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And here we go again. Tensions are rising in the region with a new wave of strikes on Iran, announced for this evening by U.S. President Donald Trump, who also threatened to seize control of the strategic island of Kharg — the linchpin of Iran's oil economy. However, in yet another reversal, Trump later posted on his Truth Social platform that he had decided to call off the strikes he had been threatening against Iran, asserting that "discussions with the Islamic Republic have been seen and approved by Iran's highest authorities." And, as is often the case, the news was quickly denied by Iran's Fars news agency. But according to Axios , senior Iranian officials confirmed that a "framework agreement" had been reached, but that they were "awaiting the approval of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei." Having exhausted all diplomatic avenues, Washington is now banking on a military approach to ramp up pressure on the Islamic Republic and force it to negotiate a deal that would neutralize the nuclear threat it poses, curb its destabilizing regional influence through its proxies, and resolve the dispute over the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. The strategy, then, remains the same. It is the tactics that have changed — and hardened, as evidenced by the increasingly aggressive tone of President Trump's threats. "The war will only end with Iran's surrender," he said during a Fox News interview, shortly after posting on his Truth Social account: "The United States will strike Iran very hard tonight (Thursday). The Navy, Air Force, radar systems, air defenses, and all other forms of defense (belonging to Tehran), along with most of its offensive capabilities, will cease to exist." Overnight from Wednesday to Thursday, the U.S. military primarily targeted southern Iran as well as sites near the capital, including in Karaj, Nazarabad, and Pishva, according to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Donald Trump coupled his threats with others of an economic nature — far more significant for Iran: "At some point, in the not-too-distant future, we may take Kharg Island and other oil infrastructure locations. We will assume full control of their oil and gas markets, just as we did with Venezuela, which is working brilliantly for both Venezuela and the United States of America," he wrote, in what appears to be a blueprint for bringing an already economically battered Iran to its knees — a country further squeezed by the American blockade on its ports. He repeated the same threat on Fox News but expressed reservations about the American public's appetite for an escalation of the conflict. "You know, my preference has always been to take Kharg Island. I'm not sure America has the stomach for it," he said. Donald Trump also indicated that he does not intend to strike civilian infrastructure, so as not to harm the Iranian people, who are largely opposed to the mullahs' regime. All of these threats are putting the ceasefire in place since April 8 under severe strain, even as Tehran responds forcefully to U.S. hammer blows. Overnight from Wednesday to Thursday, the Iranian military targeted U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan. It spared the United Arab Emirates, which, according to Bloomberg, recently held its first security meeting with Iran since the war began. The aim of that meeting: to ensure the UAE's economic stability, according to the outlet. Tehran has also completely blocked the Strait of Hormuz, through which, until Wednesday, it had been allowing passage — albeit for a fee — to vessels from countries it considered friendly or neutral, while the US military announced on Wednesday that it had neutralized a third tanker that had attempted to breach the blockade of Iranian ports within the span of a week. A fool's game vs. diplomacy For now, this escalation in violence still appears contained — even calculated — though the risk of a spiral remains. Tehran and Washington remain locked in a kind of dangerous game of bluff, in which each side tries to maneuver with the leverage at its disposal to impose its terms within the framework of ongoing mediation efforts. The question is who will blink first. One telling sign that the violence we have witnessed over the past few days is measured and purposeful is the absence of Israeli involvement. The day Donald Trump asks his Israeli ally to join in strikes against Iran will mark the official return to the military option in pursuit of defined war objectives — at the risk of igniting a regional conflagration. Washington is thus continuing to bet on the diplomatic process. Donald Trump reaffirmed yesterday that this process remains his "preferred option," while Islamabad and Doha were working overtime to hammer out an acceptable formula for a statement of intent that would allow Iran and the United States to resume negotiations. Qatari negotiators left Tehran on Thursday, having arrived the previous day in an attempt to bridge the gaps between the United States and Iran, a diplomat familiar with the Qatari mission told AFP. The talks with Iranian officials were conducted in coordination with Washington, the