Articles

Rarely in the history of humanity has the progressive assault been as preponderant as it is today. During the worst hours of Marxism, the gulags and intellectual terrorism were limited to certain countries or empires, without being able to subjugate the rest of the West. The Soviet empire could only forbid Christian faith, freedom of thought, and cultural heritage in the territories it directly controlled or through interposed vassals. Today, progressive delusion ignites souls in what Leo Strauss would define as a devastating nihilism. It is a plethora of pseudo-intellectuals who seek to deconstruct the human by cleverly questioning all the values that distinguish it. The aim is to transform the human person into an individual stripped of everything that socially and culturally constitutes them. This new man, divested of his bearings, is placed alone before the law, which itself is devoid of any sense of discernment. The progressive lexicon Identity is demonized, heritage is standardized, history is handed over to gravedigger historicism, and truth is relativized. Generalized uncertainty thus inexorably leads to nihilism. The modus operandi of this leftist intellectualism consists of systematic intimidation designed to anticipate and prevent discourses that do not conform to globalist ideology. Its weapon is a specially sharpened lexicon to abort any attempt at debate on subjects elevated to globalism's dogma. The identitarian is then equated with the fascist, rejecting otherness and devoid of humanity. They are constantly adorned with tirelessly repeated attributes that mechanically loop back. It is necessary to denounce this pernicious lexicon in order to unmask it. The expressions that recur most often are those of identitarian withdrawal, tribal behavior, racial fetishism, religious identitarianism, and ethnic identitarianism. The terms confession, clan, tribe, and even nation are always used in a pejorative and humiliating sense. These are contrasted with appealing notions, but emptied of their meaning, as they are detached from reality. These also recur repeatedly: living together, coexistence, inclusivity, and otherness. The nation, assimilated to evil, is to be dissolved, along with its notions of borders, history, and identity. The Christian religion, which founded otherness par excellence, is perceived as an enemy and an obstacle to this otherness. Man is desacralized and daily life is despiritualized. The sacred person is replaced by the consumer and taxpayer individual. The new man, the ideal of woke and liberal progressivism, no longer has a transcendental dimension; he is only evaluated in relation to his performance and his material and caloric needs. Eugenics Wokism is merely the extreme manifestation of this ideology. After denying family, community, country, faith, tradition, and heritage, it pushes to the negation of sexual evidence. It is the rejection of divine creation and even of nature as a manifestation of the divine. It is the contestation of creation, according to Fyodor Dostoevsky. Thus, after killing God, as Martin Heidegger tells us, the nihilist seeks the "death of man". The lexicon of progressive "bien-pensance" continues to grow. Recently, on the social networks of a pseudo-historian, conservatives, identitarians, and federalists were accused of eugenics. Here again, the intellectual short-circuit stems more from ideological discourse than scientific. For eugenics is, above all, a product of progressivism. It rejects creation with its flaws; it wants to perfect it. The new man must be selected down to his genes. Nothing is more opposed to this practice than Christian conservatism. It protects life, prohibits abortion and artificial selection. Christianity sees in the sick person the very face of Christ and His presence manifested by absolute otherness. The Isolationists It is not the first time that progressives project their vices onto conservatives. Haven't they, since 1975, labeled Christian conservatives as isolationists? They fought them militarily and ideologically. And yet, the Lebanon of these so-called isolationists was open to the whole world and to all cultures; that of the progressives was ostracized by the international community, and isolated from both the West and the Arab Gulf countries. Finally, progressives want to be rooted in what they call the Arab East. They claim to be Arabists and open to their natural environment. They accuse conservatives of being utopians artificially oriented towards the West. Here again, discernment would be appropriate. For in reality, conservatives are attached to their Lebanese land, their Levantine belonging, and their Eastern Christian, Antiochian, and Syriac heritage. It is, on the other hand, the progressives who are the most deeply Westernized, as revealed by their integral adoption of the Western ideology par excellence, which is wokism or radical liberalism. This rejection of heritage, as well as self-hatred, are characteristics not found anywhere other than in current Western civilization. Neither the Muslim world nor the Far East experiences such a form of civilizational suicide. This ideology therefore constitutes empirical proof of the Lebanese left's (which claims to be Arab) belonging to the West with its qualities and its vices. Here, in the West, there prevails Benedict XVI tells us, " a form of self-hatred... And one can only describe it as pathological… And this pathology rages throughout the West, carrying away the Levantine coast with it. Faced with this distressing lack of discernment, His Holiness reminds us that " the unification of humanity is not a political task but an eschatological hope, and that to ignore the identity of peoples to merge them into a global mix is a sin of pride, similar to the biblical sin of the Tower of Babel.

