Levant Time logo

Articles

News feature image
Massive explosion caused by an Israeli strike near the town of Al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon. (AFP)
Weekly essentials
Author portrait
By LevantTime .
Published Sep 6, 2026 - 23:27
While the United States had appeared to be relying solely on economic warfare against Iran, the US military abruptly carried out strikes on Iranian territory on Tuesday in retaliation for attacks targeting oil tankers, setting off a spiral of violence over the course of the week. In Lebanon, Israel released several civilians held in its prisons, while its army seized the strategic Ali el-Taher hill and continued its heavy strikes in the area it controls in the south of the country. The week from August 31 to September 6 was marked by a sharp acceleration of events in the Middle East, after the previous one had seemed defined by relative stagnation. On the Iranian front, the US military carried out targeted strikes inside Iranian territory as early as Tuesday evening, the first in nearly a month. This screen grab, made on September 6, 2026 from undated video footage released the same day by US Central Command, shows what CENTCOM says is one of the Iranian oil tankers it destroyed in response to attempted missile attacks on naval vessels. (CENTCOM via AFP) However, the relatively limited pace of the strikes suggests that the US administration has opted for an escalation that remains controlled, while continuing its blockade and economic pressure on Tehran. Even so, tensions continued to rise throughout the week. Explosions were heard on Saturday on the highly strategic island of Kharg, through which most of Iran’s oil exports pass. US President Donald Trump, for his part, threatened to strike the Kuh-e Kolang nuclear site — “Pickaxe Mountain” in Persian — a heavily fortified facility located deep underground, not far from Natanz, Iran’s main uranium-enrichment site. Earlier in the week, he had enshrined the “tanker for tanker” equation, pledging to target an Iranian vessel every time the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. That is precisely what the US military did on Saturday, setting two Iranian vessels ablaze. Politically, Donald Trump further hardened his tone toward Tehran. After saying in an interview that talks had been permanently frozen “because an agreement with them is not worth the paper it is written on,” he said on Saturday that the “conflict” with Iran was not a “war,” but “something ordinary” for the United States. A way of rattling the Iranians while at the same time reassuring the US public ahead of the midterm elections. A port, along with storage facilities and warehouses, was damaged following a US military strike carried out on September 6, 2026 in Iran’s southern Hormozgan province, which borders the Strait of Hormuz. (AFP) At the same time, the US news outlet Axios published a report on Saturday suggesting that the United States is already looking beyond this conflict, which began on February 28. Citing US officials and other informed sources, the outlet said the Trump administration is developing a broader strategy for the post-war Middle East. According to the report, it would be based on creating a regional alignment aimed at containing Iran, bringing an end to the regional fallout from Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks in Gaza, and expanding the circle of normalization between Israel and countries in the region. The threat against Kuh-e Kolang, which brings the Iranian nuclear issue back to the fore, echoes an announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which said on September 1 that Iran had still not reopened its sites to inspectors following the strikes of May 2025. It should be recalled that despite the scale of the Israeli-American offensive against Iranian sites, it is almost certain that the stockpile of enriched uranium remains intact and has been moved to a safe location by the Iranian authorities, which remain committed to what they consider their right to develop a nuclear program. Following the IAEA announcement, the United States, together with France, Britain and Germany, said they intended to submit a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning Iran’s failure to comply with its non-proliferation commitments. This display of unity stands in contrast to the chill that has prevailed between Washington and its European allies since the beginning of the conflict. For their part, the Iranians appear to be responding to the upheaval in much the same way as before: by striking neighboring countries, notably Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without directly targeting Israel. Heavy strikes in southern Lebanon On the Lebanese front, Israel is intensifying its destruction operations in villages in the south, even using explosive barrels in some cases. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Washington and the international community to “put an end” to Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, which killed seven people on Sunday against the backdrop of a fragile truce. The strikes hit several localities in the Nabatiyeh region. Twenty people were also wounded, including children, according to the Health Ministry. One strike also destroyed the former Ghandour hospital, which had been out of service for years. Release of detainees and capture of Ali el-Taher But the major event of the week in the south was the Israeli capture of the strategic Ali el-Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh region. The site served as a major Hezbollah headquarters, consisting of an extensive network of tunnels from which fighters from the Shiite party operated, along with, according to some reports, Iranian fighters. On Thursday evening, the Israelis announced that they had taken control of the complex. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that tunnels still had to be blown up. This military “success” may not have come as a surprise after weeks of bombardment, but Hezbollah’s reaction was more unexpected. After long insisting that it would refuse to give up this strategic hill — as had the Iranians, who had also threatened to intervene — the Shiite party ultimately sought to play down the significance of the development through its media outlets and allied networks, without officially confirming the loss of the site, which it had refused to preserve by handing it over to the Lebanese army. The other major surprise of the week was Israel’s release of five Lebanese and Syrian civilians held in its prisons. The move came following a visit to Tel Aviv by US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. According to the Israeli prime minister’s office, Thursday’s announcement “follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of leaders of the Jewish community who had been abducted and killed in Lebanon” between 1984 and 1986. Here too, Hezbollah’s reaction raises questions. While describing the move as positive but insufficient, the party once again turned on the Lebanese authorities, accusing them of “submission to the enemy” and holding them “responsible” for the disaster in the south. It even warned them against “internal conflicts.” Could the party’s military setbacks push it to turn