diplomat confirmed, adding that they lasted "into the early hours of the morning." In Islamabad, Pakistani foreign ministry spokesman Tahir Andrabi indirectly acknowledged that conciliation efforts have reached a deadlock, but stressed that his country has not yet given up. "It is difficult to remain optimistic in the face of renewed hostilities, but let us not draw the curtain on Pakistan's approach in favor of mediation," he said. He noted that Islamabad had conveyed a message to that effect to both parties. "We remain committed" to mediation, Mr. Andrabi insisted. Saudi Arabia also called for the continuation of Pakistan's mediation efforts and praised Qatar's role in supporting the negotiations. A similar appeal was issued by the Kremlin. Mediation is now proceeding in step with American strikes and threats — both military and economic. In this context, it is worth noting that US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that funds will be drawn from frozen Iranian accounts to compensate for damages caused by Iranian missile strikes against Washington's allies in the Gulf. "All tolls paid to the Persian Gulf Strait Authority will also be offset by funds drawn from their accounts. Every attack launched by Iran will only worsen the economic and financial consequences it faces," he announced — even as one of the main sticking points in the indirect Tehran-Washington dialogue concerns frozen Iranian assets. The Islamic Republic is demanding that these be unfrozen as a condition for agreeing, among other things, to return to negotiations. Could this high-wire strategy pressure Tehran into accepting American conditions for a "deal," or could it instead push it to escalate militarily, knowing that Trump is opposed to a full-scale war? The coming days should provide some answers. Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia resume In Lebanon, the main news is of a political and economic nature, with the resumption of Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh had suspended its imports from Lebanon in late 2021 due to the crisis triggered by the remarks made by then-Information Minister Georges Cordahi regarding Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen and the trafficking of Captagon into its territory. On the ground, exchanges of fire continue between the Israeli army, which is pressing forward around the perimeter of Beaufort Castle, and Hezbollah militants, of whom "10,000 are said to have been eliminated during the war," according to Tel Aviv. On the Lebanese side, the death toll is approaching 4,000. In what Israel has deemed a violation of the May ceasefire, the pro-Iranian group launched drones toward northern Israel on Thursday morning. The devices were intercepted before entering Israeli airspace, according to the Israeli military. Is this a message to the Americans and Israelis signaling Hezbollah's readiness to reopen the Lebanese front should the new standoff between Tehran and Washington escalate? The question is worth asking.

This series of articles aims to provide a clearer understanding of the current situation in light of the past, free from passionate, ideological, or romanticized narratives that miss the realities on the ground, leaving readers to draw their own conclusions. The previous eight installments offered a reexamination of events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power since the Taif Agreement, through the Israeli army's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollah-controlled zone in the South, and the 2006 war. This article picks up where that conflict left off. The Battle of Wadi Al Houjeyr, also known as the Battle of Wadi Slouqi, took place in the central sector of the Lebanese-Israeli border between August 11 and 13, 2006. It was one of the costliest engagements for the Israeli army. The Israeli forces' objective was to cross the Slouqi valley heading northward to reach the Litani River before the anticipated ceasefire came into effect. The Slouqi valley, also known as Wadi Al Houjeyr, is a steep and narrow gorge. Hezbollah fighters made extensive use of Kornet anti-tank missiles — capable of piercing double armor — from concealed positions on the surrounding heights and in nearby villages. As soon as Israeli Merkava tanks entered the gorge, they came under crossfire from Kornet operators. The initial lack of coordination between the attackers' infantry and armored units left the tanks exposed to the concealed missile operators. The infantry was supposed to cover the tanks' advance with mortar fire to suppress the hidden missile teams, but this was not carried out effectively. This battle is often referred to as the "Merkava massacre" by Hezbollah supporters. Israeli losses amounted to 33 soldiers killed and dozens wounded, with around twenty Merkavas hit, two of which were destroyed. On the Hezbollah side, approximately forty fighters were killed. The Israeli army ultimately succeeded in crossing the valley on August 13; however, the ceasefire that came into effect on August 14, 2006 halted any further advance. Along this axis, Israeli troops had passed through the village of Ghandourieh and stopped north of it, just a few kilometers short of the