Lebanon in Transition: The State Against the Axes

The entire region finds itself today before great transformations that are redrawing the political and military balances and equations. The war that erupted between America and Israel on one hand, and Iran and Hezbolla on the other, cannot be reduced to a passing confrontation or a limited skirmish, but constitutes a pivotal event whose profound repercussions will be felt across all states, and singularly in Lebanon, which finds itself once again at the heart of the storm.

Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that great wars do not stop at the borders of the belligerent states, and that their consequences spread to fragile and torn entities, to states incapable of consolidating their sovereignty and of concentrating their decision-making power within their legitimate institutions. It is for this reason that maintaining Lebanon bound to regional axes and leaving it as an open arena for the conflicts of others places the Lebanese before existential dangers that it would be unwise to underestimate.

The world today follows closely the American-Iranian negotiations and the political, security and military reconfigurations they might engender. But the real danger lies in the fact that Lebanon ranks among the countries most exposed to paying the price, due to the persistence of weapons that escape the authority of the State, and the insistence of certain forces on keeping the country within the orbit of a regional project that transcends the interests of the Lebanese, their homeland and their State.

The region has truly entered a new phase, one in which the notions of war and peace are being redefined, new frontiers of influence are being traced, and the roles of states and armed groups are being redistributed. In this context, it becomes clear that any ceasefire between America and Iran would not be a passing conjunctural detail, but the prelude to a new political phase whose effects would inevitably reverberate across all the region’s arenas, Lebanon foremost among them. For it falls to America to impose on Iran the dismantling of its armed proxies and the cessation of any transfer of weapons and funds to any faction in the region, and most particularly to Hezbolla.

To bet on the perpetuation of the status quo, or on the possibility of Lebanon remaining outside the trajectory of the coming transformations, would be a wager at once mistaken and dangerous. The international community and the Arab states are increasingly convinced that regional stability cannot be achieved in a context where states persist that are incapable of controlling their sovereign decisions, nor as long as the phenomenon of parallel armies and armed organizations operating outside all legality endures.

The Lebanese president’s recent address constituted a remarkable moment in his treatment of the question of direct negotiation and of war and peace, when he affirmed clearly that any ceasefire decision is a sovereign decision that belongs to the Lebanese State alone, and to no other party whatsoever. He reaffirmed likewise, in terms that admit of no ambiguity, that no one has the right to speak in the name of Lebanon save the Lebanese State and its constitutional institutions.

This position expresses the very essence of the idea of the State and the most elementary principles of national sovereignty. For Lebanon cannot endure as a State if the decision of war and peace remains outside its legitimate institutions, nor if certain forces persist in presenting themselves as the effective authority above the State, above the Constitution and above the will of the Lebanese people.

It is regrettable that some continue to treat Lebanon as an open arena in the service of regional projects, while what the country needs today is to restore the principle of one State, one authority and one decision. For Lebanon is not protected by slogans, nor by political outbidding, nor by speeches of accusation and incitement, but by the advent of a real State, capable of protecting its borders, its people and its national interests.

It is now evident that any new military adventure would be paid for solely by the Lebanese, and that any tethering of Lebanon’s fate to the Iranian-Israeli confrontation (via Hezbolla) would inexorably lead the country toward yet greater isolation, collapse and destruction.

Similarly, any regional and international agreements or arrangements to come will impose new realities on the region, and Lebanon will be incapable of protecting itself or defending its interests so long as it remains unable to build a genuine State, sole holder of the right to use force, of the monopoly of arms and of the decision of war and peace.

The Lebanese State finds itself today before a historical test: either it fully recovers its role as the sole reference for all the Lebanese, or Lebanon remains a profaned arena whose people pays the price of others’ conflicts.

The coming phase demands the highest degree of national responsibility, for the region is transforming rapidly and the settlements to come will impose new equations. It is for this reason that Lebanon’s salvation begins with a return to the Constitution, to the logic of the State, to respect for Lebanese and international legality, and to the building of a State genuinely capable of protecting its people, its territory and its sovereignty.

The Lebanese deserve a State that protects them and not a State whose territory is instrumentalized to settle scores. They deserve a future founded on stability, sovereignty and prosperity, and not on perpetual wars, divisions and dependence on the outside. In this pivotal moment, attachment to the State ceases to be a mere political choice and becomes the very condition for Lebanon’s survival.

Lebanon’s protection begins above all with its disengagement from the axes of conflict, with the reaffirmation of its Arab identity, with the consecration of its neutrality with regard to the wars of others, and with the establishment of the exclusive authority of the State over the entirety of Lebanese territory.