Articles

As negotiations on the American-Iranian front stall and security incidents multiply in the Gulf, Lebanese authorities stand out with a clearly sovereigntist strategic vision, while at the same time a military escalation occurred at the end of the week with a bombing of the southern suburb and an Iranian threat against Israel. "Lebanon is our country, not yours." These words spoken by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun during a widely-followed interview with CNN's renowned journalist Christiane Amanpour on Friday not only marked the week that just ended in Lebanon, but certainly reinforce the trend toward a clear shift in official discourse in the direction of the sovereigntist message that was central to the head of state's inauguration speech. President Joseph Aoun's sharp criticism of the Iranian regime and Hezbollah prompted violent attacks from certain Iranian media outlets against Baabda. Parallel to this verbal escalation, the week ended with a serious military development. In response to rocket fire launched by Hezbollah toward northern Israel, the Hebrew state's air force carried out three raids on Sunday afternoon against an operations center of the pro-Iranian party in the southern suburb. Recall that following recent intervention by President Donald Trump aimed at preventing, just days ago, a massive attack on the southern suburb, in exchange for a halt to Hezbollah's fire against Israel, Israeli leaders had warned that the southern suburb would be bombed if the Shiite party launched rockets against northern Israel. Yet at the end of the week, Hezbollah resumed its fire against Israeli territory, which prompted Sunday afternoon's retaliation that killed two (Hezbollah operatives) and wounded eleven. Tel Aviv was to indicate in the evening that it had warned Washington in advance of its decision to launch a raid against an office of the pro-Iranian organization. In fact, President Trump was to declare Sunday night that he supported Israeli attacks against Hezbollah, emphasizing that the United States was ready to help the Israeli army launch "a well-targeted attack against Hezbollah," specifying on this matter that he was prepared to ask Syrian President Ahmed Chareh to provide assistance to any operations against Hezbollah. Following the triple raid on the southern suburb, the Iranian regime openly threatened to launch missiles against Israel. To which Israeli leaders responded that if Iran attacks Israel, it risks relaunching the Iranian war. The sovereigntist positions of the regime Returning to the Lebanese authorities' condemnation of the Islamic Republic's attitude toward Lebanon, the remarks made by President Aoun to CNN were preceded by an equally sharp speech by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam at the launch of an appeal for international aid for those displaced from conflict zones in Lebanon. Mr. Salam notably emphasized on this occasion that "Lebanon cannot be a card in anyone's hands." Mr. Salam was referring to the Lebanese authorities' choice to launch direct negotiations with Israel starting in early April, rather than having the Lebanese issue integrated into Iranian-American negotiations, as the Shiite parties wish. These statements may be nothing new in themselves: since his election, Joseph Aoun has repeatedly emphasized his desire for a monopoly on weapons in the hands of the state, which must necessarily pass through the disarmament of the Hezbollah militia, and he is supported in this by the head of government. However, his determination to free Lebanon from Iranian influence has never appeared as clear and resolute as during this highly-watched interview on an American television channel. The Lebanese president directly attacked Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which were the first to reject a framework agreement on a ceasefire in Lebanon, obtained during the Lebanese-Israeli meeting of June 2-3 in Washington. Unsurprisingly, these remarks drew the ire of not only Shiite parties on President Aoun, but also certain Iranian media outlets. Notable was the jab launched by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, advising the Lebanese president to "save Lebanon from its real enemy," namely Israel, arguing that "it is not his country that occupies one-fifth of Lebanon" currently. Mr. Araghchi conveniently omits to mention that it was the front opened by Hezbollah in support of Iran against the Israeli-American attack of February 28 that plunged Lebanon into this new deadly conflict and brought about a new Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. The Failed Ceasefire The statements by Lebanese leaders further deepened internal divisions with the pro-Iranian camp. And it was not only public declarations that provoked the ire of this camp: the aforementioned meetings of June 2-3 in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli delegations under American sponsorship drew harsh responses from the Lebanese executive on the domestic front. From Hezbollah of course, notably through its Secretary General Naim Qassem, who called it a "capitulation," but especially from Parliament Speaker and Amal leader (the other component of the Shiite duo), Nabih Berry, previously seen as a potential proponent of a differentiated