Litani — their original objective. Targeting bridges, roads, and infrastructure During the 2006 war, Israel targeted 109 bridges and 130 roads across Lebanon over the course of 33 days. One objective was the tactical isolation of southern Lebanon through the destruction of bridges over the Litani River, severing communication routes between the South and Beirut. This was intended to prevent Hezbollah from sending reinforcements, ammunition, and military equipment to the front. It also served two additional purposes: the first was to prevent Hezbollah from deploying heavy missiles to parts of Lebanon beyond the South — for example, a bridge linking Baabda to Beirut was destroyed after a missile, concealed in a 40-foot container, had crossed it along the Baabda–Wadi Chahrour road; the second objective was to prevent the two Israeli soldiers captured at the start of the war from being transferred out of the country, by destroying bridges and roads leading to Syria. The bombing of "vital" infrastructure — including Rafic Hariri International Airport and the Jiyeh power plant — was intended to cripple the Lebanese economy and pressure the Lebanese government into disarming Hezbollah. The destruction of these routes severely hampered the delivery of humanitarian aid, leaving many southern communities cut off and isolated. This strategy was part of the Dahiya doctrine, an Israeli military tactic of asymmetric warfare that advocates the use of massive and disproportionate force against civilian infrastructure in areas serving as bases for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other armed groups, in retaliation for attacks on Israeli territory. First applied during the 2006 war and formally articulated in 2008 by Gadi Eisenkot, the Israeli Chief of Staff, this approach treats villages or neighborhoods from which missiles are fired not as civilian areas, but as military bases. The causes of Israel's tactical failures An Israeli government inquiry commission, chaired by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd, was tasked with examining Israel's political and military failures during the 2006 war against Hezbollah. The commission's final report concluded that the conflict represented a strategic and military failure for Israel, citing shortcomings in command and preparedness. As a result, Israel overhauled its ground doctrine, accelerated the development of a short-range missile defense system known as the Iron Dome, and rolled out an active protection system called Trophy across its armored vehicles. This system, later sold to the U.S. military, works by intercepting anti-tank missiles before they strike the vehicle's hull. A Merkava tank during exercises in the Negev. (AFP) The Winograd Report revealed the vulnerability of the Merkava tank to RPG-29 rockets and to Hezbollah's precision Kornet and Metis-M missiles, all of which use tandem warheads — dual-charge designs capable of penetrating the Merkava's dual-layer internal and external armor. The external armor is reactive, meaning it explodes and deflects conventional anti-tank missiles, but tandem-charge missiles are designed to overcome this and pierce through to the interior of the tank. During the 2006 war, 52 Merkava tanks were struck by these munitions, resulting in the deaths of 30 soldiers. Of those, five were completely destroyed, while 24 were penetrated and 23 suffered minor damage. All 47 of the damaged tanks were later repaired and returned to service. Beyond the effectiveness of tandem-charge rockets and missiles, the Winograd Report found that the Merkavas were hit primarily due to systemic tactical errors in how they were deployed. The report also criticized the lack of coordination between the Israeli air force, infantry, and armored units, as well as the inadequate preparation of reservists, who had not conducted any armored maneuvers in six years. A first in military history The large-scale use of RPG-29 rockets and Kornet and Metis missiles — all fitted with tandem warheads — marked a turning point in military history. Although they had been used sporadically before, during the Chechen wars in the 1990s and against American forces in Iraq in 2003, the 2006 conflict was the first time a militia demonstrated the effectiveness of deploying such weapons en masse against tanks equipped with reactive armor. Furthermore, Hezbollah's sophisticated tactics and its preparations for this war highlighted the extent of Iranian involvement in Lebanon and provided a masterclass in asymmetric warfare strategy. The Ukrainians almost certainly drew lessons from this conflict, as their tactics during the early weeks of the 2022 Russian offensive closely mirrored those of Hezbollah in many respects — except that their tandem-charge anti-tank missiles were Western-made (the Javelin, the equivalent of the Kornet, and the NLAW, the equivalent of the Metis-M). Read more on this topic: Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (8) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (7) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (6) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (1)