increasingly toward the domestic front? Finally, the Israeli army made an important statement on Sunday, saying it was considering reducing its occupation zone in southern Lebanon, moving from the current “yellow zone” to a “grey zone.” Such a development would, according to this assessment, reflect a reduced threat from Hezbollah. The measure has not yet been approved by Israel’s political leadership. Yemen and Palestine The week was also particularly tense in Yemen, where clashes between Houthi rebels and government forces continued to intensify, culminating in an especially deadly Saturday in which more than 60 people were killed in a single day, bringing the death toll since Thursday to around 200. The Houthi offensive is aimed in particular at taking control of areas bordering the Bab el-Mandeb passage, which would give this Iranian ally additional leverage over another major strategic chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz. In Palestine, particularly troubling comments by Israel Katz on Gaza marked the week. He claimed, without providing evidence, that most of the territory’s residents wanted to leave, stressing that Israel was “ready for such an evacuation” on a mass scale. A sign that the ordeal of Gaza’s residents may be far from over. Finally, it is worth noting that the IAEA announced on September 1 that facilities discovered in Deir el-Zor, Syria, indicate that Bashar al-Assad’s former regime had secretly been preparing an advanced nuclear program that could have led to the production of an atomic weapon with the help of North Korean experts.
Homage
Author portrait
By Michel Hajji Georgiou - Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
News feature image
The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix, Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix, thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer. And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina. Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
Analyze

Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
Author portrait
By Mona Fayad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
News feature image
The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
More Articles
Sort By: NewestOldest
Lebanon in a Hundred Years
By
Samir Abdelmalak
Published

In an era when crises and challenges are multiplying, we read each day articles, studies and analyses focused primarily on describing the current reality and examining its political, economic and social dimensions. Yet, despite the importance of understanding the present, excessive focus on diagnosing the situation has locked us into circular thinking: we turn endlessly around the same observations and the same deadlocks, without genuinely advancing towards serious reflection on the future of Lebanon, on that of its citizens, and consequently on that of society and the State. Launching national reflection circles… with positivity Lebanon today has an urgent need to create spaces for dialogue and reflection bringing together groups, elites and actors of society, whatever their level of organisation, in order to raise the fundamental questions that will determine the shape of the country in the decades to come. The nations that survive and progress are not those that content themselves with managing their daily crises, but those that have the courage to think long-term and to sketch a clear vision of their future. But before any debate, we must adopt positive thinking. A positive person is more open to the opinions of others; they see in the diversity of ideas a wealth and new opportunities for progress. Conversely, negative and closed thinking fosters mistrust of the other and ends up casting doubt on the very opportunities that stand before one. We must also look at reality as it is, and not as we would wish it to be. Fleeing from facts or embellishing them produces no solutions; it merely defers the explosion of crises and aggravates them. It therefore becomes essential to raise questions with objectivity and respect, far from pretence, narrow calculations or preconceived judgements. Living societies do not fear questions; they regard them as a natural step towards the search for a better future. Imagining the next hundred years Lebanon today, more than ever, needs “national reflection circles” capable of approaching calmly and realistically the great fundamental challenges, of exchanging viewpoints and seeking common ground likely to guarantee the country’s stability for the next hundred years. Among the essential questions to be raised: – What is the form of governance best suited to Lebanon in the light of past experience? Does the centralised system remain the best choice? Would extended decentralisation or federalism offer more effective solutions? Or is it necessary to imagine an entirely new formula? – Is the Taif Agreement still adapted after all the transformations experienced by Lebanon and the region? – Is the model of coexistence and consensual democracy still capable of producing stability and building a genuine State? – Does coexistence remain possible in its current form, in light of the experiences, crises and divisions traversed by the Lebanese? – How should Lebanese diversity be managed? Through a civil system founded on complete equality among citizens? Or through a system respecting communal specificities and balances within a consensual formula guaranteeing stability? – What should be the role of the State? Should it be limited to ensuring security, stability and essential needs such as health, education and infrastructure? Or should it intervene more broadly in the various economic and social sectors? – What of education? Should priority continue to be accorded to private schooling, which has long been one of Lebanon’s historical pillars? Or does the future require a more balanced model between public and private sectors? – What economy do we want? Does the liberal economy remain the most appropriate choice for Lebanon? Or does the next stage require a social economy reconciling economic freedom and social justice? – How to ensure genuine popular participation in the production of power? What electoral law would ensure fair representation and strengthen democratic life? – How should major national decisions be taken in the event of disagreement? – And what constitutional and political mechanisms would prevent deadlocks while preserving the national partnership? These questions are but a few examples of the great debates that should be approached with courage and serenity. For building a nation consists not only in managing the crises of the present, but also in being capable of imagining the future and preparing for it. It is often said: “In times of crisis, opportunities are born.” This is true, provided one knows how to read reality with lucidity and possesses the intellectual and political courage necessary to seize those opportunities, rather than contenting oneself with managing collapses or awaiting solutions from outside. If Lebanon wishes to remain a living nation capable of enduring, it needs a long-term intellectual and national project, collectively elaborated, in order to build political, social and economic stability for the next hundred years — and not merely for a few years.

