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The International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), which brings together 93 states and governments, supports programs in Lebanon and across the Middle East focused on promoting the French language, education, gender equality, and development. In Beirut, these efforts are coordinated by Lévon Amirjanyan, the OIF’s representative for the Middle East, who heads the regional office, which opened in late 2022. The office covers four countries: Lebanon and Egypt, both full members, and Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which are associate members, with Lebanon serving as the regional hub for the organization’s activities. Lebanon remains a central member of La Francophonie. A member of the OIF since 1973, the country celebrated the 50th anniversary of its membership in 2023, reaffirming its deep historical roots within the organization. In keeping with this longstanding role, Lebanon has also contributed to La Francophonie’s institutional development by hosting the Francophonie Games in 2009, while the regional office of the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie has been established in the country for more than three decades. Since 2022, more than €4 million has been mobilized for Lebanon through the organization’s cooperation and support programs. But the organization longstanding presence is more than symbolic, taking the form of a range of practical initiatives on the ground. According to Amirjanyan, “The OIF’s work in Lebanon is guided by a plan signed in 2021, focused on promoting the French language, education and vocational training, and women’s empowerment.” In response to the country’s successive crises, the organization also introduced a €1 million emergency plan in 2024. In the education sector, the organization supports Lebanon’s Ministry of Education by developing digital teaching resources, expanding distance learning, and providing teacher training. The “La Francophonie avec elles” (“La Francophonie with Women”) fund, established in 2020 to promote women’s empowerment, has mobilized nearly €1.5 million in Lebanon to finance 24 projects – moe than the regional average. The OIF also supports youth and local initiatives. Beyond its work in education and women’s empowerment, the OIF is also active in the information sector. Amirjanyan noted that “in partnership with the Ministry of Information and UNESCO, the organization is combating disinformation, providing technical and material support to the ministry, and leading a nationwide awareness campaign accompanied by audiovisual content.” At the same time, the organization is working to expand economic opportunities across the Francophone world. According to Amirjanyan, “The OIF supports the private sector through economic missions. The 2023 mission brought together between 60 and 70 companies from 25 French-speaking countries, while a follow-up mission in 2025 led to the signing of 18 memorandums of understanding.” Media, Culture, and Reach of La Francophonie Alongside these institutional and economic initiatives, the OIF is also active in the media sector. “The OIF supports French-language media in Lebanon, notably by backing the relaunch in 2025 of Télé Liban’s daily French-language television news bulletin, which is considered an essential tool for preserving the French language in public broadcasting,” Amirjanyan said. This commitment also extend to supporting local cultural organizations. The organization’s cultural work is thus supported by the 12 Centres for Reading and Cultural Activities (CLACs) in Lebanon, which Amirjanyan described as a “true jewel” of La Francophonie because of their role in providing access to culture, knowledge, and information, including in areas far from cultural centers. More than simple libraries, these centers serves as cultural and community spaces that foster social cohesion, dialogue, and coexistence. Part of a network of more than 300 centers across the Francophone world and established in Lebanon in 2001, the CLACs are now undergoing modernization. Amirjanyan pointed out that “a recent evaluation mission allowed the organization to consult users and local stakeholders in order to identify changes needed in response to digital transformation and evolving cultural expectations, while preserving their role as community-based spaces.” A Growing Regional Dynamic While Lebanon remains the organization’s main foothold in the region, its activities extends well beyond its borders. At the regional level, Amirjanyan highlighted activities covering Egypt, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, with programs tailored to national contexts. In Egypt, cooperation includes projects with major Francophone institutions, notably Université Senghor in Alexandria, which plays a central role in training development professionals across Africa and hosts students and professionnels from many French-speaking countries. In Egypt, the OIF also runs training programs for diplomats and teachers, particularly in digital technology and artificial intelligence, with a strong emphasis on strengthening public administrations capacity. In another area of work, the OIF is also developing targeted partnerships in Gulf countries. In Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, the organization’s efforts focus on strengthening French-language education and integrating it into national education systems, in coordination with local authorities. This is accompanied by growing interest in the French language and clear enthusiasm for La Francophonie in both countries, driven in particular by education systems and cultural cooperation. According to Amirjanyan, this approach allows “programs to be adapted to each country’s priorities while maintaining regional coherence, in a region where La Francophonie is experiencing growing momentum and attracting increasing interest.” A Francophonie Looking to the Future Beyond ongoing projects, the organization is now preparing the next phase of its regional strategy. Amirjanyan emphasized the OIF priorities going forward: youth, gender equality, digital development, and artificial intelligence. French-language training programs for Lebanese civil servants and diplomats are already in place and will continue, as part of efforts to strengthen skills and modernize public administration. Overall, whether in education, culture, media, gender equality, or economic cooperation, the objective remains the same: to make La Francophonie a space for exchange and opportunity adapted to today’s challenges. In Lebanon and across the region, La Francophonie remains dynamic, supported by sustained interest in the French language and multilingual education systems. In conclusion, Amirjanyan said that this reality confirms that La Francophonie goes beyond language alone: it is a space for cooperation, training, and economic and social opportunity, with a forward-looking vision.

