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In 2005, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1612, providing for the identification of parties responsible for grave violations against children in armed conflicts and wars, whether they are states or de facto authorities such as militias and illegitimate local powers. Pursuant to this resolution, the “List of Shame” is issued annually, ranking states and organizations according to the number and nature of the violations they commit. The annual report reveals that armed and security forces committed 38,000 violations against children worldwide over the past year. It covers sixteen countries, most notably Afghanistan, Mali, Haiti, Myanmar, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Iran and Israel. Israeli armed and security forces alone account for one quarter of all documented violations, with more than 12,425 violations committed against five thousand children whose cases have been verified, while investigations remain ongoing into another five thousand cases. As a result, Israeli security forces have once again been identified as the principal perpetrators of these violations, topping the List of Shame for the second time. UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell addressed the issue, stressing that: “The figures contained in this report do not reflect the true scale of violations against children, since the report includes only cases that have been verified. A great many violations go unreported for a variety of reasons, including difficulties in gaining access to affected areas, fear of reprisals and other obstacles.” The report also shows that 70 percent of all deaths and injuries resulted from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Israel’s position at the top of the “List of Shame” extends beyond what is taking place in Palestine. Violations committed against children in Lebanon and Syria are no less severe, nor are those suffered by the Iranian people, who already endure the brutality of the mullahs’ regime. These violations nevertheless pose a profound challenge to the entire civilized world, especially to democratic states that uphold international humanitarian law and the conventions they themselves helped shape and promote. International law provides for the prosecution not only of the principal perpetrators of such crimes, but also of those who become complicit in them, in accordance with the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Complicity is therefore regarded as a form of indirect participation encompassing material support, logistical assistance and moral backing. This legal responsibility also extends to arms manufacturers, along with all companies whose activities, directly or indirectly, contribute to supplying the military effort of those responsible for the crime of genocide, including technology and artificial intelligence companies. In her remarks, the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Virginia Gamba, declared: “Failure to act does not stem from ignorance. It is the result of a conscious political choice.” In light of this testimony, it becomes legitimate to reassess the positions of every state connected, directly or indirectly, to crimes committed against children across the world, wherever they may be and whatever the reasons for which their childhood has been violated. The gulf between what international law prescribes and the present condition of humanity remains immense. Remarkable scientific progress does not, in itself, amount to genuine civilizational progress. The Capital Negotiations over the status of East Jerusalem were postponed until the end of the five year transitional period established under the Oslo Accords. As the turn of the third millennium approached, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak refused to engage in discussions on the issues of a final settlement with Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. The mediation undertaken by U.S. President Bill Clinton before leaving the White House proved equally unsuccessful, as neither side accepted the proposals he put forward. Ariel Sharon then chose a different course, one of carefully orchestrated provocation, coordinated with Ehud Barak through his entry into the Al Aqsa Mosque compound. This first triggered a broad popular Palestinian uprising, followed by a return to armed struggle under the leadership of Hamas. After becoming Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon ordered Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip on 15 August 2005, under what became known as the Disengagement Plan. He presented this as a model for resolving the conflict while preserving the vision of Greater Israel, withdrawing only from Palestinian urban population centers as the Judaization of East Jerusalem continued in parallel under the annexation policy Israel has enforced since the end of the June 1967 war. That model continued to be implemented in pursuit of the Judaization of the capital of the State of Palestine. The Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem were placed under a special legal status that denied them Palestinian identity documents while also withholding Israeli citizenship, unlike Palestinians living inside Israel. Instead, they were issued cards bearing the designation “permanent resident,” granting them the right to vote only in Jerusalem’s municipal elections, while excluding them from elections to the Knesset. Every time Palestinian legislative elections were held, the same battle resurfaced over the right of Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents to vote for the Palestinian National Authority and its Legislative Council. Israel has consistently opposed their participation in Palestinian elections, even though, under international law, they remain the inhabitants of occupied territory entitled to international protection. During his first term, President Donald Trump recognized Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem by relocating the United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to the city, with little regard for the consequences of such a decision. He went even further by closing the office of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington. Last May, the Knesset approved, on first reading, a bill establishing a “Judea and Samaria Heritage Authority,” the biblical name used for the West Bank. The bill still requires second and third readings before becoming law. Once enacted, all archaeological sites across the West Bank would fall under the authority of the Israeli government. These sites, found almost everywhere, span successive civilizations from the Canaanite period through the Roman and Ottoman eras, enabling that authority to restore, build, buy and sell without significant constraint. Such a measure would enable Israel to seize any area of Jerusalem and, more broadly, of the West Bank. From its perspective, the central issue remains the Temple believed, according to its own historical narrative, to lie beneath the Al Aqsa Mosque. With this objective in mind, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has intensified measures targeting the administration of the sanctuary by occupying parts of the compound and stationing soldiers alongside the “Temple Guards Unit,” whose mission is to protect those seeking to enter the mosque compound and perform their religious rituals there. Israeli forces have taken control of four locations within the Al Aqsa compound: the Dome of Imam Al Ghazali, the Dome of Solomon, the Dome of Moses, and the Dar al Hadith building. Security forces have also removed thirty seven guards and employees, reducing the number of Palestinian guards from fifty to twenty on each shift, while revoking the work permits of thirty employees residing in the West Bank. At the same time, the Israeli police have launched a recruitment campaign for new volunteers to join the “Temple Mount Unit,” drawing from among the most radical Jewish extremists. These policies, which undermine the agreements concluded with the Palestinian Authority and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the custodian of the Al Aqsa Mosque since the 1920s, have elicited from Netanyahu nothing more than a brief statement claiming that nothing has changed on the ground. Yet despite its limited support, the Israeli movement Peace Now remains the only organization to have openly condemned the bill, declaring: “If this bill is approved by the Knesset, it will constitute, by every standard, an act of annexation accompanied by the large scale confiscation of Palestinian land.”

