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Rather than becoming an occasion to open a serious debate on the foundations of the judicial system, justice, and punishment in Lebanon, the political and legal discussion around the proposed general amnesty law has turned into a sectarian and confessional contest, entirely removed from the basic principles underpinning the anticipated legislation, namely achieving justice, redressing the wrongs suffered by detainees who have been denied for years their natural right to timely trials, and addressing, of course, the issue of prison overcrowding, which violates the bare minimum of human rights even in the case of a prisoner or a pre-trial detainee, thereby contradicting the very reformative idea of detention and converting prisons into spaces that entrench criminality and abuse. As at every political or legislative juncture, confessional and sectarian groups have rushed to fight over the demands on the table, each seeking to claim the largest share for its own community with the aim of entrenching confessional influence and ensuring its perpetuation, to the point where the mere idea of breaking free from it becomes a matter of extreme complexity and difficulty, thereby deepening sectarian divisions across the country and obstructing any reform process that, in any case, rarely succeeds. The moment the debate around a general amnesty law breaks down along confessional lines in its treatment of the various files (one community calling for the release of Islamist detainees, another seeking to address the drug cultivation that flourishes in the Bekaa mohafazat, and others demanding the return of those expelled to Israel in 2000), this reveals the profound pathological state of Lebanon’s political society and the absence of any genuine desire to bring about the slightest change capable of disrupting the existing structure. And yet, the very fact of contemplating the adoption of a general amnesty law, one that comes not in the wake of a civil war or bloody conflict as was the case in 1991, should prompt a multitude of questions relating fundamentally to the nature of the Lebanese judicial system and its multiple challenges, bound up with how it operates and with the mechanisms of oversight and accountability, given the chronic delays in adjudicating judicial files that in hundreds of cases exceed, as they often do, the maximum sentences the charges would carry, constituting a severe and unprecedented injustice against the detainees. Who will give back the lost years, squandered away for them? If the mechanisms of judicial work are near-paralyzed, whether in the handing down of verdicts, their cassation appeal, the resolution of pending claims, or the inspection and accountability of negligent, corrupt, and derelict judges, an urgent question then presents itself to the presidency and the government, namely how to set the wheels of judicial reform in motion, starting with how to make the judiciary a genuinely independent authority, free from political interventions and influences in its transfers, promotions, and appointments, which transform it into an arena of struggle and power-sharing, to the detriment of the very essence of the judicial idea and its independence. Among the many important commitments the President of the Republic, General Joseph Aoun, has put forward in his inauguration speech and in his subsequent political positions, judicial reform figures prominently, and he has expressed his conviction in this regard on numerous occasions when addressing the judicial body. This position converges with similar, if not identical, views held by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who occupied one of the highest international judicial posts before assuming the Lebanese premiership, as an international judge whose writings on justice, politics, and reform are extensive. Certainly, the Israeli war has upended all balances and reconfigured priorities in a manner radically different from what was expected, and certainly Lebanon — its South in particular — has become a disaster zone in every sense of the word, with the priority remaining the cessation of hostilities, the Israeli military withdrawal, and reconstruction; and yet it is equally true that progress on many internal files is both possible and within reach, and it would be even more accurate to say that it will never again be as smooth and accessible as it is with these two presidents specifically in office. In this regard, it is imperative that the debate around the general amnesty law transform into a debate on the means of revitalizing judicial inspection and activating accountability mechanisms within the judiciary, as a prelude to the more fundamental question concerning the nature of the relationship between political power and the judiciary, and the paths toward a genuine “liberation” of the courts and the judges from the political stranglehold that domesticates the judiciary and drains it of its substance, its role, and its mission. In this incandescent regional moment, one bearing transformations that would have been difficult to imagine only a few years ago, while Lebanon loses one by one the distinctive qualities that once set it apart, to the benefit of other rising nations, it is no longer possible to continue going in circles: wars, divisions, corruption, and decay.