Lebanon today stands at a decisive historical crossroads. It has a rare and golden opportunity to rid itself, once and for all, of its most dangerous foe: Hezbollah—the Iranian-backed military organization that has dominated the country’s internal political life for over forty years. Under the false pretext of safeguarding Lebanon’s security and defending it against Israel, Hezbollah has instead brought havoc, destruction, economic collapse, and misery. Its track record clearly demonstrates total incompetence and impotence: it has failed to defend even a single inch of Lebanese territory or to inflict any serious strategic damage on Israel. Yet, despite its flagrant defeat and discomfiture, the organization continues to refuse compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Until now, President Trump’s ideas and diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving this issue have been met with Hezbollah’s denial and categorical refusal to fully relinquish its military arsenal north of the Litani River. However, this puppet of the Iranian mullah regime now finds itself trapped between a rock and a hard place. Unable to detach itself from its patron, it is equally incapable of justifying to the Shiite community—which it falsely claims to represent—that the dice have been cast, that the winds of change are irreversible, and that the time for peace with Israel has arrived. Decades of unnecessary violence and ideological struggle have yielded nothing but stagnation and regression for Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Arab Gulf states are experiencing unprecedented economic growth, social development, and a brighter future for their younger generations. The hollow pipe dreams of pan-Arab nationalism have been swept aside, replaced by realism, pragmatism, and plain common sense. Undoubtedly, the advent of President Trump represents a major turning point in the Middle Eastern political landscape—and a unique opportunity for Lebanon to finally extricate itself from the vicious grip of the Iranian mullahs and their local proxies. Never before has an American president offered Lebanon, on a silver platter, such a clear chance to turn the page and inaugurate a new and promising chapter for all its citizens. Contrary to the complacency and endless tergiversations of previous Democratic administrations, the current U.S. leadership is determined—even by force if necessary—to impose peace and stability in the region. With the exception of a few rogue states and entities such as Iran, Hezbollah, Yemen, and to a lesser extent Iraq, the prevailing regional mood is shifting away from arrogance toward pragmatism. Correcting and dismantling the disastrous and deliberately misguided foreign policies of the Obama administration—policies that emboldened the Iranian regime while alienating the Gulf states—is no easy task. Yet President Trump is undeniably moving in that direction. Parallel to these developments, Lebanon itself has a fundamental role to play if it genuinely wishes to seize this historic opportunity and avoid missing the train set in motion by President Trump. Lebanese authorities—the President and the government—must immediately enforce the disarmament of Hezbollah throughout the country. Doing so would unlock the implementation of other long-overdue and essential reforms. The repeated invocation of a potential civil war is nothing more than a scarecrow, cynically used to mask political weakness and inaction. Failure to act should then compel the population to wake up, take the initiative, and react. We must clean up our own backyard if Lebanon is ever to be taken seriously by the international community. With at least 75% of the population in favor of Hezbollah’s disarmament, a well-organized and highly publicized campaign should be launched without delay. Anti-Hezbollah political parties must be pressured by their own constituents to support—not obstruct—such efforts. For once, the pressure must rise from the grassroots upward, not the other way around. This campaign can take multiple forms and should not be limited to a single course of action: conferences, editorials, podcasts international media outreach meetings with foreign embassies marches and protests under the protection of the Lebanese Army Lebanon is rich in independent talent willing to contribute to such an effort. However, this will require funding, coordination, and sustained commitment over the long term. Should all of the above fail, civil disobedience must become the people’s credo: refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of public administrations, work stoppages, and sustained pressure on the political establishment. Our collective will must prevail if Lebanon is ever to see the light again. Finally, a fundamental question remains unanswered: will Iran relinquish its megalomaniacal ambitions and order Hezbollah to step aside once and for all—or will it, together with its proxy, suffer yet another historic defeat at the hands of Israel and the US ? The aftermath of the last Trump–Netanyahu meeting will undoubtedly shed light on the course of events to come.

