Trump and the Iraqi Bet…

Will Donald Trump have better luck with Iraq than he has had with Iran? The question naturally arises after the exceptionally warm welcome the U.S. president extended to Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in Washington. Trump lavished praise on al-Zaidi, overlooking the fact that, until not long ago, he owned a bank that had been placed under U.S. sanctions on charges of laundering money for the benefit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Trump received the Iraqi prime minister at the White House at a time when intermittent clashes between the United States and Iran have resumed, with particular focus on the Strait of Hormuz. The American president discovered, rather belatedly, that the memorandum of understanding he signed with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was, in reality, worth very little. A wide gulf still separates Washington from Tehran. Each side continues to interpret the memorandum according to its own interests. On the American side, the agreement had been negotiated by Vice President J. D. Vance, accompanied by special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The renewed confrontation between Washington and Tehran is ultimately a reflection of Trump’s profound disappointment with the outcome of the Islamabad process and the failure of Pakistan’s mediation efforts.

Ali al-Zaidi has succeeded in rehabilitating his political standing and rising to the office of prime minister, the most powerful position in Iraq, after the U.S. president vetoed the return of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the leading Shiite figure within the so-called Coordination Framework.

So far, al-Zaidi has demonstrated genuine resolve through his government’s anti-corruption campaign. Yet that campaign remains incomplete because it has not reached the major figures who have stood at the heart of Iraq’s corruption since 2003, when the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, with all its flaws, before effectively handing this strategically important country over to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

What Iraq is now expected to do under Ali al-Zaidi’s government is to chart a course independent of Iran. That, however, appears highly unlikely, for one simple reason: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still controls the country’s principal levers of power. The clearest evidence of this remains the continued prominence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization comprising several sectarian militias loyal to Tehran that continues to serve as one of the main centers of gravity in Iraqi political life. The PMF even assumed a security role during the funeral ceremonies for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Karbala and Najaf, attended by influential figures such as Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri, and Qais al-Khazali. Even more telling, the day of Khamenei’s funeral was declared an official public holiday in Iraq.

Sooner or later, Iraq will face its moment of reckoning. The issue extends far beyond an anti-corruption campaign that is unlikely to progress much further than it already has. The real challenge lies in the weapons held by the various factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as by other Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Contrary to what President Trump appears to believe, neither Ali al-Zaidi nor any other Iraqi leader will find it easy to free Iraq from Iran’s grip so long as Tehran continues to hold the real keys to power in Baghdad. How does al-Zaidi explain the launch of drones from Iraqi territory toward Kuwait? How does he account for the continued attacks on the Kuwaiti consulate in Basra, while the Islamic Republic persists in targeting the Arab Gulf states and Jordan under the pretext of retaliating against American strikes?

Equally revealing was the seizure by the Syrian authorities, at the Iraqi border, of a shipment of weapons that included 150 drones and missiles en route to Baniyas, home to an oil refinery. The weapons were reportedly destined for Hezbollah, which the Syrian authorities described as a terrorist organization. Who carefully packed these weapons in Iraq before sending them through Syria to Hezbollah and into Lebanon? Is the mere formation of an Iraqi investigative committee enough to ensure that no one in Iraq continues to sympathize with Hezbollah?

There is no doubt that the Iraqi government’s decision to designate the Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is a step of the utmost importance. Yet one fundamental reality remains: at least for now, Ali al-Zaidi’s government has proven incapable of making a complete break with Hezbollah, which has managed to penetrate more than one Iraqi militia that continues to sympathize with it. But who knows? Perhaps, through its position on the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi government is merely throwing dust in people’s eyes rather than confronting the reality of what might be called the “Iraqi Hezbollah.”

Trump spoke at length about the importance of Iraqi oil and what it represents for American companies. One cannot help but fear that his bet on Iraq may fare no better than the one he placed on Iran and on the memorandum of understanding that a faction within his administration reached with the Islamic Republic.

Questions of this kind will continue to linger so long as no profound change takes place in Iran. Such a change may come… or it may never come. Until then, the entire region, Iraq included, will remain hostage to that uncertainty, whether Ali al-Zaidi is in power… or not.