Uncertainty persisted at the start of the week over when technical talks between Tehran and Washington would resume, after both sides agreed last Tuesday in Switzerland to establish four working groups dedicated to sanctions relief, nuclear issues, and reconstruction. Strained by the military standoff over the Strait of Hormuz — where Iran is seeking to impose total control — and Tehran's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear sites, talks between the two capitals have nonetheless not broken down, according to multiple corroborating sources cited by AFP and American media outlets. On Monday, President Donald Trump announced on his social media platform, Truth Social, that Iranian officials had requested a follow-up meeting and that it was set to take place on Tuesday in Doha. That announcement was quickly denied by Tehran, which stated that no meeting or technical working group session was planned for this week in Qatar. The White House, however, confirmed that the two American negotiators, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, are expected to travel to Qatar "for high-level meetings," though no date was given. According to the American news site Axios, they would be in Doha on Tuesday for talks with Qatari officials. On Wednesday, the American and Iranian technical delegations tasked with implementing the memorandum of understanding signed on June 18 are each set to meet separately with Qatari and Pakistani mediators, Axios reported. A diplomat described by AFP as being close to the matter confirmed to the French news agency that communication channels between the two countries remain open — meaning in practical terms that the mediation, jointly led by Qatar and Pakistan, has resumed following the recent escalation of tensions and exchange of threats between the two sides. On Monday, calm had been restored on the US-Iran front: the exchange of threats that had flared up following Iranian attacks late last week on tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz had ceased, as had Iranian drone strikes and American counterstrikes. This calm appears to have been reached by mutual agreement, as a US official announced Sunday evening a suspension of mutual attacks in order to allow technical discussions to continue and to maintain freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. However, the situation is far from resolved, with Tehran remaining intransigent over its self-proclaimed right to control this strategic maritime chokepoint. The Islamic Republic had counted on the cooperation of the Sultanate of Oman to set a precedent in violation of international maritime law, but was quickly disappointed. Muscat reaffirmed on Monday that it will take no action contrary to that law, but that it remains willing to discuss with Tehran the possibility of fees being imposed in exchange for guaranteed services. Monopoly on arms in Iraq — what about Lebanon? Still at the regional level, another development deserves attention due to its strategic significance. The Iraqi government has given pro-Iranian armed factions a three-month deadline to hand over their weapons — a deadline that expires on September 30. The announcement comes as Iraq's new Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, is expected to visit the United States, which has long called for the disarmament of these factions, and in the wake of an unprecedented crackdown within Iraqi political circles. At least 200 people — including numerous members of parliament, former ministers, and businessmen — were detained as part of an operation conducted under the banner of the fight against corruption. Tens of millions of dollars were seized from certain residences. These two operations reflect the determination of Iraq's leadership to break free from the influence of the Islamic Republic, which has not responded to the announcement. They cannot be separated from the broader transformation process the region has been undergoing since the Israeli-American military operation against Iran. At the political level, Iraq and Lebanon share many similarities, particularly regarding Iranian influence and its destabilizing effect on both countries. The key difference between them, however, lies in the capacity and willingness to act: in Iraq, the decision to curb the grip of armed factions has translated into concrete measures, whereas in Lebanon, the same decision taken in August 2025 continues to meet with reluctance over its implementation. It remains unclear and is now contingent on a set of measures outlined in the framework agreement reached last week between Beirut and Tel Aviv in Washington. The first phase of this agreement calls for an Israeli withdrawal from 'pilot zones' in southern Lebanon — a withdrawal that has yet to take place. The arrival in Beirut of CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper — who held talks with Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal and President Joseph Aoun focused on preparations for implementing the document signed in Washington — signals the beginning of this process. Israel also appears to be preparing for gradual, partial withdrawals up to the Blue Line, as evidenced by the large-scale demolition of Hezbollah tunnels in Majdal Zoun and the destruction of homes in other villages, including Haddatha. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on Monday that his country will not withdraw from Lebanon as long as Hezbollah remains armed, while the pro-Iranian group flatly refuses to give up its weapons. While the tension that manifested on the ground through protests among Hezbollah's base following the signing of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement has eased somewhat on the political front, it remains very much alive. Militia leaders continue to warn against any attempt at disarmament, repeatedly reaffirming their determination to resist the diplomatic process underway between Beirut and Tel Aviv. For now, however, calm prevails. The Amal-Hezbollah tandem is not considering an escalation, at least 'for the time being.' Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry, who is also opposed to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, expressed his commitment to the country's stability and the preservation of calm during a phone call with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Through one of its officials, Mahmoud Qomati, Hezbollah indicated that it does not currently plan to withdraw its ministers from the government, even as it claimed that 'Hezbollah has the means to bring it down.' WLCU welcomes the agreement Despite these dissenting voices — all moving within the same orbit — and the reservations expressed by certain politicians, including Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, regarding specific provisions of the Lebanese-Israeli document, the framework agreement enjoys broad consensus insofar as it removes Lebanon from Iranian influence and would prevent southern Lebanon from continuing to serve as an echo chamber for regional conflicts. The World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU), the main body representing Lebanese diaspora communities, welcomed the agreement on Monday, stating in a communiqué signed by its president, Fares Wehbe, that the process initiated by the Lebanese authorities 'is in keeping with the Head of State's inaugural address and with the government's decisions aimed at restoring to the State, exclusively, the authority to decide on war and peace.' For the WLCU, as Farès Wehbé emphasizes, this process is a "first step toward restoring Lebanon's full sovereignty over its entire national territory" and it "reconnects with the tradition of bold Lebanese diplomacy that existed in the aftermath of independence, before the power to decide war and peace was stripped from state authority." "For the first time in several decades, the country is negotiating in its own name and in the interest of its nation," Mr. Wehbé notes, adding that "Lebanese people, both at home and around the world, are longing to rediscover a normal Lebanon — one where culture, the arts, life, and joy will once again take precedence over the language of arms." The WLCU president also expressed his commitment to supporting the president and government in this endeavor, while calling on the Lebanese people "to remain vigilant and to thwart any attempt to sow chaos, especially given that certain armed factions, tied to a deeply entrenched system of corruption within the deep state, have a vested interest in keeping the arms issue under the sway of regional power dynamics." "What has been achieved must now be preserved through serious and sustained commitment, not celebrated as an end in itself," the WLCU statement emphasizes, reaffirming that "the independence Lebanon aspires to must be complete and definitive."

This essay explores the figures of crisis and catastrophe, tracing them from ancient cosmologies to the lived experience of a world shaken to its foundations. Bringing Greek, Biblical and Indian traditions into dialogue with the philosophy of Jan Patočka, it examines how civilizations have conceived disorder, collapse, irreversibility, and even the possibility of action when meaning itself begins to falter. Published here as a series of seven essays, this study follows a demanding yet essential line of inquiry: Is catastrophe a sudden rupture, a slow disintegration of the world, or the deepest truth of our historical condition? What follows is the second chapter. A Cosmology of Disorder The concepts of crisis and catastrophe have marked the conceptual history of modern politics as two major operators through which disorder has been rendered historically intelligible. The term crisis derives from the Greek krisis , whose original meaning is “decision” or “judgment.” In Hippocratic medicine, it designates the decisive moment at which the course of a pathological process turns toward one of two equally possible outcomes: recovery or death. Transposed into the political sphere, crisis thus denotes a regime of disequilibrium in which established forms of regulation are no longer capable of absorbing or neutralizing social, economic or symbolic tensions. It therefore has a dual function: it is revelatory, insofar as it lays bare the lines of fragility within an existing order; it is also productive, insofar as it calls for the reconfiguration of that order and the renewal of its principles of coherence. Crisis refers to a moment of suspended decision, an unstable interval within the unfolding of becoming, where determinations are provisionally held in abeyance while the outcome remains undecided. This Greek framework stands in marked contrast to the plurality of its counterparts, which are never true equivalents, within the Sanskrit tradition. Among these are saṅkaṭa (सङ्कट), denoting a critical situation, distress or a dangerous impasse; vipatti (विपत्ति), referring to adversity or impending disaster; and, in certain philosophical contexts, saṃśaya (संशय), expressing doubt or a structurally constitutive state of indecision. [1] Yet none of these terms fully captures the semantic density of the Greek krisis , understood as the immanent moment of decision in which judgment emerges from within indeterminacy itself. Another Sanskrit term, niṣkarṣa (निष्कर्ष), may nevertheless be invoked, not as an equivalent of crisis, but as its logical counterpart, a kind of inverted image of the Greek concept of krisis . Whereas crisis designates the open moment of decision, niṣkarṣa refers to the stabilized outcome of a process of discernment, the conclusion reached after passing through indeterminacy, in other words, meaning once the crisis of meaning has been resolved. [2] On closer examination, however, these Sanskrit notions illuminate certain dimensions of the critical as it manifests itself in lived experience, without making it either necessary or even possible to stabilize them within a strictly conceptual framework. For crisis is not merely a logical category or a schema of decision; it also belongs to an affective regime. It presents itself