Wednesday, May 27 ended with two developments that offer little cause for optimism: during an expanded meeting of his ministerial team, President Donald Trump emphasized that he "is not satisfied with what Iran is proposing" for the memorandum of understanding currently being negotiated between the two countries; at the same time, the Israeli military was recording a "first" by asking residents Wednesday evening to evacuate "all of South Lebanon" and retreat "north of the Zahrani River", a few kilometers south of Sidon! The overall political climate began to turn red in the middle of the day following reports from Iran's official television regarding the content of the draft memorandum being discussed between American and Iranian negotiators, through Pakistani mediators. Iranian television, widely picked up by the media, thus reported having obtained "a draft of an initial unofficial framework agreement for a protocol agreement with the United States". According to the Iranian media outlet, the terms of this framework agreement would stipulate that "Iran would restore commercial maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz within one month" and remove mines from the area, while the United States "would commit" to ending its military presence in the region and lifting its blockade of Iranian ports. Nothing about nuclear issues… The White House was quick to respond by stating that this information is entirely baseless and "fabricated out of thin air", as Reuters reported. Trump's statements For his part, President Trump held a meeting of his ministerial team at the White House on Wednesday (rather than at Camp David as originally planned) to discuss negotiations with Iran. "We are not satisfied with the Iranian proposals regarding the memorandum of understanding", the American president emphasized during this meeting, adding that American forces may "have to return to Iran to finish the job". Earlier in the day, the White House chief told BBC News that "Iran will not get sanctions relief in exchange for giving up enriched uranium". President Trump also reiterated that Iran "wants a deal and has no other choice", asserting that his administration "has still not reached an agreement with Iran and is not satisfied with it". He stressed in this context that Iran "is very weak" currently. For his part, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that "options remain open on the Iranian issue, but what is certain is that this country will not obtain a nuclear weapon". As if responding to the American administration, a senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards official estimated that the probability of another war is "low", pointing to the "weakness of the enemy". He assured that Iranian armed forces remained ready to intervene, "their magazines full". In another surprising statement, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence noted that the United States and Israel were still seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic "by new means", after having "failed" to do so through strikes. The South Lebanon evacuation order In Lebanon, the Israeli escalation continues relentlessly. One of the day's main stories was the evacuation notice for all of South Lebanon. The Israeli military in fact invited all residents of the South to withdraw north of the Zahrani, specifying that the region south of this river is a "combat zone". The IDF emphasized its determination to launch a major offensive against Hezbollah in this area. Another major flashpoint in the South is the town of Zawtar al-Charkiya in the Nabatiyeh area, where fierce clashes have erupted between Hezbollah militants and the Israeli army, which is advancing along this axis. According to analysts, the Israelis are seeking to capture Beaufort Castle, a highly strategic hilltop, on their route toward the city of Nabatiyeh. Their operations in Tyre also suggest a push in this direction. Hezbollah continues to use its missiles extensively against the Israeli army in Lebanon, as well as its most effective weapon at present—explosive drones—beyond its borders. How much longer will it be able to slow the Israeli advance? The Iranian-backed party appears to be increasingly adhering to its guerrilla tactics, sacrificing territory in favor of a war of attrition. The Qaraoun Dam Issue On another note, it should be mentioned that the three strikes that targeted the Qaraoun Dam in the Bekaa Valley last Tuesday, May 26, have triggered alarming reactions from the National Litani Authority and the Union of Bouhayra Municipalities, which represents 19 villages along the lake's shore. (Pages Facebook Al Buhaira Union of Municipalities , Machghara Municipality ) The Qaraoun Dam was built according to the so-called "gravity dam" model. While it does have a concrete "core" at its center and up to a certain height, the pressure exerted by the artificial lake's waters is primarily contained by a massive embankment that "crowns" this concrete structure. This embankment plays a crucial role in stabilizing the rocks and preventing them from sliding toward the dam's base. From a technical and architectural standpoint, the road bombed last Tuesday is an integral part of the embankment in question. A retaining wall was built along this section to keep the rock masses in place and protect the dam structure against any landslides or structural impacts. Consequently, the road targeted by the Israeli strikes is not merely a route connecting the western and eastern banks of the Litani, but rather a structural and functional element of the dam's protection system. The Israeli strikes were likely aimed at isolating West Bekaa from South Lebanon by cutting off Hezbollah's communication and logistical support routes. Following the bombing of the bridge connecting the village of Machghara (which came under intense Israeli strikes on Tuesday and where tunnels were discovered) to the village of Sohmor, another Hezbollah stronghold located on the opposite bank of the Litani, the only remaining passable road was the one across the dam. Now, with this route neutralized, traffic must either head further north toward Kefraya or take another route southward near Nabatiyeh. In either case, these routes are longer and more exposed. In this context, the National Litani Authority issued a statement warning of the dangers posed by repeated attacks near the dam's installations. The Authority emphasizes that any attack, direct or indirect, against the Qaraoun Dam or its facilities could have catastrophic consequences for the population, infrastructure, and essential equipment located downstream. (Page Facebook Litani River Authority, litani.gov.lb ,) It has also reposted a projection developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which describes potential flooding scenarios in the event of a dam breach and identifies vulnerable areas likely to be inundated following structural damage or an attack on the dam.