As the contours — and perhaps the unspoken elements — of the framework agreement reached between Washington and the Islamic Republic of Iran gradually and tentatively come into focus, two fundamental parameters that might be described as "peripheral" to the broader political process underway are emerging with increasing clarity: on one hand, internal Iranian divisions within the ruling establishment and the cracks now openly visible in the regime's structure; and on the other, the steady, patient, and meticulous construction by the United States of what appears to be a new politico-military-security order in the region — one designed to clip the mullahs' regime's wings and reduce its extraterritorial influence to an absolute minimum. The first of these two parameters complicates — and may even inhibit — what some, loosely speaking, call "dialogue and negotiations" between Washington and the Islamic Republic. Several Iranian media outlets and credible, well-informed sources closely monitoring Iran's internal situation have been reporting for days on serious fault lines shaking the mullah regime's political apparatus at the highest levels. It is becoming increasingly clear that the radical wing of the establishment has not lost its dominant influence, and it is making itself heard through fierce, public criticism directed at the so-called "moderate" or pragmatist camp, which managed to push through the framework agreement with the United States. The radicals' opposition has manifested in frontal attacks against the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, whose interview on Iranian state television a few days ago was abruptly cut short and taken off air before it could conclude. The other "face" of the negotiations with the United States, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, was booed by Iranian pilgrims during his recent visit to Karbala, Iraq. These setbacks prompted Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian to publicly denounce the campaign against the Iranian negotiators earlier this week. The criticism, however, goes beyond targeting the negotiators personally — it extends more broadly and deeply to the policy direction of the Iranian president and the members of the Supreme National Security Council who gave the green light to the framework agreement signed with the United States. Significantly, the attacks against President Pezeshkian and the negotiators are coming from high-ranking radical bodies that represent the backbone of the regime. The Lebanese website Al-Janoubiya, which reflects the viewpoint of the Lebanese Shia opposition and is generally very well informed about the situation in Iran, reports that 63 of the 84 members of the regime's "Assembly of Experts" recently published a statement calling on the Islamic Republic's negotiators to adhere to the "red lines" set by the "wali al-faqih," the Supreme Leader. Al-Janoubiya further reports that the "administration of religious seminaries" (the "hawzat"), operating under the authority of the wali al-faqih, also issued a statement warning the Iranian president, the negotiators, and the members of the Supreme National Security Council against any "laxity" in upholding the red lines referenced in the document signed with Washington. These internal tensions would explain why the Iranian delegation in Doha, which was expected to meet with American negotiators for technical-level talks, refused any direct negotiation. The Iranian delegates were thus engaged in discussions with Pakistani mediators, while the American representatives were meeting separately with Qatari officials. These indirect talks through Pakistani and Qatari mediators led to a symbolic measure: the unfreezing of $3 billion in frozen Iranian assets. This came after Tehran initially demanded the release of $12 billion, then settled for requesting the $6 billion frozen in Qatar — a demand it ultimately failed to secure. Moreover, the $3 billion unlocked on Wednesday will be used to purchase humanitarian goods, most likely on the American market… The New American Order The second factor shaping the feverish game of chess unfolding in the region is the new American order — political, military, and security-related — that appears to be gradually taking shape across the Levant and, more broadly, throughout the entire region. The signs of this US framework have become clearly visible over the past days and weeks. The sequence of events on this front is particularly telling: on the eve of Lebanon and Israel signing the framework agreement under Washington's auspices, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in Bahrain with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial conference. Following that meeting, the Gulf states and Rubio issued a joint statement unequivocally backing the Lebanese government's stance on direct negotiations with Israel. (The European Union also separately expressed its full support for Lebanon's chosen approach.) With the backing of the United States, the European Union, and the Gulf states, Lebanon signed its framework agreement with Israel. One of its key effects is to keep Iran out of the crisis-resolution and end-of-war process in Lebanon, thereby reinforcing the sovereigntist course charted by Beirut. The momentum built by President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and his government could involve direct American military participation — through experts and senior officers — in the phased deployment of the Lebanese army and the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. Significantly, the US House of Representatives voted by a wide margin earlier this week to reject a Democratic-sponsored resolution that would have imposed significant restrictions on any potential American