as hesitation, as the weakening of one’s grasp upon reality, as a relative loss of control, but equally as the effort to recover what is slipping away. It thus embodies a tension between powerlessness and the will to master what resists mastery. Crisis also possesses its own distinctive tonality: the anxiety provoked by time as it slips away, contracts or remains suspended, as though becoming itself were withdrawing from its own habitual coordinates. In politics, therefore, crisis does not merely designate a moment of rational transition. It is simultaneously the eruption of the political and the exposure of its most strained underside: a state of tension in which power discovers itself both energized by its own reconfiguration and weakened by what exceeds every stable form of control. Crisis both plays with and outwits catastrophe. The critical, a rudimentary attitude, almost a reflex of survival, disguises itself as relief: “I have not yet reached catastrophe.” In that displacement, it establishes itself as a position of relative respite, a way of postponing collapse by keeping it at a distance. Catastrophe, by contrast, presents itself as a kind of inverted festival of crisis: not a celebration, but an excess without a subject, a suspension of all points of reference, the world’s stark exposure to its own unbinding. It thus appears as the intensified reverse side of crisis. Whereas crisis still remains governed by the logic of management and thresholds, catastrophe exceeds every economy of control and postponement. The two great Indian epics, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa , each unfold, in their own way, a complex dynamic between crisis and catastrophe, yet neither offers an explicit conceptualization of the relationship. [3] Instead, this articulation emerges through a narrative, cosmological and ethical staging of disorder, in which disorder appears simultaneously as the suspension of decision and as the collapse of the world’s order. In the Mahābhārata , crisis first manifests itself as the obscuring of dharma , understood simultaneously as normative, cosmic and social order. Even before the outbreak of the Kurukṣetra war, the world has already entered a regime of disequilibrium: the law becomes unreadable, lineages contradict one another, duties collide, and hierarchies begin to disintegrate. The situation thus fully belongs to the register of crisis in the strongest sense of the term: a condition of structural indeterminacy in which judgment is both demanded and rendered impossible without transgression. Its paradigmatic expression is the figure of Arjuna, suspended in judgment on the battlefield, incapable of deciding without compromising the very order he is called upon to defend. [4] Yet crisis is never merely internal to a regime of decision. It is always already traversed by a catastrophic potentiality. The war of Kurukṣetra represents its absolute actualization, where the virtuality of disaster becomes embodied in an all-encompassing catastrophe: the near-total destruction of lineages, the collapse of structures of filiation, and the exhaustion of ordinary moral categories. [5] Disorder no longer merely suspends order; it dissolves the very conditions of its possibility. Within Indian thought, catastrophe belongs to the cosmic logic of the yugas . It is not the contingent event of ruin, but the decisive moment of a cosmic metamorphosis: the world must come undone in order to be reconfigured. The end of a cycle is never an absolute rupture, but the opening of a necessary recomposition, in which dissolution and regeneration follow one another according to the rhythm of cosmic temporality. The Mahābhārata illustrates this dynamic by presenting catastrophe not as closure but as the re-sedimentation of being. By destroying the old order, conflict prepares the rebirth of the world and the emergence of a renewed equilibrium of dharma . The war, despite its apocalyptic scale, becomes the vehicle of a cosmic restoration: a passage from decline to the reaffirmation of meaning. The Rāmāyaṇa , by contrast, offers a different modality of disorder and its resolution. Here, crisis does not take the form of a cosmic cataclysm but is condensed into Rāma’s exile, the symbol of suspended legitimacy. Catastrophe never fully erupts; it is displaced, deferred and contained. The narrative neutralizes disaster through its own structure. Rāvaṇa, the sovereign figure of disorder, embodies the temptation of chaos; his defeat marks the restoration of the continuity of dharma and the re-establishment of legitimate sovereignty. Thus, whereas the Mahābhārata makes catastrophe the matrix of a cosmic re-foundation, the Rāmāyaṇa stages its narrative domestication. Disaster is transformed into a process of purification and the reaffirmation of order. Crisis becomes a passage rather than an ending; destruction becomes the very principle of the world’s endurance. What fundamentally distinguishes the two great Indian epics is that crisis is never purely decision-oriented, nor catastrophe purely terminal. Both belong to the same cosmic regime, structured by the three dynamics that govern all worldly becoming: dissolution ( pralaya ), recomposition ( sṛṣṭi ), and cyclical repetition ( saṃsāra ). [6] Within the framework of dharma , as it structures the itihāsas ( Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa ), no stable separation exists between crisis and catastrophe, because the world itself is conceived as unfolding through cycles of disequilibrium and readjustment. The unraveling of dharma is therefore never absolute; it belongs to a broader economy of cosmic recomposition. Crisis corresponds to an internal instability of order, already permeated by the possibility of collapse, while catastrophe never signifies pure annihilation but rather the world’s reconfiguration, the reordering of meaning after disintegration. [1] On the philosophical uses of saṃśaya as a structure of doubt and indecision in the Indian traditions, see also Jonardon Ganeri, The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India, 