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Lionel Messi or the Re-enchantment of the World

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By Michel Hajji Georgiou
Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix , Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix , thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer . And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina . Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
Analyze

Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
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By Mona Fayad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
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The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
Opinion

Portents of an Israeli-Turkish Clash in Syria

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By Youssef Mouawad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 13:25
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In 2010, Israel violently intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship chartered by a humanitarian NGO to bring aid to the Gaza Strip, which was under Israeli blockade at the time. This was the last straw, and the incident brought the simmering hostility between Erdogan's government and the Jewish state out into the open. (AFP)
The war has not yet ceased in our south, and already it threatens to break out among our neighbors. In other words, we live on borrowed time, lurching from one conflict to the next. And for good reason! The bombing of a Syrian base very nearly escalated into an all-out clash between Ankara and Tel Aviv. That was on August 18, and Benjamin Netanyahu didn't mince his words: his country would not tolerate a Turkish military foothold that could spread into southern Syria. The warning was all the more forceful given that eight strikes had targeted the Abu al-Dhuhur air base, just 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. It's worth recalling, too, that since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Erdogan has become the chief mentor of the new Syria under Ahmed al-Sharaa, helping rebuild its armed forces and turning it into a strategic partner. This is no longer Hafez al-Assad's Syria Was it this renewed tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv that prompted a meeting between Syria's top diplomat, Assaad Chaibani, and Mossad chief Roman Gofman, in Jordan on August 23? Yet this quiet parley did not spark outrage across the Arab world the way Anwar al-Sadat's surprise visit to Israel did in 1977. A taboo was officially broken—and indeed, who would have imagined such talks taking place under the Baathist regime? Israel might have been expected to welcome this, but contrary to expectations, it halted neither its airstrikes nor its territorial incursions, as seen on August 27 in Quneitra. The fact is, things have changed. Under Hafez al-Assad, Syria was a regional power that, while not exactly formidable, was feared by its immediate neighbors, Arab or otherwise. No one wanted to pick a fight with it, which allowed it to pursue, within certain limits, an assertive foreign policy that often bordered on provocation. As a result, thanks to the autonomy it exercised and the room to maneuver it granted itself, Syria had become, at least geographically, a buffer zone between an "Erdoganist" Turkey flaunting its unabashed brand of Islam on one side, and Israel, a state Jewish to its core, on the other. But now, in a country worn down by Baathist mismanagement and ravaged by years of civil war, Turkey has begun staking its claims—and will inevitably find itself face to face with an Israel that occupies part of Syrian territory. What can we expect? Given the outsized egos of both Netanyahu and Erdogan, and assuming both leaders remain in power, we should brace for an epic showdown across Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, or even other territories. This will be a fight of feints and dodges, of underhanded tactics as well as head-on attacks, close combat, and rising tensions right up to the breaking point. And this despite a September 2025 report from the Congressional Research Service concluding that direct confrontation between Turkey and Israel remains unlikely, precisely because both states are well aware of the cost such a war would entail. Still, in the realm of conflict studies, leaders and other elites don't always act rationally! All the more so since, in the eyes of Israeli observers, the slogan now popular in Anatolia—"Make Turkey great again"—hardly reassures the Zionist state. Washington will find it increasingly difficult to contain or keep apart two adversaries already gearing up for battle. Turkey, the new Iran? Yes, that's one hypothesis, but only in a face-off with Israel, since Syria has overnight become a zone where 'two security perimeters overlap' — the Turkish and the Israeli, the Muslim and the Jewish. And it can't be ruled out that Shiite militancy, that mobilizer of "proxies," might end up allying itself, even if only temporarily, with a 'Muslim Brotherhood version' of political Islam championed by Ankara! So we would have, against all odds, a Hezbollah backed by its former enemy, Ahmad al-Sharaa, an Islamist who emerged from Jabhat al-Nusra and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham! Against a common adversary, a reversal of alliances is always legitimate and opportune. But this would only be a tactical alliance, dictated by the exigencies of the moment, one that couldn't presume anything about the future. With Arab nationalism now out of the picture, Turkey won't settle for economically capturing the Syrian market of 25 million consumers: it will want to wield political influence in Damascus, and to that end will deploy its military and security apparatus. Since the shaky power of the Syrian president can't fulfill certain sovereign functions or oversee the various branches of the state, it will inevitably turn to the expertise of its northern neighbor. Does this mean Turkey will get sucked into the spiral of 'announced belligerence'? Everything points that way, and we can already see the early signs of a spiral reminiscent of the US involvement in Vietnam under Lyndon Johnson. Indeed, if the Syrian state intends to rebuild itself, it will first need an army capable of quelling the centrifugal tendencies of the Alawites, the Druze, and other factions calling for the country's breakup. And it's up to Ankara to provide that and to bolster the central authority based in Damascus. But Israel, which has gotten into bad habits in Syria and intends to keep its freedom of aerial action there, cannot tolerate an army built along NATO lines that could serve as a proxy for a neo-Ottoman venture. And Lebanon, from primary stage to secondary stage? A new stage is now set for a new script that will define new rules of the game! What will become of Hezbollah, caught in a trap? Well, in that scenario, it could benefit, even if only partly, from Damascus's logistical support — support it has sorely lacked since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. And perhaps, through a shift in the tectonic plates, Lebanon would move from being the initial stage to being merely a secondary stage of a regional conflict. But frankly, that would do us a lot of good!
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Lebanon: When Geography Becomes a Liability

