Articles

The looting of Iraq’s National Museum in 2003 led to the loss of priceless artefacts and triggered a domino effect, manifested in the widespread plundering of archaeological sites across the country. This, in turn, fueled the international trafficking of antiquities and severely hampered scientific research in the field. The episode has since become an emblematic case of the political responsibility borne by occupying forces in wartime, the emergence of an economy built around the illicit antiquities trade serving organized crime and terrorism, and, in parallel, the development of a “recovery diplomacy” involving international cooperation to secure the return of stolen objects. The National Museum of Iraq is one of the world’s most important archaeological institutions. It houses the core of Mesopotamian heritage, from a region often described as the “cradle of humanity”. The museum was founded in the 1920s, alongside the emergence of the modern Iraqi state, by Gertrude Bell, a British writer and archaeologist. Her aim was to prevent the treasures of Mesopotamia from being removed from the country. The main building, covering approximately 45,000 square meters, spans 5,000 to 7,000 years of history and contains the most comprehensive collection of Mesopotamian artefacts in existence. Its holdings include objects from the Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, Assyrian and Chaldean civilizations, as well as from pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. The museum contains major works – including cuneiform tablets, cylinder seals, royal statues and funerary objects – which constitute essential evidence for the history of writing, state formation, law and religion in the Near East. Among these holdings are the Nimrud gold treasure, comprising jewelry and artefacts dating from the 9th century BC, as well as sculptures, reliefs and cuneiform tablets from Uruk and other major Mesopotamian sites. The museum stands as a symbol of national unity and of continuity between Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, the Islamic era and contemporary Iraq. It also serves as a research and documentation center for archaeologists, holding vital archives relating to excavations at Ur, Uruk, Nineveh and Nimrud. The 2003 Looting: Geopolitical Stakes There is only one word to describe the looting of the museum in 2003: catastrophe. US troops had, in principle, been ordered to give priority protection to the museum. In practice, however, security was not put in place until a week after coalition forces entered Baghdad - a week too late, during which the looting took place. Between 10 and 12 April 2003, before the site was secured by US forces and after museum staff had withdrawn, approximately 15,000 objects disappeared, including ritual vessels, Assyrian ivories, statue heads, amulets and more than 5,000 cylinder seals. The looting shocked world opinion and has since been regarded as an emblematic case of the destruction of cultural heritage in times of war. International Mobilization The episode prompted an international mobilization – involving Interpol, universities, Unesco and specialized missions – aimed at recovering the stolen works of art and strengthening the protection of Iraq’s cultural heritage. Fifteen years after the events, approximately 7,000 of the 15,000 looted objects were believed to have been recovered. These items were returned through domestic amnesty programs, customs seizures and police operations carried out across the world. Recovered Iconic Artefacts Major pieces such as the Warka Vase and Mask, the copper statue of Bassetki, as well as objects from the Nimrud treasure, were recovered – often buried or concealed by looters who had been unable to sell them. Several iconic Sumerian royal statues and cult objects were located abroad and subsequently repatriated through cooperation between Interpol, US authorities, museums and academic researchers. Despite the museum’s reopening in 2015 and ongoing restitution efforts, thousands of objects remain on the black market or are permanently lost, limiting our understanding of entire chapters of Mesopotamian history. The 2003 looting has now become a textbook case in debates over the protection of cultural heritage during wartime, influencing military standards, international law, and provenance policies in Western museums. It should be noted that numerous legal frameworks exist to safeguard heritage in times of conflict, including the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1999 additional protocols, as well as the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Moreover, international cooperation has enabled the mapping of archaeological looting networks – from trafficking routes and regional hubs to final markets – as well as the identification of the economic actors involved, including intermediaries, auction houses and collectors, and their links to organized crime and terrorism. Such international collaboration plays a crucial role in global efforts to protect cultural heritage and facilitates the recovery of stolen objects.