position from his pro-Iranian ally. The latter vehemently attacked the agreement, deeming it "rigged" and "unjust." The reason both parties were so virulent is that the statement following this agreement took the form of a joint Lebanese-Israeli-American communiqué. And it is not just the form: in substance, the three parties condemn Iranian attacks on Gulf countries and consider that Hezbollah must halt its operations first in this ongoing confrontation in the south. In any case, this agreement was quickly undermined, not only by Hezbollah's negative response to President Aoun, but also by an evident lack of Israeli willingness to end the fighting. Does Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have an interest in showing conciliation on this front if Hezbollah continues its attacks, especially as his disagreements with the American president come out into the open and he prepares for future elections in his country? In any event, despite ongoing negotiations, note that the intensity of fighting has not diminished in south Lebanon, on either side. Worse still, Hezbollah has resumed striking northern Israel (something it appeared to have renounced just days earlier). Israel, for its part, no longer hesitates to target the Lebanese military: it has done so more than once this week, notably in a deadly attack on Saturday, during which two officers and a soldier were killed in a military vehicle on a road in Nabatieh. Reopening of Qlayaat Airport For all these reasons, the declarations hostile to Iranian interference from Presidents Aoun and Salam seem like seeds sown for the future that struggle to germinate in a hostile environment. Even the declarations from the American president, who has repeatedly claimed to have "spoken to Hezbollah" (which many experts doubt, favoring the theory of third-party intervention, particularly Iranian), could embarrass Lebanon's official position. However, reality is more nuanced. Mr. Aoun's remarks have garnered support from several Arab countries, such as Bahrain. On social media, reactions are deeply divided, but the president is seen by many as embodying an unprecedented determination to "free" the country from all foreign interference. In short, the country appears torn between two powerful currents, walking a tightrope toward an uncertain future. But the camp opposed to Iranian control scored another point this week. On Saturday, the reopening of Qlayaat airport in Akkar, a region in the north that has become synonymous with neglect and underdevelopment, painted an entirely different picture of the country. Why is the reopening of this airport symbolic of emancipation? Because the prospect of a second airport in Lebanon has repeatedly been blocked by a Hezbollah veto and that of its allies, and governments aligned with it have never dared to pursue it. Indeed, Beirut airport, located in the southern suburbs (a stronghold of the yellow party), was under the unofficial control of the Shiite party, and any other infrastructure in a region not aligned with it would have escaped its control. This explains the enthusiasm for images of Saturday's inauguration, with the Prime Minister's arrival in a private plane landing on the runway. Images that were felt as a symbol of genuine change. Lastly, note the visit made by Lebanese army commander-in-chief Rodolphe Haykal this weekend to Pakistan, the country playing the primary mediator role between the United States and Iran. Meanwhile, on the Iranian-American front American-Iranian negotiations, in fact, appeared to stall throughout this week. Donald Trump's statements about an imminent deal (balanced by his threats of another attack) continued with the same regularity but without achieving breakthroughs. For their part, the Iranians continue to systematically deny any statement from the American president. In either case, words commit the region to no significant progress. This gray zone that is settling in coincides with the imminent start of a global sporting event that risks permanently diverting attention from the ongoing Middle East conflict: the FIFA World Cup, taking place partly in the United States… and in which the Iranian team is participating. The team is expected to play its first match in Los Angeles, and the players obtained their U.S. visas this week. Faced with this political stalemate, the situation on the ground is heating up increasingly. Clashes between the Revolutionary Guards and the American military are multiplying in the Strait of Hormuz, which remains partially closed. American strikes on Iran's Qeshm Island notably prompted an Iranian response, clearly directed mainly at Gulf states. Most notably, the strike on Kuwait airport Tuesday killed one person and wounded 63 others, some critically. It should also be noted that the situation in the West Bank and Gaza escalated this week as well, with several attacks on the strip causing numerous deaths. In the West Bank, abuses against the Palestinian people, especially by settlers often aided by soldiers, are multiplying. Such episodes of violence are raising tensions within Israel. On Sunday, gunfire was heard simultaneously in four Israeli regions, and the military said it was facing an "incident" that left one dead and several wounded. One attacker was killed and another arrested.

