not collapse immediately, but they suddenly lost their function when the center disappeared. This model can be partially applied to Hezbollah if Iran's ability to finance and provide strategic protection to it diminishes. 2. The Shah's regime Despite a different context, the fall of the Shah demonstrates that: • Powerful institutions are insufficient if they hesitate at the decisive moment. • Legitimacy, once lost, cannot be restored by force. • External forces cannot save a regime that has lost its internal cohesion. Ironically, the regime that overthrew the Shah is today facing a similar dynamic, with the difference that it possesses a network of regional armed groups. 3. Arab regimes after 2011 The Arab experience has shown that: • Regimes do not always fall, but they lose their ability to maintain total control. • Affiliated armed groups become more aggressive as central power weakens. • Fragile states pay a double price for this weakness. Fourth: Possible scenarios for the impact of Iranian transformation on Hezbollah 1. Continuity and gradual decline In this scenario, the regime remains in place, but its ability to: • Provide substantial funding. • Manage open confrontations. • Protect its allies from international pressure is reduced. This would lead Hezbollah to: • Reduce the stakes of engagement. • Focus on internal issues. • Redefine its priorities. 2. Compensatory tensions A regime in crisis could resort to: • Regional escalation. • The use of its allies as a means of deterrence. This scenario is the most dangerous for Lebanon, as it transforms the Lebanese arena into a space for compensating for the weakness of the central government. 3. Strategic transformation If a fundamental change occurs in the structure of the Iranian regime, Hezbollah will face a historic choice: • Either transform into a full-fledged Lebanese party, with all necessary redefinitions of its armament and role. • Or find itself confined to a specific environment, accelerating its internal isolation. Fifth point: Lebanon, a fragile system facing external transformations Lebanon is not merely a spectator of this trajectory, but an integral part of it. The weakness of the Lebanese state: • Makes any regional upheaval more devastating. • Prevents the absorption of shocks. • Transforms internal divisions into instruments of external conflict. Conversely, any decline in Iranian hegemony theoretically opens an opportunity to restore balance, but this opportunity remains conditioned by the existence of: • A comprehensive national project. • The ability to manage the transition without resorting to vengeance. • The will of the Shiites to break the monopoly of representation. Therefore, even if the imminent collapse of the mullahs' regime cannot be predicted with certainty, it can be affirmed that this regime has entered a prolonged period of structural instability. In such phases, the pillars of the regime do not collapse immediately, but gradually lose: • The clarity of its functioning. • The solidity of its support. • The ability to impose previous power structures. Given its fragility, Lebanon will be the first affected, not by the final collapse itself, but by the process of erosion. The real challenge is not to predict the end of the Iranian regime, but to assess Lebanon's capacity to confront a Middle East where Tehran is no longer able to exert its influence as before.