Rifaat al-Assad, who passed away a few days ago, on January 20, 2026, embodied one of the most revealing faces of Syria’s great transformation toward what may rightly be called a “State of Barbarism”: a state whose claimed legitimacy rested on repression, enforced communal ʿasabiyya , and the relentless pursuit of an “alliance of minorities.” This transformation effectively began with the Syrian-Egyptian union of 1958, a fleeting experiment that survived barely three years and a few months. At heart, Rifaat al-Assad was no more than one cog among others within that Syrian State of Barbarism which he defended without reservation, long before the Hama massacre of February 1982 and through the invasion of the countryside into the cities. This enterprise sought to impose archaic values upon urban populations, in retaliation against everything Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Latakia embodied as civilizational values. That invasion unfolded within Syria itself. But the Syrian State of Barbarism soon overflowed its borders and extended into Lebanon. For years, Rifaat al-Assad maintained a tangible military presence there, through the deployment of forces from the Saraya al-Difaʿ at the al-Nahda Club stadium in Ras Beirut, near the Military Bath. He and his gang were responsible for disgraceful practices, including the kidnapping of the Jordanian chargé d’affaires Hisham al-Muhaysin, who was later released under pressure. Rifaat also sought to mobilize the Alawites of Tripoli, attempting to enlist them in the service of his project based on an alliance of minorities against the Sunni majority, wherever it existed. The drift toward the Syrian State of Barbarism had already been deeply consolidated with the coup of March 8, 1963, carried out by Baathist and Nasserist officers determined to annihilate any possibility of Syrian renewal. That putsch swept away the last hopes of Syria returning to a normal state after the end, both grotesque and tragic, of the union dissolved on September 28, 1961. The union had produced nothing but economic disaster, opening the way to nationalizations and laying the foundations of the security state, under the direction of the officer Abdelhamid Sarraj. Rifaat al-Assad, the younger brother of Hafez al-Assad, fully embodied this Alawite figure driven by a thirst for power and money, incapable of expressing himself in any language other than violence and blackmail. He thus became an organic component of the State of Barbarism established by Hafez al-Assad, who methodically laid its foundations. Until 1984, Rifaat remained one of the instruments of the “elder brother,” founder of the Alawite state that collapsed on December 8, 2024, the day Bashar al-Assad fled headlong to Moscow. Rifaat al-Assad did not confine himself to crimes against ordinary people. He even went so far as to impose himself by force as a “doctor,” adopting the airs of an intellectual while being incapable of articulating a single sentence correctly. He played every role the system expected of him, notably by founding the Saraya al-Difaʿ , Alawite military units whose sole mission was to protect the regime and serve as its shield. These forces were later dissolved and replaced by the Republican Guard, itself commanded by Alawite officers. Rifaat briefly held the post of vice-president of the Republic, before being sidelined when he attempted to seize power during his brother’s serious health crisis in 1984. He believed that all conditions were then ripe for him to appropriate absolute power. But Hafez al-Assad, saved by his doctors, mobilized other senior Alawite officers to block any succession bid. The defense minister at the time, the Sunni Mustafa Tlass, assumed the role of public invective, lifting the final veil of protection from Rifaat. Tlass always knew how to satisfy Hafez al-Assad and mastered perfectly the role assigned to him, while his “master” prepared his eldest son, Bassel, for succession. That was what was supposed to happen in 2000. But Bassel had died in 1994, and the heir to the throne became Bashar. During the long years he spent outside Syria, Rifaat al-Assad benefited from considerable financial largesse from several Arab sources. He acquired lavish properties and hotels in France, Britain, Spain, and elsewhere. He also attempted to reinvent himself through media ventures. His behavior, shaped by a shabbiha culture, changed little. What did change was his discourse: he began presenting himself as a defender of the Gulf states, claiming to be far removed from any attempt at blackmail through rapprochement with Iran, a practice his brother Hafez and later Bashar had turned into an instrument of power. Hafez al-Assad possessed a formidable political mind, driven by a desire to conceal his sectarianism and his hatred of urban Sunnis, as well as of all those who still believed in freedom in Syria. He seized power in the autumn of 1970 and acceded to the presidency in 1971, becoming the first Alawite to hold that office. All-powerful… until fate struck him brutally in 1994, when his eldest son, Bassel, was killed in a car accident while on his way to Damascus airport. Hafez received that day the most violent blow of his life. Rifaat, for his part, remained convinced to the very end that circumstances would eventually allow him to return to Damascus and play a political role, long before Bassel’s death. He did return in 1993, on the occasion of the death of the mater familias, Naissa. But the Syrian president continued to treat him with extreme caution, especially after deciding to groom Bashar as his successor. Hafez al-Assad, who described Rifaat as “stupid,” according to the testimony of a U.S. ambassador who served in Damascus, allowed his younger brother to occupy minor roles while keeping him under close surveillance. Rifaat soon left Syria when he realized that all political activity was definitively closed to him. Alea jacta est . The most Bashar al-Assad ever did for his uncle was to allow him to flee from Paris to Damascus in order to escape a French prison sentence. Rifaat al-Assad thus avoided incarceration. He remained, until his last day, a fugitive from justice — a justice that, sooner or later, will catch up with Bashar al-Assad and, with him, many others as well.