1450–1700 (Oxford University Press, 2011). [2] Nadja Stchoupak, Luigia Nitti, and Louis Renou, Dictionnaire sanskrit-français (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1959). [3] Wendy Doniger, The Hindus: An Alternative History (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), Chapter 9 (“Women and Ogresses in the Rāmāyaṇa ”), pp. 213-250; Chapter 10 (“Violence in the Mahābhārata ”); and Chapter 11 (“Dharma in the Mahābhārata ”), pp. 251-338. Doniger examines how both the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata stage the disintegration of dharma through wars, dynastic conflicts, and cosmico-political disorder. [4] On Arjuna’s suspension of judgment and the crisis of dharma in the Mahābhārata , see Alf Hiltebeitel, The Ritual of Battle: Krishna in the Mahabharata (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), especially the introduction and the chapters devoted to the Bhagavad Gītā , particularly the sections analyzing the opening dialogue between Arjuna and Krishna, where the coordinates of the dharma collapse and the suspension of decision on the battlefield of Kurukṣetra are brought to the fore. [5] On the Kurukṣetra war as a total catastrophe and as the moment of the collapse of dharma , see in particular Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Hinduism and Buddhism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), pp. 75-82; D. D. Kosambi, The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient India in Historical Outline (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 100-108; Irawati Karve, Yuganta: The End of an Epoch (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 1969), pp. 7-32 and 95-120; and Bimal Krishna Matilal, Moral Dilemmas in the Mahabharata (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989), pp. 1-24. [6] Upinder Singh, Ancient India: Culture of Contradictions (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2021), chapter “Violence in Early Indian Tradition” and the sections devoted to the Mahābhārata , particularly Singh’s reading of the Kurukṣetra war as a moment of extreme intensification of political and cosmic violence rather than as a mere dynastic conflict. Singh emphasizes that the epic and normative sources do not construct a unified theory of violence, but instead reveal its central structural role in the imaginaries of power, kinship, and dharma . Read also: Crisis, Catastrophe and the Shaken World (1/7): Crisis and Catastrophe: Two Different Relations to Time

Regardless of the political and media debate surrounding the content of the US-Iran agreement, recent developments have made it increasingly clear that new dynamics are taking shape across the region. Their defining feature may well be turning the page on the long-standing and deep-rooted conflict between Washington and Tehran and replacing it with a framework for managing their differences according to parameters markedly different from those that prevailed in the past. It is in this context that Iran’s insistence on “bringing the state of war between the two countries to an end can best be understood”. The Iranian ruling establishment demonstrated remarkable pragmatism by agreeing to enter direct negotiations only weeks after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose moral, religious, political and military authority occupied a central place within the Islamic Republic. In doing so, it broke with the doctrine that had shaped Iranian policy for more than forty-five years, ever since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power, the formulation of the regime’s governing principles at home and its policy of exporting the revolution, along with its enduring description of the United States as the “Great Satan.” Despite the heavy losses it suffered in the two successive wars, Iran appears to have capitalized on the distinctive temperament of US President Donald Trump, always in pursuit of major deals and eager to project the image of a leader capable of achieving unprecedented breakthroughs. His readiness to wage war against Iran, encouraged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, led him to entertain lofty expectations that quickly proved unattainable. The sheer magnitude of American power does not automatically translate into immediate results. In practical terms, Tehran emerged from the war with gains that exceeded even its own expectations. Sanctions on Iranian oil are expected to be lifted after years of restrictions, part of the country’s frozen financial assets will be released at a time when they are urgently needed, and discussions are underway over the creation of a $300 billion reconstruction fund. As for the very issues for which the war was fought, namely the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program and the Iranian proxies, they have ultimately been deferred to the negotiating table. And who has mastered the art of patient, long-term negotiation better than those who weave carpets? Without underestimating the devastating impact of the country’s economic and social crisis, the Iranian regime has long grown accustomed to living under political and economic pressure, even if it now seeks to free itself from those constraints more than ever before. From Tehran’s perspective, simply weathering this storm without collapsing amounts to a victory in itself. Despite the elimination of senior leaders and the extensive destruction inflicted upon numerous strategic civilian and military facilities, the regime has remained intact. It also became clear that Washington’s expectation, even if it was probably never a serious one, that the Iranian people would rise up against their leadership as soon as the war began, was badly misplaced. Israel had promoted that assumption in Washington to strengthen the case for war, despite the absence of any solid evidence to support it. Whether the Iranian public’s retreat from protest reflected a surge of national solidarity in the face of foreign aggression, or whether it simply gave the