The War in Iran: Where the Parties Stand
By
Khalil Helou
Published

Three months to the day after it began, the war in Iran appears to be in suspension, and in the calculations of Washington and Tehran, the opposing side will eventually give in with the factor of 'time'. Although all signs suggest that Iran should capitulate after its military disaster and integrated economic losses estimated between 1,000 and 1,450 billion US dollars, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not backing down. It has no accountability to its people, prevents them from expressing themselves, has massacred at least thirty thousand of them, and imprisoned fifty thousand more as of last January. The IRGC has thus secured its internal framework, firmly preserves its positions within it, and continues to coordinate closely with Hezbollah. Facing this force, Israel is launching targeted strikes and conducting a limited offensive in South Lebanon and parts of western Bekaa. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed to international navigation by Tehran, and Washington maintains its blockade on Iranian ports. Despite ongoing negotiations to break the deadlock, the situation in the Gulf is described as a strategic impasse. What about the demands presented by the belligerents, where do negotiations stand, and—a question asked and asked again many times—how could this war possibly end? Washington's position The Trump Administration maintains its demands, particularly the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the refusal to allow it to remain under Iranian control. It is demanding firm guarantees for international freedom of navigation. On the nuclear issue, the United States is demanding the complete halt of uranium enrichment for military use and the sequestration, for sixty days, of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile with a trustworthy third country, pending negotiations for permanent dismantling. Frozen Iranian assets would remain blocked as long as Tehran has not conceded on all American demands. The Abraham Accords should be expanded to all Gulf countries and Iranian support for Hezbollah must cease. Finally, CENTCOM reserves the right to conduct immediate defensive strikes against any mine-laying or direct threat, as was recently the case at Bandar Abbas, as long as no final agreement has been signed. Tehran's position Tehran is demanding the complete and immediate lifting of economic sanctions, is calling for the return of the tens of billions of dollars frozen abroad, and wishes to entrust Qatar with the role of financial guarantor for unblocking funds. All restrictions on its oil exports should be abolished. The Iranian regime reaffirms its sovereign right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes and would be willing to temporarily transfer its highly enriched stockpile to China, provided this is not part of permanent dismantling. It demands full recognition of its maritime sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and wishes the security of the Persian Gulf to be ensured exclusively by littoral states, excluding any Western military presence. Tehran is demanding an immediate halt to CENTCOM strikes and refuses to ratify an agreement as long as these strikes continue. Finally, Iran's top diplomat Abbas Araghchi refuses to tie a ceasefire to normalization between Arab countries and Israel and is seeking to convince Gulf monarchies to loosen their security ties with Washington. Positions of Pakistan and Qatar Negotiations are ongoing thanks to Pakistan, Qatar, and China, but they are facing profound mistrust between Iran and the United States whose contradictory statements are not facilitating a resolution. Since 1979, Pakistan has hosted Iran's interests section in Washington and thus serves as the de facto communication relay between the belligerents. Its top officials closely coordinate military and civilian exchanges between Washington, Tehran, and Beijing to preserve the ceasefire. Qatar, for its part, focuses on financial mechanisms, particularly proposals aimed at unfreezing Iranian funds in exchange for maritime security guarantees. China's Position China does not assume the role of front-line mediator, which is left to Pakistan and Qatar, but acts behind the scenes as a strategic guarantor for both parties and as a financial guarantor for Iran. It proposes a major technical solution: the nuclear stockpile. Iran would transfer its highly enriched uranium to China, offering Tehran an honorable exit and Washington tangible proof of short-term nuclear de-escalation, although the American administration shows reluctance to entrust this control to Beijing. Economically, China is Iran's financial lifeline, purchasing nearly 90% of its oil under sanctions. It has leveraged this role as an indispensable economic partner to pressure Tehran into accepting the ceasefire of April 8. To protect itself from the maritime traffic halt in the Gulf that it saw coming, China had accumulated massive reserves of 1.4 billion barrels of oil (enough for 6 months). This allowed it to negotiate without the absolute urgency that grips Western markets. Beijing also insists on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, vital