Lebanon and, more specifically, the Shiite community commemorated a few days ago the 25th anniversary of the death, on January 10, 2001, of the former president of the Supreme Shiite Council (SSC), Imam Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddine. The man who was, for more than two decades, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shiite community, succeeding Imam Moussa Sadr – who mysteriously disappeared during a visit to Libya in 1978 – left behind a political 'will' whose existence and true scope are ignored (or concealed...) by many Lebanese and foreigners, particularly in academic and journalistic circles. The historical and truly existential dimension of this legacy is highlighted by the dramatic developments currently unfolding in Lebanon and the region. More than ever, the Land of the Cedars and the Levant need the contribution to public life of a personality combining, like Imam Shamseddine, moral authority, open-mindedness, and a clear vision of current socio-political realities. At the end of his life, and although weakened by illness, he had recorded his memoirs and recommendations on cassette regarding the course of conduct that Shiites in Lebanon and the region should adopt. He particularly urged his co-religionists not to have a 'political project specific to Shiites' and to fight for their rights 'by integrating into the society in which they live'. Clearly, he subtly rejected the principle of exporting the Iranian Islamic Revolution initiated by the Pasdaran in the aftermath of Khomeini's rise to power in 1979. He particularly challenged, in this context, the system established by Khomeini, based on the authority of the Walih el-Faqih, namely the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution – in this case, himself and his successors – endowed, in his capacity as a direct descendant of the Prophet, with absolute and unchallenged decision-making power on strategic matters, including decisions of war and peace. By establishing such a political system, Ayatollah Khomeini had sown the seeds of chronic regional destabilization, the result of an autocratic power's behavior that would plunge the entire Middle East into chaos for over four decades. And for good reason: the Wilayat el-Faqih was designed to be an absolute reference authority not only for Iranians but also for all Shiites. In terms of religious practice, every Shiite group or individual must indeed choose their own spiritual leader. However, by granting himself power based on a divine 'legitimacy' (thus indisputable), the new Leader of the Islamic Republic (Khomeini, then Khamenei, currently) placed himself above all other religious authorities, serving, moreover – and this is where the problem lies – a transnational, expansionist, hegemonic, repressive political project that sanctifies violence as a mode of action. This Khomeinist 'graft' on the Shiite socio-political-religious body could only be a source of tension and conflict in the Arab world, under the weight of the 'exportation of the Islamic Revolution' and the divine power granted to the Supreme Leader. As a true visionary, Sheikh Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddine had seen the danger looming, clearly distancing himself from the foundations of Wilayat el-Faqih and the expansionist ambitions of the Pasdaran, much like the spiritual leader of the Shiite community in Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, Imam Moussa Sadr, and even Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, whom many Western observers mistakenly called the 'spiritual guide of Hezbollah', whereas, on the contrary, he challenged the divine power of the Walih el-Faqih and, consequently, expressed reservations about Hezbollah's conduct in Lebanon. More than twenty-five years later, events have illustrated the visionary nature of Sheikh Shamseddine's political legacy. In fact, it is on the basis of the 'Shiite-specific (transnational) project', denounced by the former president of the SSC, that the Iranian regime resorted to militiamen from Arab countries to brutally suppress its own people in bloodshed a few days ago. The slogan 'Neither Gaza, nor Hezbollah, we give our lives for Iran', launched by Iranian revolutionaries, alone summarizes the entire historical and existential dimension of the vision expressed by Imam Shamseddine. In this context, it primarily reflects the serious resentment towards Arab populations expressed by a large part of Iranian public opinion, which does not understand how the radical wing of the Iranian regime could spend tens of billions of dollars to maintain proxies in Arab countries while Iran faces an unprecedented severe socio-economic crisis. It is also on this same basis of the 'Shiite-specific (transnational) project' that Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, constantly prioritizes the supreme interest of the Iranian regime at the expense of the imperatives of building a strong and sovereign Lebanese state. He even went so far as to utter threats against Foreign Minister Joe Raggi (deemed too sovereignist!), not forgetting to brandish the specter of internal unrest if the government were to implement its decision to disarm Hezbollah… During one of his recent public interventions, President Joseph Aoun called on Hezbollah to 'reason,' which openly displeased Naim Qassem (the supreme interest of the mullahs' Iran requires it!). To stop such a suicidal drift by the pro-Iranian faction, an imperative step must be taken today, urgently: alignment with the recommendations, with the prophetic political legacy, of Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddine. Even if this must inevitably lead – they will have to admit it one day – to a genuine 'cultural revolution' to reshape their political doctrine developed in the mid-1980s...