The Strait of Hormuz has held the world up to a magnifying mirror of its own contradictions, much as the Covid-19 crisis did, or the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Modern prosperity rests on global stability and the free flow of material exchanges — maritime routes, molecules, cables, ports, interest rates — within a globalisation built on the economy of contemporary reality. Faced with an energy crisis, reactions now follow a familiar pattern: rising oil prices make renewable energy more attractive, soaring gas prices heighten the importance of safer routes, and notions of reclaimed sovereignty reassert themselves in public debate. This logic is not wrong, but it is simply incomplete. With the Hormuz crisis, globalisation enters a phase of progressive foundering, its liquidity dissolving into the labyrinths of shifting sands. States that simultaneously wish to rearm, decarbonise, protect their social model, fund an ageing population, invest in artificial intelligence, support their industry and reduce their debt find themselves trapped in a context of sluggish growth and shrinking budgetary margins, amid structural collapses that have brought Europe — once hailed as the “heart of the world” — closer to third-world conditions, as the chapter of its cultural progressivism and intellectual authority draws to a close. To this is added the melancholy disillusionment over the fall of the American dream once proclaimed by the celebrated Declaration of Independence of 1776, while democratic spaces dissolve into voids and political populisms. The private sector and civil society cannot substitute for the state when it comes to bearing political or strategic risks, nor can they alone shoulder the task of returning to a more satisfactory state of affairs. Stability, in reality, comes only after risk disengagement carried out by the public sector, not in its place. The equation is formidable: the more dangerous the world becomes, the more indispensable investments in sovereignty grow — yet these require states endowed with intellectual, political, financial and social solvency, at the very moment when the multiplication of crises renders those same states more fragile. The global public service is disintegrating — shared debts, trimmed ambitions — the solutions are known, and so are the disagreements. The strait crisis represents not merely a shock to hydrocarbon prices, an inflation of freight costs, disruptions to supply chains and industrial overheads; it also lays bare the shock sustained by modern societies’ capacity to adapt to conflicts and collapses within the “Tower of Babel” of geopolitical fractures, as well as the threat posed by a minority of billionaires who present themselves as superior and all-powerful, capable of bringing the world to heel in pursuit of inordinately cultivated interests, without bearing the slightest moral cost. Hamlet , Shakespeare’s masterpiece devoted to the mercurial prince, seems to be living through a singularly chosen moment. The fictional tale of loss that inspired the creation of Hamlet — a character at once pragmatic and unattainably ideal — is perfectly suited to our age, where the torrent of bad news ceaselessly fuels existential questionings, and people are exhausted by the relentless cascade of the world’s calamities. How can this man of multiple inner dissonances find his place in a world that persists in misunderstanding him, in recasting his anxieties as simplified narratives, in confronting him with complicity in a failing political system so closely akin to our own that it generates a pervasive, generalised sadness? The world perceives all too clearly that everything Donald Trump wants amounts, in essence, to: “Take this thing and do with it as you please.” Each day he exhibits his facetious gesticulations, addressing his audience directly with a theatrical steadiness that carries considerable weight. And this manner of being instils in the world a persistent unease — a president hyperconnected on his Truth Social platform, posting almost every hour a statement that sets the entire world in motion, things that are difficult to decipher. The world’s rhythm now turns on the narratives surrounding America and Iran: are they drawing closer to a deal, or perhaps not; the agreement with Iran is largely concluded and will be announced soon, or there is no urgency to announce any deal, and indeed there may be no deal at all. These are but a sample of Trump’s bewildering messages. Yet it does appear that the warring parties are genuinely approaching an understanding, even if it will not be a comprehensive agreement bringing the war to a definitive end. At best, it would likely take the form of a provisional accord around a set of general principles — an extension of the ceasefire for