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Massive explosion caused by an Israeli strike near the town of Al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon. (AFP)
Weekly essentials
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By LevantTime .
Published Sep 6, 2026 - 23:27
While the United States had appeared to be relying solely on economic warfare against Iran, the US military abruptly carried out strikes on Iranian territory on Tuesday in retaliation for attacks targeting oil tankers, setting off a spiral of violence over the course of the week. In Lebanon, Israel released several civilians held in its prisons, while its army seized the strategic Ali el-Taher hill and continued its heavy strikes in the area it controls in the south of the country. The week from August 31 to September 6 was marked by a sharp acceleration of events in the Middle East, after the previous one had seemed defined by relative stagnation. On the Iranian front, the US military carried out targeted strikes inside Iranian territory as early as Tuesday evening, the first in nearly a month. This screen grab, made on September 6, 2026 from undated video footage released the same day by US Central Command, shows what CENTCOM says is one of the Iranian oil tankers it destroyed in response to attempted missile attacks on naval vessels. (CENTCOM via AFP) However, the relatively limited pace of the strikes suggests that the US administration has opted for an escalation that remains controlled, while continuing its blockade and economic pressure on Tehran. Even so, tensions continued to rise throughout the week. Explosions were heard on Saturday on the highly strategic island of Kharg, through which most of Iran’s oil exports pass. US President Donald Trump, for his part, threatened to strike the Kuh-e Kolang nuclear site — “Pickaxe Mountain” in Persian — a heavily fortified facility located deep underground, not far from Natanz, Iran’s main uranium-enrichment site. Earlier in the week, he had enshrined the “tanker for tanker” equation, pledging to target an Iranian vessel every time the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. That is precisely what the US military did on Saturday, setting two Iranian vessels ablaze. Politically, Donald Trump further hardened his tone toward Tehran. After saying in an interview that talks had been permanently frozen “because an agreement with them is not worth the paper it is written on,” he said on Saturday that the “conflict” with Iran was not a “war,” but “something ordinary” for the United States. A way of rattling the Iranians while at the same time reassuring the US public ahead of the midterm elections. A port, along with storage facilities and warehouses, was damaged following a US military strike carried out on September 6, 2026 in Iran’s southern Hormozgan province, which borders the Strait of Hormuz. (AFP) At the same time, the US news outlet Axios published a report on Saturday suggesting that the United States is already looking beyond this conflict, which began on February 28. Citing US officials and other informed sources, the outlet said the Trump administration is developing a broader strategy for the post-war Middle East. According to the report, it would be based on creating a regional alignment aimed at containing Iran, bringing an end to the regional fallout from Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks in Gaza, and expanding the circle of normalization between Israel and countries in the region. The threat against Kuh-e Kolang, which brings the Iranian nuclear issue back to the fore, echoes an announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which said on September 1 that Iran had still not reopened its sites to inspectors following the strikes of May 2025. It should be recalled that despite the scale of the Israeli-American offensive against Iranian sites, it is almost certain that the stockpile of enriched uranium remains intact and has been moved to a safe location by the Iranian authorities, which remain committed to what they consider their right to develop a nuclear program. Following the IAEA announcement, the United States, together with France, Britain and Germany, said they intended to submit a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning Iran’s failure to comply with its non-proliferation commitments. This display of unity stands in contrast to the chill that has prevailed between Washington and its European allies since the beginning of the conflict. For their part, the Iranians appear to be responding to the upheaval in much the same way as before: by striking neighboring countries, notably Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without directly targeting Israel. Heavy strikes in southern Lebanon On the Lebanese front, Israel is intensifying its destruction operations in villages in the south, even using explosive barrels in some cases. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Washington and the international community to “put an end” to Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, which killed seven people on Sunday against the backdrop of a fragile truce. The strikes hit several localities in the Nabatiyeh region. Twenty people were also wounded, including children, according to the Health Ministry. One strike also destroyed the former Ghandour hospital, which had been out of service for years. Release of detainees and capture of Ali el-Taher But the major event of the week in the south was the Israeli capture of the strategic Ali el-Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh region. The site served as a major Hezbollah headquarters, consisting of an extensive network of tunnels from which fighters from the Shiite party operated, along with, according to some reports, Iranian fighters. On Thursday evening, the Israelis announced that they had taken control of the complex. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that tunnels still had to be blown up. This military “success” may not have come as a surprise after weeks of bombardment, but Hezbollah’s reaction was more unexpected. After long insisting that it would refuse to give up this strategic hill — as had the Iranians, who had also threatened to intervene — the Shiite party ultimately sought to play down the significance of the development through its media outlets and allied networks, without officially confirming the loss of the site, which it had refused to preserve by handing it over to the Lebanese army. The other major surprise of the week was Israel’s release of five Lebanese and Syrian civilians held in its prisons. The move came following a visit to Tel Aviv by US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. According to the Israeli prime minister’s office, Thursday’s announcement “follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of leaders of the Jewish community who had been abducted and killed in Lebanon” between 1984 and 1986. Here too, Hezbollah’s reaction raises questions. While describing the move as positive but insufficient, the party once again turned on the Lebanese authorities, accusing them of “submission to the enemy” and holding them “responsible” for the disaster in the south. It even warned them against “internal conflicts.” Could the party’s military setbacks push it to turn increasingly toward the domestic front? Finally, the Israeli army made an important statement on Sunday, saying it was considering reducing its occupation zone in southern Lebanon, moving from the current “yellow zone” to a “grey zone.” Such a development would, according to this assessment, reflect a reduced threat from Hezbollah. The measure has not yet been approved by Israel’s political leadership. Yemen and Palestine The week was also particularly tense in Yemen, where clashes between Houthi rebels and government forces continued to intensify, culminating in an especially deadly Saturday in which more than 60 people were killed in a single day, bringing the death toll since Thursday to around 200. The Houthi offensive is aimed in particular at taking control of areas bordering the Bab el-Mandeb passage, which would give this Iranian ally additional leverage over another major strategic chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz. In Palestine, particularly troubling comments by Israel Katz on Gaza marked the week. He claimed, without providing evidence, that most of the territory’s residents wanted to leave, stressing that Israel was “ready for such an evacuation” on a mass scale. A sign that the ordeal of Gaza’s residents may be far from over. Finally, it is worth noting that the IAEA announced on September 1 that facilities discovered in Deir el-Zor, Syria, indicate that Bashar al-Assad’s former regime had secretly been preparing an advanced nuclear program that could have led to the production of an atomic weapon with the help of North Korean experts.