Lebanon: When Geography Becomes a Liability

By
Mona Fayad
Published

One increasingly hears voices lamenting their fate: why were we born in this corner of the world? For Lebanon's geographical position has placed it, today, in a situation that few would envy. Geography is not a blind destiny, and yet it constitutes a rigid framework that delimits the field of the possible and narrows the margin for error. In geopolitics, as Robert D. Kaplan reminds us in The Revenge of Geography , geography does not dissolve behind slogans; it reasserts itself whenever states choose to ignore it, and most acutely for small states situated on fault lines. Lebanon is one of them, caught between two powerful neighbours: one a vast military garrison housing one of the largest armies in the world, backed by the United States, and one that we helped restore to its occupation of Lebanon; the other having already exercised prolonged domination and a heavy-handed tutelage over Lebanon under the authoritarian Assad regime. Lebanon thus constitutes a glaring example of a country in which geographical position plays a decisive role. Its situation between Israel to the south and Syria to the east and north, along an open Mediterranean coastline, made it historically a space of transit and exchange rather than an arena of confrontation. Michel Chiha grasped this singularity early on: the narrowness of the coast, the elevation of the mountain and the absence of continental strategic depth push the Lebanese toward the sea — that is, toward trade, openness and mediation — rather than toward wars and conflicts. Our Phoenician history bears witness to this. In this sense, Lebanese geography was never designed for a military role, but for an economic and civilisational one. The dangerous turn came when Lebanon deviated from this vocation and allowed itself to be drawn gradually into regional conflicts that exceeded its capacities, transforming itself from a space of equilibrium into a theatre of confrontation. In this context, invoking a "curse of geography" amounts to a misreading of the situation. The problem does not lie in the position itself, but in the manner in which it is used. The geography that could have been a source of prosperity — as it was during a certain modern period — became a source of danger the moment it was used as a platform for other people's conflicts, and the moment the state lost its monopoly over the decision of war and peace. It is here that the Lebanese situation converges with a historical transformation that Alexis de Tocqueville had identified in Democracy in America . In the era of empires, small entities were easily absorbed; but with the emergence of concepts of sovereignty and the rights of peoples, and then with the appearance of an international order embodied in the United Nations, it became possible in principle to protect small states through legal rules and international resolutions. This transformation, however significant, did not abolish the logic of force; it reconfigured it. International law confers legitimacy but does not guarantee protection automatically. Small states are preserved not by texts alone, but when their stability becomes part of the interests of greater powers. This is why Lebanon's crisis appears in all its complexity: Lebanon enjoys full international recognition of its sovereignty, yet lacks the internal and external conditions that would render that sovereignty defensible. Foreign interference, direct and indirect, could not have succeeded without the internal fragility that made it possible — confessional sensitivities, a divided sovereign decision, the allegiance of certain local forces to regional axes — all of this within the context of an open conflict between Iran and Israel that is conducted in part on Lebanese soil. In this configuration, geography becomes a fatal vulnerability. A small state, geographically open, cannot afford a duality of decision, nor can it simultaneously be a party to a conflict and an entity seeking protection from it. The solution does not lie in denying geography, but in managing it with clear-eyed realism. And this requires a redefinition of Lebanon's vocation: from theatre of conflict to space of equilibrium, from instrument of external axes to a society in pursuit of common interest. Neutrality, in this perspective, is not a moral slogan but a conditional strategic choice. The experience of countries such as Switzerland and Austria has shown that neutrality rests upon three inseparable elements: a solid internal consensus, a unified national defence capability, and explicit international guarantees. Without these, neutrality becomes a vacuum that outside powers will not hesitate to exploit. Lebanon stands today at a crossroads: either it remains captive to its position as a front line, or it repositions itself as an entity whose stability proves indispensable to all. This requires recovering sovereign decision-making, unifying the security framework, and anchoring the country's stability to economic, regional and international interests that would make any destabilisation costly for all parties concerned. Lebanon's maritime facade could have meant trade, services and financial influence — as it did during the nineteen-sixties and the early seventies. Instead, it has become a country besieged, threatening and threatened, exposed to blows from all directions. Lebanon cannot change its geography, but it can change its position within that geography. And it is only there that geography ceases to be an imposed destiny and becomes a choice managed in the service of the national interest. One fundamental question remains: can Lebanon obtain an "international guarantee" that protects its neutrality without that neutrality becoming a form of tutelage? And what do we mean by "international guarantee"? Not a new mandate, nor foreign administration or dispossession of sovereignty, but an internationally recognised neutralisation and a collective commitment to refrain from using Lebanon as a battleground — which amounts to making Lebanese neutrality a common interest to which all parties subscribe. The evolution of the international environment lends credence to this model: the great powers no longer want permanent flashpoints in the Middle East; the Arab states are turning toward development, favouring de-escalation and reducing disorder; Europe, for its part, needs stability in the Middle East. All of this opens a window of opportunity for Lebanon to seize. The time has come for Lebanon to exit the cycle of conflicts, for the decision of war and peace to rest exclusively with the state, for it to serve as no axis's instrument, and for it to make its stability an interest for all rather than a burden on everyone. For our economy, our schools, the future of our children are not bargaining chips. We refuse to be instrumentalised — from whatever direction that instrumentalisation may come.