at least sixty days — affording time to negotiate the modalities of implementing those principles, with negotiators still needing to work through the details. Every detail, every word of a declaration of intent will carry weight and be scrutinised closely. But what matters most will depend on what happens thereafter. Iran wants at all costs to avoid the scenario of a provisional and fragile agreement that its adversaries might use to prepare for a war that Trump will in all likelihood not launch again after the end of the World Cup, and just weeks before the midterm elections. But can Iran obtain from the United States a commitment that Israel will also be bound by the agreement? That is far from certain. The Iranian regime may well have survived the war. The Revolutionary Guards have consolidated their grip on power and demonstrated to the United States, Israel and the Gulf states that a large-scale war was insufficient to make them yield, let alone to bring them down. They have discovered that closing the Strait of Hormuz amounted to a deterrent nearly equivalent to a nuclear weapon, and they now intend to levy tolls on it to compensate for the damage caused by the conflict. But who will verify compliance? And what will become of the existing nuclear installations? These will be long and complex nuclear discussions, bearing notably on Iran’s stockpile of more than four hundred kilograms of enriched uranium. America has long demanded its transfer abroad, while Iran insists on diluting it on its own soil. Mr Trump has hinted that he might accept the latter option, perhaps under the supervision of an “Atomic Energy Commission”, without making clear whether he meant the American body of that name — dissolved in 1974 — or the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog. The most contentious issue remains Iran’s demand for substantial economic benefits. The regime hopes to recover promptly a portion of its assets, estimated at one hundred billion dollars, frozen in foreign banks. American officials say they are prepared to grant a waiver allowing Iran to export some of its oil, but refuse any direct release of funds until definitive progress has been made. Meanwhile, the theocratic regime is already counting on everything it might hope to obtain, beginning with the reconstruction of its ballistic missile programme and its militias through the billions that will flow into its coffers with the potential lifting of sanctions under a final agreement — which would only complicate an already heavily burdened situation further. Troubling situations, or at least near-troubling ones: a war partially lost, partially missed, a war for nothing or only in order to gain nothing. A war in which losses and gains prove insufficient to justify the contest, and which above all leaves everything far below the previous status quo. This is the political fear of leaving the Gulf states and the region in a state of shock, with morale at its lowest, threatening political regimes unaccustomed, on one side or the other, to cohabiting with instability — beneath the watchword of “peace through strength”, supposedly extending to an entirely new Middle East. And if confidence has not disappeared but has simply deserted the Middle East region through the American desire to occupy every space within nautical miles of China, to control every scenario, to reduce everything to a narrative, and where every promise is perceived as designed to be traded — then the world must stop searching for absolute trust. The next two years will be decisive in terms of the capacity to remain in the global game industrially, technologically and geopolitically. Everyone will arrive with their own pressures, fears and national priorities, at the very moment when the world must think collectively to settle the bill of a time that keeps passing.

Pakistani diplomacy is active on two fronts, Lebanese and Iranian, with the official visit of the commander-in-chief of the army, General Rodolphe Haykal, to Islamabad, and that of Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi to Tehran. Though different, both missions are part of sustained efforts to restore calm in the region. The Lebanese army announced Saturday the departure of its commander for Islamabad, at the invitation of his Pakistani counterpart and the defense minister, without specifying the purpose of the visit. Because of friction between Beirut and Tehran, exacerbated by Wednesday's Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire agreement, all signs point to General Haykal's trip to Islamabad as part of Pakistan's mediation efforts between the United States and Iran. And for good reason: the Hezbollah file is among the points of contention between Washington and Tehran. Concerned with preserving its influence in