A widespread view in Lebanon holds that the Lebanese quarrel with Hezbollah stems from its doctrine and its adherence to the wilayat al-faqih as theorised by Khomeini. But the question deserves to be framed differently: does the problem truly lie in the doctrine itself, whether one agrees with it or rejects it, or rather in the imposition of that doctrine and the practices it entails upon society as a whole and upon the State? We have no right whatsoever to object to what others believe, nor to contest their full right to embrace whatever ideas and convictions they choose, whatever these may be. Any individual or community is free to forge its own intellectual and spiritual vision of the world, whether religious or political. This falls within the domain of freedom of conscience, a freedom enshrined in the Lebanese Constitution, one that is not, in its very essence, open to debate, nor should it be. Each individual and each community is free to see the world as it wishes and to build its own intellectual and spiritual framework without any form of tutelage. What becomes, however, a matter of objection, refusal, and indeed profound concern, is the moment when doctrine ceases to be a freely assumed personal or collective choice and becomes instead a force that imposes its law upon others, a project seeking to drag an entire society down paths it has not chosen. The difficulty deepens when doctrine transforms into an authority superior to that of the State, or into an instrument for imposing its choices upon a plural and diverse society, for at that point one is no longer in the realm of “belief” but in that of coercion. The objection, then, bears not on “what you believe” but on “how and why you seek to bind others to those beliefs.” At that stage, we are no longer facing a divergence of opinions or a diversity of convictions, but a perilous shift from the space of freedom to that of authoritarianism and domination. If I hold it as a principle that the beliefs of others are none of my concern, I am, on the other hand, entirely concerned when those beliefs become the pretext for drawing me into a war, for altering my way of life, or for imposing a political reality upon me against my will. This position proceeds from no hostility towards any community or school of thought: it is a defence of pluralism, of the right to differ, and of respect for the limits of all authority. The problem, then, does not lie in “what we believe” but in “how we translate that belief into practice.” For when conviction becomes the justification for imposing fateful decisions upon a plural society, for monopolising arms and wielding them as instruments of threat, and then for determining questions of war and peace outside the framework of the State and its institutions, one has crossed the boundaries of freedom and entered the logic of despotism and domination. This was recently made manifest in the declarations of certain leaders and adherents of Hezbollah, asserting that their arms will remain until the advent of the Mahdi !! At that point, one exceeds the bounds of reason and approaches collective delirium. In a society like Lebanon, founded by its very nature upon pluralism and a delicate balance, any attempt to impose a single model, whether ideological or religious, cannot but engender profound disorder, not because that model would necessarily be wrong in itself, but because it is imposed outside of any consensus and in breach of the rules of coexistence. It becomes therefore necessary to restore things to their proper place: defending freedom of belief does not mean accepting that it be imposed upon others, and pluralism does not imply that any one group may set itself up as guardian of everyone’s choices. What we need today is not a doctrinal debate that would only deepen divisions while missing the essential point, but a clear agreement on the limits of practice: the freedom of the individual or the group ends where the freedom of others begins, and no idea, whatever it may be, can legitimately transform itself into an authority imposed upon society and the State. This problematic cannot, however, be fully grasped if one confines oneself to the level of the behaviours or the visible political decisions of the Hezbollah movement. This is where the full importance of the approach developed by Waddah Sharara becomes apparent, for he did not regard the phenomenon as a mere collection of practices but as a coherent structure producing a particular mode of commitment, discipline, and loyalty. In State of Hezbollah , the Party reveals itself as a space that transcends political organisation to constitute a “society within society,” endowed with its own logic for defining legitimacy, belonging, and duty. From this angle, the engagement of individuals belonging to this movement, or their conformity to its injunctions, ceases to be a simple