Homage
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By Michel Hajji Georgiou - Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
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The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix, Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix, thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer. And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina. Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
Analyze

Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
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By Mona Fayad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
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The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
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Middle East: Fire and Powder
By
Rami Rayess
Published

The political and electoral promises of President Donald Trump have evaporated, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, and the glittering headlines about ending wars have come to nothing — he who boasted, upon his election, of bringing “eight wars” to a close — while in return he has ignited two new ones, in Venezuela and Iran, and is now seriously threatening to make Cuba his third. The arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro did unfold without triggering any notable domestic reaction, as the regime abandoned its own leader and adapted with considerable pragmatism to American pressure, but the situation with Iran is an altogether different matter. Events on the ground have belied American and Israeli expectations, for it quickly became clear that eliminating the head of the regime, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with several senior commanders, had not caused the Revolutionary Guards to lose their grip on the country or loosen their iron hold over it. The bet on a popular uprising erupting from within Iran the moment war broke out has also proved a failure, for while a considerable segment of Iranian public opinion harbors genuine hostility toward the regime, it has no desire to ride the American wave. The role played by the United States and its CIA in overthrowing the Mossadegh government in the coup of 1953 remains deeply embedded in Iranian popular and collective memory, having likely entrenched the conviction that relying on the Americans cannot succeed or contribute to real change, especially since Trump himself has no genuine interest in political transformation for reformist reasons, but exclusively on the basis of self-interest. The American administration would have had no difficulty dealing with a new Supreme Leader had he shown the flexibility Washington expected, and it would not then have concerned itself in the least with the Iranian people’s aspirations for freedom, democracy, and human rights. The Venezuelan example remains vivid: Trump sidelined the opposition leader even after she had sought to flatter him by nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize, apparently believing that lending her name to the world’s most prestigious award might increase her standing in his eyes. He simply ignored the gesture and continued working with the very pillars of the Maduro regime, which he keeps in a cell at the federal detention center in Brooklyn, New York, while securing what he wanted on the oil front. The Venezuelan people’s dreams of change have accordingly crumbled as well. Trump is now threatening Cuba, the island that has unsettled Washington for decades and long served as a thorn in its side, and appears determined to sweep away all the efforts at engagement and reconciliation undertaken by his predecessor Barack Obama to turn the page on the past, opening a new front against it instead. This confirms Washington’s indifference to the most elementary principles of international conduct and to any obligation to act through the United Nations. More than that, a clear drive is underway to undermine and weaken the international order built after the Second World War, of which the “Peace Council” (still faltering) established in the wake of the Gaza war is but one telling illustration. But who says that Washington’s disregard for the real interests of peoples actually serves its own? And who says that reinforcing its alliances with most of the dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and beyond serves them either? It is true that democratic systems do not come into being overnight, and it is true that democracy imported from the West may not take root in every society, but it is equally true that the repression of peoples invariably produces, at one point or another, a political and social explosion. If the experience of the Arab revolutions ended in painful outcomes, it did so because of complex circumstances, some related to the seizure of the revolution by regimes themselves (Syria being the clearest example), others to the inability of the revolutionary forces to organize, an inability itself attributable to the fact that dictatorial authorities had tamed their societies and drained them of the elites capable of leading a project of change. None of this, however, justifies the West’s retreat toward a policy of rehabilitating existing regimes or replacing them with others no less repressive than those they displaced. As for the Middle East, the question no longer concerns solely the nature of the political societies of the Arab region, but also Israel’s relentless pursuit of war, and, something new, its success in dragging the United States along into its multi-front conflicts, even when no real threat to American national security exists, contrary to what Israel works hard to sell. The latest of these wars is the one waged against Iran, which has itself not refrained from harming its neighbors in the Arab Gulf states, something that will make future coexistence a lasting challenge. This Israeli insistence on averting its gaze from any idea of peace, indeed on destroying it through wars and occupations, will have profoundly negative repercussions across the entire region for generations to come. On the Palestinian front, Israel does not content itself with destroying Gaza and bombing it daily even after the ceasefire (reaching a terrifying number of martyrs approaching 75,000!); it also pounces on the West Bank, planting settlements there that definitively foreclose any peaceful solution and bury the historic two-state project, which will never see the light of day if Israel persists in its regional policies. This policy of imposing facts on the ground is one Israel applies equally in southern Lebanon and southern Syria, portions of which it has occupied following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, in addition, of course, to its occupation of the Syrian Golan since 1967, a territory it refuses to relinquish and has formally annexed, with no intention of reversing that annexation. Unless the region manages to hold Israel to firm rules, including sustained pressure to abandon the policy of permanent and rolling wars and a genuine recognition of the Palestinian people’s legitimate rights, Israel will not be able to sustain its occupation project indefinitely. The Abraham Accords have shown that they did not defuse tensions in the region, on the contrary they exacerbated them, and that they did not provide Israel with the security it pursues from one war to the next. The smell of fire and gunpowder fills the Middle East, and new approaches as well as new policies are now inescapable.

Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2)

This series of articles will allow for a better understanding of the current situation in light of the past, moving beyond impassioned, ideological, or romanticized rhetoric that misses the mark, leaving the reader to draw their own conclusions. Furthermore, it is high time to seriously counter the sterile rhetoric of resistance, not with counter-rhetoric, but with serious work by promoting the rule of law, which can only be established through sovereignty. The first part outlined the international and regional situation that led to the Taif Agreement and the beginning of Hezbollah's rise to power. This second part illustrates how the Hezbollah militia has continued to exist and strengthen itself under the dual sponsorship of Syria and Iran. Damascus's goal is to strengthen its position at the peace negotiation table with Israel, while Tehran's is to undermine any attempt at peace between Israel on the one hand, and Syria and Lebanon on the other. Part 2: The Implementation of the Taif Agreement The Taif Agreement, signed on October 22, 1989, was drafted by the Lebanese themselves, particularly its clauses concerning internal constitutional reforms. It was the result of several rounds of dialogue between the Lebanese parties, conducted in stages since 1976. This agreement shifted or readjusted the balance of power between the communities in the country and granted more prerogatives to the Council of Ministers at the expense of the President of the Republic. Furthermore, it was the only document aimed at ending the wars that were ravaging the country. Indeed, it clearly stipulated the dismantling of armed militias. However, constitutional law specialists have highlighted, and continue to highlight, numerous constitutional shortcomings that it created. These were not the only ones, as it included another, far more important one, now obsolete: the implicit recognition of the Syrian Ba'athist occupation of Lebanon, with the approval of Arab countries, the international community, and particularly the United States. Washington was concerned about stability in Lebanon, and in its view, this could only be guaranteed by the Damascus regime, even at the cost of suppressing freedoms. It was, in its eyes, necessary to pave the way for a peace agreement between Israel and Syria, and then to include Lebanon, itself under Syrian occupation. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's troops invaded Kuwait in August 1990, a few months after the signing of the Taif Agreement, which General Michel Aoun's government opposed, stability in Lebanon became a top priority not only for the agreement's Arab sponsors but even more so for the Americans, who no longer wanted to be distracted by Lebanon and wanted to focus on the Kuwait crisis. On October 13, 1990, Damascus obtained Arab and international approval to invade the part of Lebanon it did not control, in exchange for joining the anti-Saddam coalition tasked with liberating Kuwait. Leveraging his near-total control of Lebanon, Hafez al-Assad implemented the Taif Agreement only selectively, according to his needs to consolidate his occupation of the country. Thus, the Syrian regime appointed Elias Hraoui and then Emile Lahoud as presidents of the state, each for a nine-year term, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. During their respective terms, Hezbollah enjoyed unprecedented leeway. It intensified its arms buildup from Iran via Syria. The prime ministers and successive ministers under Hraoui and Lahoud had no power over any military and security matters. These were exclusively the responsibility of the Syrians, whose strategy consisted of exerting extreme pressure on Israel from Lebanon, through Hezbollah, which operated freely in the south of the country and in the Bekaa Valley. Step 1: Dismantling of Militias Except Hezbollah During 1991, after their invasion, the Syrians took care to dismantle the militias that were outside their control. Hezbollah was not only granted immunity from the Taif Agreement, but it was also encouraged and supported by Damascus to wage a guerrilla war against the Israeli forces occupying part of southern Lebanon. The goal was to pressure Tel Aviv to improve Hafez al-Assad's position in the peace negotiations with Israel, initiated following the Madrid Conference held that same year. Tehran, for its part, sponsored Hezbollah to establish itself on the Lebanese scene, infiltrate the Lebanese state, weaken it, and export the Khomeini revolution, in accordance with the Iranian Constitution. It should be noted that this dual sponsorship enjoyed by Hezbollah lasted until the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. Since then, Hezbollah's tutelage has become primarily Iranian. It has strengthened and continues to this day. Stage 2: The Seven-Day War Between Hezbollah and Israel The guerrilla war waged by Hezbollah against the Israeli occupation forces