Rarely in the history of humanity has the progressive assault been as preponderant as it is today. During the worst hours of Marxism, the gulags and intellectual terrorism were limited to certain countries or empires, without being able to subjugate the rest of the West. The Soviet empire could only forbid Christian faith, freedom of thought, and cultural heritage in the territories it directly controlled or through interposed vassals. Today, progressive delusion ignites souls in what Leo Strauss would define as a devastating nihilism. It is a plethora of pseudo-intellectuals who seek to deconstruct the human by cleverly questioning all the values that distinguish it. The aim is to transform the human person into an individual stripped of everything that socially and culturally constitutes them. This new man, divested of his bearings, is placed alone before the law, which itself is devoid of any sense of discernment. The progressive lexicon Identity is demonized, heritage is standardized, history is handed over to gravedigger historicism, and truth is relativized. Generalized uncertainty thus inexorably leads to nihilism. The modus operandi of this leftist intellectualism consists of systematic intimidation designed to anticipate and prevent discourses that do not conform to globalist ideology. Its weapon is a specially sharpened lexicon to abort any attempt at debate on subjects elevated to globalism's dogma. The identitarian is then equated with the fascist, rejecting otherness and devoid of humanity. They are constantly adorned with tirelessly repeated attributes that mechanically loop back. It is necessary to denounce this pernicious lexicon in order to unmask it. The expressions that recur most often are those of identitarian withdrawal, tribal behavior, racial fetishism, religious identitarianism, and ethnic identitarianism. The terms confession, clan, tribe, and even nation are always used in a pejorative and humiliating sense. These are contrasted with appealing notions, but emptied of their meaning, as they are detached from reality. These also recur repeatedly: living together, coexistence, inclusivity, and otherness. The nation, assimilated to evil, is to be dissolved, along with its notions of borders, history, and identity. The Christian religion, which founded otherness par excellence, is perceived as an enemy and an obstacle to this otherness. Man is desacralized and daily life is despiritualized. The sacred person is replaced by the consumer and taxpayer individual. The new man, the ideal of woke and liberal progressivism, no longer has a transcendental dimension; he is only evaluated in relation to his performance and his material and caloric needs. Eugenics Wokism is merely the extreme manifestation of this ideology. After denying family, community, country, faith, tradition, and heritage, it pushes to the negation of sexual evidence. It is the rejection of divine creation and even of nature as a manifestation of the divine. It is the contestation of creation, according to Fyodor Dostoevsky. Thus, after killing God, as Martin Heidegger tells us, the nihilist seeks the "death of man". The lexicon of progressive "bien-pensance" continues to grow. Recently, on the social networks of a pseudo-historian, conservatives, identitarians, and federalists were accused of eugenics. Here again, the intellectual short-circuit stems more from ideological discourse than scientific. For eugenics is, above all, a product of progressivism. It rejects creation with its flaws; it wants to perfect it. The new man must be selected down to his genes. Nothing is more opposed to this practice than Christian conservatism. It protects life, prohibits abortion and artificial selection. Christianity sees in the sick person the very face of Christ and His presence manifested by absolute otherness. The Isolationists It is not the first time that progressives project their vices onto conservatives. Haven't they, since 1975, labeled Christian conservatives as isolationists? They fought them militarily and ideologically. And yet, the Lebanon of these so-called isolationists was open to the whole world and to all cultures; that of the progressives was ostracized by the international community, and isolated from both the West and the Arab Gulf countries. Finally, progressives want to be rooted in what they call the Arab East. They claim to be Arabists and open to their natural environment. They accuse conservatives of being utopians artificially oriented towards the West. Here again, discernment would be appropriate. For in