military involvement in Lebanon. This US role was also discussed with Lebanese leaders during a visit to Beirut by CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper earlier in the week. Three additional significant developments further illustrated the American process underway: – A wave of arrests in Iraq targeting members of parliament, senior political figures, and businessmen close to the Iranian regime, as well as a decision taken 48 hours ago by the Iraqi government setting a deadline of September 30 for pro-Iranian militias to hand over their weapons to the state. – The CENTCOM commander's hosting this week in Bahrain of an expanded regional security and defense meeting with senior military officials from Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen. – An announcement made twenty-four hours ago by the US Treasury Department regarding a decision by the member states of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) to impose measures against Hezbollah's funding sources, including Qard el-Hassan. - L’annonce il y a vingt-quatre heures par le département du Trésor américain de la décision prise par les États membres du Centre de lutte contre le financement du terrorisme (TFTC) d’imposer des mesures contre les sources de financement du Hezbollah (dont Qard el-Hassan). Faced with this US dynamic, the Iranian regime is attempting to hold on to two trump cards it seeks to preserve: maintaining its dominant role in Lebanon (seriously called into question by the firm stance of the Lebanese authorities on this matter); and having its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz recognized, in disregard of international regulations and law on this issue. In this regard, a senior American official told the Axios website that US negotiators have made clear to Iranian delegates present in Doha that Iran's insistence on imposing transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz risks torpedoing the framework agreement between Washington and Tehran. A situation, therefore, to be closely watched…

On May 29, at the initiative of the Focolare Movement, 35 representatives of and members from various ecclesial movements gathered to speak publicly about their distinctive identities and mission. Addressing the gathering in the Cathedral of the Resurrection, Jean Barbara, former president of Charis and now president of a network of communities grouped under the banner Sword of the Spirit (“the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God,” Ephesians 6:17), presented Cardinal Josef Ratzinger’s understanding of ecclesial movements. He cited a little-known text written in 1998 by the future pope, then prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, at the request of John Paul II. Entitled The Theological Place of Ecclesial Movements , it describes the movements as a “theological locus” complementing the parish. At the time, although the Church had long encouraged lay apostolic movements to play an active role in its mission, it had yet to articulate a theology of such movements. In his study, Cardinal Ratzinger observed that, after a “winter” marked by widespread Christian weariness, something had occurred in 1970 that no one had anticipated: throughout the Catholic Church, the experience of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit spread rapidly, reaching millions of believers. Prayer groups and new movements sprang up across the Church. Some even spoke of a “new Pentecost.” By 1998, however, prayer groups and communities had already experienced their share of growing pains, the “Panzer Cardinal” observed. The Church therefore needed to define the relationship between these new movements and its permanent structures. Put another way, it had to determine their proper “theological locus.” Various attempts had been made to resolve the issue. Some maintained that the Church was institutional while the movements were charismatic; that the Church was Christological while the movements were pneumatological; and finally, that the Church was hierarchical whereas the movements were prophetic. Cardinal Ratzinger, however, argued that the institutional Church is every bit as charismatic, pneumatological and prophetic as the movements themselves, albeit in a different way. He addressed the issue from two distinct historical perspectives: by distinguishing between the Church’s local and universal dimensions – which some identify with its Petrine and Marian aspects, respectively – and by revisiting the role ecclesial movements have played throughout the Church’s history. From the Church’s earliest days, Ratzinger argued, these two dimensions had coexisted. Referring to the apostolic and episcopal figures of St. Paul and St. James, the first bishop of Jerusalem, he showed that while they were closely interconnected, they remained clearly distinct. On the one hand were the Church’s local ministries, which gradually took on permanent institutional forms through the episcopate and the priesthood. On the other was the apostolic ministry, expressed through ecclesial movements. Ratzinger concluded that the Church’s universal dimension – what transcends local ministries – is every bit as indispensable as its local structures. To support his argument, Ratzinger sketched an overview of the various apostolic movements throughout the Church’s history. He began with the emergence of the eremitical life in the fourth century under St. Anthony the Great, through the monastic movement with St. Basil, the missionary monasticism that flourished between the sixth and ninth centuries, contributing to evangelize the British Isles and the Germanic peoples, the mendicant orders of the thirteenth century, which played a decisive role in the Christianization of Europe, and the missionary