and their ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), intensified in 1992 and 1993, under the slogan of "the resistance." On July 25, 1993, Israel responded by launching its first major war against Hezbollah, dubbed "Operation Settling Accounts," also known as the "Seven-Day War." This war ended on July 31, 1993, under pressure from the United States, particularly Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Israeli objectives were to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure, cut off its supplies, eradicate it from the South Lebanon region, and pressure the Lebanese government by displacing civilians to Beirut. This seven-day war ended with an unwritten agreement between the two sides, known as the "July Agreement," stipulating that civilians on both sides would not be targeted, while military operations against military targets on both sides would continue. From the outset of hostilities, Washington quickly intervened to broker this agreement, seeking to keep Syria in the Madrid peace process. Excessive use of force by Israel was perceived by President George H.W. Bush's administration as a factor that could force Syria to withdraw from the negotiations. "Operation Settling Accounts" resulted in 120 Lebanese civilian deaths and 500 injuries, 300,000 displaced persons, and thousands of destroyed and damaged buildings. Hezbollah's losses amounted to an undetermined number of dead, and dozens of fighting positions were destroyed. Israel, for its part, lost two soldiers and one civilian. (to be continued) Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

Trump's truce provides cover for the peace option

A significant new step was taken on Wednesday, April 16, towards restoring Lebanon's autonomy in decision-making, free from any regional dictates. A ten-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon (including Hezbollah) came into effect at midnight on Thursday night, following two telephone conversations that President Donald Trump held in the late afternoon with President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The White House chief himself announced the ceasefire in the early evening during a casual conversation with press correspondents. The announcement of this ceasefire under the auspices of the Trump Administration carries twofold strategic importance: firstly, it consolidates at the highest level the separation of the Lebanese and Iranian aspects of the ongoing conflict, as Tehran has insistently attempted in recent days to place any ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel under its control, with the aim of controlling Lebanon; and secondly, it largely legitimizes and reinforces the Executive's decision to engage in direct negotiations with Israel, with the prospect of a peace agreement between the two countries. President Trump also indicated, after the ceasefire announcement, that he had tasked Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Razin Caine with working towards achieving a lasting Lebanese-Israeli peace. The US president also emphasized his intention to invite President Aoun and Mr. Netanyahu to a meeting at the White House within two weeks. This strong American involvement in the process of resolving the outstanding disputes between Lebanon and Israel is vital for the Lebanese government. The Israeli Prime Minister declared Wednesday evening that the Israeli army will maintain its presence in southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River, in order to consolidate the buffer zone extending ten kilometers from the international border. Lebanon will thus need the support of the United States to negotiate, under the best possible conditions, an Israeli withdrawal and the conclusion of a peace agreement, with the dismantling of Hezbollah's militia apparatus as a prerequisite and essential step. Hezbollah has, moreover, been declared illegal by the Council of Ministers. The members of parliament in Beirut... It is worth noting in this context that the government received significant parliamentary political support on Wednesday. Members of Parliament from Beirut, representing all religious and political affiliations, held a congress on Wednesday at the Phoenicia Hotel under the theme: "For a secure Beirut, a Beirut free from all illegal weapons." Several MPs, representing the major parties in Parliament, spoke at the event to unequivocally support the government's position regarding the illegality of Hezbollah's militia, the illegality of the presence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the country, and the necessity of monopolizing weapons in the hands of legal forces. In short, this congress of Beirut MPs unequivocally secures popular legitimacy and fundamental political cover for the sovereignist policies pursued by the presidency and the government, much to the chagrin of Hezbollah and the mullahs' regime, which seize every opportunity to denounce the government's peace policy.

