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This tenth day of the American-Israeli offensive against the Iranian mullahs' regime was marked by three highlights: the strong stance adopted by President Joseph Aoun, who severely condemned the behavior of Hezbollah, and furthermore declared himself in favor of direct negotiations with Israel under international supervision; the intense Israeli aerial bombardments against the southern suburbs of Beirut, specifically against the offices of Qard el-Hassan (Hezbollah's illegal financial structure); and the Parliament's vote to extend the mandate of deputies for a period of two years. This vote, which passed with a slim majority of 76 votes, is explained by the State's inability to organize the legislative elections that were supposed to take place in two months, next May. At the current stage, no one can predict the duration of the armed conflict initiated by Hezbollah on the local scene, especially since this new war, which is once again shaking Lebanon, is entirely dependent on the overall regional context. President Joseph Aoun moreover emphasized this precise point in a statement released publicly on Monday, March 9, in the mid-afternoon. In a clear allusion to Hezbollah, the head of state broke his silence and was particularly critical of the pro-Iranian party, declaring that « those who launched rockets (against Israel, on March 2) did so based on Iranian calculations ». The head of state declared himself in favor of direct negotiations with Israel « under international supervision » in this context. It is the first time since his election to the State's highest office that President Aoun has so openly advocated for direct negotiations with Israel. Addressing the leaders of the European Union via Zoom, at the initiative of the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, President Aoun unleashed his anger against Hezbollah, strongly condemning the behavior of this party, which resulted in the reopening of the South Lebanon front, on the night of March 1 st to 2 March: « Those who launched the rockets wanted to drag Lebanon into chaos (…). The country is caught between two fires, between an aggression that in no way respects international laws and humanitarian law, on the one hand, and an armed faction that stands apart from the State and in no way takes into account the interest of Lebanon and its people, on the other hand ». Emphasizing that the firing of six rockets against Israel by Hezbollah, on the night of March 1 st to 2 March, had absolutely no impact on the course of the current war in the region and was only intended to provoke an Israeli intervention to then claim that only the Hezbollah militia is capable of defending the country, President Aoun clearly declared himself in favor of holding direct negotiations with Israel to get the country out of the crisis. This forceful position by the head of state comes as, on the regional level, the Iranian conflict is at a crucial turning point following the official announcement, on Sunday evening, March 8, in Tehran, of the appointment of the new Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the person of Mojtaba Khamenei, who thus succeeds his father, Ali Khamenei, killed during the first Israeli air raids in Tehran on February 28. The new Leader is known for his close ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His designation was perceived by many observers as a sign of further hardening in the Iranian position. President Donald Trump moreover emphasized late Monday evening that he was hostile to the appointment of this new Leader…

To be or not to be. In this famous tirade, Shakespeare symbolizes life with its share of pain, injustice, and suffering, which we have endured for decades, but it also embodies death and suicide as a way out. If a fanatical splinter group has decided to take this path in the name of an obscurantist cause, the majority of Lebanese openly reject it. The Announced End of a Tyranny The signs are not deceiving. History teaches us this again and again. When a dictatorship such as that of the mullahs and the Revolutionary Guards finds itself cornered, when danger looms, when the delusions and megalomania it long fed on for its survival crash against harsh reality, when the house of cards it painstakingly built for decades at any cost, in defiance of all moral and ethical consideration for a population it believes it holds under its yoke, collapses, when despair takes over and all indicators turn red, then blind fanaticism, furious hysteria, and kamikaze madness take over and prevail over reason. To paraphrase Georges Clemenceau: “Dictatorships are like impalement: they start well but end badly.” The Iranian frog that wanted to make itself as big as the ox eventually imploded. But at an always exorbitant price for the populations bending under its vicious grip. The same goes for its agent in Lebanon, Hezbollah. Has the Mountain Given Birth to a Mouse? “You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.” In my view, this acerbic and premonitory criticism by Churchill of Chamberlain symbolically illustrates the government's policy towards Hezbollah. After weeks of tranquility, the rockets sent to Israel by Hezbollah on March 1st were not only a resounding slap in the face and an affront to the state, but above all, blatant proof that this militia's loyalty to Lebanon is null and void. Without any military value, they are mere wasted efforts, a headlong rush, an irresponsible and suicidal act. Paranoia, delusion, megalomania, and blind fanaticism are the guiding threads. But the price paid