movement of the nineteenth-century, which undertook the global mission in the Americas, Africa and Asia, as well as the predominantly female missionary congregations on continents only lightly touched by Christianity. In short, Ratzinger argued for a clear historical continuity linking the eremitical tradition, monasticism, the mendicant orders, missionary congregations and today’s ecclesial movements. The Response of the Holy Spirit On the basis of these two perspectives, Ratzinger observed that the Church is always in need of ministries and forms of missions not exclusively tied to the local Church; that apostolic movements necessarily emerge in ever new forms throughout history, as a response of the Holy Spirit to the Church’s changing circumstances; and finally that, when these movements are received by bishops and priests within diocesan and parish structures, they represent a true gift of God, both for the new evangelization and for missionary activity. Concluding his presentation, Jean Babara stated: “Ecclesial movements exist and find their place in the Church because we stand within the historical continuity of the universal apostolic work of the Holy Spirit, from the monastic movement and the religious orders down to the present day. We are the successors of the monks… and of other religious orders, with a universal mission. Certainly, we are only a handful in number, but in the eyes of the Lord, it is not numbers that matter.” At the end of the meeting, Bishop Antoine Bou Najem offered an emotional testimony to what he owes to the Focolare Movement. Recalling the preparatory retreat for his ordination that he attended in Loppiano, the movement’s center in Italy, he said: “It was in Loppiano that I understood, deeply shaped by the experience of community life, that the priesthood is a service before being an authority, a gift of self before being an office.” For his part, Bishop Paolo Borgia spontaneously asked the faithful and ecclesial movements not to forget to include priests and bishops in their prayers. “Do not think they do not need it,” he said, stressing that the Church’s hierarchy also needs the support and prayers of the laity. “The Greatest Battle” The Indian cardinal Ivan Dias (1936-2017) recounts that, a few months before becoming Pope John Paul II, on November 9, 1976, Cardinal Karol Wojtyła said: “We are now facing the greatest battle humanity has ever seen. I do not think the Christian community has fully understood this. We are now facing the final struggle between the Church and the anti-Church, between the Gospel and the anti-Gospel.” The former prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples went on to point to a powerful current of secularization, relativism and indifference that is putting the world under strain, stifling and extinguishing the faith of tens of millions of people. Regarded as providential by John Paul II, the flourishing of ecclesial movements after the Second Vatican Council is one of the most striking and unexpected phenomena of contemporary Catholicism. In Lebanon and across the world, they are now part of the Church’s landscape. Rooted in prayer and the Eucharist, these movements are seen as one of the “weapons” ultimately meant to shake the foundations of the “anti-Church” and of relativism.

After forty days of war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, along with simultaneous fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, a preliminary ceasefire framework agreement between Washington and Tehran came into effect on April 8, 2026. A few hours later, a series of massive Israeli air operations struck more than thirty Hezbollah positions in Lebanon within ten minutes, killing over 300 people and wounding 1,150 others — among the deadliest strikes of the conflict — as the Israeli air force dropped precisely 160 bombs. The American-Iranian agreement, initially set to last fifteen days and not covering Lebanon, was extended indefinitely on April 21. In addition to halting hostilities between the two parties, it provided for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the start of diplomatic talks. Those talks culminated on June 17, 2026, in a 60-day memorandum of understanding — signed by Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian — that included a halt to the war in Lebanon and aimed to establish a lasting cessation of hostilities. In the meantime, under strong American pressure, a supplementary agreement covering Lebanon came into effect on April 17, 2026 — nine days after the start of the Iran-U.S. ceasefire and the simultaneous deadly Israeli strike. This truce, negotiated among Trump, Netanyahu, and Joseph Aoun, called for a halt to fighting for a period of ten days. It was subsequently extended and eventually led to the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement signed in Washington on June 26, 2026. The Illusion of a Ceasefire Since April 17, and even after the framework agreement of June 26, the ceasefire in Lebanon quickly showed its limitations on the ground. Hostilities never truly stopped: between repeated violations, the geographic expansion of strikes, and economic devastation, southern Lebanon remained the scene of high-intensity confrontation until June 26, and of medium-to-low intensity since then. In the same Hezbollah booth referenced in the previous caption, a poster shows a fighter giving a military salute, with both the Lebanese flag and the Hezbollah flag. This is an extremely rare — almost unthinkable — sight, as the national flag is seldom present at Hezbollah events, let alone displayed alongside the group's yellow banner. (AFP) To better illustrate the White House's stance on ceasefires between Israel and Hezbollah — the latter not having been directly included in