Two Affirmations Make a Nation

Two Affirmations Make a Nation

By
Ibrahim Shamseddine
Published

Among my distinguished colleagues gathered at this podium dedicated to the Lebanese Constitution, I am nothing but a novice in the company of experts; yet I am also a Lebanese citizen in a democratic and constitutional republic, sincerely and earnestly attached to his citizenship. I know my constitutional rights, hold fast to them, and refuse to surrender them to any confessional community or zaamat . For over the course of a hundred years, the one constant need expressed by the Lebanese citizen as an individual has been his need for the State, not for the sect, not for the zaim . The Blessed Patriarch Elias Howayek, who, together with his companions, kindled the flame of Greater Lebanon, gazes upon us now from a century's distance. His gaze carries within it what he sees: disappointment, bitterness, and sorrow. And with good reason: we celebrate the founder… while destroying what he and his companions built. No democratic state can be built without a constitution or a constitutional order, and if that constitution is not respected, the state collapses. Those who wrote the Constitution in 1926 and developed it in 1990 were neither incompetent nor ignorant nor half-educated. Their patriotism was neither deficient nor suspect, and they were not those courtiers who compose ornate and pedantic missives. The Lebanese Constitution is a rigorous text, drafted according to the principles and rules of constitutional science; it is the covenant of the Lebanese among themselves, not a favour bestowed by some upon others, and it is binding upon all without exception. As an expression of the Taif Agreement, it does not constitute a conjunctural necessity rendered obsolete by the passage of time; it has become, on the contrary, an essential component of Lebanon’s integrity and unity, and the Lebanese Republic built upon it is a homeland erected through consensus and consent, not through coercion, domination, or compulsion. The Taif Agreement has not failed for it to be set aside and abandoned. It simply has never been applied. I repeat constantly that the current formula concerning the completion of the implementation of the Taif Agreement is inaccurate, since it was quite simply never applied for its completion to be possible. We need neither a new Taif, nor a new constituent assembly, nor a vice-president of the Republic, nor enlargements and administrative additions to the Lebanese state. We need only to apply the Constitution in its entirety, to respect it, to revere it, and to rely upon it; and in cases of ambiguity, to call upon a solid Constitutional Council whose members are not politicians in search of an occupation. This Constitution, as a covenant, is the legal edifice that has embodied Lebanon’s subtle composition and the vital equilibrium that runs through it, for it regards the communities for what they are in themselves and not for their demographic weight and their number. It is from there that the balance between Muslims and Christians derives, and the balance within each of them as well, giving us a political regime that is, on one hand, civil in nature (that is to say, a civil state) and, on the other, preserves the balance between communities and within each of them. Consequently, this Constitution is the certain reference text for building the state and its institutions on sound foundations. It represents simultaneously the permanent and faithful roadmap for consolidating the political regime, stabilising it, and enabling its development. This Constitution needs to be applied in its entirety, in observance of the succession of legal timeframes its application requires. I am aware that there are, here and there among the Lebanese, those who sincerely wish to see the Constitution applied and call for it, while at the same time expressing reservations, equivocating, or fearing the activation of all its articles, sustained by a vague and obscure illusion that full application would not be in their favour. A partial constitution, a fragment of a constitution, builds no state and safeguards no homeland. I would not wish us to be among those whom the Quran reprimanded: “…Do you then believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part?…”, those very ones whom the righteous James, in his epistle in the New Testament, urged to observe the law in its entirety: “For whoever keeps the whole law and yet stumbles at just one point is guilty of breaking all of it.” It is time, after a hundred years, for us to take our destiny in hand, we the Lebanese, and to build a single unified state, resting on a single constitution, with a single reference authority and a single president — not three. It is the sincere and complete application of the Constitution, with the uncompromising resolve in that direction from truly honourable statesmen, that is capable of bringing arms under control before prohibiting them, of protecting the state from systematic pillage, and of shielding it from being reduced to a temple turned den of thieves. I return to the famous formula of Georges Naccache: “Two negations do not make a nation.” I depart from it partially, for the consensus on “neither East nor West” did indeed make a nation, or, more precisely, did indeed consecrate a nation. But I also endorse it broadly, for those two negations proved incapable, on their own, of preserving a homeland or of building a state that would endure and last: the state collapsed in internal wars, and those wars came close to sweeping away the homeland — and risk doing so still. The first Lebanese knew what they did not want from one another, without being certain of what they truly wanted from one another. We now know what we want from all Lebanese and what we ourselves are bound to as Lebanese, for the benefit of all Lebanese: to respect and apply Taif as it is embodied in the Constitution; to acknowledge that we are all Lebanese in a definitive homeland; that our shared and unified coexistence is our way of being in the world and our way of being Lebanese; that we have a just state as the embodiment of that coexistence; and that we are free within it, in a genuine and complete democracy. The Taif Agreement, as it has been embodied in the Constitution, has introduced us to two great positive virtues: the virtue of the democratic regime, and the virtue of the sincere participation of communities. It has also preserved us from two great vices: the vice of the despotic grip of communities over the state, and the vice of the monopolisation of power by a faction of a single community. Our failure to apply and respect it has plunged us into the first of these vices and nearly dragged us toward the second. Our Constitution belongs to all of us. It belongs to all our children. Let us not barter it away. *Speech delivered during a panel discussion on the centenary of the Lebanese Constitution at the Holy Spirit University of Kaslik on Wednesday, June 3, 2026, on the sidelines of the exhibition organized by the university for the occasion.

