The Funeral of a Regime
The funeral of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the largest state funerals ever held in the Middle East. Popular emotion overwhelmed the official ceremony, transforming it into a spontaneous farewell as immense crowds accompanied their leader’s coffin to its final resting place in 1970.
In November 2004, three continents, Europe, Africa, and Asia, bid farewell to the Palestinian symbol Yasir Arafat. Paris honored him with the dignity reserved for monarchs, Cairo welcomed Palestine, while in Ramallah every official arrangement was overtaken by the sheer weight of popular grief. Palestinians carried the coffin on their own shoulders, their eyes overflowing with tears for the man who had forged their national identity. His passing was rendered even more poignant by Ariel Sharon’s reference to “the hand of fate.” The Palestinian people answered with unmistakable defiance: “Do not rejoice. Justice is on our side.”
In Britain, the world witnessed in 2022 what was arguably the most magnificent state funeral of this century: that of Queen Elizabeth II, attended by hundreds of heads of state, government leaders, and reigning monarchs. Every detail of the ceremony had been meticulously planned by the late Queen herself. It reflected the institutional wisdom of the monarchy through her own character and her deeply pragmatic vision of the state, society, and public life. One could almost imagine that she had consciously accompanied her own funeral, content with what she had accomplished for both the Crown and the Kingdom.
Yesterday, millions of loyal followers of the Supreme Leader marched behind Ali Khamenei, shedding abundant tears with remarkable discipline. Surrounding him stood only a handful of foreign dignitaries, but countless generals and senior officials of the Islamic Republic. The ceremony thus became a vast demonstration of loyalty, now the regime’s foremost source of strength after the destruction of its power.
Yet such a display is unlikely to persuade the tens of millions of Iranians who watched from afar that the security apparatus, even with the backing of the regime’s faithful supporters, is capable of preserving the system on its own. In reality, the procession seemed less like the funeral of a leader than the funeral of the regime itself, a regime that, when its own day of collapse comes, will find no one left to accompany it.
A Cascade of Challenges
The first statement came from the Supreme Leader, who declared: “We will certainly take revenge, and soon.” In doing so, he invoked the language of religious obligation, effectively calling upon anyone capable of carrying out such an act. The rhetoric immediately recalled the fatwa issued decades earlier by the first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, calling for the killing of the British novelist Salman Rushdie following the publication of his celebrated novel The Satanic Verses.
The second statement came from the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who announced the “closure of the Strait of Hormuz until further notice.” Although the Supreme Leader did not explicitly identify the target of this promised retaliation, the crowds gathered at his predecessor’s funeral filled that silence by chanting, “Death to Trump” and “Death to Netanyahu.”
Between threats of assassination and revenge issued by the regime’s highest religious authority, the announced closure of the Strait, and attacks on commercial shipping in Omani territorial waters, the conflict has entered a new and far more dangerous phase. The initial understanding between the parties has collapsed, the truce has unraveled, and competing interpretations of broadly worded provisions have given way to a renewed exchange of military blows, each side acting according to its own capabilities.
Many of those who criticized the wording of the memorandum overlooked one fundamental point: it had already fulfilled Washington’s primary objective by enabling the United States to disengage from the war in its original form. The Iranian leadership, so confident in its negotiating skill, quickly discovered that what it regarded as “Persian cunning” was no match for American statecraft. In international affairs, practical outcomes are determined by actual balances of power rather than by political swagger or clever tactical maneuvering. It was sufficient for Washington to acknowledge, at least for the time being, Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait, while confining that recognition strictly to internationally recognized territorial waters.
Meanwhile, coordination with the Sultanate of Oman enabled the U.S. Navy to bypass Iranian restrictions by using the southern maritime route running along Oman’s coastline. Tehran thereby lost its last meaningful strategic card, while simultaneously alienating a mediator that had long remained cooperative and remarkably accommodating, even within its own territorial waters.
This marked the turning point that unsettled the Iranian leadership. Having substituted the “Strait card” for the “nuclear card,” it believed it had successfully diverted negotiations away from their original objective, namely changing the regime’s behavior, toward a debate focused solely on whether the Strait of Hormuz would remain open or be closed.
In doing so, the White House succeeded in reshuffling the strategic deck, both on the American domestic stage and within NATO, following the outcomes of the Ankara Summit.
Before the Supreme Leader’s funeral procession had even come to an end, Iran’s military leadership discovered that reality had fallen far short of its expectations. The victories it had promised its own public evaporated faster than a stick of incense burns away.
If the euphoria surrounding what Tehran portrayed as a diplomatic triumph following the announcement of the memorandum ultimately disappeared along Oman’s southern maritime corridor, the mobilization of millions of supporters chanting slogans of death and revenge remains incapable of altering the actual balance of power, even if it temporarily boosts the morale of a people living under oppression and led by a leadership largely indifferent to the cost of its own policies.