When I recalled the substance of George Orwell's 1984 and Albert Camus's The Stranger , I sensed a certain thread connecting their respective descriptions of the instrument of control — or rather the general framework of domination — and what has been unfolding in Lebanon, particularly in recent years, since power consolidated itself in Hezbollah's hands and under its command. There is a strange convergence between the worlds of Orwell and Camus, despite their apparent differences: the world of external oppression in Orwell, and the world of absurdity and existential detachment in Camus. In Orwell, the individual is subject to absolute external surveillance. Big Brother does not merely monitor behaviour; he attempts to seize control of consciousness itself. The objective is not simply compliance, but the erasure of any possibility of internal dissent. Freedom is threatened from without, and the individual — Winston — seeks to reclaim his own selfhood through rebellion. In Camus, the situation is almost reversed. No visible totalitarian authority watches over the hero Meursault. The problem is not external surveillance but inner emptiness. Meursault does not “rebel” because he simply sees nothing worth opposing. And yet society will not tolerate this neutrality: it puts him on trial not only for his crime, but for his failure of emotional conformity, for not having wept at his mother's funeral. In 1984 , society imposes total surveillance and the individual attempts to escape it in order to recover his humanity. In The Stranger , the individual does not spontaneously submit to established norms, and society exercises a retroactive surveillance over him to bring him back to “proper behaviour”. In other words, Orwell describes a society that pre-empts dissent, while Camus describes a society that punishes it after it has appeared. Oppression in Orwell is political and institutional; in Camus, it is moral and social. In Orwell's world, the individual cannot “stray” from the norm, because surveillance is both pre-emptive and total. And if he does stray — as Winston does — he will be entirely reformatted, compelled to love the very power that crushes him. This “restoration” is all the more terrifying in that it does not consist of a return to ordinary behaviour, but of a re-creation of the human being from within. In both works, society cannot bear any deviation from the “model”, and so it exercises a surveillance whose ultimate aim is to return the individual to the norm, either through coercive persuasion — Camus — or through complete reprogramming — Orwell. In Camus, the norm is moral and social, and what is demanded is that one feel as one should. In Orwell, the norm is political and ideological, and what is demanded is that one think as one should. Both worlds articulate something deeply unsettling: the problem lies not only in behaviour, but in the fact that society aspires to unify the human interior itself — feelings or thoughts. Meursault is condemned because he does not feel as he should; Winston is broken because he does not think as he should. If we now replace the word “society” with “Hezbollah”, do we not discover that this party has accomplished the form of oppression Orwell describes in 1984 , while treating all its partisans and defenders in the manner that “society” treats Meursault in Camus's novel? Applied to Hezbollah, this analytical framework reveals that the party proceeded to a recomposition of collective consciousness — through persuasion, identity and narrative — in a register close to the “symbolic Orwell”, while resorting to direct punishment in the face of refusal, which belongs rather to the “concrete Camus”. It even added a religious dimension to its surveillance, that of accusations of apostasy and rupture with the faith. And its surveillance of socio-moral behaviour resembles what one finds in Camus: it extends to prohibiting the expression of certain forms of grief, since “the martyr ascended to heaven in joy”. What is more redoubtable than death is to be reformatted to the point of no longer perceiving oneself as distinct from the power or the community. It is precisely here that Orwell and Camus converge in the method Hezbollah has practised: the first by expressing the shattering of interiority, the second by expressing the punishment of those who refuse to inscribe themselves within “the prescribed framework” through the culture of sahsouh (Tr.'s note: a Lebanese term denoting the punishment inflicted on anyone who dares to express an opinion contrary to the forces in power). One understands from this that Hezbollah's domination over a large part of the Shia community, and over essential levers of the Lebanese state, was not the result of a single simple factor, and cannot be explained by military force alone or by popular legitimacy alone. What occurred is the fruit of a complex historical accumulation combining violence, identity framing and the internal recomposition of society. To understand this trajectory, three solidly interconnected mechanisms must be examined. First: Coercion — the founding of power and the imposition of accomplished facts In the nineteen-eighties, within the context of the Lebanese civil war, the confrontation was not merely political: it was a struggle for existence and hegemony