Lebanon, which it considers a satellite state, the Islamic Republic has no intention of relinquishing this trump card for its upcoming negotiations with Washington. It demonstrated this once again when it openly contested Thursday the ceasefire agreement, which is nonetheless a Lebanese sovereign decision. Iranian opposition, echoed by Hezbollah in rejecting the agreement in turn, complicates the implementation of the document. Three Lebanese soldiers killed in the south Besides, the ceasefire, dependent on the pro-Iranian formation ceasing fire against Israel, is still forthcoming. The war continues at the same pace since Wednesday in southern Lebanon, where Israel says it struck "approximately 150 Hezbollah targets" in 48 hours. Three Lebanese soldiers were also killed Saturday in an Israeli strike between Khardali and Nabatiyé. Strongly condemned by Lebanese authorities, this unjustified attack is under investigation in Tel Aviv, according to the Israeli military spokesperson, who mentioned the possibility of an error related, according to him, to "a movement that was deemed suspicious near a combat zone." This attack was immediately exploited by Hezbollah, still lacking arguments to justify the destructive adventure it has dragged Lebanon into. According to it, the raid that killed a brigadier general, a captain, and a soldier "is the consequence of the government's disregard for sovereignty, as well as its gratuitous concessions." This baseless accusation, tinged with bad faith, follows the criticism leveled by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi against President Aoun. The latter had condemned Friday, in a CNN interview, Tehran's destabilizing role in Lebanon. "Based on Mr. Aoun's statements, one might think it is Iran that occupied a fifth of Lebanon, displaced a quarter of Lebanese citizens, and bombs its country daily," Araghchi responded on X. "If Lebanon had been a bargaining chip for Iran, we would have concluded an agreement long ago. Save Lebanon from your true enemy, Mr. President," added the minister who, equally acting in bad faith, merely focuses on the consequences of actions for which his country is directly responsible. His misplaced remarks directed at the head of state sparked indignant reactions in Lebanon, where MP Ghayath Yazbek (Lebanese Forces) ironically asked the Iranian minister to leave Lebanon alone. "Thank you, Mr. Araghchi. We relieve you of your concern for Lebanon. Go sign an agreement with Washington and let us live in peace," he wrote on X, before comparing Iran to an "arsonist firefighter." "Your state made it the symbol of its foreign policy, based on bad neighborliness, sabotage, and the export of chaos and provision of its services," he added. Targeting of Bahrain and Kuwait This accusation comes just hours after new Iranian strikes, during the night of Friday to Saturday, against Bahrain and Kuwait, which have stated they reserve the right to defend their respective countries. The Iranian attack followed strikes by the American military, which on Friday shot down six of the seven ballistic missiles and Iranian drones launched toward the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf's Arab allies. The seventh did not reach its target, according to Centcom, which also said it struck back at radar sites, including an island in the strait, 'to defend against further attacks.' It is against this backdrop of renewed tensions that Pakistan's Interior Minister, Mohsin Naqvi, traveled to Tehran on Saturday, carrying, according to pan-Arab media, new American proposals relating notably to the unfreezing of Iranian assets, on which the Islamic Republic is insisting. Opening of Qlayaat Airport On another front, Lebanon launched on Saturday the development and operation project of Qlayaat Airport in Akkar, at an official ceremony held in the presence of the head of government, Nawaf Salam, and numerous officials. The airport symbolically received its first aircraft. The significance of this project is not merely socio-economic. It is also political insofar as the inauguration of René Moawad Airport marks another step toward freeing Lebanon from Hezbollah's grip. The latter, along with its allies in Lebanon, opposed it for various reasons. Hezbollah had managed to maintain an active presence at Beirut's only international airport, which was of paramount strategic importance to it, particularly given its geographic location. Beirut International Airport is located in its stronghold, the southern suburbs of Beirut. It suffices to recall that this organization carried out its coup in Beirut in May 2008, when the government of Fouad Siniora attempted to reduce its influence within the state by dismissing the head of airport security, Wafic Choucair, and dismantling his communications network.