personal choice and becomes instead part of a collective mind that reshapes their perception of the world and of their place within it. This collective mind rests not only on conviction but on a system of symbols and meaning of considerable depth, articulated around martyrdom, sacrifice, the sacred, and belonging to a cause that transcends national borders. It is precisely here that the difficulty of the debate resides, for one is no longer in the presence of a political decision open to argument and contestation, but face to face with a mental and ethical structure of remarkable cohesion. Even in understanding this structure, however, the fundamental question remains: does this internal cohesion justify converting it into a force imposed upon the outside world? And can a collective mind, however coherent and self-assured, claim to reduce a diverse society to its own categories and impose its trajectory upon it? The true challenge, then, consists neither in deconstructing the belief itself nor in engaging in doctrinal controversy that risks proving sterile, but in drawing the boundary between the domain where this collective mind has every right to live and to express itself freely, and the domain it may not cross when the destiny of an entire society is at stake. In this sense, the more rigorous debate proves to be not a confrontation between beliefs but a struggle over the limits of authority and over who holds the right to determine the common destiny. And here, understanding the phenomenon is no longer enough: it is necessary to reaffirm a simple and decisive principle, namely that no force is legitimate when it claims to rise above the society to which it is supposed to belong, and that no idea may transform itself into a fate imposed upon others.

Fourteen years already. Fourteen years have passed since Nassir al-Assaad’s departure, and yet my brother’s memory remains intact in the hearts of all those who knew him, loved him, esteemed him, or simply crossed his path on the road toward a Lebanon he dreamed of as free, sovereign, and dignified. Nassir belonged to that generation of men who sought neither the spotlight nor honours. He believed deeply in just causes without ever seeking any personal gain from them. A discreet but determined artisan of the Cedar Revolution of 2005, alongside Samir, Fares, Elias and Samir, but also Walid, Gebran and others, he had understood early on that Lebanon could not survive without freedom, without pluralism, and without a State. He was one of those who act more than they speak. One of those who build in silence. One of those who refuse compromise but always maintain respect for others and the modesty of great men. His commitment was neither circumstantial nor opportunistic. It proceeded from a deep conviction: that Lebanon deserves better than divisions, tutelages, illegitimate arms, and foreign dependencies. He believed in an open, modern Lebanon, rooted in its history and faithful to its vocation of coexistence and freedom. But beyond the committed man, Nassir will above all remain in our memories as a man of immense humility. Despite his responsibilities, despite his real influence in many political and intellectual circles, he retained a rare simplicity, a sincere closeness with everyone, and a moral elegance that commanded respect. For me, he was not only a man of convictions or an engaged figure of his time. He was, above all, a brother. A deeply loved brother, a fellow traveller, a confidant, a reassuring and faithful presence. His absence has left, for fourteen years now, a void that time has never truly filled. Certain fraternal bonds transcend words: they are made of memories, glances, silences, simple moments that continue to inhabit an entire life. I miss him in the great milestones as in the details of daily life. I miss his wisdom, his reserve, his quiet humour, and that unique way he had of calming things without ever imposing his presence. He was young when he left us. Too young. And as is often the case with men of conviction, time seems to have given even greater value to his path and his legacy. Today, as Lebanon traverses one of the most difficult periods in its contemporary history, the memory of Nassir reminds us that there still exist men capable of placing the national interest above personal interests, men capable of believing in Lebanon even when everything seems to push toward discouragement. The finest tribute we can pay him is not only one of words or memories. It is to continue defending the values to which he devoted his life: sovereignty, the dignity of the State, freedom, dialogue, and hope. On the occasion of the fourteenth anniversary of his passing, we think of him with emotion, pride, and fidelity. Because some men never truly disappear. They become a part of the memory of nations. To Nassir, with affection, gratitude, and respect.