The Fog of Non-Victory (1/2)
By
Rayyan Al-Basseer
Published

The United States decision to launch a major military campaign against Iran was driven by a confluence of pressures. Hawkish figures in the national security establishment had long advocated for decisive action. Pro-Israel lobbying pressed hard for intervention, especially after the June 2025 strikes failed to produce lasting deterrence, and Israel itself had spent months pushing Washington toward a more maximalist posture. These factors created the political conditions for war. Yet the most strategically decisive driver was arguably a logic like the one applied in Venezuela. President Trump’s core objective is not simply to degrade Iran’s military capacity, but to reshape the architecture of global oil transactions — controlling not just who sells crude, but who buys it and under what terms. By sustaining and deepening sanctions pressure on Iranian oil exports, Washington seeks to constrain China’s access to subsidised or discounted crude at a moment when that access constitutes a meaningful input into Chinese industrial and military growth. Conventional Victory and Its Limits There is no question about what the US military achieved in March and April 2026. The opening strikes killed the Supreme Leader, eliminated senior military commanders, and destroyed key institutional compounds including the main defence research headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards. A large share of Iran’s air defence systems was degraded within the first 24 hours, handing US and Israeli aircraft effective control of Iranian airspace almost immediately. Most Iran’s ballistic missile launchers were destroyed within the first two weeks, and most of Iran’s mapped military-industrial sites were struck overall, reducing Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel dramatically by the second week of the war. The main enrichment facilities were hit severely, first in June 2025 and again in 2026, while a significant number of Iranian warships were sunk. By any conventional military metric, the campaign was a remarkable success. Yet this picture of conventional military success requires nuancing. Iran’s strategic posture was never built primarily on its conventional forces. It rests on a mosaic defence approach — an interlocking network of asymmetric tools including drone swarms, proxy militias, naval harassment, and the latent threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz. The campaign neutralised Iran’s conventional military layer while leaving its asymmetric capabilities largely intact. Dismantling an adversary’s navy, ballistic missiles, and air defences is strategically significant — but insufficient when that adversary’s primary coercive instruments are drones, proxy networks, and the capacity to disrupt critical maritime chokepoints. Degrading the conventional without neutralising the asymmetric is, in effect, removing the rifle from your enemy’s hand while leaving the pistol loaded. An Ambiguous Ceasefire The limitations of what was achieved are already visible in the ceasefire’s contours. The agreement, never made public, has been widely characterised as ambiguous. Most critically, the nuclear file remains entirely unresolved, despite being the one issue on which the Trump administration and its critics converged. Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, while severely degraded, are not permanently disabled. Their reconstitution is a function of resources, not resolve, and any sanctions relief embedded in a ceasefire agreement would effectively restart the rearmament clock. The Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran-aligned factions in Iraq are already in rebuilding mode. For these actors, the ceasefire represents not a defeat but a tactical pause and an opportunity to reconstitute. Post-War Iran It would be equally misleading to frame Iran’s position as one of victory or resilience. The regime that survived this war is not the regime that entered it. More than fifty senior figures were killed. The military has been severely degraded. The nuclear programme has been set back by years. The economy, already under severe strain from decades of sanctions, has been pushed to the verge of structural collapse. Infrastructure damage is extensive, and the already fraying social contract between the regime and its citizens is under extraordinary new stress. The power structures within the regime are under internal strain as rival factions compete to define what post-war Iran looks like and who leads it. Iran may have dodged the worst outcome — a collapse of the regime — but the colossal challenges it now faces are a far cry from victory. The contrast between Iran’s stated positions and its behaviour in April 2026 is stark. Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei consistently declared there would be no negotiations with the US. In March 2026, Iranian officials consistently confirmed that any ceasefire would require full deterrence guarantees. Between 7 and 10 April, multiple Iranian officials publicly declared there would be no talks in Islamabad unless Israel first stopped its operations against Hezbollah. Not only did Israel not stop, but it launched one of its largest single operations against Hezbollah on April 8th. And yet the Iranian delegation flew to Islamabad and sat down at the table. No amount of deceitful victory rhetoric will change this reality. An American Constant The US has a well-documented pattern of failing to translate military dominance into political gain. In Lebanon in 1983, after the bombing that killed 241 servicemembers, the Reagan administration withdrew within months, leaving a vacuum that Hezbollah moved swiftly to fill. In 2003, the US overthrew Saddam Hussein with formidable military precision but no coherent plan for what would follow, producing a power vacuum that Iran-backed militias rushed to occupy and have never vacated. The 2011 premature withdrawal from Iraq eroded institutional capacity and state authority at a pivotal moment, compounding governance failures that ISIS was able to systematically exploit by 2014. In 2013, President Obama drew a public red line around chemical weapons in Syria, then declined to enforce it when Assad crossed it in Ghouta. American credibility collapsed, Russia intervened, and the Syrian war reshaped the regional balance in ways that still reverberate. In August 2021, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan handed the Taliban a victory at no cost and sent a signal across every theatre where the US had partners. In May 2025, Trump declared the Houthis had ‘capitulated’, while they insisted it was Washington that had backed down. The ceasefire of April looks like each of these episodes and shares the same pattern of an overwhelming force, incomplete political follow-through, and adversaries who adapt and fill the vacuum. Washington’s Structural Inability Washington’s structural inability to sustain strategic engagement after military action is not incidental. It is a product of the domestic political architecture that shapes every foreign policy decision. The US does not enter or exit wars through a unified national will. It does so through the collision of competing interests that are rarely reconcilable. Defence contractors and the military-industrial complex have institutional incentives that favour escalation cycles over resolution. Bipartisan polarisation ensures that any policy associated with one administration becomes a target for the other, regardless of its strategic merit. MAGA isolationists opposed the war from the outset; pro-Israel groups wanted it taken further; traditional foreign policy establishments on both left and right view the outcome as a strategic half-measure. No coherent coalition exists to sustain the political investment a durable settlement would require. With midterm elections approaching, inflationary pressure and higher oil prices are leaving the Administration and Republican Party exposed. The predictable result is the same pressure for premature disengagement that has, in every comparable episode, left the underlying strategic problem intact, and the next confrontation more expensive than the one before. Conclusion The war between the US and Iran did not produce a winner. It produced a region more fractured than before, a nuclear file more dangerous for being unresolved, and two adversaries who will return to confrontation – albeit in different forms – under conditions they have each made worse. The fog of non-victory is not a metaphor. It is the strategic reality that will define the next chapter addressed in Part Two of this analysis. Next article : The Fog of Non-Victory: The Region’s New Disorder