for its imports, while respecting Iran's pro-sovereignty discourse. Finally, China seeks to strengthen its regional influence and obtain American concessions on Taiwan in exchange for its stabilizing role. The Art of the Geopolitical Deal: Trump's Negotiation Strategy In these negotiations, President Trump applies a personalized and aggressive style, a geopolitical version of his "Art of the Deal," combining soothing public rhetoric with concrete pressure on the ground. On one hand, the displayed optimism, asserting repeatedly an "imminent agreement," aims to reassure markets and the electorate; on the other hand, targeted military operations and maximum economic measures serve to force the IRGC to yield to US demands. The White House chief favors bilateral channels with Pakistan and Qatar as well as direct dialogue with Xi Jinping, thereby imposing his unilateral narrative on the conflict's stakes. His "overheating" tactic consists of immediately demanding extreme positions (zero enrichment, adherence to the Abraham Accords) so he can then make concessions and sell compromises. Finally, he involves China, accepting to entrust it with Iranian uranium, using it simultaneously as both leverage and a fuse. If the deal succeeds, he takes the credit; if it fails, he can denounce its responsibility. Iran's Asymmetrical Negotiation Strategy Iran's negotiation strategy is slow, patient, and methodical, based on asymmetrical resistance aimed at wearing down Washington through attrition. Tehran practices "brinkmanship diplomacy" by provoking calculated tensions (mining the Strait of Hormuz, Hezbollah's involvement in a war with Israel, strikes against the United Arab Emirates, targeting ships in the Gulf) to demonstrate that the cost of inaction for the United States exceeds that of a compromise. The Iranian regime exploits its moderate diplomats and the IRGC to alternately present flexibility and threats. It seeks to fracture pro-American coalitions in the Gulf and strengthen its ties with China and Pakistan to demonstrate that it is not isolated. It uses time as leverage, prolonging technical discussions to exhaust Washington, which faces intense political and financial pressure. Finally, the sanctification of sovereignty makes any public capitulation unacceptable; technical solutions, such as uranium transfer to China, are therefore valued because they resolve the problem without Tehran appearing defeated. Outlook Negotiations are stalled, and as long as neither side has inflicted a sufficiently decisive shock to break the other's will, the conflict will persist in the shadow of measured but explosive tension (blockade, strait closure, intermittent strikes of varying intensity), which is bearable for President Trump but perhaps not for Tehran. From there, the conflict could evolve in two ways: either Iran yields over time, signaling the beginning of the regime's end; or Washington concedes to certain Iranian demands, saving face for the regime, which would mean a setback for Trump. Time will be the determining factor that will force one of the two parties to change course; otherwise, a third scenario would prevail: a devastating total war.

Lebanese cultural diplomacy: between influence, solidarity and resistance (1/2)

A Lebanese Pop-Up Store is being organized on May 30 and 31 in Paris at the Aalamuna gallery by the company ELFAN to promote Lebanese artists. This new ELFAN initiative is part of a broader global movement aimed at supporting Lebanese artists by developing Lebanese cultural presence in France and Europe. Before outlining the context of this new Lebanese Pop-Up, a brief overview of the ongoing global dynamics, in which Culture Minister Ghassan Salamé is participating, seems useful in several respects. For several years, particularly since the events of 2019 and the explosion at Beirut port in August 2020, Lebanese culture has been experiencing growing momentum abroad. Clearly, Lebanese cultural initiatives outside Lebanon are not new: the diaspora has always played an essential role in promoting and showcasing Lebanese cultural identity. But today, this phenomenon appears to be taking on a new scale. Many artists, creators, intellectuals, and cultural professionals have left Lebanon in recent years, sometimes out of necessity, sometimes to find opportunities that the country could no longer offer them. Because for a long time, culture in Lebanon has remained sidelined behind political, economic, and social emergencies. Yet despite this structural fragility, the Lebanese cultural scene continues to reinvent itself and reach out internationally. In this context, it seems important to examine Lebanese cultural initiatives in France, where we have been witnessing a multiplication of events and projects related to Lebanon for several years. Today, cultural initiatives are multiplying to promote the country abroad, certainly, but also to support Lebanese artists, preserve Lebanon's heritage, and maintain a living connection with Lebanon during this difficult period of crisis and war. A strong Lebanese presence The prestigious Clermont-Ferrand International Short Film Festival is a striking example. Two years ago, Lebanon was highlighted there through