reality, conservatives are attached to their Lebanese land, their Levantine belonging, and their Eastern Christian, Antiochian, and Syriac heritage. It is, on the other hand, the progressives who are the most deeply Westernized, as revealed by their integral adoption of the Western ideology par excellence, which is wokism or radical liberalism. This rejection of heritage, as well as self-hatred, are characteristics not found anywhere other than in current Western civilization. Neither the Muslim world nor the Far East experiences such a form of civilizational suicide. This ideology therefore constitutes empirical proof of the Lebanese left's (which claims to be Arab) belonging to the West with its qualities and its vices. Here, in the West, there prevails Benedict XVI tells us, " a form of self-hatred... And one can only describe it as pathological… And this pathology rages throughout the West, carrying away the Levantine coast with it. Faced with this distressing lack of discernment, His Holiness reminds us that " the unification of humanity is not a political task but an eschatological hope, and that to ignore the identity of peoples to merge them into a global mix is a sin of pride, similar to the biblical sin of the Tower of Babel.

What a master of suspense Donald Trump is! In the warm waters of the Gulf as in the frozen lands of Greenland, the American president follows the same pattern: he engineers a stunning event, then scoops up the prize under the stunned gaze of the protagonists. One would be wrong to overlook the histrionic side of the man, who seeks to monopolize attention and to be implored before dispensing his favors. On January 13, he called on Iranian demonstrators to seize control of institutions, assuring them that help was “on the way.” But this promise was nothing more than a damp squib. Three days later, the American president backtracked, seizing upon a hollow pretext: “I greatly respect the fact that all scheduled hangings that were supposed to take place yesterday were canceled by the leaders of Iran. Thank you!” Indeed, he had won his bet: a trophy added to his hunting board—or to his résumé as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. If he had saved lives through mere threat or bluff, why then put other lives at risk by launching a raid? A Well-Crafted Scenario Clever Donald—he really pulled the wool over everyone’s eyes! All the more so as astonished observers continue to believe that he reversed course at the suggestion of his military advisers and under pressure from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries. As if the strategists in the White House had not already weighed the pros and cons of a selective bombing campaign in the land of the ayatollahs. In reality, the last-minute interventions were nothing but evasive maneuvers Donald Trump used to avoid taking action, with Netanyahu and MBS extending him a lifeline and pulling him out of trouble. Why be surprised, after all? Did this president not himself tell a journalist: “No one convinced me—I convinced myself”? In truth, with remarkable consistency, Donald Trump has never abandoned the idea that one should never get bogged down in a war. That does not prevent him from pursuing an arms race and making himself feared by all. Will He Strike or Not? In short, Donald Trump will resort to brute force only very rarely—unless his troops are directly targeted. Which is not the case here, since the Iranians are not suicidal! And if, during the latest escalation, the White House ordered the evacuation of certain U.S. bases in the Gulf, it was merely for show. Just another ruse, like the order given to the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln to head toward the Persian Gulf. As a U.S. Navy source specified, “while the presence of this aircraft carrier is not indispensable to an offensive action, it nonetheless constitutes a strong signal of deterrence and readiness, addressed to both allies and adversaries.” The mood is not one of aggression; yet interference at this level could be justified and considered a humanitarian intervention at a time when unarmed civilians are being killed without mercy. And What About Us Lebanese? Just as Iranian insurgents could not count on an American strike, we free Lebanese cannot count on the fall of the mullahs’ regime to loosen the grip of Hezbollah on the country. It is up to us to reclaim the lost space of our freedoms. So let us take inspiration from the heroism of the insurgents of Tehran, Isfahan, and elsewhere—now that fear has changed sides and tongues are loosening.