« Totalitarian regimes are not content to dominate bodies; they seek to enslave minds. » – George Orwell Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the United States has imposed a large-scale economic sanctions regime on Tehran, which has become over the decades one of the most multidimensional pressure tools in American diplomacy. The first measures, instituted after the hostage-taking at the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979, froze Iranian assets in the United States via Executive Order 12170, immobilizing billions of dollars and blocking numerous financial operations. In the mid-1990s, Washington strengthened its arsenal: in March 1995, all American investment in the Iranian energy sector was prohibited; a measure followed in May by a total trade embargo covering almost all exchanges and technology transfers. The « Iran and Libya Sanctions Act » of August 1996 introduced extraterritorial sanctions, threatening foreign companies investing in Iranian hydrocarbons. Escalation of Financial Sanctions With tensions related to Iran's nuclear program, sanctions took on an increased financial dimension. In July 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), aiming to isolate Iran from the global financial system by restricting access to the dollar and maritime transport for Tehran's economic actors. Between 2011 and 2012, new measures hit Iran's central bank and oil buyers, causing a significant drop in revenues, a pillar of the national economy. In parallel, sanctions targeted the regime's officials and financial networks, with asset freezes and prohibitions on operations to limit their access to international markets. Maximum Pressure and the Iranian Strategy After a temporary easing linked to the 2015 JCPOA (the Iranian nuclear deal), certain sanctions were suspended in January 2016, allowing a partial resumption of oil exports. This period ended on May 8, 2018, with the withdrawal of the agreement in question by the United States, which progressively reinstated sanctions until November 5, 2018, as part of its maximum pressure policy. According to Phillip Smythe, a Middle East expert who worked at the Washington Institute and the Atlantic Council, « economic sanctions have sent the Khamenei regime into a free fall. » « However, this has not prevented the Iranian government from pursuing its adventurous actions and acquiring weapons, » he notes. « On the other hand, US measures complicate the financing of these efforts and proxies abroad. Maximum pressure has limited access to dual-use technologies, restricted the movement of the ghost fleet transporting oil, and curbed access to international banking networks. » Smythe specifies that despite the pressure, the regime continued to finance certain militias and attempted to pursue its armament programs, notably long-range missiles. Its ghost fleet continued to export oil, and in this regard, China remained a key partner, allowing the regime to maintain its resources and power. New Targets and Unprecedented Measures In January 2026, facing the repression of massive protests, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, for his role in the crackdown. Asset freezes and prohibition of any operations with American entities also apply to other high-ranking officials and financial networks of the regime. On January 12, 2026, a historic measure imposed a 25% tariff on any country that continues to trade with Iran, thus illustrating the regime's dependence on its foreign partners and the structural weaknesses of its economy. Future Levers Against the Regime According to Phillip Smythe, « the United States has many tools » to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic. « They could tackle the more secret banking apparatuses operated by the Islamic Republic, » he indicates. « These measures could thus include sanctions directly targeting the leaders and the foundations of their power » (taking into account that the regime's economy largely relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, and bases controlled by the mullahs). « Among other potentially viable tools is also targeting how the regime uses cryptocurrencies to continue financing itself, » adds Phillip Smythe. « Attacking other 'ghost' economies, such as banking, maritime transport, and money transfer, could also be other useful ways to limit the aggressive actions of the Islamic Republic. » A Regime Focused on Armament Mr. Smythe also emphasizes that for the ruling power in Tehran, « the people often come last. » The regime's priority remains military programs and regional ambitions, to the detriment of the population. Despite sanctions and international pressure, the Iranian government continues its military adventures and support for its militias, thereby highlighting the persistence of a totalitarian system determined to impose its strategic objectives. From 1979 to 2026, US sanctions – sectoral, extraterritorial, or targeting individuals – have evolved from a simple asset freeze to a global and multidimensional system, combining embargo, financial restrictions, sanctions against elites, and tariff measures affecting commercial partners, thus revealing the flaws and contradictions of the Iranian regime. A Paper Tiger Despite the image of power it seeks to project internationally, the Iranian regime has proven to be a veritable paper tiger. Its military and political structures, presented as solid and omnipotent, rely on fragile networks and an economy dependent on foreign partners. Successive sanctions have highlighted the financial vulnerabilities of the power and its difficulty in financing its regional and military ambitions. Its apparent resistance hides a much more precarious reality: costly programs, ultra-funded proxies at the expense of an increasingly suffering population. This mix of façade and structural fragility shows that, behind the rhetoric of strength, Iran struggles to maintain its influence without the support or tolerance of other powers, confirming the fact that it is in reality a paper tiger.