Washington: a tripartite statement of major historical significance

Washington: a tripartite statement of major historical significance

By
LevantTime .
Published

The fourth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations held Tuesday and Wednesday in Washington ended with a 'first': the publication, in the night from Wednesday to Thursday (Levant time) of a joint American-Lebanese-Israeli statement whose content itself constitutes another 'first'. Alongside the establishment of a ceasefire conditioned on the Hezbollah halting its fire against Israel and the creation of 'pilot zones' in the South under the sole control of the Lebanese army, the document emphasizes—and this is where the precedent lies—that 'the future of relations between Israel and Lebanon must be decided by the two sovereign governments'. The three signatory countries further emphasize that they reject 'any attempt by a state or non-state actor to hold Lebanon hostage.' The allusion to the Iranian regime and Hezbollah will not escape anyone's notice. And in a move whose historical significance appears undeniable, the signatory countries further add that 'Israel and Lebanon reaffirm that they have no hostile intentions toward one another and they commit to pursuing direct negotiations to build confidence'. Clearly, the statement notes that Iran is kept out of the current process initiated by Lebanon and Israel, under American auspices. Furthermore, this is the first time that Lebanon and Israel have affirmed in a joint statement that they have 'no hostile intentions toward one another.' The immediate consequence of the publication of this document: AFP reported late in the day that Hezbollah informed Lebanese authorities that it rejects the ceasefire with Israel. A position that clearly echoes a hostile reaction from the Iranian regime, which spares no effort to control the Lebanese landscape. Planned measures At the level of resolutions taken late Wednesday evening, the tripartite statement mentions the implementation of a ceasefire, conditional on Hezbollah stopping its attacks. The novelty of this text is the creation of pilot zones that will be under the sole control of the Lebanese army in the south. The statement emphasizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries and speaks of the dismantling of non-state armed groups, another jab at Hezbollah. The words 'comprehensive peace and sovereignty agreement' are explicitly mentioned. The two parties agreed on a new round of negotiations on June 22, with a view to reaching a 'comprehensive agreement'. This fourth round of negotiations was unprecedented in substance and form, due to practical measures aimed at demilitarizing Hezbollah on the one hand, and the reading of a joint statement on the other. The three Lebanese, Israeli, and American parties jointly condemned Iranian attacks against Gulf countries. In other words, both Hezbollah and Iran find themselves marginalized. During these negotiations, Israel insisted on the security of its territory and the necessity of disarming Hezbollah once and for all, while Lebanon called for respect of internationally recognized borders, which means a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese territory. The proximity of the next round testifies to the willingness for rapid progress between the two parties. The ceasefire, however, is not an absolute certainty given that several ceasefires had been decreed before this without results. Fighting on the ground in the south continues, but the capital and its suburbs remain spared for now. Following the meeting, Lebanon's ambassador Nada Hamadé Mouawad assured that 'this is a historic moment,' and that the achievements of these negotiations are due to 'the sole will of the sovereign Lebanese state'. Israeli Ambassador Yechiel Leiter, in a statement on the sidelines of the meeting, expressed conviction that "Hezbollah will have to understand that all this madness is over" and that the two states are gradually reaching an agreement. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated that "Hezbollah is the enemy of both parties." According to MTV reports from Baabda, negotiations were extremely difficult, and the head of the Lebanese delegation, Simon Karam, had to suspend talks in order to include a clause on a total ceasefire in Lebanon. Following an intervention by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, discussions resumed and yielded the results we now know. In an initial reaction to the negotiations, addressing journalists directly, Republic President Joseph Aoun stated that the ceasefire "could be implemented within 24 hours following its final approval." A first sign came with a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the village of Debbin, Marjeyoun, and their replacement by the Lebanese army. Aoun said he was awaiting responses from all parties and their commitment to making this truce succeed. He also informed his interlocutors that Lebanon proposed a first pilot