Iran and the world have been focused since December 28 on the revolt movement triggered in Tehran by Bazaar merchants and thousands of young and old against the rapid deterioration of the socio-economic situation. The demonstrations, which quickly spread to numerous cities and localities, reached an unprecedented scale by January 8, openly defying the Islamic regime, before being violently repressed in blood. A national internet shutdown, which allowed, according to human rights organizations, to mask the repression, was compounded by threats to inflict heavy sanctions on protesters, labeled as "rioters acting on behalf of foreign powers". The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, speaks of "unprecedented" repression. He reported last Friday that security forces had fired "live ammunition" at protesters, deploring the deaths of "thousands" of people, including children. Iranian authorities report the deaths of over 3000 people, claiming that the majority of victims "are martyrs", meaning members of the security forces or bystanders, and not "rioters". Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), based in the United States, reports 5002 deaths, primarily protesters, and at least 26,852 arrests. For its part, the NGO Iran Human Rights (IHR), based in Norway, confirmed that 3428 protesters had died but feared that the final toll could rise to 25,000 deaths. By targeting the power led by Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, protesters are defying the Islamic Republic like never before, but is the scale of the movement sufficient to overthrow the theocratic power? Are we witnessing the end of the mullah regime? Regime change? Analysts remain very cautious about the outcome of the protest and report several dimensions to the crisis, which could have various consequences. These analysts agree that the course of events can be very strongly dictated by external action. Interviewed by Levant Time, Josef Kraus, professor at Masaryk University in Prague and Iran expert, shares his insights on the subject. Mr. Kraus begins by recalling the multidimensional nature of the Iranian crisis. He highlights internal factors – inflation, economic crisis, corruption – to which are added external problems shaking the regime: failure of the Islamic Republic's imperialist policy in the Middle East and loss of several vectors of its power, also loss of distant allies, with the fall of Maduro in Venezuela, combined Israeli-US offensive, etc. The internal, regional, and international dimensions are closely linked. They are compounded by heavy sanctions imposed by foreign powers. According to Mr. Kraus, "we are still far from the end of the regime, unless there is an unpredictable and unforeseen external element." He notes in this context that "if one focuses on internal issues and the resolution of internal problems, it is almost certain that the regime will not be overthrown." "But if one considers the regional, or even global, dynamic, the situation could be very different," he specifies. "For example, a massive intervention by the Israelis or Americans could strongly unbalance the situation in Iran". Professor Kraus, who maintains contacts in Iran due to his interventions in Iranian universities, states that a "significant part of Iranian society expects an American or Israeli intervention likely to cause the collapse of the regime." "Everyone expects a second phase of what they call the 'Twelve-Day War' between Israel and Iran". For Mr. Kraus, "if the Americans intervene in a more muscular way, the stability of the regime could be severely threatened." "Some even call for an intervention in Tehran similar to that carried out in Caracas, i.e., deploying the Delta Force, kidnapping Khamenei, etc.!", he emphasizes. Cited by AFP, Nicole Grajewski, professor at the Centre for International Research at Sciences Po., "mass demonstrations, however sustained, are unlikely to be decisive". A similar analysis from Arash Azizi, of Yale University: "It is possible that under the combined pressure of internal protests and foreign threats from the United States and Israel, members of the regime may undertake a coup-type action and modify the fundamental policies and structures of the regime". Loss of Legitimacy Mr. Kraus returns to the bitter failures of Iranian foreign policy. He affirms that the regime derives its legitimacy from ideology: Velayat el-Faqih, the Islamic Revolution, and the resulting legacy. "But frankly, hardly anyone believes in it anymore," he asserts, before adding: "I would draw a striking parallel between the current Iranian regime and, for example, the Eastern European regimes of the 1980s, like Czechoslovakia. No one believed in communism anymore. Those who participated and remained loyal to the regime did so for economic and social advantages: better jobs, apartments, privileges, etc." He adds: "The situation