The Iranian leadership thus found itself confronted with the American-Omani alternative, one designed to keep the Strait of Hormuz permanently open in accordance with international law. It is against this backdrop that the recent surge of radicalization and recklessness should be understood, reflected in attacks on passing commercial vessels, on several Arab Gulf states, and on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
One fact, however, stands out. Iran has shown extraordinary caution in avoiding any direct strike against Israel. Likewise, a direct military confrontation with the United States Navy remains entirely out of the question.
This reflects a straightforward strategic calculation. From Tehran’s perspective, attacks against commercial shipping and Arab states do not provoke Washington’s anger. On the contrary, they encourage those same countries to purchase additional American air defense systems. At the same time, the Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, have no intention of allowing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to drag them into a war on Tehran’s timetable or under its chosen conditions. They possess a defensive strategy rooted in a position of strength and increasingly exercise an influential regional and international political role.
If mediation constitutes one expression of that strategy, it serves broader long-term political objectives. This has become even more apparent since Oman moved away from its previous posture, while Qatar’s mediation has gradually been reduced to its financial dimension, Doha continuing to hold substantial Iranian assets frozen under international sanctions.
Meanwhile, Islamabad, Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara continue to maintain open channels with the Iranian presidency and the Foreign Ministry in order to preserve diplomatic mediation. Every day, these four capitals reaffirm their opposition to war and their determination to extinguish its flames through the application of international law, particularly regarding freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. That, precisely, is where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has suffered its most significant defeat.
We have now entered a war of attrition on multiple fronts. Day after day, Iran’s new leadership provides the White House with everything it needs to sustain this war through the end of the year. Such a trajectory serves the American president’s domestic political agenda while also strengthening his position internationally. It unfolds against the backdrop of a noticeable easing of partisan tensions in the United States, without suggesting that genuine political unity or consensus has taken hold within the superpower that continues to shape much of the global agenda.
An Independent Decision
For the first time, the Lebanese state is actively shaping its own future through a clear-eyed and realistic assessment of international conflicts, particularly the ongoing confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
That confrontation has resulted in the return of the Israeli occupation to South Lebanon, alongside continuing violations of Lebanese airspace. It has also, for the first time, drawn Hezbollah into a war against Israel in support of Gaza and Iran following the death of Ali Khamenei, even as the organization now stands outside the former equation of “Army, People, and Resistance,” following the implementation of the state’s monopoly on arms through its legitimate institutions.
It can therefore be argued that, without the decision establishing the state’s monopoly on arms, Lebanon would never have been able to enter negotiations that produced the memorandum. That agreement now requires sustained political stewardship and the management of highly complex files, tasks well within the capabilities of Lebanese diplomacy, whose experience in Arab and international affairs has long been recognized.
Most of those criticizing this bold and courageous step are the very same actors who fundamentally oppose the principle of the state’s monopoly on arms. They likewise maintain reservations about the Taif Agreement and the regional and domestic balance it established. Consequently, objections to the Lebanese-Israeli negotiating track cannot be separated from broader opposition to those two foundational decisions, even when some claim, at least rhetorically, to support the Taif Agreement while acting in ways that contradict it.
At its core, this is a confrontation between a recent past burdened by policies that treated Lebanon as a geopolitical arena for investment rather than as a nation deserving construction and sacrifice, and a new approach enjoying broad international and Arab support. That support reflects an understanding of the heavy burden imposed by external interference, pressures that exceed the Lebanese state’s capacities and confront it with challenges vis-à-vis Israel that are not of its own making.
This understanding has been embodied in successive United Nations resolutions, foremost among them Resolution 425, which settled any dispute regarding Lebanon’s sovereignty over its southern borders. That resolution addressed a historical period extending from the aftermath of the June 1967 War and its consequences, including the rise of Palestinian armed struggle launched from southern Lebanon. It also provided the legal framework for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, allowing the Lebanese state to begin the long process of recovering from successive wars.
Today’s negotiations, which build upon the body of international resolutions supporting Lebanon, most notably Resolution 1701, form part of a broader international and Arab effort fundamentally committed to Lebanese sovereignty. That commitment rests on clearly established foundations: the Constitution, the National Pact, the Taif Agreement, the Presidential Oath of Office, and the Ministerial Statement.
It is this foundation that enables Lebanon today to make constructive use of both international and Arab legitimacy in narrowing, through political means, the imbalance of power with Israel. That imbalance, however, cannot be reduced without engaging the United States administration itself, the ultimate guarantor of the Hebrew State. Those who seek to belittle Lebanon’s present political efforts to secure understandings capable of protecting the country and opening a path out of its deep crisis are, in reality, attempting to turn the wheel of the state backward in pursuit of narrow interests that bear no relation to Lebanon’s destiny as both a nation and a sovereign state.
Against the backdrop of this new war of attrition between Washington and Tehran, safeguarding Lebanon from the repercussions of the Strait of Hormuz has become more important than ever. Iran continues to invest wherever opportunities remain. The more its strategic cards collapse, the more determined it becomes to reclaim control over Lebanon’s independent national decision-making.