zone in two strategic villages in the Nabatiyeh region, Zawtar el-Sharqiya and Zawtar el-Gharbiya. Hezbollah's Response Clearly, these advances are not welcome to everyone in Israel and Lebanon alike. In Tel Aviv, Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir called the ceasefire with Lebanon a "grave mistake." Defense Minister Israel Katz, for his part, assured that his country "will maintain freedom of movement in Lebanon," particularly in case of a Hezbollah attack. On the Iranian axis side, Esmaïl Qaani, commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, reiterated his country's support for "resistance in Lebanon," arguing that a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces to the point before this latest conflict is the least that should happen. Perhaps Mr. Qaani forgets that the Israeli army was already occupying five points on Lebanese territory before March 2... even as the Lebanese state is negotiating for a total withdrawal from the territory. As expected, the reaction of Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, in a speech Thursday, to this Lebanese-Israeli-American joint statement was particularly fierce. He described the ceasefire achieved by the Lebanese state as "fictitious," and direct negotiations as "pointless and humiliating." "If the objective of any agreement is to disarm Hezbollah, that means depriving Lebanon of all its cards of strength," he declared, adding that "this statement is a surrender and a call for internal discord." Noting that this text calls on Hezbollah to cease hostilities as a priority, Qassem declared that his movement "is only concerned with a total ceasefire and a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territories." The vehemence of this reaction is expected, given that the joint statement completely marginalizes the role of Hezbollah and Iran, even as the course of negotiations appears inevitable. How will Hezbollah react on the ground? In any case, as U.S. President Donald Trump himself said Thursday, efforts continue to separate the Iranian and Lebanese aspects. On the ground, fighting has not stopped. While it had given the impression the day before of avoiding strikes on northern Israel, Hezbollah apparently sent drones to the region again, even though it did not claim responsibility for attacks on Israel. Sirens sounded in northern Israel shortly after Qassem's speech, according to the Israeli military. It also continued its strikes in various regions of the south and issued a new call for the evacuation of all residents south of Zahrani (Sidon), well north of the Litani, the former demarcation line. Another serious development in the south: the death of a Blue Helmet in Marjeyoun, a UNIFIL soldier of Serbian nationality, following a missile strike on the organization's headquarters. UNIFIL condemned it as a 'deliberate attack' on its soldiers and called for an investigation to determine responsibilities. Several Blue Helmets have been killed and wounded during this conflict, some by Israeli fire and others by Hezbollah, according to the organization's own statements. Also note the visit to Lebanon by French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian, who met with several Lebanese figures on Thursday. French President Emmanuel Macron expressed hope that ongoing negotiations (in which France does not play a role) will lead to an effective ceasefire, and that his country 'remains available' according to AFP. The U.S. Congress On the U.S.-Iran front, the most dramatic development on June 4th is the resolution passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in favor of an immediate halt to the war in Iran, launched by U.S. President Donald Trump since February 28th. A decision made possible by 4 Republican representatives joining the Democratic bloc, but which is merely symbolic in scope. Congress essentially reproaches Trump for engaging in a war without a clear vision and without considering American interests. Under pressure (both internal and external, due to renewed attacks on Gulf countries, particularly Kuwait on Wednesday), Trump believed negotiations could be concluded this weekend. He reiterated that no agreement could be reached without Iran's complete delivery of enriched uranium to the United States. For his part, Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued a statement accusing the United States and Israel of attempting to sow discord, asserting that 'the enemy suffered a crushing defeat' in this conflict with his country. This inflammatory statement comes even as the U.S. President recently expressed his desire to meet with him, and continues to declare that Iran wants a deal and that negotiations have made significant progress. This type of Iranian denial has become routine whenever Donald Trump speaks. Finally, note a renewed surge in tensions in the Gaza Strip, where Israeli forces conducted intense bombing raids Wednesday night into Thursday on apartments, killing an entire family among others.