by the Lebanese people, and particularly the Shiite community that the militia claims to represent, is very heavy. It entails not only enormous material devastation, painful human losses, general impoverishment, displacement of populations, and boundless humiliation, but above all, the destiny and future of an entire country that the murderous aberration of a totalitarian, doctrinaire, exalted organization, totally subservient to the Islamic Republic of Iran, is leading directly to the abyss. The decision of March 2, 2026, to consider the party's military wing an outlaw organization, unfortunately came too late. The iron should have been struck fifteen months ago, when it was hot. Missing the momentum proved fatal and benefited the militia, which exploited official laxity and lack of firmness to pursue, right under everyone's noses, subversion and destabilization. The Pigeon Grotto's pressure tactics were, however, a harbinger of problems to come. Instead of firmly opposing and prohibiting it, instead of putting a stop to it, the authorities deemed it better to lie low and wait for the storm to pass. And on March 2, again with another attack towards Israel. A new defiance of the government's decision. Trying too hard to smooth things over often leads to missing the boat. History teaches us that at a given and fateful moment, banging one's fist on the table and showing intransigence when it comes to the superior interest of the State are necessary and crucial, regardless of the potential price to pay. Notwithstanding President Joseph Aoun's vain attempts to bring the militia to reason (this same militia that had signed the ceasefire agreement and its disarmament throughout Lebanese territory), the average citizen has the legitimate right to consider that Aoun was duped, and us with him. Threats of civil war, military schism, Syrian invasion, and other demonic scenarios daily propagated by Hezbollah's propaganda are nothing more than smoke screens, crude scarecrows intended to sow fear and confusion. “Tyrants are great only because we are on our knees,” wrote A. de Tocqueville. The Eternal Recurrence? Zeus condemned Sisyphus to eternally roll a boulder to the top of a hill, which boulder tumbles down the hill when it reaches the summit. Sisyphus knows the extent of his miserable condition and it is of that he thinks during the descent. But he chooses life against all odds, does not give in to despair, and continues to roll his rock, thus defying the gods. This tragic myth makes me think of our drained country, caught in the eye of the storm, a maelstrom from which it will have enormous difficulty escaping, but it has no choice but to fight evil and conquer it. However, time is pressing. Urgency is at our doorstep. Words and official good intentions are not enough and have proven sterile, ineffective, and counterproductive to date. Procrastinations, hesitations, political jargon are no longer acceptable and cannot be tolerated. As long as the authorities do not immediately implement the official decision to once and for all impose the law over the entire territory, as long as they do not have the audacity, determination, and courage to bring Hezbollah to heel and disarm it without kid gloves and without asking its permission, Lebanon will remain at the mercy of irresponsibles, thugs, and criminals, and will enjoy no international credibility or sympathy, incidentally to the great satisfaction of Israel, which was waiting for the misstep to carry out, in good conscience, its undermining work, which it will persist in pursuing until further notice.

They have precision missiles, but they have no blankets for the children. This is not an oversight or a logistical failure — it is a choice. Cement was not used to build shelters to protect families; it was used to dig tunnels to protect rockets. In this logic, a warhead holds strategic value, while a civilian is considered replaceable. You simply produce more. Demography becomes, in this way, a form of arsenal. And the suffering of those civilians is not a failure for those who run this system. On the contrary, it becomes a tool. A mother weeping in a school before the cameras of the entire world produces a powerful message that spreads on its own: look at what they are doing to us. What one rarely says is that the enemy did not destroy the shelters. There simply never were any. To prevent people from asking too many questions, misery was eventually transformed into doctrine. The explanation goes: suffering is a form of resistance, poverty is proof of dignity, and living in destitution is almost a badge of honor. In this system, whoever dares to complain becomes suspect, as though betraying the memory of the martyrs. Meanwhile, the leaders run the cause from air-conditioned bunkers and fortified offices, while ordinary militants sometimes sleep on asphalt and are proclaimed glorious. Speeches cost nothing, whereas mattresses cost money. For decades, everything was done to ensure the Lebanese state remained too weak, too divided, and too corrupt to offer any real alternative to the population. The result is simple: people stay where they are — not out of love for the system, but because they have the impression that no other way out exists. The true genius of this system lies neither in its missiles nor in its parallel financial networks. Its genius consists in transforming entire populations into hostages who end up thanking those who hold them prisoner, simply because they no longer have the strength to imagine anything else. The tunnels protect the weapons. The tents, for their part, serve to display the