The latest article in our analysis of the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership of Barcelona (Euromed), then of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), draws an unvarnished assessment of the achievements and shortcomings that have marked, for Lebanon, the two phases 1995-2008 and 2008-2025 of this dual European strategic initiative. The Euro-Mediterranean Barcelona Process (Euromed), then the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), have brought political, economic, and institutional achievements to Lebanon. However, these remain limited due to the chronic instability that has plagued the country since 1995, and more particularly since 2008. The benefits of the Barcelona Process for Lebanon in various areas can be outlined as follows: – On the political front, the recognition of the legitimacy of the central power after a long period of constitutional vacuum, support for the sovereignty and stability of the State, the establishment of a regular dialogue with the European Union on issues of governance, human rights, and regional stability. – On the economic front, the signing in 2002 of the Lebanon-EU Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2006, the granting of preferential access for certain products to the European market, financial and technical aid for the modernization of the economy, support for SMEs, as well as infrastructure development. – On the institutional and social front, support for institutional and administrative reforms, education, training, and cultural cooperation, strengthening of state capacities in public services and environmental protection. However, political instability, regional conflicts, and internal Lebanese crises have had an inhibitory effect, preventing Lebanon from benefiting from the desired trade exchanges. Structural reforms have progressed slowly. The benefits of the UfM Since 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has provided Lebanon with primarily sectoral, technical, and diplomatic contributions, through the implementation of various concrete projects: – On the political front, Lebanon remains integrated into regional dialogues within a Euro-Mediterranean multilateral framework. It gains access to a platform for North-South and South-South dialogues, allowing it to defend its interests despite its precarious political and security situation, while maintaining its cooperation with the European Union. – On the economic and development front, achievements have focused on participation in regional projects in the areas of sustainable urban development, transport, energy, and environment, as well as support for inclusive growth, job creation for youth and women, entrepreneurship, and SMEs. – In terms of education and training, Lebanon has benefited from UfM programs in the areas of higher education, vocational training, academic mobility, and youth employment. – On the social front, support has been provided for initiatives promoting gender equality and social inclusion. – On the environmental and sustainable development front, support has been granted to projects related to water management, waste treatment, the fight against climate change, and the development of renewable energies. All these are important areas, considering the demographics and successive crises. However, political instability in Lebanon since 2008, the 2019 economic crisis, regional tensions, as well as the limited financial resources of the Union and the restricted role of EU aid (as well as international institutions) have curtailed the anticipated results. Mixed assessment Nevertheless, the Barcelona Process has brought Lebanon closer to the European Union and integrated it into Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, while providing aid in economic and institutional sectors. However, the economic impact of these measures remains limited. Regarding the Union for the Mediterranean, Lebanon has benefited from support for education, the environment, and civil society, which has resulted in concrete projects within a framework of regional cooperation. These achievements have allowed it to maintain its place in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, but they have not been sufficient to overcome the successive crises the country has faced. Previous articles Mediterranean Union: What became of the Barcelona Process? (1/5) The Mediterranean Idea: Tested by European Balances (2/5) A Cooperation Rich in Promises: The Barcelona Process (3/5) Union for the Mediterranean: An Unfinished Revival of the Barcelona Dream (4/5)

In Syria, the question is no longer whether Bashar al-Assad’s regime could endure. That chapter is now closed. The real issue lies elsewhere. Can Syria, in the aftermath of the old regime’s collapse, rebuild a unified and viable state, or does the risk of disintegration and partition linger, merely taking on new forms? The fall of Assad’s regime at the end of 2024, followed by Ahmad al-Chareh’s rise to power during the transitional period, marked a major turning point in the Syrian landscape. While this upheaval did not, in itself, bring an end to the crisis, it profoundly reshaped its political contours. The debate has shifted from the fate of a regime to the very future of the state itself. First: What has truly changed since Assad? The collapse of the old regime did not simply involve a change in leadership; it represented the downfall of an entire system, built on: – a single-party structure, – sprawling security apparatuses, – tightly centralization, – and strong external alliances, particularly with Iran and Russia. The transitional phase, overseen by Ahmad al-Chareh, has been marked by a radically different message: the goal is no longer to restore a regime, but to rebuild the