What would an indicted or accused person not do to save his own skin? Brought before a court of law for crimes against humanity or war crimes, what would a former Syrian mukhabarat officer not say if called upon to answer for his misdeeds? The Fingernails Torn from the Children of Daraa The first defendant to appear before the “Damascus Trials” was Atef Najib. We followed his testimony on social media: he answered the Criminal Court’s questions in a cold and detached tone, as though he had no concern for the fate of the teenagers whom he had consigned to the worst forms of torment. To be sure, he acknowledged the facts for what they were: around fifteen schoolboys who had scribbled anti-Assad slogans on the walls of their school had been detained for more than a month and subjected to severe abuse, including beatings and the tearing out of their fingernails. That said, Atef Najib vehemently denied any direct or personal involvement in the inhumane treatment inflicted upon these young people. To extricate himself, he invoked the responsibility of other agencies charged with repression. In essence, the torture suffered by these schoolchildren was not, he claimed, the result of his own initiative but rather of a broader “chain of command.” In effect, he was saying: what could I do if that was how the Syrian security services functioned collectively and hierarchically? Shifting Responsibility: A Recurring Defense Mechanism Deflecting blame onto a “higher or diffuse authority,” or onto the system itself, is a classic maneuver used to exonerate oneself or dilute personal culpability. Yet international courts are well aware of this recurring defense strategy, which seeks to place responsibility on the hierarchy. Nevertheless, by invoking—rightly or wrongly—the instructions he allegedly received, Atef Najib effectively called upon the highest levels of the state, where decision-making power resided, to assume responsibility. Ultimately, the issue will arise even more sharply when General Khardal Ayoub appears in court, given his alleged involvement in the chemical attack on Eastern Ghouta in 2013. The Yamashita Standard In international criminal law, command responsibility is also known as the Yamashita standard, named after the Japanese general who was prosecuted and executed for crimes committed by troops under his command during the Second World War. Military leaders have a duty to supervise and restrain their forces. This is by no means a recent concept: it was established by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and has since been continually updated and reaffirmed. To exculpate himself, the deposed Syrian president Bashar al-Assad cannot plausibly argue that he was unaware of a chemical weapons attack launched by subordinates, whether generals or ordinary soldiers, nor that he had issued no specific instructions to that effect. Under the aforementioned doctrine, as commander-in-chief he bears criminal responsibility whenever “he knew—or should have known—that crimes were being committed and failed to take the necessary measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.” Edgar Morin and Repentance Edgar Morin, the sociologist and anti-Nazi activist, has recently passed away. A Sephardic Jew, he did not advocate revenge against the “architects of the Final Solution.” His deeply humanistic outlook is revealed in a text devoted to the memory of the Holocaust, in which he wrote: “I am among those who await the repentance of the wicked. I am among those who have never confined a man who has committed a crime within the all-encompassing concept of ‘criminal.’” Yet granting forgiveness does not mean consenting to oblivion or concealment. Justice must first be done. It would not be equitable if, in Syria, only Atef Najib and Khardal Dayoub were made to pay the price in place of fugitives sheltering in Moscow. Transitional justice is indeed a prerequisite for national reconciliation. But there can be no true justice so long as Bashar, Maher, and the members of the Syrian high command have not appeared before courts of law—and so long as they have not stood in the dock to hear the verdict condemning them.

This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous seven instalments offered a reassessment of the events surrounding the rise of Hezbollah’s power, from the Taif Agreement to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollahland in the South and the eruption of the 33-Day War in July 2006, which was initiated by Ali Larijani.. The 2006 War in Gaza Hezbollah’s cross-border military operation, dubbed “True Promise,” along the Blue Line had a dual objective: to open a second front to relieve pressure on Gaza and, above all, to divert attention from Iran’s nuclear dossier. Israel’s military campaign in Gaza during June and July 2006 was codenamed “Summer Rains.” It was launched on June 28, exactly two weeks before the outbreak of war in Lebanon, following the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas on June 25. The operation marked Israel’s first large-scale ground incursion into the Palestinian enclave since its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 under a plan known as the “Disengagement.” The two conflicts – in Gaza and Lebanon – therefore unfolded simultaneously during the summer of 2006. Operation Summer Rains reached its peak on July 12, when Israeli forces advanced into central Gaza – the very day