Trump, Obama… and the Iranian Trap

Trump, Obama… and the Iranian Trap

By
Khairallah Khairallah
Published

Which Donald Trump are we to believe, the one who understands, in his bones, what Iran represents under the regime established in 1979, or the one who seems to have drifted toward the illusions of Barack Obama, who was convinced that Tehran held the keys to every regional crisis and that its nuclear file contained them all? Obama went so far as to persuade himself that radical Shia Islam, embodied by the Revolutionary Guards and their proxies across the region, was fundamentally different from radical Sunni Islam, as represented by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and before as after them, the Muslim Brotherhood. He never grasped that religious fanaticism, in whatever form it takes, Christian, Islamic, Jewish, or Hindu, amounts to nothing more than different faces of the same coin. Trump's behavior over the past few days has given the impression of a man gripped by indecision. The American president appeared to be leaning, at least outwardly, toward a lopsided deal with a regime that is seeking to recapture the initiative in the region after discovering a new weapon: the Strait of Hormuz. All signs suggest that within the American administration, certain voices are pushing for an arrangement with the Iranian regime centered on reopening the strait, to be presented afterward as a personal victory for Donald Trump. The Iranian file is, admittedly, of extreme complexity, all the more so since Tehran has found this new card to play after having long relied on its nuclear program as the regime's first line of defense. What, then, will the American president do in the days and weeks ahead, as he continues to speak incessantly of “progress” in the negotiations with Iran, and even of the possibility of a meeting with “Supreme Leader” Mojtaba Khamenei, whose true state of health few people know, and whose actual capacity to govern the Islamic Republic remains, at a more fundamental level, an open question? The American president's talk of a possible “memorandum of understanding” with Iran is cause for serious concern at a time when the Islamic Republic has by no means abandoned its aggression toward neighboring states. The two most recent attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain have laid bare both Tehran's persistent belligerence and its inability to strike directly at the United States and Israel. None of this has been enough to prompt an American reassessment of the futility of any agreement with an Iran that deliberately targeted civilians at a Kuwaiti airport, so long as it has not renounced its expansionist project, a project it has still not accepted is now running into a dead end. Certainly, no Lebanese can do other than thank Trump for intervening to dissuade Benjamin Netanyahu from launching a new offensive on the southern suburbs of Beirut, with all the additional destruction that would have visited upon a Lebanese district adjoining the capital, without meaningfully affecting Hezbollah's military capabilities. But such an initiative on the part of the American president will carry little real weight as long as he has not adopted a clear position on the Iranian expansionist project as a whole. One cannot deal with the Islamic Republic piecemeal, in the manner of Barack Obama, who did everything in his power to placate the Iranian regime in the hope of reaching a nuclear agreement in July 2015, just months before the end of his presidency and the first arrival of Donald Trump at the White House. In the period leading up to the signing of that agreement between the Islamic Republic and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, the Obama administration spared no effort to shield Tehran from the slightest irritation. It was in this spirit that Obama refrained in the summer of 2013 from striking Syria to bring down the minority regime that had just turned chemical weapons against its own people. The former president forgot his promises and the “red line” he had himself drawn for Bashar al-Assad. Overnight, he stopped seeing the color red — every other color remained visible, but not that one. Donald Trump, from the moment he arrived at the White House in early 2017, had nonetheless demonstrated a deep understanding of what Iran represents as a regime. He tore up the nuclear agreement in 2018, calling it “the worst of its kind”. In early 2020, shortly before the end of his first term, he gave the green light for the elimination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force within the Revolutionary Guards, then regarded as the most influential Iranian figure after the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. That assassination, which came shortly after Soleimani had left Baghdad airport, having arrived from Damascus following a meeting in Beirut with Hassan Nasrallah, bore witness to an intimate knowledge of Iran, the architecture of its regime, and the pivotal role that a figure like Soleimani played both inside the country and across the region. Everything the American president has accomplished since his return to the White House a year and a half ago attests to a thorough command of the Iranian file. This has included his participation in two wars against Iran alongside Israel. The first concluded in June of last year, following a campaign of strikes that hit Iranian nuclear installations. But has something changed in the American approach to the Islamic Republic and what it represents? Has Trump begun to engage with Iran on its own terms, under the influence of a Pakistani mediation that gives Tehran more time to maneuver? A few days will suffice — a few weeks at most — to determine whether Trump is now prepared to fall into the Iranian trap by severing the nuclear file from the ballistic missiles and their launch platforms, from Iran's instruments of power in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, and from the Islamic Republic's general conduct toward its neighbors, particularly the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. What is certain is that whether Trump changes course and begins dealing with Iran piecemeal — or does not change at all — Lebanon will pay a heavy price on account of Hezbollah's arsenal. For the one constant in the Israeli-American relationship remains that stubborn insistence on separating the Lebanese file from the Iranian one.

Lebanon-Israel Talks: Is Hezbollah Engaging in Provocation?

Lebanon-Israel Talks: Is Hezbollah Engaging in Provocation?