is very similar in Iran. However, a significant part of society still trusts the regime. They wish for its continuation. They continue to believe in the Islamic Revolution, in the guardians of the doctrine, the "fuqaha". But with the catastrophic economic situation, even those who believed in the legacy of the Islamic Revolution are greatly disturbed. They prefer to think that the system itself is not bad, but they question the leaders for their mismanagement of affairs," adds Mr. Kraus. This distrust extends beyond the economic sphere, says Mr. Kraus, and discontent also concerns security, both internal and regional. Internal security is paramount for the regime. Indeed, when the middle class realizes it has nothing to lose by risking a revolution, it will overthrow the regime. But it will not do so as long as stability and security are assured. "The regime knows this and takes advantage of it," notes Mr. Kraus. "In essence, it tells them: 'Do you want to overthrow those who guarantee your security? Look at Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria. Do you want that to happen in Iran too? If not, be loyal.'" In fact, the threat of civil war is strong in a multi-ethnic country. Any destabilization of central power could easily mobilize the Kurds, Balochs, Khuzestan Arabs, Azeris, Turkmen, etc. For now, this threat is overused by the regime and works perfectly. At the same time, it plays the external security card: "Do you want to be threatened by Israel? Do you want to be bombed by the Americans? If not, we are here to ensure security through our allies, our proxies, our powerful army, and our Revolutionary Guards". But this legitimacy has disappeared: it is true that Iran was not directly defeated by the Israeli air force, but it did not win either! The military superiority of the Hebrew state allowed its bombers to establish themselves in Iranian airspace. Now, the majority of the Iranian population is demanding accountability, due to the regime having diverted colossal sums for decades for armament, the Guardians, and the maintenance of militias in other countries. Change of leaders? Returning to the question of Khamenei's succession, Mr. Kraus recalls several elements: the Iranian Constitution stipulates that any new power must be embodied by a single person. However, so far, no one fits this profile. Some speak of the Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei: he holds political and economic power and maintains excellent relations with the armed forces. But he cannot seize power alone, because succession from father to son is a royal tradition, and the very legitimacy of the anti-royalist Islamic Revolution would therefore be shaken. A collegial leadership, a triumvirate and perhaps even five people, is therefore an idea that makes perfect sense. But who would be part of it to have the necessary legitimacy? This collegial body would need popular support. This implies the presence of diverse personalities within this body. By reconciling profiles, it could work. It would be necessary to satisfy traditionalists, the hard right, with Mojtaba on one side, reformers on the other, but also liberals and the left. For Mr. Kraus, "something very important is brewing behind the scenes". "We have absolutely no idea, because it's not just about the constitutional system, elections, or different strategies," he indicates. "It's also about families; there are the Rafsanjani, the Larijani, the Khamenei, the Khomeini... These clans are vying for access to decision-making centers and power. They could share power in some way, as the Larijani family currently shares it with the Khamenei family. Ali Larijani is becoming the most important security figure in the country, whereas five years ago, it was believed that his political career was over". Historically, Iranian politics has always been made this way. Before the Shah, political office was dependent on clans and even tribes. Nowadays, the families of great religious dignitaries are establishing themselves as new dynasties, engaging in a remake of "Game of Thrones" Sanctions, a central element If the economic situation in Iran has reached such a catastrophic state, it is not solely because of sanctions: "The country is very poorly managed," says Mr. Kraus, "to this are added corruption, nepotism, and of course, the region itself which has been very destabilized for several years. This does not help. Moreover, sanctions have been in place for four decades. This means that for more than twenty years, Iran has been experiencing a significant brain drain." "If you talk to locals, those with the skills to do business, intellectuals, academics, high-tech professionals, all want to leave the country," emphasizes Mr. Kraus. "And they do it quite well. This brain drain has been going on for 20 years, towards the West in general, Western Europe, Canada, the United States or