The defeat of Viktor Orbán: a historic turning point in Hungary and Europe
The victory of Peter Magyar and his party “Tisza” marks a historic turning point in the Hungarian political landscape, ending sixteen years of Viktor Orbán's rule and his Fidesz party. The elections were described as the most important in decades, not only because of the record popular turnout, but also because their outcome granted the opposition a two-thirds majority in parliament, enabling it to amend the constitution and roll back the illiberal policies Orbán had entrenched during his years in power.
The new president Magyar pledged to restore press freedom and reform state media, in a move aimed at dismantling the system of information control on which the previous regime had relied. The great surprise was Orbán's acknowledgment of defeat immediately after the results, without attempting to cling to power by force, which spared the country a political crisis or violent protests.
Causes of Defeat
The defeat was not born of a single electoral moment, but was rather the product of accumulated economic, social, and political pressures that had gradually eroded Orbán's legitimacy. Moreover, Magyar's organised campaign — he had previously been an ally of Orbán — succeeded in uniting the opposition behind a single figure capable of genuinely competing with Fidesz. Orbán's reliance on negative propaganda and fear-mongering had also ceased to convince voters and instead turned against him, as his messaging lost credibility in the face of a deteriorating economic reality.
1. Orbán's Rise and the Construction of the Economic Model
Since the crisis of 2008, Viktor Orbán built his popularity on a promise of economic prosperity and a "work-based society," with a focus on job creation and making citizens more self-reliant. This model rested on low-wage foreign investment, attracting foreign companies to employ local labour at reduced salaries with the aim of lowering production costs and increasing the country's competitiveness on global markets. While this model does generate employment, it leaves the national economy fragile before global crises and limits the capacity to improve living standards.
2. Economic Stagnation and the Decline of the Model
Orbán's successes in raising employment slowed markedly after the Covid pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, exposing the fragility of the economic model on which his years of rule had depended. Hungary, which had prided itself on high employment rates in the previous decade, found itself from 2022 onwards facing a harsh economic reality: near-zero growth and the highest inflation in the European Union, directly affecting citizens' daily lives through rising prices and a decline in purchasing power. Yet the crisis was not merely economic; it deepened into a profound social and political crisis. Citizens felt that Orbán's promises of building a "work-based society" were no longer achievable in the face of global crises and market pressures.
3. Erosion of Popular Support and Ethical Crises
Despite the high voter turnout, Fidesz's electoral base shrank from 3.1 to 2.3 million voters, a clear indicator of the erosion of public trust in Orbán and his party. This decline was not simply a natural consequence of economic factors; it was compounded by ethical and political crises that damaged the party's image, most notably scandals involving the cover-up of child sexual abuse cases, which undermined the party's legitimacy and its capacity to present itself as the guardian of traditional values. Frustration grew over pervasive corruption and the glaring social inequality highlighted by images of the lavish palaces owned by the ruling elite, in contrast with the hardships endured by the middle and working classes, widening the gulf of trust between the people and the government. All of this contributed to the rise of his rival Peter Magyar, who was able to capitalise on the general loss of confidence and present himself as a more upright and competent alternative.
4. Cultural Discourse and External Admiration
In the face of internal decline, Orbán attempted to compensate through nationalist and cultural discourse by means of what are known as the "culture wars," directing attention towards questions of identity and the defence of the nation against "globalism." He portrayed the European Union, international financial institutions, and liberal organisations as "globalist" forces threatening Hungary's identity and culture, focusing on border protection, rejection of European migration policies, and the assertion of "traditional values" against what he regarded as a deconstruction of family and society.
Yet despite his anti-globalisation rhetoric, his economic model depended on foreign investment — German car manufacturers, Chinese battery factories — making him vulnerable to global fluctuations. That is to say, while presenting himself as a leader resisting the "liberal globalisation" imposed by Brussels and the West, he had in practice bound the Hungarian economy to globalisation.
In foreign policy, Orbán leaned closer to Russia, opposing European Union policies toward Ukraine, and became a symbol of alliances hostile to Western globalisation. He also received direct support from Trump, who saw in him a model for populist nationalism opposed to liberal globalisation. He consequently became an icon of the global populist right, a star of conservative conferences around the world — such as the Conservative Political Action Conference, where he presented himself as a "David" resisting a "Goliath of globalisation." This American annual conference, attended by Donald Trump as its headline figure, became a platform for the global export of conservative populist discourse, particularly after a version of it was hosted in Hungary, being cited across Europe and Latin America as a source of inspiration for the nationalist right.
Yet this right-wing populist identitarian cultural discourse, which had previously been an effective instrument for mobilising support, was no longer sufficient in the face of economic deterioration and degraded public services. Voters had become more preoccupied with rising prices and declining living standards than with nationalist slogans.
Meanwhile, nationalist leaders across Europe and the United States continued to extol Orbán as a symbol of resistance to globalisation, regarding his experiment as a model for confronting "global threats." But this external admiration remained detached from Hungary's internal reality, changing nothing in the daily suffering of its citizens or in the decline of their trust in the system.
5. International Repercussions
These results represent a blow to the nationalist and divisive discourse of which Orbán had been the standard-bearer, and reveal the limits of this model's effectiveness, particularly in Europe. Russia is among the biggest losers, having lost its most powerful voice within the European Union in what concerned the obstruction of aid to Ukraine. The United States under the Trump administration has lost a prominent ally in Europe, despite its attempts to support Orbán before the elections. China, as usual, watches with caution, having invested heavily in Hungary's electric vehicle sector; its interests may be affected should Magyar recalibrate his orientation to strengthen ties with the European Union.
Perhaps the biggest loser is the global populist right, particularly its allies in France: Marine Le Pen and her Rassemblement National, and Éric Zemmour with his Reconquête party. Among the other major losers are the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland, Nigel Farage and the Reform Party in the United Kingdom, former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.
But the greatest winners are, first and foremost, the Hungarian people, who expressed their rejection of corruption and authoritarianism, alongside the European Union, which has recovered a partner more aligned with its orientations, and Ukraine, which may now find it easier to secure support within the Union following the retreat of pro-Russian influence.
The recent Hungarian elections were not merely an internal change of power, but a global message against right-wing populism and corruption, and a blow to Russian and American attempts to influence Europe. Orbán's experiment reveals the limits of "pro-worker conservatism": it succeeds when it delivers tangible economic promises, but collapses when tested by global crises. The elections also demonstrated the limits of "informational authoritarianism": when the economy deteriorates and the opposition unites behind a strong alternative, instruments of disinformation and propaganda become less effective and lose their capacity to determine outcomes. Orbán's fall was not solely the result of his authoritarianism or cultural discourse, but of the failure of his economic model and the erosion of ethical trust in his party.
The experience reveals that regimes dependent on the control of information are not impregnable, and that they collapse when they lose credibility before economic and political crises. Magyar's success, for its part, reflects the inclination of voters toward a more capable, moderate centrist alternative, gathering both centre and liberal left, even though he is conservative and shares some of Fidesz's policies. Magyar therefore does not represent a radical shift in public policy so much as a declaration that Orbán's era has exhausted its momentum. The challenge before Magyar remains that of achieving genuine reforms capable of rebuilding public trust, without losing the support of voters who were originally part of Fidesz's base.