By
LevantTime .
Published

The second session of the fourth round of direct Lebanon-Israel talks resumed Wednesday at the US State Department in Washington. The discussions remain arduous and are being impacted by violence on the ground in southern Lebanon. They were due to resume after a lunch break. Beirut is still trying to secure from Tel Aviv a commitment to a lasting truce, while on the ground the ceasefire framework imposed by President Donald Trump on Monday, after Israeli threats to strike Beirut’s southern suburbs, continues to be tested. On Wednesday, Hezbollah showed little regard for threats issued by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz, who warned that the army would strike Beirut’s southern suburbs if the Iranian-backed group continued attacks on northern Israeli localities. Donald Trump firmly opposed such strikes. In the early afternoon, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for firing two rockets at an Israeli military base in northern Israel. Both were intercepted by the Israeli army, with sirens sounding in Kiryat Shmona and Menara. Is Hezbollah trying to provoke Israeli authorities, knowing they will not overstep the limits set by the US president? Possibly. But it would be mistaken to believe it can exploit the rifts that emerged on Monday between Tel Aviv and Washington after the spat between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu over the Israeli military operation, still confined to southern Lebanon. Comments made Wednesday by the US president, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirm that Washington and Israel remain aligned on strategic objectives in Lebanon and Iran but differ on tactics. The two sides agree on the need to end Hezbollah’s military presence in Lebanon, viewing it as Iran’s armed proxy in the country. For Washington, diplomacy remains the preferred path, whether in Lebanon or on the Iranian dossier. Donald Trump reiterated that position on Wednesday in an interview on the New York Post podcast, while also saying he was “frustrated” by what he described as Israel’s “endless war” in Lebanon. At the same time, Netanyahu said he shared the US president’s goal of disarming Hezbollah in an interview with CNBC. “If we want to save Lebanon, if we want to achieve peace between Lebanon and Israel, as I want, we must disarm Hezbollah and demilitarize the country. This is an objective the president and I share, and it is what we must do,” he said. The US secretary of state echoed that assessment, stressing the “danger” Hezbollah poses to the Lebanese state, particularly after threats by figures within the group to overthrow Nawaf Salam’s government. What remains most significant is Washington’s determination to separate the ongoing Lebanese-Israeli negotiations from talks with Iran, a linkage that Tehran continues to reject. The US presidency is therefore seeking to manage, simultaneously but separately, bilateral Lebanon-Israel negotiations and the Iran dossier. On the latter, Donald Trump said talks were moving quickly. Iran, however, swiftly denied this, rejecting any claim that it had sent Washington a response to US proposals for a resumption of negotiations. The denial, issued by the Tasnim news agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, came shortly after Trump’s interview with the New York Post . Tasnim did not, however, comment on the US president’s remarks suggesting the possibility of a meeting with Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. As Tehran continues to stall, Trump reiterated once again that he will not wait indefinitely, and that he will eventually have to choose between reaching a deal with Iran or launching a military strike – an option he described as “not pleasant.” For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the Islamic Republic was “playing with fire,” pointing not only to its delays in indirect talks with Washington but also to strikes carried out overnight Tuesday into Wednesday against Kuwait and Bahrain. According to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, those operations were carried out in response to US attacks targeting an Iranian tanker and an island in the Strait of Hormuz. In Kuwait, the raids claimed by the Guards hit an airport terminal, killing one person and injuring 63 others, some of them critically wounded. The US military responded with “defensive strikes” on Iran’s Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz, according to US Central Command (CENTCOM). The Revolutionary Guards then retaliated in turn, targeting an air base hosting helicopters in Kuwait, as well as the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet naval command in Bahrain.

Dismantled, Yet Still Dangerous: Iran After Operations “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion”: (1/2)

Dismantled, Yet Still Dangerous: Iran After Operations “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion”: (1/2)