state itself. Consequently, the old Constitution has been repealed, the Baath Party dissolved, the former security apparatus dismantled, and the process of reconstructing state institutions launched on new foundations, though these remain fragile. What is even more significant is that the new leadership made it clear from the outset that Syria’s unity is non-negotiable. More than that, it rejected any discussion of partition or the establishment of a community-based federation. This was not a mere slogan, but a concrete political choice. Second: Has the risk of partition been eliminated? The precise answer is that the danger has been reduced, but it persists. At the height of the war, particularly between 2012 and 2016, partition was a very real possibility. Talk of a “useful Syria,” maps of mini-states, and stark divisions between zones of influence had made the country’s dismemberment a seriously considered project on the international stage. Today, the landscape is different for several reasons: 1 - The existence of a new central authority with transitional legitimacy Ahmad al-Chareh does not inherit the old regime. He is seeking to build a new legitimacy, bolstered by cautious American and Arab engagement, as well as conditional international endorsement. 2 - The absence of international consensus on partition At present, the United States, Russia, and regional powers see no advantage in partitioning Syria. The costs would be high, and the risks far outweigh any potential benefits. 3 - The failure of the idea of community-based mini-states In the shadow of Turkish refusal and American disengagement, it is impossible to establish a viable Alawite mini state, a unified Sunni entity, a secessionist Druze project, or even a Kurdish state. As a result, the partition of Syria is no longer seen as a feasible solution, but rather as a collapse scenario, should the new state fail. Third: The American turnaround… and the abandonment of the Kurds One of the most significant changes in post-Assad Syria has been the clear shift in American policy. Washington, which for years had supported the Kurds as a de facto force in north-eastern Syria, has now redefined its priorities. The American message was clear: – No support will be given to a separatist Kurdish project. – No permanent protection will be provided to an independent autonomous administration. – Priority is given to the stability of a unified Syrian state. This shift in position has pushed the Kurdish leadership towards an option previously little considered: negotiating with the new regime. Agreements have been reached to gradually integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions, manage resources and border crossings, in exchange for guarantees on cultural and citizenship rights. This does not mean that the Kurdish question has been resolved, but it has shifted from a logic of separation to one of fragile and uncertain integration. Fourth: From dismemberment to a return to centralization… but at what cost? Syria is now moving from a phase of actual dismemberment to an attempt to restore a central state. This new centralization is different – or should be different – from that which prevailed under the old regime. The main challenge Ahmad al-Chareh faces is not merely military, but also political and social: – How can a strong state be built without reverting to despotism? – How can diversity be managed without causing the center to implode? – How can state authority be asserted without reproducing repression? For now, the signs are mixed: – progress has been made in regaining control over the territory, – yet the economy remains fragile, – minority communities are anxious, – and former forces, which once enjoyed considerable autonomy, remain wary. In other words, the danger is no longer Syria’s partition into mini states, but the failure of the new central state to manage its diversity. Fifth: is Syria truly out of danger? Syria has avoided the scenario of a rapid and chaotic partition, but it has not yet entered a phase of lasting stability. The situation can be summarized as follows: – Syria has escaped total collapse, – it has avoided community-based partition plans, – and it has avoided the transformation of dismemberment into a permanent reality. However, it has not yet overcome: – economic collapse, – the fragility of civil peace, – the risk of a return to violence in new forms, – and the test of popular legitimacy for the new government. The Syrian state therefore exists today, but it remains under trial. Sixth: the most plausible scenario In the short to medium term, the most likely scenario is one of: – a unified state, – clear political and security centralization, – limited administrative decentralization, – gradual integration of local forces, – and international support conditioned on reforms and stability. This model does not resemble pre-2011 Syria, nor does it resemble the partition scenarios. Rather, it resembles a state emerging from a long war, seeking to redefine itself. The success of this scenario hinges on a crucial factor: will the new transitional authority become a unifying state, or will it be yet another iteration of strong power devoid of a social contract? The fall of Assad’s regime has closed one chapter, but it has opened a more difficult one. Syria now faces a rare historical opportunity: to move beyond the logic of the old regime without falling into the trap of dismemberment. The danger of partition is no longer imminent, but it has not been entirely eliminated. It lies in political failure, not in geography. Ultimately, the question is no longer whether Syria will be divided, but whether it can succeed in becoming a unified state after the fall of the regime that once claimed to govern it in the name of unity.