suffering. And for those whom misery alone is not enough to convince, there is always the great promise of paradise. It is, in a sense, the deferred wage of the poor. In this world, there is not always a pension, not always healthcare, not always a decent school for the children — but a perfect reward is promised after death, with terms and conditions that no one has ever been able to read. The contract is ideal for those who propose it, because the beneficiary never comes back to demand an accounting. In this system, dying becomes almost a promotion, and sending others to their deaths can be presented as an act of generosity. It is a form of martyrdom accounting in which the workforce pays itself with its own faith. There are no social charges, no unions, no strikes. There are only mothers who weep and posters on the walls. Those posters are essential, because the martyr does not truly disappear. He becomes an image. On the poster, before his name, they write "The Happy Martyr," and after his name they add: "On the road to Jerusalem." But the poster never says what he left behind. It does not show the family without a father, the children who grow up without him, nor the immense void that opens in a house when someone does not come home again. That void is simply filled by the next volunteer. And so a simple question eventually poses itself: who decided he was happy? The dead do not speak, and that is precisely what makes the system so efficient. You can put any words in his mouth. You can claim he is fulfilled, that he is happy in paradise, and no one will ever be able to verify it. Telling a mother that her son is happy is almost tantamount to forbidding her to grieve. Her sorrow becomes suspect, as though it were a form of ingratitude. And so many mothers fall silent. They look at the posters on the walls and they say nothing. But somewhere deep within them, a question keeps haunting them. If their son is truly happy, why is the pain so great? Meanwhile, the promise of divine victory goes on. It is always near, always imminent, but it seems to recede each time one believes one is drawing close to it. It is announced for soon, for ten years from now, for the next generation, for the next war. And while this promise keeps shifting through time, the architects of this victory live rather well. They have bodyguards, protected villas, and children who study in Europe. They speak of sacrifice from armored podiums and weep for the martyrs with great eloquence, but they themselves almost never become martyrs. This coincidence has lasted for decades, and by lasting so long it has ended up resembling less a coincidence than a very well-organized system. In this system, the tunnels descend ever deeper to protect the weapons, while on the surface, the tents await the wind, the rain, and the cameras of the entire world. And the system continues to turn. It has been turning for decades because the dead never come back to tell their version of the story, and because the living are exhausted. Exhausted from fighting, exhausted from losing, exhausted from hoping. And so they end up voting for those who keep them in this machinery. They rarely vote out of conviction and almost never out of love. They vote out of fear, out of the absence of alternatives, and above all out of exhaustion. And sometimes too out of a certain very human cynicism, the reasoning that if one must remain a prisoner, one might as well let one's jailer win. The system knows this exhaustion very well, and it feeds on it. And it will continue to function as long as no one dares to ask the simplest question — the one that everyone avoids out of habit, out of fear, or out of politeness. Who decided he was happy? And above all, across all these years, how many of those martyrs have truly made it all the way to Jerusalem?

The complex relationship between a segment of Lebanon's Shia community and Hezbollah cannot be grasped through conventional political analysis alone. It reaches beyond strategic calculations or immediate interests into a deeper realm — the cultural and symbolic architectures that shape how communities perceive themselves and inhabit the world. This is where the tools of sociology and anthropology become indispensable, particularly what Émile Durkheim offered us on the collective consciousness, and what Claude Lévi-Strauss illuminated about the deep cultural structures that organize how societies make sense of reality. Collective Consciousness and Obedience in the Time of Fear Durkheim argued that every society produces a system of shared values and beliefs — what he called the collective consciousness. This system does not merely define what the community holds to be right or wrong; it also exerts a moral pressure on individuals, compelling them to conform to what the group deems necessary for its own survival. In times of existential crisis or war, the collective consciousness tends toward rigidity and closure. Communities that feel threatened seek out powerful symbols capable of organizing their collective fear and transforming it into a sense of cohesion. In such moments, ideological organizations emerge as bearers of collective identity — not merely as political actors. This is the lens through which the rise of Hezbollah becomes legible. The party succeeded in presenting itself not merely as a political or military organization, but as a symbolic body embodying a threatened collective dignity. Over time, this symbolic dimension became woven into the collective consciousness of the environment that had given it birth. Dissent from the party thus became, in the eyes of