regime an opportunity to regain its footing in the midst of the conflict, the outcome remains the same. The Iranian regime did not waver, while all those living abroad who had already straightened their ties in anticipation of returning home were left facing a profound and lasting disappointment. The regime’s prospects for survival have, in fact, become stronger than before, making any discussion of its collapse unlikely for the foreseeable future. Above all, Iran “discovered” a major, perhaps even decisive, card that it had long threatened to play: the Strait of Hormuz. Experience has shown that merely brandishing that card can work to its advantage, even without going so far as to impose a toll on ships passing through it, as it had hoped to do. Trump, like the West more broadly, attaches enormous importance to the uninterrupted flow of oil and the smooth passage of oil shipments, given their far-reaching impact on the global economy. The issue is no longer simply one of winners and losers. Rather, it points to the emergence of a new political trajectory whose defining feature may well be a regional status quo, in other words, a form of coexistence between Washington and Tehran, however far from friendly. The coming days will reveal what this means for the region’s other outstanding issues, including Lebanon and Hezbollah’s weapons. Those who assumed that the fall of Iran would automatically lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah will likely have to reassess that assumption and adopt a more realistic approach, centered on the search for a US-sponsored regional settlement capable of resolving this longstanding dilemma and ensuring that the monopoly over arms rests exclusively with the Lebanese state, which alone should hold the authority to decide questions of war and peace. Such an outcome, however, also requires Washington to rein in its unruly ally, Israel, whose actions routinely exceed political, moral and even geographical boundaries, occupying territory here, bombing there and carrying out targeted assassinations elsewhere. The expression “clip the claws” is not intended as a slight against Israel. Rather, it reflects the nature and depth of US-Israeli relations, as well as the difficulty, at least for now, of creating meaningful distance between the two allies. Should such a settlement fail to materialize, Lebanon will enter an even more delicate phase, marked by Israel’s refusal to withdraw militarily and Hezbollah’s refusal to surrender its weapons in light of what Tehran has achieved. The important thing is to ensure that this regional status quo does not evolve into an explosive and draining reality for Lebanon.

After the displays of joy and goodwill following its supposed "victory" against the Israeli-American camp, the pro-Iranian axis quickly bared its teeth when confronted with ground realities, as revealed by the chain of events since the signing of the memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington on June 18, followed by the agreement between Beirut and Tel Aviv on June 26. Iran, which believed it could call the shots after successfully getting its key priorities included in the text of the agreement with Washington, quickly revealed the limits of the "goodwill" it had touted throughout the negotiations that led to the signing of the document presented as a prelude to a regional peace deal. The vehemence of its reaction to the normalization of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and to the return of IAEA inspectors to its nuclear sites, has laid bare — as if any further proof were needed — the true intentions of the Islamic Republic: to concede nothing on the essentials, including the Lebanese file. Yet the United States had lifted the naval blockade imposed on Iranian ports and authorized the production, delivery, transport, and sale of crude oil and Iranian petroleum products during the 60-day negotiating period. On Saturday night into Sunday, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carried out strikes against Kuwait and Bahrain, in response, according to their statement, to "American aggression." Yet if there is an aggressor in this affair, it is clearly Iran. Indeed, ever since the Sultanate of Oman decided, in coordination with CENTCOM, to secure a navigation corridor along its coastline in the Strait of Hormuz while the issue is being resolved, Tehran has been conducting drone attacks against tankers using the route that falls outside its control. On Saturday night into Sunday, a Panama-flagged oil tanker was targeted, prompting an immediate response from U.S. forces, who carried out retaliatory strikes against military installations on the Iranian coast near Hormuz. Disregarding CENTCOM's warnings, Tehran retaliated by launching a series of drone attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain. Most of the projectiles were intercepted. Trump's Threats U.S. President Donald Trump responded by warning on his Truth Social platform against Tehran's continued ceasefire violations, once again suggesting he is prepared to resume hostilities if the impasse continues. But the Islamic Republic appears unwilling to listen. Its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, reaffirmed on Sunday that his country alone is "responsible for managing this strategic waterway" and warned that any interference in Iran's management of the strait risked "escalating tensions." Araghchi made these remarks during an unannounced visit to Baghdad to discuss the memorandum of understanding with the United States with Iraqi officials and to coordinate with them the details of the funeral ceremonies for Ali Khamenei, scheduled from July 4 to 12 at the Shia shrines of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq. Ironically, regional cooperation also came up, as the Iranian minister welcomed a Baghdad initiative — presented by his Iraqi counterpart, Fuad Hussein — to organize a summit bringing together Iran and the Gulf states, which the Islamic Republic continues to bombard. Iranian Legal Action Against