a special focus dedicated to Lebanese cinema. Many directors, producers, and industry professionals attended the occasion and contributed to the program, illustrating the growing importance of Lebanese cinema on the international cultural stage. The Arab World Institute (IMA) also plays an important role in this dynamic of showcasing Lebanese heritage and creativity. The current exhibition on Byblos, postponed two years ago because of the war and eventually maintained despite the absence of certain works still held elsewhere, is also a significant example. Culture Minister Ghassan Salamé was present, illustrating the importance now placed on these cultural initiatives abroad. In this same framework, the exhibition Photographing Lebanon's Heritage 1864-1970, after its Paris showing, is open to the public in Marseille until September. The concert by Ibrahim Maalouf and Hiba Tawaji at the IMA, accompanied by several artists from Lebanon, and the presence of Khaled Mouzanar and Nadine Labaki at the Cannes Film Festival—where Khaled Mouzanar was also part of the Un Certain Regard jury—demonstrate how much Lebanese cultural figures now occupy an important place on international stages. This dynamic was also recently illustrated in Saint-Malo, where Lebanon was the guest of honor at the Étonnants Voyageurs festival. Lebanese writers, artists, and intellectuals participated in several discussions on memory, exile, and contemporary Lebanese creation. Ghassan Salamé was also present at this event. "The more tragedies succeed one another, the more the Lebanese people have grown accustomed to expressing them. While I'm speaking to you, Lebanese painters are at the Venice Biennale, Lebanese filmmakers are at the Cannes Film Festival, and Lebanese writers are at the Saint-Malo festival," Ghassan Salamé aptly noted in his speech at the Saint-Malo festival. Minister Salamé has been continuing his travels and meetings abroad for several months to promote Lebanese cultural heritage and influence. In parallel, numerous artistic events are designed as spaces of concrete solidarity with Lebanon. This is notably the case with Moments for Lebanon, an artistic and humanitarian initiative based in Paris, founded by a collective of Lebanese diaspora members, whose second edition is already planned in the City of Light in June 2026 to continue artistic and humanitarian mobilization around Lebanon. ELFAN's new initiative It is this broader dynamic that also drives ELFAN's work in promoting Lebanese artists. This company has set itself the mission, in particular, of training future cultural professionals so they can support and develop this rapidly growing sector. It is within this framework that a new Lebanese Pop-Up Store is being organized on May 30-31 in Paris at the Aalamuna gallery. The event will bring together creators, artists, and entrepreneurs to highlight Lebanese expertise while simultaneously supporting Lebanon and the Lebanese Red Cross. With the same goal in mind, a themed week dedicated to Lebanon will be organized next July in Clermont-Ferrand, at ELFAN's initiative, at the Atelier Reine Mathilde gallery. On the program: exhibitions by Lebanese painters; calligraphy and dabkeh workshops; film screenings; Lebanese brunch... The aim is to introduce Lebanese culture to a predominantly French audience, with the parallel objective of supporting the Lebanese Red Cross. Faced with this proliferation of initiatives, an important question increasingly comes to mind in the cultural sphere: are we witnessing the establishment of Lebanese cultural diplomacy? Or is it rather a form of cultural resistance? Because unlike institutional cultural diplomacy, which is conceived and structured by the State, many of these projects are now born from individual or associative initiatives, at the local level or within the diaspora—somewhat like Lebanon itself. It is artists, collectives, or event organizers who carry Lebanon's visibility abroad, often without official support. This reflection is moreover beginning to emerge even in discussions at the level of the Ministry of Culture. Minister Ghassan Salamé recently stated that "what saved culture in Lebanon is the fact that it is rooted in society and not in the State. When the State collapsed, culture continued to live." Yet his numerous appearances at these cultural events also show that culture is beginning to take on a significant place in the work and thinking of the Lebanese State. Beyond international influence or the preservation of cultural identity, another essential question now arises: what can be the real contribution of culture and art to Lebanon's development? Can culture participate in economic reconstruction, the creation of opportunities, and maintaining the link between Lebanon and its diaspora? These are reflections that also open up the debate on Lebanese cultural policy itself… Next article: Lebanon's cultural policy

Iranian conflict: diplomatic stalemate, military escalation