many, tantamount to dissent from the community itself — no longer a critique of a political decision, but a betrayal of belonging. Yet Durkheim also reminds us that the collective consciousness can become a conservative force resistant to critical revision — especially when communal values become entangled with powerful or sacred institutions. When this happens, debate about political and military choices becomes nearly impossible, for the question shifts from political discourse to one of identity. From the Pluralism of Jabal Amel to the Centrality of Resistance To understand this transformation more fully, we must return to the social history of the Jabal Amel region in southern Lebanon. Before the final decades of the twentieth century, Shia society in this region was neither monolithic in structure nor governed by a single political narrative. It was, rather, a social space of multiple reference points: independent religious scholars, vast family networks, rich educational traditions, and an active emigration toward Africa and the Americas — a movement that had nurtured a relatively open social culture. In that era, religious affiliation was an important element of identity, but it was not the sole framework through which the individual related to the world. Ameli culture had historically produced remarkable intellectual and scholarly achievement, yielding thinkers and scholars who played formative roles in the religious and cultural life of the region. But the Lebanese civil war, along with the occupations and armed conflicts that accompanied it, shattered and remolded this social fabric. In that turbulent landscape, Hezbollah emerged as an actor capable of organizing collective fear and channeling it into a coherent political and military project. Gradually, the political identity of the community was reformulated around a single central idea: resistance. The Symbolic Structure of Identity Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis helps us understand this cultural shift. Cultures, in his view, do not operate through isolated ideas, but through deep symbolic structures that organize a community's perception of the world. These structures typically rest on fundamental binaries: interior and exterior, protection and threat, community and enemy. In the Hezbollah experience, collective identity was reorganized around a single stark duality: resistance versus the enemy. This symbolic structure does not operate only in political discourse — it becomes the very framework through which society interprets daily events. Losses can be read as necessary sacrifices; crises, as trials of endurance; internal criticism, as a fragment of external conspiracy. In this way, reality is perpetually reinterpreted in a manner that preserves the coherence of the founding narrative. Yet this very structure carries within it the peril of closure. When the entire world is reduced to the binary of resistance and enemy, the capacity to perceive broader political and social complexity narrows to a vanishing point. From Resistance Movement to Social Power Structure Over time, Hezbollah ceased to be merely a military organization or a resistance movement. It transformed into a comprehensive social power structure within the Shia environment. The party built a vast network of educational institutions, media outlets, and social services, alongside an extensive economic and charitable apparatus. This network created an organic relationship between the party and society, such that the party's presence became woven into the daily life of much of the population. In this sense, the party was no longer a political force to be supported or opposed — it had become a social framework that organized multiple dimensions of community life. This transformation reinforced its capacity to entrench the symbolic structure upon which its discourse rested. But at the same time, it deepened the entanglement between collective identity and political organization, making any critique of the party appear as a threat to the community itself. Yet this sociological reading does not amount to an absolution of the party's political and moral responsibility. An organization that places itself in the position of exclusive representative of a community must also bear responsibility for the price that community pays for its choices. When those choices lead to recurrent wars, to the displacement of populations, or to the exposure of society to permanent risk, a fundamental question becomes inescapable: does this strategy still protect the community — or has it itself become part of the crisis the community endures? The Moment of Reckoning Social history shows that communities do not remain captive to their symbolic structures forever. When contradictions accumulate between discourse and lived reality, the collective consciousness itself begins to shift. This process is slow — often invisible in its early stages — but it constitutes the true turning point in the history of peoples. What Lebanon is living through today may be one of these hinge moments. Social exhaustion, economic collapse, and mass displacement are all forces pressing people to reconsider the relationship between identity and arms, between promised protection and actual cost. The question Lebanon's society faces today is not only one of security or politics. It is a deeper question: how can dignity and protection be redefined outside the logic of permanent war? A society asked to sacrifice without end may begin, at some moment, to seek a different form of security — one grounded not in arms and allegiance, but in the state and the law.