Open War... Lebanon’s Chance
By
Hisham Dibsi
Published

Approaching the negotiation process that concluded in the capital Islamabad as one component of the conflict the two sides wage against each other in multiple forms spares us from evaluating it through the binary of success or failure. The event can instead be illuminated from the angle of the first direct meeting between the Islamic Republic and the “Great Satan,” after nearly half a century of a rigidity that was calculated, and not merely ideological. Whatever the case, the most significant achievement for both sides was the smooth descent from the top of the tree, and the ending of a war that has been devastating for Iran and costly for America. Lifting the Mourning That was the title of an article by the brilliant Samir Kassir, taken from us too soon, written at the moment of “liberation,” in which he called on Hezbollah to shed its black, but it was they who ended up casting the mantle of mourning over his loved ones, his friends, and the country itself. Had Samir Kassir been among us today, he might have written that it is Ghalibaf who has lifted the mourning, opening the negotiating platform to a serious possibility of understanding with his American counterpart, especially given that Iran’s generous offer of “initiatives for the future” implies that the Iranian economy might shift into the American orbit. But Trump does not buy a fish still in the sea; he wants to hold the coveted goods in his own hands, namely the nuclear file, the master key to all other files. Hence Ghalibaf’s declaration that “America has failed to gain Iran’s trust,” a statement that reflects Iranian arrogance, but if one turns the proposition around, that “Iran has failed to gain America’s trust,” one would be considerably closer to the truth. In any event, what transpired in Pakistan drew the political lines of the negotiation with clarity. That is an achievement in itself, and another achievement lies in the revelation of American priorities, which differ markedly from Iranian ones, a matter that will require further adjustment of political, economic, and military balances. This is what we see today, and what we will continue to see until the next round of negotiations, even if it has not yet been announced. Common Ground Any observer of the open conflict between Washington and Tehran cannot fail to notice certain similarities of mentality and behavior, such as a language whose vocabulary and meanings are symmetrically overbearing, a posture of hauteur, an invocation of a past that the current balance of power renders untranslatable into concrete gains, at least on the Iranian side, and something comparable is to be found in the White House, with however a vastly superior capacity for mobilization. There is also another trait common to both, namely the pursuit of an accumulation of power in the region, even at the expense of other states or of the very groups affiliated with them, in an attempt to compel the countries of the region to accept Tehran’s demands or to live alongside them. This is also what Washington does through its Israeli vassal, its parallel language and its concrete conduct. It is equally worth noting that both parties exhaust legal and diplomatic channels before jointly bypassing them, at the expense of international bodies and the states of the region and the world at large, however repugnant the means employed to achieve their declared objectives, as we have witnessed and continue to witness, around the clock. In short, we are faced with a trio of extremism (America, Israel, Iran) that nothing seems to deter from advancing toward its immediate and distant goals, whatever the human and economic costs, which the Arab countries in general, and Palestine and Lebanon in particular, are left to pay. Separating Interests The initiative of President Joseph Aoun and the decisions of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government together constituted a historic turning point in the trajectory of correcting the political and sovereign role of Lebanese authority, and in its mission to protect the homeland, the people and the state. An initiative that severed the Lebanese national interest from any external attachment, and reactivated the logic of Lebanese interest according to what the overwhelming majority of the people, their representatives and their parties consent to, as well as the custodians of the spiritual families that constitute Lebanon’s particular character, such that any party’s departure from this consensus or opposition to this order of national interest calls for a response commensurate with the noble objective sought, without permitting any obstruction whatsoever of this historic initiative’s course. And if this moment recalls a painful hour that marked the beginning of Lebanon’s civil war, what the Prime Minister articulated regarding the references adopted for the preservation of civil peace remains the criterion that guides all toward the keys to the solution, and not any other approach belonging to the language of war and arms, rejected by the great majority of the Lebanese people and alongside them by the refugee communities, Palestinian, Syrian and others, and the evidence is abundant, without any need to recall it here. In this context, the White House’s policy, through its pressure on the Netanyahu government, appears to have grasped the importance of the presidential initiative and the necessity of addressing the Lebanese file separately from the ongoing negotiations with Iran. The presidential initiative has moreover enabled Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France and Lebanon’s many friends, from Britain to Australia, to move in the same direction, which gives reason to believe that the coming negotiating battle with Israel will not find Lebanon bereft of the capacities to protect its national interests. Israeli military superiority is not the decisive factor in everything, and the occupation of the lands of the South does not give the Israeli government all that it covets, and its generals articulate a great deal of coveting, for Lebanon’s political space and the sophistication of its management are infinitely richer and vaster than the extremist Israeli mind, which measures all things solely by the scale of force and excessive force. Protecting Civil Peace In these arduous and difficult days, Lebanon needs its great figures, women and men of all communities, to step forward to the front ranks, in order to save both the people and the homeland. I presume that the remarkable man who left us recently, Mohammed Hussein Shamseddine, now joined by his spiritual twin, the “Red Bey” Samir Frangieh, would say today in one voice that a comprehensive national conference is imperative to protect the people and the homeland, on the basis of achieving justice and rejecting violence. And that all must be invited as equals, in their capacity as citizens of this homeland who share its destiny and forge the future of their children, to put an end to the open war so that Lebanon may remain an Arab, Middle Eastern and universal beacon. Indeed: this is Lebanon’s chance… for those who dare.