Lebanese citizens, and the peoples of the Levant region more broadly, apparently must resign themselves to being regularly subjected to a rollercoaster of developments regarding the Iranian conflict. On Thursday afternoon, reports from the American website Axios indicated that a framework agreement had been concluded between US and Iranian negotiators. The same sources claimed that a copy of this memorandum of understanding had been transmitted to the White House and that President Donald Trump had requested "a few days of reflection" before endorsing the text. A few hours later, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards appeared eager to "facilitate" the task for the American president by emphasizing, through the Tasnim agency which reflects their viewpoint, that no agreement has yet been reached between Americans and Iranians. Based on the public positions adopted on both sides, significant differences remain between the two parties, particularly concerning issues of free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the US naval blockade imposed on Iran, the return to Iranian authorities of a portion of Iranian foreign currency assets frozen for several years, and the fate of enriched uranium. The US Treasury Secretary stated on Thursday that no agreement is possible with Iran before the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic without conditions and without the handover of enriched uranium to the United States. However, this latter point is rejected by the Revolutionary Guards, so skepticism was clearly evident Thursday evening regarding a quick breakthrough in American-Iranian negotiations. It should be noted that President Trump issued a stern warning to the Sultanate of Oman on Thursday, cautioning it against any agreement it might be tempted to conclude with the Iranian regime to jointly manage the Strait of Hormuz and collectively impose a passage fee on merchant vessels. Tehran insists on controlling the strait and imposing a sort of toll on this maritime route to ensure substantial revenue. It is worth noting that an Iranian source indicated to the Wall Street Journal that the Islamic Republic's foreign currency reserves are sufficient for barely three months. Escalation in Military Operations While negotiations appeared to be stalling, a clear escalation in military operations was recorded on Thursday at both the regional and local levels. Late Thursday evening, Iran's official Fars agency reported "Iranian missile fire from southern Iran." The Tasnim agency, for its part, reported that automatic weapon fire was heard in Bandar Abbas due to clashes taking place in the Gulf waters. Tehran's media clarified that the Revolutionary Guards opened fire in the Strait of Hormuz at American warships and a clash ensued between US vessels and the Pasdaran. At dawn Thursday, the Revolutionary Guards had launched drones against a US oil tanker and three ships attempting to cross the Strait of Hormuz. The US military indicated it had intercepted four drones before launching an air strike against a drone launch site in the Bandar Abbas port area. In response, the Pasdaran launched missiles and drones against Kuwait. Air raid sirens were activated in the capital and the Kuwaiti military specified in a statement that "Kuwaiti air defenses repelled attacks carried out by enemy missiles and drones." The Pasdaran, for their part, claimed to have targeted 'an American base.' This attack by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps on Kuwait is part of the strategy pursued by the Pasdaran since the beginning of this war on February 28, aimed at focusing their aggression on Gulf countries (rather than Israel) in order to pressure them to call for the dismantling of American bases in the Gulf and to urge the United States to end its economic and military pressure on the Islamic Republic. It should also be noted that the Israeli military eliminated two senior Hamas military officials in Gaza on Thursday. Raggi's efforts to preserve the remains of Tyre On the Lebanese front, reports indicated late in the evening of significant rapid advances by Israeli forces that are reportedly one and a half kilometers from the city of Nabatieh and have taken control of the Beaufort Castle, an important strategic position in the region. Thursday was marked mainly by an Israeli missile strike on an apartment in Choueifat, where Ali Husseini, the head of the Hezbollah missile system, was killed. At dawn on Thursday, an Israeli airstrike was carried out against the city of Tyre. The Israeli military said it had targeted Hezbollah command centers in the city. According to some sources, a strike also targeted an area near the famous remains of the city of Tyre. On this matter, Foreign Minister Joe Raggi has undertaken urgent diplomatic steps to prevent any damage to the archaeological and cultural heritage that enriches the Tyre region. Returning to military operations, a missile strike targeted an apartment in a multi-story building in Sidon at dawn on Thursday. Three people were killed in this attack. Furthermore, a vehicle was hit by a drone strike on the coastal road near Adloun, not far from Sidon. This attack reportedly killed six people. Airstrikes were also reported in the early morning against the city of Nabatieh as well as against Hezbollah militia positions in the Jezzine district and in Zahrani. A motorcycle traveling on the outskirts of Tyre was also targeted by a drone strike at dawn.