within the community itself. This period was marked by the liquidation or removal of intellectual and militant currents — Hassan Hamdan, Hussein Mrouwa and others, including among the resistance fighters, of communist, leftist or liberal allegiance. Confrontations also set Hezbollah against other Shia forces, notably the Amal movement in what became known as the “war of the brothers”. Hezbollah resorted to violence, kidnappings and direct deterrence against the Lebanese environment as well as foreigners — bombings of embassies, taking of hostages. And it imposed certain modes of behaviour by force or by threat across various communities. This means that Hezbollah did not emerge in an environment of “free adherence”, but in one that had been partially reconfigured by constraint. We are here confronted with what might be called the foundational Orwellian phase, where boundaries are first imposed before legitimacy is constructed. Second: Social control, or the transformation of coercion into “natural behaviour” After the consolidation of hegemony, the most decisive mutation took place: it was no longer a matter of controlling alone, but of recomposing society from within. This process was accomplished through the imposition of religious, social and cultural behavioural norms, through an attempt to impose the veil by threats of disfigurement with acid, and subsequently through material incentivisation — sums of money paid in exchange for wearing it. A sharp binary was then constructed between “resistant” and “traitor”, between “conformist” and “deviant”, and an intense social pressure was brought to bear on those who diverged, ranging from reputational damage to ostracism and accusations of treachery. At this stage, oppression was no longer always direct: it had become diffuse, integrated into the social body itself. Society had begun to monitor its own members. It is here that one encounters the Camusian logic: the individual is not sanctioned merely for what he does, but for his refusal to conform to the collective model. Third: The construction of the framework that produces conviction and identity The most decisive step in the success of this model was the construction of a powerful narrative capable of giving meaning to everything that had preceded it. This narrative rested on the idea of resistance and dignity, on the protection of the community against external threats, on the valorisation of sacrifice, suffering and martyrdom, and on the fusion of the religious with the political and the identitarian. In parallel, networks of social services were built, along with educational, health and cultural institutions, and an architecture of internal solidarity, visible in the multiplication of religious occasions and the creation of rites and customs largely imported from Iran. It was then that the decisive mutation was accomplished: the passage from a subjected society to a convinced one — at least in part. It is in Erich Fromm that one finds the explanation of this behaviour: the human being does not only flee oppression; he sometimes chooses conformity because it grants him a sense of security and belonging to the community. Fourth: Recourse to political coercion and repression Despite the success of social control and the construction of a body of convictions, political coercion remained present at moments of crisis. It manifested through decisive internal events such as those of 2008, through a climate of assassinations and political deterrence stretching from the martyrdom of Rafic Hariri to that of Lokman Slim, and through the entrenchment of uncrossable red lines — the Doha accords, the blocking third, the black shirts. These moments fulfil a fundamental function: the permanent reminder that force remains present. The balance is thus maintained between conviction on one side and fear on the other. Fifth: How did the “apparent consent” take shape? What resembles “consent” within this environment cannot be simplified: it is the result of an interweaving of complex factors. Genuine conviction in one part of the population, adaptation in another, fear or silence in others still, and the absence of credible alternatives completing the picture. “Consent” is in reality a composite structure, and not a single unified position. At the end of this long trajectory, we find ourselves in a situation where the party dominates no longer through force alone, but through the identity and the framework by which the individual understands himself, his suffering and his choices, perceiving them as logical, legitimate and meaningful. Society then participates partially in reproducing this hegemony by itself. Control thus ceases to be solely external and becomes internal as well. What of today? But recent transformations, under the pressure of regional events and external violence, have brought to the surface a gap between the narrative and reality, interior questionings that remain for the most part silent, and undeclared reassessments. Against this, the external danger continues to tighten cohesion, and social pressure prevents open explosion. We are therefore living today through a phase of silent trembling, without any clear or definitive transformation on the horizon.