From the kickoff, on February 28, of the Israeli-American offensive against the Iranian mullahs' regime, marked by the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic Ali Khamenei, until the flare-up of the South Lebanon front, at dawn on the 1 st March, including Iranian strikes on all Arab Gulf countries, the first week of the new Middle East war is undoubtedly historic in more ways than one. There are years that can be summarized in a few words, and weeks that seem like years. The days from January 28 to March 8, 2026, have been so full of twists and turns that they could be described as a transition from one era to another. The starting point was the predictable launch of Israeli-American strikes against the Iranian regime, after the failure of negotiations on the nuclear file, the long-range ballistic missile program, and the fate of the regional outposts of the Pasdaran, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah. The rest was a succession of surprises, as if the attack on Iran had opened Pandora's box. The first surprise came from the precision of the Israeli strikes on Saturday morning, February 28, which led, as would be announced hours later, to the successful assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ali Khamenei, the true spiritual and political head of that country, along with about forty high-ranking Iranian officials and senior executives, including the Minister of Defense, the head of the Pasdaran, the head of Intelligence, and Khamenei's closest advisor. To what extent did this first blow, and the initial American-Israeli bombardments on Iranian territory, destabilize that country? In retaliation, the regime surprised everyone by directing its ballistic missiles not only against Israel or American bases in the region, as would have been predictable, but especially towards the Arab Gulf states, hitherto considered symbols of security and stability. Aggressions against Gulf countries Daily, since the beginning of this war, the civilian infrastructures of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and even the Sultanate of Oman, despite being a privileged intermediary in Iranian-American negotiations, have been pounded by missiles from the Revolutionary Guard. For eight days, their airports have been almost closed, and their legendary internal security has been flouted, despite the interception of the vast majority of Iranian missiles and drones launched against their territory. And even when Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian resolved to « apologize » to these countries for the damage caused, eight days after the outbreak of the conflict, promising them the « suspension » of strikes against them, the firings continued the same day, suggesting either a tactical, purely cosmetic conciliatory stance from the Iranians, or a beginning of the regime's erosion between the hardline wing represented by the Pasdaran, and a supposedly more moderate political authority. In any case, another sign of the weakening of the Iranian regime has been the delay in designating a successor to Khamenei during the last eight days, knowing that the Revolutionary Guard is seeking to impose the candidacy of the assassinated Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, whose designation is rejected by the Americans. The Israelis, for their part, continue to oppose any election of a new Leader: after striking the meeting place of the Iranian Council of Experts tasked with this mission for the first time, the Israeli army, through its Arabic-speaking spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, once again threatened this council with a new targeting in case of a meeting for the vote, which would be « imminent ». In any event, this first week of the conflict ended on the night of March 7-8 with a « qualitative » escalation, namely the bombing of four fuel depots on the outskirts of Tehran, which caused massive fires all around the capital. The opening of the front in Lebanon The other major surprise was the reopening by Hezbollah of the South Lebanon front. This initiative, suicidal in every sense of the word, came at the express request of the Pasdaran. In what constituted a declaration of war against Israel, the pro-Iranian party thus launched Katyusha rockets against Israeli territory on the night of the 1 st to March 2, nearly 48 hours after the start of the American-Israeli offensive and less than two and a half years after the « support war » in Gaza, on October 8, 2023, from which the country has not yet recovered. Incredulous, the Lebanese once again found themselves mired in a vicious cycle of violence, destructive bombings, and the exodus of residents from entire regions in South Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and North Bekaa. Hezbollah, for its part, continues its daily attacks towards northern Israel, employing rockets and drones. It even launched drones against a British base on the peaceful island of Cyprus. Israeli Merkava tanks on the Lebanese border. After this new front opened from an exhausted country, undermined by the economic crisis and the consequences of a very recent war, even the fiercest defenders of Hezbollah's « Lebaneseness » (!) had to revise their theories. Because this party, which continued to suffer, without reacting, targeted Israeli assassinations despite the ceasefire of November 27, 2024, only retaliated to the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, which was unanimously perceived as a clear response to an order from the Iranian « sponsor ». Israeli threats This decision caught the entire Lebanese political class by surprise, including the ally of the pro-Iranian party, the head of the Amal movement and Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berry. President Joseph Aoun and the government of Nawaf Salam clearly positioned themselves against this unilateral decision by Hezbollah, declaring all its military activities « illegal » and enjoining it to hand over its weapons, as stated in a resolution of the Council of Ministers, dated Monday, March 2. However, this unprecedented decision by the Lebanese authorities, whose implementation was entrusted to the Lebanese army (previously tasked with disarming the south of the Litani, with the well-known success), did not shield the government from internal criticism or Israeli threats, in the face of the return of Hezbollah fighters to the borders. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on Saturday threatened Lebanon with a heavy price to pay if it failed to disarm this party. In any case, this new conflict seems different from the one that preceded it: the Israeli army occupies even larger areas, it even carried out a helicopter landing in a village in the Bekaa on Saturday, March 7, and the entire region south of the Litani is now evacuated by its inhabitants, as well as the southern suburbs of Beirut. Among the targeted assassinations, several have targeted Iranian Revolutionary Guard officials, including in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, regions considered « safe.» The outcome of this new bloody episode is more uncertain than ever. The Iranian regime has decided to sow chaos, and to once again sacrifice countries like Iraq, and, above all, Lebanon, as well as its relations with neighboring countries, from the Arab Gulf to Azerbaijan and Cyprus. What will the Middle East look like after this explosive episode? Without a doubt, this conflict will play the role of an accelerator of history.