Viktor Orbán, Standard-Bearer of Europhobia and Champion of Corruption

Ruling Hungary with unchallenged authority since 2010, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has now been defeated at the polls, swept from office by public fatigue over corruption and perceived assaults on the rule of law. Now 62, he asserted himself on the international stage through repeated clashes with Brussels and his overt ties with U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Orbán also shocked with his indulgence toward far-right ecosystem and the broader autocratic network in Europe and around the world. Viktor Orbán received by Tony Blair at 10 Downing Street in January 2002, a year before the ill-fated invasion of Iraq built on spurious claims. According to Voltaire, “Politics is the art of lying at the right time.” (Gerry Penny/AFP) At the NATO summit in Washington in 1999, Orbán – then a young prime minister of a Hungary newly admitted to the Alliance – was mistaken for an interpreter by security personnel. “No, sir,” he reportedly replied to the officer, “I am the Prime Minister of Hungary, but I would be happy to interpret if you wish.” The anecdote, illustrative of his relative anonymity at the time, illustrates the still marginal position occupied by Central Europe’s new democracies in the late 1990s within the Euro-Atlantic order. Hungary, newly emerged from the Soviet sphere, was not yet seen as a major political actor – still less its leader. Champion of “Illiberalism” The man once mistaken for an interpreter has gradually established himself as a central figure of “illiberalism.” Popularized by Orbán himself, the concept refers to a system in which power is exercised by bypassing individual freedoms, the rule of law and the separation of powers, while preserving the institutional appearance of democracy. In practical terms, elections continue to be held, but the press and the opposition are placed under pressure, the judiciary loses its independence and checks and balances are weakened. In the Hungarian case, this is compounded by heightened nationalism and a socially conservative outlook rooted in another era: any resemblance to populism is far from accidental. Yet the young Orbán himself experienced the realities of communist dictatorship, when Hungary was still within the Soviet orbit. He first made a name for himself as a committed liberal, co-founding the “Alliance of Young Democrats,” the future backbone of the Fidesz party, and challenging the regime in 1989 with a passionate speech in favor of democracy. The shift occurred gradually. Orbán adopted a more authoritarian discourse, targeting the independence of the judiciary, the media and key institutions. Returning to power in 2010 in a country weakened by the economic crisis, he set about methodically consolidating his party’s grip over the state apparatus, universities and the media, in the name of defending the “Hungarian nation.” His restrictions on freedoms, particularly those affecting the LGBTQ+ community, led to tensions with the European Union, which decided to freeze several billion euros in funds earmarked for Hungary. Defending family, rural or Christian values is not in itself objectionable. What is, however, is the use of a well-honed strategy: instrumentalizing fears to seize power, spreading xenophobia and fueling Europhobia under the guise of patriotism. Post-Communism Formerly communist Europe went through a painful transition. Societies in the East experienced a genuine shock as they moved to liberal democracy. The old system, despite its constraints, provided a form of stability, a comfort zone. They had to learn to govern themselves without the experience of Western societies. Even today, the differences between the two halves of the former continent remain visible, as if the vanished wall continued to exist in an immaterial form. September 1989: East Germans crossing the Hungarian border en route to West Germany in their now-legendary Trabants, a symbol of the decay of communist economies. (Christophe Simon/AFP) In Germany, for instance, “Wessis” still sometimes mock “Ossis”, more than three decades after reunification. Much like East German Trabants – cars made from cotton-reinforced resin – set against West German BMWs. This divide is not limited to economics or technology; it also concerns mentalities. It is therefore unsurprising that far-right parties today perform better in former communist regions. The Nationalist Turn After consolidating his conservative base, Viktor Orbán drew on a nationalism deeply rooted in Hungarian society, shaped by a historical sense of isolation and insecurity within a nation surrounded by three major cultural spheres: Slavic, Latin and Germanic. This reflex is not unique to Hungary. In Poland, Serbia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, distrust of the “outsider” remains a powerful political driver. In this context, Orbán has taken a firm stance against European migration policies, going so far as to have a several-hundred-kilometer fence built in 2015 to prevent migrants from entering the country. His strategy rests on the designation of an external enemy. As the political scientist and Hungarian MP Zsuzsanna Szelényi has noted, this logic enabled him to win decisive victories in the 2014, 2018 and 2022 elections. Dangerous Ties with Russia In his latest campaign, after communists and migrants, Ukraine became the main target. Accused of seeking to drag Hungary into a war with Russia, it served as a scapegoat in an increasingly polarized discourse. The campaign relied in particular on disinformation and the use of content generated by artificial intelligence. Tabloids close to the government circulated manipulated images, amplified by networks of fake accounts. Orbán has never severed ties with Putin, even after the invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s international isolation. (Alexander Nemenov/AFP) Experts also point to Russian influence operations, including deepfake videos and content presented as news articles. Posters funded by public money portray Volodymyr Zelensky negatively, sometimes alongside European figures, in deliberately provocative staging. Orbán did not hesitate