the negotiations — Donald Trump, when questioned in early June 2026 in the Oval Office, stated that "a ceasefire in Lebanon is different from a ceasefire anywhere else in the world." This statement signals his intention to decouple the Lebanese situation from the Iranian file, even though Iran treats the two conflicts as interconnected — a linkage that is more in line with reality and that undermines the agreements, unless Lebanese authorities demonstrate firmness and solidarity. A Persistent Asymmetry of Force Hezbollah and its unconditional supporters continue to exhibit a pathological denial of a reality far grimmer than their collective imagination allows. Between the first Lebanon-Israel ceasefire in April and June 14, 2026 — the date on which the Washington-Tehran memorandum of understanding including Lebanon was announced — the data collected reveal a clear imbalance in both military strength and activity on the ground. Over this 59-day period, Israeli forces carried out a total of 5,056 attacks of all types combined (primarily airstrikes, drones, artillery, and others) compared to 947 by the Shia movement across all types combined (tandem-warhead anti-tank missiles, drones, mortars, and others), amounting to 5.34 Israeli attacks for every Hezbollah attack (1). This disproportion translates into a daily average of 94 Israeli attacks, with alarming peaks in intensity — most notably on May 26, 2026, when 203 attacks carried out by the Israeli military were recorded in a single day. Alarming figures since the start of the conflict Going back to the beginning of the conflict, no precise official count of the raw number of bombs dropped on Lebanon since March 2, 2026 has been published. Scientific institutes and Lebanese government authorities have, however, conducted their own tallies. Between March 2 and April 16, 2026 (prior to the first Lebanon-Israel ceasefire), the Lebanese CNRS recorded 8,200 Israeli attacks of all types combined (airstrikes, artillery fire, and incursions), including 306 massive waves of air raids during the first two weeks of March alone. Adding this figure to the one recorded after April 17 (2), the total from March 2 through June 14 amounts to 13,256 Israeli strikes. Finally, since mid-June 2026, the bombardments have continued at a lower but daily rate of between 10 and more than 160 projectiles per day, according to UNIFIL. At the same time, no comprehensive official figures on the tonnage of munitions used (net explosive mass or bomb weight) have been published since the start of the conflict, for either the Israeli military or Hezbollah. However, data released by the IDF points to the use of guided bombs ranging from 250 to 900 kg in airstrikes, which represents an approximate total tonnage of 12,500 tonnes of air munitions targeting Lebanon. For comparison, during the 33-day war in 2006, Israel dropped 7,500 tonnes of bombs on Lebanon. For greater precision, UNIFIL observation records indicate that on typical monitoring days, approximately 97% of the explosive and projectile trajectories observed originated from Israeli forces. On Hezbollah's side, its arsenal relies on rockets, anti-tank missiles, and suicide drones rather than heavy air-dropped bombs. Since the collapse of the first ceasefire on April 17, the pro-Iranian group has fired several thousand projectiles, with peaks of 100 to 200 projectiles on high-intensity days. The individual explosive payload of these rockets (of the Katyusha/Grad type) is generally estimated at between 20 and 50 kg, resulting in a total tonnage at least 18 times lower than that of Israeli munitions — bringing the total mass of Hezbollah munitions targeting Israelis to around 700 tonnes. Hezbollah's technological innovation At the end of April 2026, Hezbollah crossed a new military threshold by deploying FPV (First Person View) kamikaze drones en masse, guided by ultra-thin fiber optic cables. Inspired by tactics from the Ukrainian conflict and assembled at low cost (between $300 and $600 per unit), these non-metallic devices operate entirely independently of radio waves and GPS signals. This technical feature makes them completely undetectable by radar and immune to Israeli electronic jamming systems. Through a continuous high-definition video feed transmitted via ultra-thin fiber optic cables connecting the drones to their Hezbollah operators, the group has been able to carry out surgical strikes with devastating precision against IDF armored vehicles, inflicting higher Israeli casualties since May and forcing the Israeli military command to rethink its ground protection systems. La charge explosive unitaire de ces roquettes (type Katioucha/Grad) est généralement estimée entre 20 et 50 kg, ce qui laisse un tonnage total nettement inférieur de 18 fois au moins à celui des munitions israéliennes; cela ramène la masse de munitions du Hezbollah ayant ciblé les Israéliens à 700 tonnes. L'innovation technologique du Hezbollah À la fin du mois d’avril 2026, le Hezbollah a franchi un nouveau cap militaire en déployant massivement des drones kamikazes FPV (First Person View), guidés par des câbles ultrafins de fibre optique. Inspirés des tactiques du conflit ukrainien et assemblés à bas coût (entre 300 et 600 dollars l’unité), ces appareils en matériau non métallique s'affranchissent totalement des ondes radio et du signal GPS. Cette caractéristique technique les rend strictement indétectables par les radars et insensibles aux systèmes de brouillage électronique israéliens. Grâce à un flux vidéo haute définition ininterrompu, à travers des câbles ultrafins en fibres optiques reliant les drones à leurs opérateurs du Hezbollah, ceux-ci parviennent à mener des frappes chirurgicales d'une précision redoutable contre les blindés de Tsahal, causant des