Hezbollah, the Resistance That Summons Occupation

In an interview broadcast on one of Lebanon’s satellite channels, following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and amid what had afflicted some with a certain “national indigestion”, former Lebanese Defence Minister Albert Mansour took aim at the inhabitants of the occupied Syrian Golan, who numbered at the time no more than twenty thousand souls and had chosen the path of peaceful resistance against the Israeli occupation, asking with derision: “Why don’t these people resist the Israeli occupation?” Many of Hezbollah’s mouthpieces and loyalists did the same, sparing the Golan’s inhabitants none of their repeated barbs over what they called a deviation from the principle “where there is occupation, there is resistance”, as though resistance could only manifest itself through rockets and projectiles, oblivious to the fact that the highest form of patriotism and resistance lies in clinging to the land, in refusing to surrender it as easy prey to the occupiers, and in preserving a heritage, a culture and an identity. This is precisely what the Golanis accomplished, within the limits of their modest and limited means, and in the most exemplary fashion. It was this state of affairs that compelled the author of these lines to publish, in January 2001, two detailed consecutive studies in the Lebanese newspaper As-Safir under the title “And They Ask You: When Will You Fight Israel?”, then to follow them with another article in “Qadaya An-Nahar” on 29 November 2005, entitled “A Letter to Hezbollah from the Occupied Golan”, in which he invited the organisation unreservedly to neutralise Lebanon and relieve its front from the burden of the conflict with Israel, now that the Lebanese had paid their share of the price. Yet, in a comedy of the darkest hue and by a reversal of a most singular kind, it was Hezbollah itself that, alongside Hamas in Gaza, proceeded to enshrine another conception of “resistance”, so strange that it would not have occurred to anyone, even in the most confused of dreams, and whose substance reduces to this: where resistance exists, occupation is summoned. A posture that goes far beyond the notion of national betrayal born of collaboration with the occupier, venturing into territory that is graver and more profound still. What Hezbollah has done to the Lebanese, and to the Shia in particular, has now reached the point of requiring the Arabic Language Academy to convene an emergency session and forge a new term that would leave the words crime and betrayal light-years behind. Hezbollah was never a national liberation movement, nor did it ever deserve that honour to begin with; quite to the contrary, it has invariably been the armed and auxiliary appendage of a foreign state that occupies Arab lands, the Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, before extending its grip entirely over Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. It was this Hezbollah that harvested the fruits of liberation in southern Lebanon in 2000, after having proceeded, in concert with its ally the Assad regime, to liquidate the cadres of the national resistance and monopolise armed struggle for itself. The voice of Georges Hawi, whom Hezbollah would subsequently assassinate, still resonates in memory: when he appeared in 2005, during the Independence Intifada, on a Lebanese satellite channel, to remind Hezbollah that after the Taif Agreement, Communist Party militants would slip clandestinely into the occupied border zone to carry out operations against the occupation and its agents, at the risk of being hunted down by them, and that Hezbollah’s own operatives had in fact liquidated many of them on their way back. In light of all the foregoing, even the comparison with Antoine Lahad’s mini-state and his disbanded army, which Hezbollah MP Hassan Yaaqoub warned the President of the Republic might be recreated, and which had been entrusted by the Israeli occupation forces with no more than the surveillance of a strip accounting for ten percent of Lebanese territory in the South, even that comparison no longer holds against Hezbollah, which enabled Iran to extend its grip over the entirety of Lebanese territory, in addition to the decades of death, devastation and ruin it has sown among its own entourage and the Lebanese at large, to say nothing of its implication in the assassination of Lebanon’s finest sons and the countless pieces of evidence pointing to its responsibility for the explosion of Beirut’s port. In any case, it would seem that this is the last war Hezbollah is drawing down upon the Lebanese, after having laid waste to their homes for decades. What the Party called Operation “Al-’Aasf al-Ma’koul”, the Lebanese will be left to swallow, and the Shia above all. The most likely outcome is that this adventure will end nowhere but in Hezbollah’s definitive removal from the scene, and perhaps in the installation of a “friendly” regime in Tehran or the clipping of its arms, eventualities that Hezbollah seems not to have factored into its esoteric calculations, namely the loss of its Iranian patron, as it persists in this gamble down to the last Lebanese Shia. Turning the page on Hezbollah in Lebanon will bring relief to the Lebanese and the Syrians alike. For breaking the backbone of the “Shia Crescent” and severing Iran’s Lebanese arm once and for all would strip any functional value from the regime of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani in Syria and might well hasten its demise. The disarmament of Hezbollah is therefore a Lebanese interest in the first, second and third instance, before it is an Israeli one, and it is a necessity that brooks no delay. As for the continuation of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations toward a peace agreement, contrary to what many believe, and even though negotiating with Israel or making peace with it could not be described as a comfortable stroll, there is considerable exaggeration in claims that belittle Lebanon’s capacity to compete with Israel on multiple levels and fronts, beginning with the dynamism of the Lebanese people and the wealth of their skills, energies and expertise, and extending to tourism, cultural diversity and a free economy. All wars are followed by others or by negotiations that lead either to a peace treaty or to surrender, with the sole exception of the October War on the Syrian front and the Lebanon War of 1982, after each of which the state of “enmity” with Israel was exploited as a profitable ‘national business’ to consolidate the equation of eternal occupation over there against eternal tyranny and despotism over here. In an earlier article in Al-Modon newspaper under the title “17 May”, former Socialist minister Ghazi al-Aridi quoted former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel as saying, on the programme “Witness to an Era” on Al-Jazeera : “It was Israel that signed, and I who did not”. Why? “I asked the American envoy, who came to me applying great pressure to accelerate the signing, to convey a message to President Reagan to the effect that: I want a personal letter from him affirming that he will continue to honour his commitment to playing the role of mediator. If Israel upholds its obligations, so much the better; and if it does not, there will be an American commitment to standing by Lebanon and protecting its sovereignty and unity...” He went on to say: “The letter came, but Israel withdrew from the agreement.” Why? “It emerged that Israel had signed not as a commitment to the agreement, but because it wanted something from the Americans, and what it wanted was the lifting of the sanctions imposed because Israel had exceeded the agreement limiting its army’s advance to 40 kilometres in the South only. Which means that Israel never actually wanted the agreement as it stood, despite everything it had extracted from it.” In the light of all this, what is required is not merely a rereading of that agreement, but a painstaking scrutiny of every element of that period. For President Amine Gemayel’s testimony does not merely shake the walls of the narrative that has prevailed about the “May 17 Agreement” for more than four decades; it may well bring the whole edifice crashing down. The most probable hypothesis, however, remains that all the catastrophes, the horrors and the wars that were waged and continue to be waged against the Syrians and the Lebanese are nothing but overdue instalments and long-deferred bills, the price for the Assad regime’s signing of that “disengagement of forces” agreement with Israel and the annulment of the “17 May” agreement in Lebanon in March 1984, without any future path having been charted as to how the conflict with Israel might one day be resolved.