In the wake of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s threats to “crush Hezbollah” and expand his military operation into Lebanon, the country has been swept into a fresh spiral of violence that reignited fears of a return to open confrontation. Those fears are all the more well-founded given that the Israeli army has begun extending the so-called security zone it controls in southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Israeli leader – who has secured American approval for a large-scale operation against Hezbollah – reaffirmed on Tuesday that he had no intention of “taking his foot off the accelerator,” stating that his army is intensifying its operations in Lebanon and “securing strategic positions.” The prime minister also pointed to a “national effort aimed at countering the threat of Hezbollah’s explosive drones.” Lebanese citizens are thus bracing for the worst, while Hezbollah remains wholly indifferent to the appalling human, economic, social and material toll of the devastating war into which it has dragged the country for Iran’s benefit. Israeli strikes intensified throughout Tuesday. Since Monday afternoon, the city of Nabatieh – on the verge of suffering the same fate as Bint Jbeil, reduced to a heap of ashes – along with towns in the Western Bekaa, strongholds of the pro-Iranian movement, have been subjected to the relentless fire of Israeli warplanes and drones. For the first time since the war began, the Israeli army called on the residents of Nabatieh to evacuate the entire city and make their way “north of the Zahrani River.” Also, for the first time, it struck with such ferocity at the villages of the western Bekaa. In the mixed village of Machghara alone, fifteen people were killed in a raid carried out after an evacuation order had been issued – a locality where Hezbollah fighters take shelter inside or near homes abandoned by their inhabitants in order to launch their rockets at Israeli positions. The logic of this group – to which Lebanon owes, in addition to the destruction, an Israeli occupation of a vast swath of its southern territory – remains unchanged: unable to repel the Israeli army, Hezbollah strives instead to inflict losses upon it. Yet those losses remain negligible compared to those borne by Lebanon. Since March 2, Tel Aviv has recorded 23 deaths in its military ranks, while Lebanon counts 3,185 dead and 9,633 wounded. A figure that risks climbing still higher should Israel follow through on its threats. Benjamin Netanyahu held military consultations with his Defense Minister, Israel Katz, and his Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, just hours before the Israeli army confirmed to Reuters its intention to push northward the fictitious “yellow line” that demarcates the so-called security zone it has established along the full length of its northern border. In the early hours of Tuesday morning, it conducted an incursion roughly ten kilometers north of that line to drive back Hezbollah fighters. The risk today is considerable that Israel will extend its sphere of influence all the way to the Zahrani River, just a few kilometers south of Sidon, in keeping with the wishes of the far-right ministers within the Israeli cabinet. Or that it will move to execute its original plan – launching an incursion into the Bekaa from positions it controls on the Lebanese slopes of Mount Hermon, in order to establish a security zone there as well and neutralize the Hezbollah threat, pending security arrangements with Lebanon. One development on the ground lends weight to this hypothesis: the targeting of roads in the Bekaa. The Israeli air force has rendered impassable the strategic road running alongside Lake Qaraoun, near the dam, which links the villages of Qaraoun and Machghara. The route in question has been struck four times, though without the dam itself being damaged, according to the Litani Water Authority. This tactic – cutting off access routes to disrupt the movement of Hezbollah fighters – echoes the one the Israeli army employed in southern Lebanon prior to launching its ground operation. Confronted with this worst-case scenario, one is entitled to ask whether Hezbollah, at Iran’s behest, has not deliberately escalated its drone attacks against the Israeli army in recent days – fully aware that Israel would not stand idly by – in order to pursue a dual objective: to derail the new round of direct talks between Beirut and Tel Aviv, tentatively scheduled for Friday in Washington, and to turn Lebanon into yet another pressure card in Tehran’s hand amid potentially fraught negotiations with the United States. For the moment, neither Israel nor Hezbollah appears ready to ease the military pressure, fueling fears of a protracted conflict over which the authorities have no control. A Mediation at a Standstill Against this charged backdrop, not only do mediation efforts to revive Iranian-American dialogue remain deadlocked, but tensions between the belligerents have resurfaced. Tehran has reverted to a language of threats, following U.S. strikes targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps hydrofoils in Bandar Abbas, near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington of a “flagrant violation of the ceasefire,” while the American military asserted it had targeted missile launch sites as well as vessels suspected of laying naval mines. “Iran holds the United States responsible for all consequences arising from these aggressive and unjustified actions,” the ministry warned in a statement. For his part, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, warned that U.S. forces would henceforth have “no safe haven in the region,” while the Revolutionary Guards claimed to have shot down a U.S. drone and opened fire on other aircraft entering Iranian airspace. It is against this backdrop of renewed escalation that U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly headed to Camp David tomorrow, according to the New York Post , for consultations on the Iranian file with members of his administration, including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who submitted her resignation four days ago. Far from the regional tensions, the suspension of an Iranian presidential decree reinstating Internet access in Iran is also noteworthy, as it underscores the Revolutionary Guards’ grip over strategic decision-making in the country. The decision to overturn the measure was taken by Iran’s justice ministry.