pertes en vies humaines israéliennes plus élevées depuis le mois de mai et forçant l’état‑major de l’État hébreu à repenser ses systèmes de protection terrestre. These "kamikaze drones" accounted for more than 50% of the pro-Iranian militia's operations up until June 26. On the other side, Israel's response relied primarily on air power (60.5% of strikes) and heavy use of artillery, targeting infrastructure as a priority—though it proved ineffective against FPV drones. And what about the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement? From a purely tactical and technical standpoint, a relative decline in the intensity of military operations has been observed since June 26. The massive Israeli air raid campaigns have given way to more targeted airstrikes and drone strikes, along with limited ground operations including the demolition of buildings and infrastructure. While Hezbollah also appears to have reduced or halted its attacks, the situation remains extremely fragile, given the Iranian factor—seeking to delay the ongoing talks in Bürgenstock—and the Israeli factor, which prioritizes security concerns and aims to empty the south of the Yellow Line of residents who support the pro-Iranian militia. In conclusion, the "ceasefire" is extremely fragile, and Hezbollah is far from claiming a clear victory, despite having adapted to new tactics and techniques. For Lebanon, already weakened by a multidimensional crisis, implementing the terms of the framework agreement is a genuine challenge. (1) and (2): Fadi Hajji-Georgiou – Research and Development

Has the uncertainty surrounding the long-announced resumption of U.S.-Iran talks in Doha over the past two days brought negotiations back to square one? Probably not, though it’s a fair question to ask. The picture is more nuanced, but the road ahead is far from easy. Tehran and Washington seem reluctant to make any further concessions beyond those already made under the memorandum of understanding they signed on June 18. While Doha is expected to host U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner today, alongside an Iranian technical delegation that will be joined on Wednesday by Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, Kazem Gharibabadi, Qatari officials say that no direct high-level meeting with Iranian officials has been scheduled for now. Majed Al-Ansari, spokesperson for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry, told a press conference earlier in the day that no direct meeting between U.S. and Iranian officials was planned in the coming days. Quoted by Iranian and Yemeni news agencies, Kazem Gharibabadi said the first round of technical discussions, through the designated working groups, would take place “once the necessary conditions have been met and after agreement has been reached on the date and venue.” He added that “consultations on this matter are ongoing through the countries serving as mediators.” On Wednesday, Gharibabadi is also due to meet with Qatari officials to discuss the $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets, Iran’s Foreign Ministry announced Tuesday evening. The frozen assets remain a priority for the Islamic Republic as it grapples with mounting financial difficulties. The Strait of Hormuz and Frozen Assets According to Majed Al-Ansari, U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who are in Qatar, will meet only with Qatari mediators and officials to assess the implementation of the memorandum of understanding signed in mid-June. The talks will cover a range of regional issues, including Iran and Lebanon. In other words, the mediators are once again at work in an effort to find common ground between the United States and Iran, which believes it has already made sufficient concessions under the memorandum of understanding. The key question now is how the disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the frozen Iranian assets will be resolved. Tehran continues to assert what it describes as its right to control the strait, a prospect fiercely opposed by Arab states, the United States, and European countries. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson was unequivocal: Doha has no intention of accepting Iranian control of the strait. Majed Al-Ansari also confirmed that the frozen Iranian funds, whose release is provided for under the memorandum of understanding, have yet to be transferred. For its part, Tehran has maintained a hardline stance. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei warned that any violation of the memorandum of understanding by Washington would trigger an immediate response. “No action will go unanswered,” he said, referring to U.S. strikes on Iranian targets after Tehran attacked oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz through the shipping corridor established by Oman in coordination with Washington. Baghaei also stressed that the United States must honor its commitment to bring an end to the fighting on all fronts, particularly in Lebanon. According to him, Washington must, if necessary, compel Israel to comply with the terms of the agreement. Pezeshkian Condemns Attacks on Negotiators The importance of a ceasefire on the Lebanese front was also underscored by Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian, who, during a visit to Qom Province, used the occasion to stress that the agreement with Washington had been concluded “in full coordination with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and with the backing of the Supreme National Security Council.” His remarks, however, once again underscored the existence of two rival camps within Iran’s leadership. According to Iran International, Pezeshkian defended the U.S. negotiating team by stressing that it had coordinated every