The unified position of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members regarding the Iranian attacks against the six member states suggests a form of renaissance for this bloc, at least in appearance. It must be acknowledged that the Council has experienced deep internal turmoil since late 2025, following Saudi-Emirati disagreements in Yemen, disputes that had already come to light in Sudan. Some believe that the initial spark was in Libya. These disagreements have paralyzed the Council, even leading to an unprecedented internal crisis in the 45-year history of this regional bloc. The Iranian threat was precisely the raison d'être of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The name given to this six-member council was carefully chosen. The apparent objective was to avoid provoking Iran by refraining from using the phrase «Arabic Gulf», considered taboo in Iran. The Gulf States, under the impetus of the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, strove to contain the threat posed by the slogan of «exporting the revolution», launched by Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, in 1979, after the fall of the Shah's regime. Sheikh Zayed hosted the first summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the Intercontinental Hotel in Abu Dhabi. This event paved the way for a long process aimed at creating a bulwark against Iranian aggression, which was manifested by Iran's refusal to end the war against Iraq, regardless of the conflict's origin. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in Abu Dhabi in May 1981, thus served as a bulwark for its six member states following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. The Council largely succeeded in preventing the escalation of the conflict, despite its eight years of war and Iran's desire to retaliate against GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Council largely succeeded in containing the extension of the conflict. It is well known that the GCC member states supported Iraq throughout the war. The fall of Iraq, the eastern gateway to the Gulf, would have led to the fall of the entire Gulf region, regardless of the mistakes made by Saddam Hussein, then Iraqi president. Iraqi mistakes can be recognized if one considers that Saddam, with his limited political experience and imprudence, did not understand from the outset that starting a war against the Islamic Republic was falling into Khomeini's trap, seeking an external enemy to stir up Iranian nationalism and Persian chauvinism. It is also well known that Iran sought revenge against Saudi Arabia by attempting to politicize the Hajj pilgrimage and provoke unrest while hundreds of thousands of pilgrims were in Mecca during that period. Iran also attacked Kuwait, attempting to assassinate the Emir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad, and causing security incidents on several occasions. Saudi Arabia successfully defended itself against Iranian aggression. Similarly, Kuwait managed to protect itself and ensure the continuity of its oil exports. In response to Iranian attacks on these ships, it notably hoisted American and Soviet flags on its oil tankers. Every member state of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) suffered Iranian aggression. The Islamic Republic spared neither Bahrain nor the United Arab Emirates, the latter having played a crucial role in developing a common Gulf position aimed at ending the war, given the potential consequences of an Iranian invasion of Iraq at that time. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) withstood the shocks it experienced, notably Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It worked for the liberation of Kuwait and its restitution to its people. Later, in 2003, the GCC absorbed the repercussions of the Iraqi earthquake – the handover of Iraq to the Islamic Republic by the George W. Bush administration – with all the strategic imbalance that this created for the entire region. This imbalance coincided with the complete fall of Syria and Lebanon into Iran's hands. During the Arab Spring, the GCC played an essential role in protecting Bahrain, where Iran exploited sectarian tensions. The direct intervention of GCC member states was decisive in thwarting a blatant Iranian attempt to overthrow the regime of this peaceful country. Whether one likes it or not, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has lived, since its creation, under the shadow of the Iranian crisis, or even the Iranian threat. A new Middle East, a different Gulf, and a different Iran will emerge from the Israeli-American war against Iran. Will a new Gulf Cooperation Council also emerge? What role will the GCC and its member states play in the face of the new challenges posed by the profound upheavals in Iran, especially given fears of the disintegration of this country which has sought to dominate the Gulf since even before the establishment of the «Islamic Republic»? The GCC will face a different Iran, whose form and nature of regime are difficult to predict at this stage. The only certainty is that the current regime, the «Islamic Republic», is doomed to disappear. Nothing demonstrates this better than the attacks launched by the Revolutionary Guards against GCC countries for specious reasons, thus revealing the true face of the regime. These attacks even targeted the Sultanate of Oman, which has always maintained friendly relations with Iran. The Sultanate adopted a political school based on the principle that friendly relations with Iran, a neighboring country, are inevitable, regardless of the nature of the regime in Tehran… Aside from Iran, the question remains: what about Iraq, a country that must change and which, since the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, has been a source of concern for every member state, whether under Saddam Hussein or after his fall?