the U.S.? Meanwhile, Tehran continues to refuse inspections of its nuclear sites damaged or destroyed in Israeli-American strikes during the war — a condition Washington has set for releasing an initial tranche of frozen Iranian assets. Tehran's argument is straightforward: IAEA inspectors are not neutral. Against this backdrop of renewed tensions, Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has stepped into the fray. In a statement released on Sunday to mark Judiciary Week in Iran, he called for legal proceedings to be launched — both domestically and internationally — against the United States, which he holds responsible for his father Ali Khamenei's death as well as for strikes carried out against his country. These remarks were tempered, however, by Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian, who declared his support for "stability, security, and dialogue in the region." Pezeshkian also expressed hope that "all parties will honor their commitments under the agreements reached" — an apparent reference to the Israeli-Lebanese accord. On the Lebanese file, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' displeasure has been plain to see since the signing of the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement, which is expected to gradually pull Lebanon out of Tehran's orbit by neutralizing the operational capacity of its military arm, Hezbollah, and curtailing its destabilizing influence. The IRGC, like Hezbollah, recognizes only what the memorandum of understanding with Washington stipulates for Lebanon. In Baghdad, Abbas Araghchi — a figure close to the Pasdaran — stressed that all parties must abide by every clause of the memorandum of understanding signed with the United States, including those relating to Lebanon, "where, unfortunately, the Zionist entity continues its airstrikes." He called on Washington to "take responsibility and pressure Israel to withdraw from the areas it occupies in Lebanon," adding, "That is the first clause of the memorandum of understanding" — without making any mention of the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement. Tehran, like Hezbollah, considers itself in no way bound by that document. One of the pro-Iranian movement's MPs, Hassan Fadlallah, again made his position clear. He not only repudiated the Washington framework agreement but insisted that "Hezbollah's weapons will be maintained through a regional equation stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to southern Lebanon." It is against this backdrop of uncertainty surrounding the pro-Iranian movement's actions on the ground that the Israeli army was set to begin a tactical withdrawal from two "pilot zones" beyond the Blue Line in southern Lebanon, where it continues nonetheless to target Hezbollah fighters. At the same time, Israeli officials continue to emphasize that their military will press on with operations in the southern part of the country to eliminate any Hezbollah threat. The week now beginning thus remains fraught with uncertainty and tension. Also worth noting is a major development on the sidelines — or perhaps as a direct outgrowth — of these events: on Saturday evening and throughout Sunday, Iraq was swept by a wave of arrests targeting more than fifty prominent political figures, including numerous members of parliament as well as businesspeople, who have been charged with corruption but who are reportedly close to the Iranian regime, according to sources that have yet to be confirmed.

The diplomatic act of June 26, in Washington, undeniably reflects, in and of itself and regardless of what follows, tremendous political courage on the Lebanese side. The substance of the framework agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel at the conclusion of five rounds and two months of direct negotiations held in Washington, under the supervision of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, is historic in every sense of the word. The terms of this document represent a genuine turning point in the evolution of the deep existential crisis that has relentlessly undermined the very foundations of the country, its political system, its stability, and its prosperity for decades. Hezbollah chose to express its disapproval following the signing of the framework agreement, but its reaction was limited to a few demonstrations and a brief blockade of the old airport road. (AFP) From the outset, it is essential to exercise discernment. The June 26 agreement is not meant to swiftly resolve, within a matter of days or weeks, the heavy disputes facing the Lebanese people, and more specifically the residents of the South. Its significance lies in its geopolitical scope, in that it very clearly defines a roadmap — a process that will admittedly be long, difficult, and winding, but which has the great advantage of finally placing Lebanon on the right path: the path toward restoring state sovereignty and ending the fait accompli of de facto militia mini-states that have been undermining the authority of the central government since the late 1960s. The geopolitical dimension of the June 26 document lies in its ultimate purpose: on one hand, the implementation of the principle of the state's monopoly on legitimate force and on arms; and on the other hand, ultimately — and this is the crux of the matter — the achievement of a lasting peace with Israel and the establishment of good-neighborly relations between the two countries. Joseph Aoun's Premises President Joseph Aoun aptly summed up the situation by laying out four premises to clearly define the direction his administration has taken: no more occupation; no more foreign interference; no more guardianship; decisions must henceforth rest exclusively with the state and the Lebanese people. These are, admittedly, commonplace principles, and this is by no means the first official document of its kind to articulate such positions. True enough… But the difference this time is that the path being charted is unfolding against a backdrop of a balance of power — locally, regionally, and