step of the process with Mojtaba Khamenei. “Unfortunately, certain groups, echoing the psychological warfare being waged by hostile media outlets, are seeking to undermine this achievement by attacking the negotiating team and casting doubt on national decisions,” he said. According to Iran International, the remarks come as his administration faces mounting pressure from ultraconservative factions opposed to dialogue with Washington. The outlet notes that several hardline figures have accused the president and his negotiating team of making concessions, while also questioning the Supreme Leader’s backing for key security decisions. Waiting Game in Lebanon In Lebanon, where the framework agreement with Israel is also meeting resistance, implementation of its provisions is still pending. The deal calls for, among other things, a gradual Israeli withdrawal from areas currently occupied in southern Lebanon, where regular forces are to be deployed, as well as the phased dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Israel, as noted, is expected to withdraw first from “pilot zones,” in an operation coordinated with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), whose commander, Admiral Brad Cooper, visited Beirut and Tel Aviv on Monday. The day after the visit, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met with the army commander, General Rodolphe Haykal, for talks on the military’s role in implementing the framework agreement. On the ground, the situation remains volatile. Israeli artillery targeted the villages of Hebbariyeh in the Marjayoun district, Beit Yahoun in the Bint Jbeil district, and Majdel Zoun in the Tyre district. The latter has now been split in two following the demolition of an underground Hezbollah tunnel, which triggered a massive explosion. Meanwhile, Israeli media reported a visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz to the sector controlled by the Israeli army in southern Lebanon. Speaking to troops, Netanyahu said that Israel “has begun dismantling what he called the Iranian axis, by striking the Islamic Republic directly and establishing a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.” He said the army would remain in the south of the country “as long as Hezbollah is not disarmed and continues to pose a threat to Israel.” He also stated that the group’s military arsenal “is only 8 percent of what it was before the war,” and that “9,000 fighters have been eliminated.”

The significance of the proposed framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel lies not merely in its aim of bringing a military confrontation to an end. More profoundly, it reflects a fundamental shift in the nature of postwar agreements. The document bears little resemblance to traditional ceasefire accords, nor does it confine itself to regulating lines of contact or withdrawal arrangements. Instead, it lays the foundations for a new model of conflict settlement, one in which state-building becomes an integral part of peace-building, and sovereignty assumes a renewed meaning, far more complex than the mere protection of borders. Whereas the Camp David Accords, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty signed at Wadi Araba, as well as the Taif Agreement and the Dayton Agreement emerged in the aftermath of major wars to reorganize political relations between former belligerents, the present agreement goes one step further. It seeks to redefine the relationship between the Lebanese state itself and the instruments of force operating within its territory, while simultaneously reshaping the regional security environment, despite Hezbollah’s opposition and its determination to rely on its Iranian patron to shape the contours of the postwar order. Equally striking is the fact that the document does not begin by asking why the war broke out. It poses a fundamentally different question: what form should the state take once the war is over? For that reason, it devotes far less attention to the well-known historical causes of the conflict than to the political order expected to emerge after the fighting ends. Rather than writing the epilogue of the war, it writes the prologue to a new political phase. A deconstructive reading of the text reveals that its central concern is not the borders themselves, but the state’s monopoly over the use of force. Nearly all of its provisions revolve around restoring to the Lebanese state the exclusive authority to decide questions of war and peace, disarming armed groups operating outside official institutions, and placing national security under constitutional authority. In doing so, the agreement reflects a remarkable evolution in the very concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is no longer confined to safeguarding borders or ending occupation; it also encompasses the state’s exclusive control over the use of force within its own territory. It thus assumes a dual dimension, extending both over the land itself and over the instruments of force exercised within it. At the same time, the document reflects the negotiating skill of Ambassador Simon Karam and his diplomatic team. It does not reopen the question of the international border, nor does it treat that border as a matter open to renewed negotiation. Instead, it proceeds from the implicit premise that the border, apart from the well-known technical issues, rests on an established body of international legitimacy under international law deriving from the 1949 Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, while taking into account the historical circumstances that gave rise to it, justified it, and conferred legitimacy upon it. In doing so, the Lebanese negotiators successfully separated the question of territorial sovereignty, regarded as a