Hezbollah launched its attack on Israel, triggering a devastating war. In this kind of geopolitical context, coincidences are rarely just that. The simultaneous opening of the two fronts was widely interpreted by observers as a coordinated strategic maneuver involving Iran and Hamas on one side, and Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on the other, aimed at advancing Tehran’s regional interests. General Qassem Soleimani, then commander of the Quds Force (killed on the orders of Donald Trump on January 3, 2020, shortly after leaving Baghdad airport), confirmed years later that he himself had entered Lebanon through Syria at the outset of the conflict to oversee operations alongside Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, who was killed by Israel in September 2024, and Imad Mughniyeh, the group’s military chief and a close personal friend. Mughniyeh had been trained by Iranian officers from the early 1980s. Over the years, he became Hezbollah’s principal liaison with Iran for “special operations” abroad. Experts have noted that he had “one foot in Hezbollah and the other in Iran.” He often bypassed his own chain of command, reporting directly to and receiving instructions from the Quds Force. Fluent in Persian, he frequently travelled using Iranian diplomatic documents. Many of the major operations attributed to him – including the Buenos Aires bombings of 1992 and 1994 and support for Shiite militias in Iraq during the 2000s – were reportedly carried out at Tehran’s direct request. “Operation True Promise” On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol consisting of two armored Humvee vehicles travelling along the road that runs parallel to the border fence on the Israeli side of the frontier. The group used explosive devices and anti-tank missiles to disable the vehicles. At the same time, it unleashed a barrage of rockets and mortar rounds on several communities in northern Israel, as well as Israeli military positions across the border, in an effort to overwhelm communications and divert the attention of the Israeli command. A Hezbollah commando unit then crossed the border fence, attacked the Humvees, and initially killed three Israeli soldiers, capturing two others, who were later confirmed dead. Three more Israeli soldiers inside the armored vehicles were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire. Immediately after the kidnapping of the two servicemen, a Merkava tank crossed the border in pursuit of the abductors, and drove straight into a powerful mine laid by Hezbollah, which destroyed the vehicle and killed all four crew members instantly. Another Israeli soldier was killed by mortar fire while trying to recover the tank crew’s bodies. The operation, carried out with professional precision, prompted the Israeli government to declare war without delay. It marked the beginning of what became known as the 33-Day War. The ambush had been months in the planning, executed by Hezbollah’s elite unit with the assistance of officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC officers advised the leadership of the pro-Iranian militia on infiltration tactics, carefully concealed and covered by diversionary attacks along multiple sectors of the Lebanese-Israeli border. The commandos involved were members of the unit then known as the “Intervention Forces,” the future Radwan Unit. They had been trained by instructors from the IRGC’s Quds Force in ambush techniques and the use of anti-tank missiles. The operation was directed by Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated by Mossad three years later in Syria. “Operation Steel Web” Israel’s response took the form of a military campaign codenamed “Operation Steel Web,” launched in reference, among other things, to a speech delivered by Hassan Nasrallah, six years earlier, at the football stadium in Bint Jbeil, just 24 hours after the Israeli withdrawal on May 26, 2000. On that occasion, he had described Israel as being “weaker than a spider’s web.” The Israeli army carried out a massive multi-day air campaign targeting the entirety of Lebanese territory before launching a ground offensive in southern Lebanon against several towns and villages. The most significant objective was Bint Jbeil, a town of deep symbolic importance precisely because of Nasrallah’s famous speech. It was there, in particular, that the fiercest fighting took place. The Battle of Bint Jbeil The Israeli army encircled the town on July 24, twelve days into the fighting and the taking of Maroun el-Ras, a village located just southeast of Bint Jbeil. On July 25, an Israeli general declared total control of the town, even as resistance continued at the town center. On July 26, a unit from the Golani Brigade walked into the deadliest ambush of the conflict on the town’s outskirts. