


The least that can be said about dragging Lebanon into the war targeting the “Islamic Republic” of Iran is that it constitutes a crime against the country and against the people of the South in particular. It appears that the aim is to finish off Lebanon at the very moment the United States, in coordination with Israel, has decided to rid itself of the Iranian regime.
What is the point of binding Lebanon's fate to that of a regime in Iran that wants to commit suicide? What is to be done when the Israeli occupation continues to expand in the South, the number of displaced persons keeps rising, and even parts of the Bekaa are affected? Is the underlying Iranian demand to push Lebanon into an internal crisis from which it can never escape, by turning the South of the country into another Gaza?
More important than all of this: can Lebanon avoid the catastrophe into which Hezbollah has plunged it, or find a way out?
There are currently approximately 110,000 displaced persons from among the inhabitants of the South, while around 30 villages have been destroyed. Hezbollah appears to have decided to raise that number to some 350,000, for spurious reasons that have nothing whatsoever to do with Lebanon. In the end, what does the “Islamic Republic” want other than to drag Lebanon down with it, now that it has become clear that the regime governing it is no longer viable?
Hezbollah's decision — an order that came from Tehran — comes in the wake of the greatest upheaval the entire region has witnessed since 1979, the year Iran's nature was transformed by its conversion into an “Islamic Republic” and by the redefinition of its regional role. This decision, suicidal in character, also arrives as the contours of a new regional balance begin to take shape, born from the womb of the Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023 — a war that the 'Islamic Republic' sought to exploit, and failed, through its armed proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
The problem Hezbollah faces at present is its refusal to learn from the experience of the “Gaza support war”, which ended as it ended. It waged that war and suffered enormous losses, including the elimination of its leadership and the enabling of Israel to return to occupying Lebanese territory. The Party refuses to draw lessons from that war and from the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, killed in the manner in which he was killed.
It remains unclear how a party — which is nothing more than a sectarian militia bound to a foreign power — can embark on a new war without taking into account that its outcome is known in advance. It is a mystery with no explanation other than this: the Revolutionary Guard is pushing Hezbollah into committing suicide alongside it. It is clear that the Party is now under Iran's full control and is, in effect, merely a brigade of the Revolutionary Guard — nothing more.
Before Hezbollah fired its rockets from southern Lebanon, the Lebanese state received clear warnings from Israel. The substance of those warnings was that Lebanon's entry into the war Iran is waging would have catastrophic consequences for the country. Despite this warning, which was conveyed to the Party, Hezbollah surprised the Lebanese by firing rockets from southern Lebanon…
There is no explanation for what happened other than the Lebanese state's inability to exercise its authority over Hezbollah. The state still fears the Party. Will the Council of Ministers' decision — characterizing the Party's security and military activities as 'a breach of the law' — represent a major turning point on the Lebanese scene and a break from the logic that had imposed the ill-omened Cairo Agreement of 1969? Will it effectively break the barrier of fear toward a Party that has done nothing since its founding but systematically destroy Lebanon and the institutions of the Lebanese state, one after another?
The Lebanese state is expected to demonstrate that it can implement the Council of Ministers' decision, in order to turn its attention to addressing the consequences of the catastrophe that has befallen the country. In reality, the Lebanese state — now facing a genuine new test — is dealing with a party that has made servitude to Iran its vocation, and has placed the interests of the “Islamic Republic” above those of Lebanon, and indeed above those of the Shia community itself.
It is a party that sees in the death of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei the death of its own leader. Simply put, it is difficult to deal with a party that regards suicide as a goal in itself and that views Lebanon as a component of the “Islamic Republic” led by the wali al-faqih.
Very well. Hezbollah wants to commit suicide. It wants Lebanon to commit suicide alongside it, and to share the fate of the “Islamic Republic”. There is no room for the language of reason with those who wish to commit suicide. It is useful, for Lebanon, to define what it truly wants. It is useful to disengage from the logic of suicide — nothing more… and the time has come!