legally settled issue, from the security arrangements imposed by the circumstances of war. They prevented the outcome of the conflict from becoming a pretext for redefining Lebanon’s borders, whose role in international stability remains particularly significant, or for reopening discussion of any future final agreement. In that respect, this approach offers an international model for preserving international legal instruments as a whole, whose meaning continues to be determined within their broader historical framework, namely their regional and international geo-strategic environment. The philosophy underpinning implementation is no less significant than the substance of the agreement itself. The document does not assume that peace will emerge simply through the act of signature. It implicitly recognizes that the consequences of war will continue to shape realities on the ground and that violations or incidents are likely to persist throughout the transitional period. It therefore embraces a gradual approach, whereby each withdrawal is matched by a corresponding step, and every advance on the ground is accompanied by mechanisms of verification and international supervision. Gradualism thus becomes more than a technical procedure. It embodies a political philosophy acknowledging that the transition from war to peace is an incremental process rather than an instantaneous event. The objective is less to proclaim the end of the war than to manage the transition toward peace. The agreement’s modernity is also reflected in its negotiating architecture. Diplomatic history has generally been shaped by agreements concluded within a single negotiating framework bringing together the parties directly concerned. Here, however, the agreement appears to form part of a much broader regional architecture, in which the Lebanese-Israeli track unfolds alongside other negotiating processes affecting the wider strategic environment of the conflict. If political indicators point to parallel understandings between Washington and Tehran on broader regional issues, the success of the Lebanese agreement depends not only on the political will of Beirut and Tel Aviv, but also on the durability of the balances generated by those wider regional understandings. The world is thus moving from the logic of the “single agreement” to that of “simultaneous settlements”, in which each negotiating track becomes one element within a broader network of understandings. Even so, President Joseph Aoun has stressed: “We welcome any assistance provided by states to help end the war. But there is a difference between helping us and interfering in our internal affairs. We conduct our own negotiations and will not accept anyone negotiating on our behalf.” The document also redefines the purpose of reconstruction. It is no longer presented merely as a humanitarian response to the devastation of war. Instead, reconstruction becomes part of a broader political and security equation, linking international assistance to verifiable progress in extending state authority and consolidating the state’s monopoly over arms. Economic aid thereby becomes an instrument for entrenching stability rather than simply a means of repairing physical destruction. The agreement’s deepest significance, however, extends beyond its security provisions to raise a broader question about the future of Lebanon’s political system itself. By calling for the state’s exclusive control over the use of force, the document implicitly opens the way for constitutional institutions to exercise exclusive authority over national decision-making. Issues of such fundamental importance can achieve lasting stability only by moving from the realm of the street and shifting balances of power into the framework of constitutional institutions. Accordingly, any opposition to the agreement, whatever its political or sovereignty-related justifications, should find its proper place within Parliament as the constitutional institution that embodies the national will and holds legislative and oversight authority. Opposition is not the antithesis of the state. It becomes a danger only when it abandons institutional politics in favor of competing power centers on the ground. If the agreement seeks to bring an end to the existence of illegal armed groups operating outside state authority, it simultaneously tests the capacity of the Lebanese people to consolidate the unity of political decision-making within their legitimate institutions. Ultimately, this document cannot be read merely as a security agreement between two states. It represents an attempt to redefine the very concept of sovereignty, the mechanisms of peace-building, and the nature of the state in the postwar era. It shifts the debate from borders to institutions, from conflict management to state reconstruction, and from peace understood as a ceasefire to peace conceived as a gradual political process. The success of this project ultimately depends on a factor that transcends the agreement itself: the ability of the Lebanese to move their disagreements from the streets into democratic competition within Parliament. Only then will the state’s monopoly over the use of force be matched by its monopoly over political decision-making, allowing the end of the war to become the true beginning of statehood rather than merely another truce in Lebanon’s long history of conflict. Only then can the end of war truly mark the birth of the state. If, however, the Lebanese choose to derail this process outside the framework of their institutions, they will not simply have brought down an agreement. They may well have squandered the last historic opportunity to rebuild their state, as though political suicide were once again prevailing over the instinct for survival.