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded. Unable to secure the town center, Israel fell back on heavy airstrikes and artillery fire, reducing much of the built-up area to rubble. Bint Jbeil was defended by 150 fighters, including units of the Radwan Force (1) . Entrenched in bunkers and tunnels, they repelled multiple ground incursions attempts with anti-tank missiles and mortar fire. Hezbollah fighters deployed along the Bint Jbeil-Wadi al-Hujeir axis were, to the surprise of many observers, heavily equipped with precision anti-tank missiles, including Kornet systems in both Russian and Iranian variants, as well as Russian-made Metis missiles supplied by Syria and Iran. The toll from the Battle of Bint Jbeil was steep on the Israeli side: 17 soldiers killed, including at least two senior officers, and several Merkava tanks damaged by missile strikes. Hezbollah’s losses were even heavier: 60 fighters killed, including the sectors operations commander, along with the wholesale destruction of infrastructure and ammunition depots. Another battle that would define thiswar was that of Wadi al-Houjeyr (to be continued) . (1) Hezbollah’s elite offensive unit, specialized in commando operations and cross-border incursions into Israeli territory, the Radwan Fore is divided into two groups: one tasked with breaching the Lebanese-Israeli border, and the other with seizing strategic positions in northern Israel. In one of his speeches, Hassan Nasrallah had threatened to capture the Galilee, relying on this Radwan unit. Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (7) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (6) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

The declaration, described as 'historic,' resulting from Washington negotiations on Thursday, was followed on Friday by unprecedented and decisive statements from Lebanon's top leadership. Declarations that appear to accelerate momentum toward the full restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty in the face of Iran and its armed wing, Hezbollah. On Friday, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam issued stern warnings to Tehran, urging it to cease all interference in Lebanese affairs. 'This is not your country, it is ours (...) You have no right to intervene in our country,' President Aoun told Iran during an interview with CNN. The head of state also called on Hezbollah to prioritize dialogue. 'Hezbollah must understand that there is no solution other than to sit at the negotiating table. There is no other way to save what remains of the country except through negotiation and diplomacy,' he said. 'This is about the Lebanese people, not Naïm Qassem's people,' affirming that Naïm Qassem does not represent the Lebanese people, referring to Hezbollah's secretary general, who had rejected Thursday's Washington agreement. 'The majority of the Lebanese people are sick of war.' Addressing Israeli military operations, Joseph Aoun stated that Israel 'can destroy the entire country, but will never achieve its objective,' before adding: 'They tried in Gaza. Hamas still exists, doesn't it?' The Lebanese president also stated that 'a great opportunity' exists today to end the state of hostility between Lebanon and Israel, while emphasizing that the Hezbollah issue could only be resolved within a strictly Lebanese framework. Addressing Israeli authorities, he declared: 'You must show real willingness to end this war. We are ready, we have the will and commitment. And you?' For his part, Nawaf Salam urged Iran to stop using Lebanon as a 'bargaining chip' in its discussions with the United States aimed at ending the war in the Middle East. Tehran indeed demands that any agreement with Washington also include an end to hostilities on the Lebanese front and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who plays an intermediary role with Hezbollah, for his part, mentioned for the first time the possibility of the Shiite movement withdrawing from southern Lebanon, provided that Israel withdraws from Lebanese territory and a 'comprehensive and unconditional' ceasefire is reached. Echoing these statements, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said during a security cabinet meeting that he favored a diplomatic approach regarding Lebanon, while several ministers argued for an expansion of military operations, according to Israeli media. Netanyahu, however, indicated that the ceasefire agreement was not yet definitively finalized. Israel is conditioning its approval on maintaining a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and preserving its freedom of military action. These developments come as the new truce announced by Washington between Israel and Hezbollah already appears compromised. Recall in this regard that the joint U.S.-Lebanese-Israeli declaration concluding the fourth round of negotiations in Washington emphasizes that 'the future of relations between Israel and Lebanon must be decided by the two sovereign governments.' The three signatories also affirm their rejection of 'any attempt by a state or non-state actor to hold Lebanon hostage,' in a barely veiled allusion to Iran and Hezbollah. On the ground, the Israeli army continued its strikes in southern Lebanon after ordering the evacuation of about a dozen towns, maintaining military pressure on Hezbollah, which had rejected the agreement the day before. The Israeli army also carried out a strike at the entrance to Tyre. According to a civil defense source cited by AFP, bombardments on the city during the night of Thursday to Friday killed seven people and slightly damaged Jabal Amel Hospital. For its part, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for several attacks against Israeli forces deployed in part of southern Lebanon, without announcing any operations against northern Israel. Faced with the scale of destruction caused by the conflict, the UN more than doubled its appeal for humanitarian aid and is now seeking nearly $640 million for the next six months.