There has been much talk, of late, about the necessity of changing the system of the Lebanese formula, described as a “crisis-generator”, and some speak lightly of an “other” Lebanon at a moment of extreme complexity through which the region is passing. Some have held, since 1989, that the Taif Accord is an accord of “necessity” — meaning that it “does not please us”, but necessity has its own imperatives: – the necessity of putting an end to the war, – the necessity of moving from war to peace, – the necessity of ridding oneself of an internal adversary, – the necessity of holding fast to this accord in the face of Hezbollah's weapons. Others consider that they have “tested the accord and witnessed its failure”, and this party returns, from the very moment of its proclamation, with examples attesting to its failure, disregarding the mechanisms that governed its selective implementation: – Syria's weapons, from 1989 to 2005, – Iran's weapons, from 2005 to the present day. Under the pretext that it 'failed' to manage the country, they break with the text to defend new formulas such as federalism, a Small Lebanon, and others. For my part, I belong to the camp that defends the Constitution as the protector of Lebanon's meaning, which rests on the triad: finality of the entity, Arabness of Lebanon and the living together. I am also proud of the Vatican's announcement of the beatification of Patriarch Elias Howayek, and I warn against: A. The gravity of a continuing transgression against the Constitution and the Taif Accord at a moment when the region's maps are being redrawn and political and economic dimensions and roles are being determined We are at a crossroads where the outlines of a new mapping of the region are taking shape, a hundred years after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the Sykes-Picot phase. Today, Islamic currents — Sunni and Shia, non-Arab — are at the forefront and seek to define their political, economic, and military weight at the expense of the region's identity. To prevent Lebanon's fall and spare it from paying the price during these phases of great change, we hold fast to what the Lebanese agreed upon in the Taif Accord, which has become the Constitution, and which affirms the finality of the Lebanese entity and its belonging to the Arab identity. On this basis, the finality of the Lebanese entity constitutes the principal guarantee required so that Lebanon neither moves toward shrinkage nor dissolves into a larger framework. Lebanon's Arabness and its belonging to its Arab environment secure for it the guarantee of integration into the Arab interest system whose contours are taking shape in the first decades of this century. B. The gravity of a reversal against the Taif Accord, the Constitution, and the resolutions of international legitimacy To step outside the Constitution at a moment when Hezbollah is attempting to impose the equation of “weapons in exchange for the Constitution” — that is, to obtain gains for one camp at the expense of the internal balance — is extremely dangerous, for Lebanon is not governed by balances of power but by the power of balance. Adherence to the implementation of the resolutions of international legitimacy, notably Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701, which draw from the Taif Accord their juridical foundation, means that holding fast to the Taif Accord is tantamount to holding fast to the resolutions of international legitimacy, just as withdrawing from it means withdrawing from those resolutions. One of the (so far) weaknesses in the content of the negotiations with Israel in Washington may lie in the absence of a political text — oral or written — concerning the resolutions of international legitimacy 1559, 1680, and 1701. C. The question of the living together and political partnership in the context of one party's rebellion against Lebanese and international justice We are in a moment of regional re-ordering, where every community and every state seeks a place that constitutes its reason for being in a world that changes at extreme speed. We are the custodians of a Lebanese experience based on the living together — which, in my view, that is to say this living together, is not the desire of Christians to live with Muslims nor the reverse, but rather the consequence of each party's inability to live alone. Such is the equation we learned during the war and after it, and which today constitutes the essence of Lebanon's meaning in the coming stage, in the region and in the world. President Ahmad al-Sharaa has promised to draft a constitution for the new Syria within four years — we wish him well, for we know the complexity of matters with the Kurds, the Druze, the Alawites, the Christians, the Islamists, the Muslims, the secularists, and others. We have a Constitution — let us preserve it. D. Reframing the debate on the question of neutrality in a way that does not contradict Lebanon's identity and belonging Neutrality rests on every internal party ceasing to rely on external backing at the expense of the national partnership. For such reliance rests on the following exchange: an internal party cedes a portion of sovereignty in exchange for a portion of gains, at the expense of the internal partner. This is why Lebanon must be kept neutral from external conflicts. Lebanon's century-long experience confirms that sovereignty is indivisible and