to declare at a rally: “We must choose who will form the government: me or Zelensky!” Despite its excesses, this rhetoric is rooted in a real fear: that of Hungary being drawn into a conflict. “The Fidesz appeals to the deepest need for existential security,” Zsuzsanna Szelényi told AFP. “Their message is: when the world falls apart, trust what you already have.” Identity Tropism and Lebanese Links In recent years, Viktor Orbán has methodically built a transnational network grounded in an identitarian and political reading of Christianity, conceived both as a civilizational framework and as a lever of influence. This strategy has taken the form of numerous conferences and forums held in Budapest, bringing together conservative and Christian actors from Europe and the Middle East in an openly stated logic of ideological convergence. As early as 2019, Gebran Bassil, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, took part in a conference on the “persecution of Christians” in Hungary, where he secured financial support for ecclesiastical projects. Budapest simultaneously launched, in the same spirit, a fund for the “reconstruction of churches” in Lebanon. This orientation was reinforced in 2025 with a conference held in Budapest entitled “The Future of Lebanon from a Christian Perspective,” organized and supported by the Hungarian government, which brought together several Lebanese Christian parties. The initiative is part of a broader Hungarian policy aimed at positioning itself as a protector of Christians in the Middle East, while forging political alliances with their representatives. Within this framework, Christian parties in the Middle East – and in particular the Free Patriotic Movement – appear as peripheral but symbolically valuable partners, allowing Orbán to anchor his project of a “Europe of Christian nationalisms” in a broader geopolitical and civilizational dimension. This rhetoric of “protecting Middle Eastern Christians” is also what Vladimir Putin invoked when intervening in Syria. Moreover, from the mid-2010s and the early years of the Syrian war, Budapest adopted a distinctive line within the European Union by refusing to fully break with Damascus. Without officially recognizing the regime, the Hungarian government maintained open channels of communication and opposed any policy of regime change in Syria. This position fits into a broader geopolitical vision in which Orbán views Assad’s fall as opening the way to radical Islamist forces and new waves of migration towards Europe. In this perspective, Assad ceases to be merely a problematic autocrat and becomes, in Budapest’s implicit discourse, a functional bulwark. This indirect rapprochement was also reflected in Hungary’s so-called “Christian protection” policy, notably through the Hungary Helps program. The initiative financed reconstruction projects in Syria, often in areas under regime control, prompting criticism within the EU, with some seeing it as a form of creeping normalization of Damascus. Without ever explicitly embracing Assad, Orbán thus contributed to undermining the European consensus of isolation, introducing an alternative logic: that of a civilizational pragmatism in which the survival of Christian communities justifies the maintenance of relations – even indirect ones – with the existing power. Europhobia Paradoxically, despite Hungary being a major beneficiary of European funds, the Orbán government has displayed outright hostility towards the EU. For years, Brussels has had to contend with a leader maintaining close ties with both Moscow and Washington, repeatedly obstructing key decisions, particularly on aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. Orbán has regularly used his veto power to block European initiatives, contributing to the paralysis of several major dossiers. More seriously, revelations by The Washington Post have pointed to the possible leaking of sensitive information to Russia. According to these reports, Hungary’s foreign minister is said to have kept Moscow informed in real time about internal discussions within the European Union. Faced with these allegations, official reactions in Budapest have ranged from dismissal to defiance. Blatant Corruption But above all, it was corruption that precipitated Orbán’s downfall. Despite a carefully calibrated campaign, voters punished a system marked by the spectacular enrichment of the Prime Minister’s entourage and the deterioration of public services. Officially, Orbán declares modest personal wealth. But in a country ranked among the most corrupt in the European Union, this display of frugality is hardly convincing. Hungarians denounce a quasi-feudal system in which those close to power accumulate wealth and influence. His father, his son-in-law, and his business allies have seen their fortunes grow exponentially, often through public procurement contracts financed by the European Union. According to Transparency International, billions of euros are lost each year due to corrupt practices, while Brussels maintains the freezing of significant funds. What of His Successor? Péter Magyar, the parliamentary election winner, wearing the traditional Hungarian jacket, the bocskai, at an election rally last March. (Balint Szentgallay/NurPhoto via AFP) The winner of Sunday’s election, Péter Magyar, inherits an immense task: dismantling the political architecture built by Orbán, restoring institutions, and rebuilding ties with the European Union. A former insider of the system, he retains some of his predecessor’s hardline positions, particularly on immigration and social issues, but promises to restore the rule of law and combat corruption. For many Europeans, he embodies an “Orbán without corruption and without Europhobia” – a formula that remains to be tested. Beyond Hungary, the stakes are global. Orbán had become a reference point for numerous nationalist movements. His defeat represents a symbolic setback for the far right, without however signaling its disappearance. In Central Europe, as in the United States with the “MAGA” camp, or in Russia, the dynamics that propelled Orbán remain active. The page may be turning in Budapest. But the model itself has not yet had its last word.