elsewhere, it has a negative impact on the economy and productivity". Thus, the essential element of Iranian foreign policy is closely linked to the lifting of sanctions. Iranians are willing to do anything to get rid of sanctions. "They are even ready to conclude a nuclear agreement 2.0 with the United States to obtain the lifting of sanctions, because the regime only wants one thing: to survive," continues Mr. Kraus. "And it can only survive if sanctions are lifted, because that would allow the economy to recover, and the majority of the population would, in a way, be content with the regime's continuation. The lifting of sanctions is therefore the absolute priority, the number one objective of the regime, because its survival is at stake". What future for Hezbollah? What is the impact of the current situation on the fate of Hezbollah? Mr. Kraus believes that two viewpoints emerge on this subject: "Hezbollah The first is that Iran, in reality, is ready to sacrifice Hezbollah if it gets an agreement with the Americans. The idea is that the regime is so desperate and needs to survive so badly that if the Americans came and said: "Here's the nuclear deal, here's the sanctions relief," while letting Hezbollah disarm, the Iranians would accept this situation because they would have no other options. He adds: "But there is also another vision. The Iranian mentality is very close to that of Hezbollah inasmuch as it is linked to religion, ideology, and the sense of sacrifice. It is not just about calculations and power dynamics, but also emotions. But Iran is of course a pragmatic and rational actor on the international stage. It is not a fundamentalist and fanatical society. It is a perfectly rational country. However, the calculation of the Iranian leaders could be different. This calculation is based on the observation that the Islamic regime has been in power for over 40 years, almost without change, always as prestigious, according to them, surviving everything". "In contrast, if we look at Israeli policy or American policy, we see that there are cycles, as in any democratic regime," notes Mr. Kraus. "Trump has three years left, not to mention Mr. Netanyahu, who is very controversial in his own country". The current tactic of the Iranians is to freeze things and wait for better days. In the meantime, they ask Hezbollah to reduce their provocation towards Israel, not to intervene in case of Israeli aggression", which Hezbollah is currently doing, also waiting for better days. Meanwhile, Lebanon is paying the price...

Nouri al-Maliki's return to power — or even to a key position within the Iraqi decision-making center — cannot be perceived as a mere political event, nor as the rehabilitation of a figure from the past. Due to what he embodies and the record of his actions, the man has become the symbol of an exhaustive governance model in its own right, associated with a pivotal phase in Iraq's post-2003 history, with its share of failures, divisions, and structural transformations of the state. Therefore, any eventual reappearance of Mr. al-Maliki effectively means the return of a global political orientation — on domestic, regional, and international levels — with all the repercussions this implies. Domestically – the return of the 'politicized state' 1. Increased centralization and erosion of balances During his two terms, between 2006 and 2014, Nouri al-Maliki was associated with the preeminence of executive power over other institutions, under the slogans of 'restoring state authority' and 'fighting terrorism'. In practice, this translated into a gradual politicization of state mechanisms, from justice to security apparatuses, and even public media. This approach emptied the principle of separation of powers of its substance, transforming the state into an instrument serving political authority rather than being a regulatory framework for political authority. Any prospect of al-Maliki's return is today perceived as the reproduction of this model: rigid centralization, restriction of opposition action, and systematic weakening of any counter-power capable of limiting the executive's grip. In a country with multiple identities like Iraq, this centralization does not produce stability, but accumulates latent tensions. 2. Worsening sectarian divisions Despite a nationalist discourse displayed at certain stages of his power, al-Maliki's experience was concretely marked by the deterioration of relations between Iraqi components, particularly with Sunnis and Kurds. Policies of exclusion, excessive use of security tools, arrests, and judicial prosecutions largely contributed to undermining trust between the state and large factions of society. These choices were not marginal: they constituted one of the structural factors that led to the explosion of the crisis with the expansion of the 'Islamic State' organization in 2014. In this context, a return of al-Maliki revives the memory of this stage and opens the way to a resurgence of divisions rather than their resolution, at a time when the national fabric remains fragile. 