that there are no particular gains for one party at the expense of full internal partnership. All communities and all parties in Lebanon have experienced reliance on the outside. No community or party has been spared the consequences of the 'adventures' of such reliance. The call for neutrality is more pressing than ever, and neutrality is a covenant among the Lebanese that transcends constitutional and legal considerations — it lay at the very foundation of the Lebanese idea. Neutrality is not a founding milestone to be added to previous founding milestones, such as the establishment of the State of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the National Pact of 1943, or the Taif Accord of 1989. The neutrality required today as a protective and unifying national necessity for all Lebanese falls within the framework of preserving Islamic-Christian living together under the sign of balance, justice, and freedom. E. Discussion of Lebanon's economic, cultural, educational, medical, and banking role, with a view to recovering its comparative advantages in this domain and exiting its current Arab and international isolation We are today entering a phase that has brought Israel into the heart of the region, while Iran, Turkey, and Russia expand with imperial appetites suspended for a century and now returning with the collapse of the old Arab order. All of this coincides with the decline of Lebanon's economic, cultural, educational, medical, and banking role. What is required, and urgently so, is to launch concerted efforts in all the aforementioned fields in order to recover this role at the global level. The era of “Lebanon as the region's service center” is over, given the development of the majority of Arab states and the repercussions of globalization and artificial intelligence. If it is true that Lebanon suffered from the problems of the Arab world and paid a heavy price for Arab causes — with the emergence of unionist currents, the momentum of the Palestinian revolution, and others — honesty requires acknowledging in return that Lebanon gained presence, renaissance, and prosperity from its belonging to the Arab world: – generations of pioneering students of engineering, medicine, and economics since the 1940s, who launched the reconstruction of the Gulf, – the Banking Secrecy Law of 1956, which attracted Arab capital fleeing nationalizations in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, – the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, which made the port of Beirut the Suez Canal of the region, – Palestinian, Arab, and oil capital. Today that phase is over and it falls to us to invent a new raison d'être in this world. I do not claim to know its contours, but I know that the formula of the living together is what remains to us — provided we know how to preserve it. It does not escape anyone's notice that the Ministers of Public Works of Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed the project to build the 'Sultan Abdulhamid' railway linking Istanbul to Mecca without passing through Lebanon. Nor does it escape notice that a maritime line extends from the Emirates to Aqaba in Jordan, then to Haifa-Israel, and from Haifa to Europe, without passing through Lebanon. And no one is unaware of what President Ahmad al-Sharaa said to the Arab press: “The time of Moses was the time of magic ; the time of Christ the time of medicine ; the time of Mohammad, the time of language ; as for the time of today, it is the time of development.” F. The recurrent anxieties of the communities Lebanon's communities have lived, since the founding of the Lebanese Republic, with anxieties they have considered existential, and these anxieties were an essential factor in Lebanon's entry into the ill-fated war. Today, in the context of the internal crises facing Lebanon and the great mutations in the region, the anxieties of the communities are reappearing: the Christians live with the demographic anxiety that has never left them, considering today that the return to “Small Lebanon” constitutes their “guarantee”; the Shia live with the anxiety of marginalization and seek to escape it by exploiting Iranian support and rebelling against the State and its institutions; the Sunnis live with the anxiety of suffocation, considering that despite their Arab extension they are in Lebanon a community like the others, to which is added today the emergence of a new Sunni leadership in Syria; while the Druze live with the anxiety of the founding community turned into a targeted minority, to which are added its anxieties on a regional level. The Taif Accord is the sole guarantor which, through its complete implementation, offers solutions to all these anxieties by consolidating the living together, guaranteeing the communities, and protecting the rights of citizens. There is a reality shared by all: the culture of submission to the fait accompli, in which all have accommodated themselves to this fait accompli in order to obtain personal gains. No community or confession has refrained from using an external “ladder of access” at the expense of the Lebanese interior: – some climbed the ladder of the Mandate, – others took turns with the PLO, Israel, Syria, and Iran. The heart of the Taif Accord is inscribed in this paragraph of the preamble to the Constitution: “Any authority that violates the covenant of the living together is illegitimate.”