internationally — that is largely favorable… For the first time since the 1980s, the country benefits from the combined and concurrent action of a President of the Republic, a Prime Minister, and a government — as a whole — that have, from the very start, defined unambiguously sovereigntist orientations. The latest gesture, highly symbolic, of replacing the signs along the airport road bearing the inscription 'Thank you Iran' with others in Lebanese colors bearing the slogan 'Lebanon First' is far from trivial. This symbolic gesture schematically and succinctly illustrates the choice Lebanon faced today: either accept the fait accompli of direct Iranian involvement on the ground in efforts to reach a settlement in South Lebanon, as had been agreed upon during the American-Iranian talks in Switzerland under the leadership of US Vice President JD Vance; or hold firm to the government's resolve to reclaim control and engage in the Washington process — one that would allow Lebanon to decide, on its own, free from any outside tutelage, on the course of action needed to achieve an Israeli withdrawal, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the restoration of sovereignty. The authorities have clearly chosen the second path, which in practice keeps Iran out of the solution process — contrary to the option agreed upon during the Switzerland talks, which, under Mr. Vance's supervision, placed the Revolutionary Guards at the heart of the ongoing dynamic. This explains the sharp reaction from Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, who, in a speech delivered on Saturday, (unsurprisingly) lambasted the agreement signed with Israel, while emphasizing — a telling sign — that his party (and therefore its patron) supported the Iranian-American framework agreement… One quickly forgets about the 'Great Satan' and the 'Death to America' slogan… A favorable climate At the regional and international level, the process set in motion in Washington is unfolding, without a doubt, at a time when the Iranian destabilizing camp — often called the 'obstructionist' camp — is emerging significantly weakened by the developments of the past three years. Taking a broader view and looking at the current geopolitical context as a whole, one cannot help but note that the mullahs' regime — the true cornerstone and driving force behind anti-Western subversion — has lost many strategic assets since 2023: the elimination of Hezbollah's top political and military leadership; the fall of the Assad regime; the elimination of the Islamic Republic's political and security leadership; the enormous military, economic, and logistical losses suffered by Tehran following the two wars of June 2025 and March-April 2026, which have further aggravated an already unprecedented and deep socio-economic-financial crisis; and the widespread weakening of Iran's proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen… All of these factors undeniably create a favorable environment for the implementation of the June 26 framework agreement, especially since the strategic option taken by the Lebanese authorities in this regard has received clear support from the Gulf Cooperation Council states, as evidenced by the joint communiqué published last Thursday by the GCC ministerial conference and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. This document, made public on the eve of the framework agreement's signing, clearly endorses Lebanon's positions regarding the restoration of state sovereignty, the monopoly on arms, and the dismantling of Hezbollah's military and security apparatus… On top of this GCC support, Saturday also brought clear backing from the European Union for the Lebanese state's positions. And to top it all off, President Trump reached out late Saturday evening to President Aoun, warmly congratulating him on the signing of the June 26 agreement and indicating that they would conduct a joint assessment of the ongoing process at an upcoming meeting to be held soon at the White House. Iran's capacity for disruption This favorable climate does not by any means suggest that the outcome is a foregone conclusion or that setbacks should not be expected. The real test facing the Lebanese state in the coming days will hinge on the question of how much the Iranian Revolutionary Guards can still — or are willing to — give free rein to their full capacity for disruption, which continues to manifest itself, as demonstrated by their attacks over the past 48 hours on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, prompting fresh American airstrikes on Iran overnight. At the same time, to what extent can Hezbollah — or does it want to — do everything in its power to sabotage the process launched on June 26? Two developments could temper the leading position taken by the pro-Iranian party on this front: the attitude of the army, which issued a firm-toned statement on Saturday evening affirming that it would not allow the call for protests — launched by Hezbollah early that same evening — to result in roads being blocked in the capital or attacks on public and private property; at the same time, Amal movement leader Nabih Berry called for calm and stressed the need to avoid any security-related excesses, while condemning the signing of the agreement with Israel and the direct negotiations with the Hebrew state. These two factors would explain why Hezbollah's call for large-scale demonstrations on Saturday evening in Beirut and across the regions 'in order to bring down the government' did not immediately receive the broad response it had anticipated. Nevertheless, the Iranian camp's capacity for disruption could still manifest itself on a large scale, despite the broad Arab support (from Gulf states), the European Union, and the United States that the June 26 process enjoys. Revenge is a dish best served cold… The reaction of the Revolutionary Guards to the Washington agreement will undoubtedly serve, in the very near future, as a significant indicator of their real ability to turn such a saying into reality.