By
Khalil Helou
Published

In this first instalment, we examine the military and industrial impact of Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion on Iran’s conventional capabilities. It will be followed next week by a second and final part exploring the conditions that could lead to Iran’s implosion over the medium to long term. The Iranian regime suffered heavy losses during the US-Israeli war fought between February and April 2026. Yet despite the scale of the damage, the collapse of the Islamic Republic did not materialize, and Tehran showed no sign of flexibility in response to U.S. sanctions and the American naval blockade. Historical experience and the assessments of many analysts suggest that an authoritarian system as deeply entrenched as Iran’s is far more likely to yield under the pressure of an internal implosion. Such a scenario would be triggered by the convergence of prolonged economic strangulation and a critical threshold of popular mobilization. International sanctions and the US naval blockade have undoubtedly weakened the Iranian state’s resources, but they remain only catalysts. The decisive rupture occurs when internal fractures – previously contained through repression – begin to spread and converge. More than 30,000 people were killed last January, while over 50,000 punitive and preventive arrests were carried out in February. Returning to the 40-day US-Israeli war against Iran, two key questions emerge: what is the true extent of the Islamic Republic’s military and economic losses, and what prospects lie ahead as it confronts the American blockade and protracted negotiations? What Remains of Iran’s Navy? The two joint military operations – America’s Epic Fury and Israel’s Roaring Lion – conducted between February and April 2026, involved a total of 20,000 airstrikes. Over a period of just 40 days, that figure amounted to 60% of all coalition strikes carried out against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq over five years. The US-Israeli campaign dealt a decisive blow to Iran’s regular navy. Strikes on the country’s main naval bases at Bandar Abbas and Konarak destroyed most of its major surface combatants. Destroyers, frigates and support vessels were either sunk or damaged beyond repair, depriving Iran of its conventional blue-water naval capability. This strategic setback has forced Tehran to rely on residual, asymmetric and highly mobile assets to defend its coastline and, above all, to maintain a threat to maritime traffic in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Although partially degraded, Iran’s submarine force retains the ability to disrupt operations in shallow waters through its remaining midget submarines. The three Russian-built Kilo-class attack submarines were damaged or sunk while docked. Half of the 23 domestically produced Ghadir-class midget submarines were also destroyed at their berths. The surviving fleet of these midget submarines – estimated at between 10 and 12 vessels and equipped with torpedoes and missiles – has been deployed on the front line in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. These mini-submarines provide maritime guerrilla capabilities, including mine-laying operations, torpedo attacks and covert missions launched from the region’s rugged coastline. At the same time, most of the surface fleet operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has survived, largely because of its dispersed structure. It consists of hundreds of armed fast attack craft, as well as light missile patrol boats such as the Peykaap II and Houdong classes. These small warships are designed to conduct coordinated swarm attacks in overwhelming numbers before rapidly withdrawing into coastal inlets and sheltered coves. Iranian Tactics in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz Iran’s strategy for targeting civilian and military shipping now relies primarily on midget submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles, each crewed by no more than seven sailors. It also draws on missile-equipped fast attack craft, typically operated by crews of four to five, as well as shore-to-sea anti-ship missiles, naval mines and attack drones. Roughly 70% of Iran’s anti-ship missile inventory – estimated at several hundred projectiles – remains intact and can be launched from around 30 coastal sites. These include the Iranian-made Ra’ad, Noor, Qader and Khalij Fars systems, all derived from China’s C-802 missile. With ranges of between 130 and 360 kilometers, they are deployed on mobile launch platforms concealed deep inland. Mine-laying remains a relatively simple capability for Tehran. However, US underwater countermeasures have succeeded in clearing several maritime corridors through the Strait of Hormuz. Between 10 and 20 commercial vessels, including giant oil tankers, currently transit these routes every day. Ships navigating these narrow passages switch off their radars and tracking systems, coordinate with the US Navy – which monitors them by radar – and receive remote escort protection. A similar pattern prevails on the Iranian side of the strait. Shahed-type suicide drones serve as an aerial extension of Iran’s maritime assets, helping to saturate American and Arab air-defense systems. Dozens of commercial vessels have been struck by these weapons. Yet Iran’s more sophisticated attacks, combining anti-ship missiles and drones, have failed to hit US naval vessels. While these remaining capabilities do not challenge American naval supremacy, they are sufficient to sustain chronic insecurity across key shipping lanes and to exert pressure on the global economy. What about Iran’s air defenses? In parallel, the massive US-Israeli coalition strikes have severely degraded Iran’s air defense capabilities, effectively opening Iranian airspace to American and Israeli aircraft. Before the conflict, Iran operated an integrated air defense system built around layered “bubbles” of access denial designed to restrict hostile aircraft and missiles across large parts of the Middle East. By early 2026, this system consisted of three complementary layers. The long-range layer relied on fixed batteries such as Russia’s S-300PMU-2 systems and their Iranian equivalents, the Bavar-373. This tier was tasked with protecting nuclear facilities and urban centers over distances of several hundred kilometers. A second, medium-range and highly mobile layer included domestically developed systems such as the Khordad-15, Raad and Talash, capable of engaging fighter jets and drones. A third, close-range defensive layer continued to operate through short-range systems such as Russia’s Tor-M1 and Pantsir-S1, supported by thousands of anti-aircraft guns and man-portable air-defense systems. The entire network was coordinated by an integrated command structure within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ “Khatam al-Anbiya” headquarters, fed by an extensive network of ground-based and coastal radar systems. The combined US-Israeli strikes – using anti-radiation missiles, B-2 stealth bombers and bunker-busting munitions – neutralized much of the fixed infrastructure and early-warning radar network. They eliminated both the long-range and medium-range layers, drastically reducing Iran’s ability to detect incoming aircraft and conduct long-range air denial operations. In response, Tehran has adopted a survival doctrine, relying in particular on intermittent radar shutdowns to evade enemy electronic warfare, increased use of optical sensors, and the dispersal of mobile batteries across coastal and mountainous terrain. Its units now conduct what analysts describe as “air ambushes.” They fire missiles from temporary positions before immediately relocating. This tactic has allowed them to shoot down several Israeli and American MQ-9 drones, the most recent in May 2026. The loss of heavy systems prevents Iran from denying its airspace to coalition stealth aircraft. Its new posture nonetheless remains dangerous: it retains an effective harassment capability against drones and low – to medium – altitude aircraft, the ability to mount saturation threats against enemy defenses, and sporadic ambushes that have, for example, forced coalition aircraft to avoid flying below 7 kilometers. Iran’s coastal air defenses have also been heavily degraded: most fixed long-range sites protecting Bandar Abbas, Jask and Kharg have been neutralized. Nuclear Sites and Military-Industrial Complexes The US-Israeli offensive also caused severe damage to a wide range of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, Parchin and Isfahan, which had already been bombed in June 2025. Similarly, drone production sites and a majority of ballistic missile infrastructure were either fully or partially destroyed. Critical energy and civilian infrastructure was also targeted, triggering fuel shortages in major cities. In conclusion, the heavy military, nuclear, industrial and economic losses – estimated at $14 trillion – have not eliminated Iran’s remaining asymmetric capabilities, which still allow it to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. However, today’s Iran is significantly degraded compared with its pre–June 2025 posture. Its nuclear, ballistic and drone capabilities, as well as its capacity to support regional allies such as Hezbollah, have been severely eroded.

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