Lebanon, Naim Qassem, and the Suspended State

In a moment of acute regional sensitivity, where Lebanon’s security dossiers intersect with the trajectory of regional and international negotiations, three closely intertwined themes impose themselves on the domestic landscape: the threats of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, the controversy surrounding attempts to reposition the “Lebanese card” in the regional bargaining game, and the dossier of displaced persons and their encampments within the capital, particularly in densely populated neighborhoods such as Bechara al-Khoury. These themes, despite their apparent divergence, point in their depths to one and the same question: to what extent does Lebanon remain a state capable of asserting control over its own decision-making and controlling its security and social boundaries? Naim Qassem’s recent threats were not simply a domestic political discourse; they arose within a tense regional context bound to the negotiations over the future of southern Lebanon, the implementation of Resolution 1701, and the redrawing of rules of engagement in the aftermath of the last war. Within this framework, the discourse can be read as a twofold message: inwardly, a reaffirmation that the arms dossier and the Party’s military role remain outside any unilateral internal settlement; outwardly, a signal that any arrangements concerning Lebanon cannot be dissociated from Iran and its role in the region. This is what revives the idea that Hezbollah intends to return the “Lebanese card” to Iran in its entirety, wresting it from the grip of the Lebanese state. It is therefore striking that a strong direct political response failed to emerge from within Lebanon, while the position of the American Secretary of State stood out as the most unambiguous. This disparity in reactions reflects a subtle reality inherent to the Lebanese system: the state avoids direct internal escalation on sensitive sovereignty dossiers, whereas the United States regards any threat to stability or to the diplomatic process as a direct infringement on its interests and on the role it plays in managing regional balances. Conversely, this political climate cannot be dissociated from the social and security reality within the Lebanese capital. Beirut itself is living under a twofold pressure: the pressure of regional political fracture, and the pressure of social and economic deterioration from within. It is in this context that the dossier of displaced encampments in neighborhoods such as Bechara el-Khoury emerges as one of the manifestations of the state’s fragility in managing the public sphere. The informal settlements along roadsides and in overcrowded neighborhoods cannot be approached solely as a humanitarian issue, nor solely as a security issue. They are the direct consequence of the absence of a clear state policy for managing displacement within cities, and of the lack of municipal and administrative capacity to organize the urban space of the capital. Over time, these encampments are transformed into environments of social pressure: congested arteries, weakened services, daily friction with residents, and the absence of effective regulatory oversight. But the real danger lies not in the existence of these encampments in themselves, but rather in the general environment that surrounds them: a state in crisis, an acute political fracture, economic strangulation, and an open-ended regional tension. In such circumstances, any administrative or social vacuum can convert into a point of fragility liable to be exploited or to explode at the first crisis. It is precisely at this juncture that linking the political level on one hand to the security and social levels on the other becomes necessary. For when political messages from regional and domestic actors intensify around the future of the Lebanese decision, while simultaneously the state’s capacity to control the daily texture of life in the capital diminishes, a single picture takes shape whose central finding is the progressive erosion of the concept of the central state. It would nonetheless be inaccurate to characterize the situation as a collapse or as an inevitable “time bomb.” Lebanon, despite all its crises, still retains a margin of relative stability, itself the fruit of complex internal and regional balances that prevent total explosion. But this stability remains fragile, and any intertwining of political escalation on one side and social deterioration on the other is capable of significantly raising the level of risk. In conclusion, Naim Qassem’s threats reflect the continuing conflict over the definition of who holds the decision-making power in Lebanon, while the displaced encampments in Beirut reveal the limits of the state’s capacity to manage its daily affairs. Between these two levels, Lebanon appears as a state operating within an extremely narrow space, caught between a truncated sovereignty and accumulated internal pressures, rendering any minor dossier capable of becoming the emblem of a larger crisis, should it fail to be addressed within a comprehensive vision oriented toward the state rather than toward axes of alignment.