3. Weakening of the reform process and sabotaging calls for change The October 2019 protests marked a turning point in Iraqi political consciousness. They expressed a cross-community rejection of the existing governance system and called for a state based on citizenship, a serious fight against corruption, and an end to the logic of sectarian power-sharing and uncontrolled weapons. In this context, al-Maliki's return is perceived as a diametrically opposed message: the victory of the old system over aspirations for change, and the recycling of the same elite that the street holds responsible for political and economic collapse. Security-wise – the preponderance of the 'parallel state' 1. Strengthening the influence of armed factions Nouri al-Maliki is widely regarded as one of the main political covers for the Hashed al-Shaabi and their related factions. During his mandate, no real project was put forward to integrate these forces into state institutions, according to the principle of the monopoly of legitimate violence; on the contrary, the duality of security decision-making was consecrated. His return would de facto mean the entrenchment of this duality: an official state with limited capacities, facing a parallel armed force with political, security, and economic influence. Such a model does not produce a strong state, but a weakened state surrounded by forces more powerful than itself. 2. Tensions with the military institution Al-Maliki's past experience highlighted a direct political instrumentalization of the military institution, whether through appointments or the management of security operations. This approach weakened military professionalism and created cross-loyalties within the army. In any scenario of a return to power, the fear is to see this dynamic repeat itself, undermining the idea of a unifying national army, transforming it into a tool in a broader political conflict. Regionally – the return of the Iranian axis 1. A clear signal of allegiance to Tehran Al-Maliki is not a circumstantial ally of Iran, but one of the most consistent Iraqi political figures in this strategic choice. His return means, from a regional perspective, the reintegration of Iraq into an advanced position in the Iranian influence project, at a time when the region is trying to redefine its balances. This positioning is not limited to foreign policy: it is reflected internally by the strengthening of forces linked to the Tehran axis to the detriment of the logic of the national state. 2. Potential escalation with the Gulf Since 2021, Iraq has initiated a gradual opening towards its Arab environment, particularly the Gulf, in an attempt to rebalance its regional relations. Al-Maliki's return threatens this process, both through political discourse and through fait accompli policies, which could lead to a cooling, or even a setback, in Arab relations. 3. Lebanese repercussions The impact of al-Maliki's return extends beyond Iraq's borders. It offers a renewed model of the 'weak state facing the strong militia', a scheme that forces allied with Iran in Lebanon rely on to justify the retention of weapons outside the state framework. Thus, any consolidation of this model in Baghdad translates into a strengthening of similar rhetoric in Beirut. Internationally – isolation and pressure 1. Tensions with Washington and the West Western capitals, starting with Washington, have a negative memory of al-Maliki's experience, whether in terms of governance, security management, or relations with armed factions. His return is not perceived as a positive factor, but as a source of concern, even if it were to be approached pragmatically. 2. Investor concern and decline in confidence At a time of reconstruction and economic diversification, Iraq needs a stable environment and clear rules. However, the return of the governance model associated with al-Maliki weakens confidence in political and legal stability, which directly affects investments and keeps the economy captive to rent-seeking and corruption. Return to pre-2014 Ultimately, the return of Nouri al-Maliki — or even the strengthening of his role — is equivalent to Iraq returning to the pre-2014 situation: a less balanced state, a heavier regional influence, weapons outside state control, and a paralyzed reform process. It is not the return of a man, but of a governance model that has demonstrated, through experience, its inability to build an inclusive and effective state. Between fragile security stability and an accumulation of political tensions, the question remains open: can Iraq bear the cost of repeating the same experience, or does the momentum for change expressed by the protests remain latent, awaiting a new opportunity?