Tensions continue to rise in the region but remain, for now, under control. It seems as though Tehran and Washington — which are continuing to exchange messages through Pakistani mediators — have opted for a new tactic: diplomacy under fire. It is through this lens that the military actions launched by Iran in the region over the past forty-eight hours are being viewed today. Strangled by the maritime blockade Washington has imposed on its ports, the Islamic Republic — which had until now been playing for time — has no option left but the military one to ease the pressure bearing down on it from two directions. The first concerns the direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations toward a peace agreement. If concluded, such a deal would inevitably end Iran's grip on Lebanon through Hezbollah, at a time when Tehran is pushing to have the Hezbollah file placed on the agenda of any potential talks with Washington, in order to dictate its own terms. The second relates to its own negotiations with the United States over a lasting ceasefire. By shooting down a US Apache military helicopter on Tuesday as it patrolled the international waters of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran escalated its confrontation with the United States, which responded swiftly by carrying out two waves of strikes against air defense systems and radar installations around the strait, according to American outlet Axios. A series of explosions rang out through the night along Iran's southern coastline. According to the US military's Central Command (CENTCOM), these were "self-defense strikes, ordered by the commander-in-chief" — a reference to President Donald Trump. Iran responded by launching attacks against US bases in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. "Imminent strikes" Although he has not abandoned the diplomatic option, the US president — who had repeatedly insisted that a "good" deal with Tehran was nearly within reach — struck a radically different tone on Wednesday. He came across as threatening, signaling that he is well aware of Iran's game and has no intention of being drawn into it. During a press conference at the White House, Mr. Trump reaffirmed his intention to "strike Iran again today," on Wednesday, and said he was considering a large-scale attack targeting power plants and bridges. He issued these threats after denouncing Tehran's duplicity. "We're going to hit them, hit them very hard. We were really close to a deal, but they keep playing games, they're making fools of us," he declared from the Oval Office. On his Truth Social platform, he had written a few hours earlier that Iran "took too long to negotiate a deal that would have been great for them," and that it "will now have to pay the price" — this coming just the day before, prior to the Apache incident, when he had announced that a "very, very good deal" was coming within "two to three days." "Iran is all talk and no action. The tyrant of the Middle East is DEAD!!!" the US president added, underscoring that the Iranian military had been devastated. Yet Iran's military retains its capacity to cause harm, as demonstrated by the overnight missile strikes against Israel from Monday to Tuesday. That attack came in response to Israeli raids on Beirut's southern suburbs on Sunday, themselves launched in retaliation for Hezbollah strikes on northern Israeli territory. The escalation can be readily attributed to the mullahs' regime, which had threatened Israel with retaliation in the event of an offensive on the southern suburbs, while the Israeli state had promised strikes on the Hezbollah stronghold should the pro-Iranian group continue its attacks on Israeli soil. Feeling wronged by the Washington-brokered Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire agreement, and likely pushed by its Iranian patron, Hezbollah did not hesitate to fire rockets toward Galilee, triggering an Israeli response, followed by an equally anticipated Iranian counter-response. Despite the escalation, tensions remain contained, as evidenced by the ongoing Qatari mission in Tehran, carried out in coordination with Washington. Yet the fire smolders beneath the surface. Will Donald Trump follow through if Tehran continues to stall? On that note, it was reported late Wednesday evening that Iran had rejected a Qatari proposal to arrange a meeting with the United States to discuss points of disagreement. For now, the Islamic Republic is simply demonstrating that it remains torn between two factions. The first, hardline, is embodied by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), while the second, more moderate, is led by Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian. While Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who is close to the IRGC, raised his tone against Washington on Wednesday, President Pezeshkian set himself apart with a widely noted speech in which he advocated for dialogue. His remarks drew attention not only because it was clear he was addressing the Pasdaran, but also because of his reference to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, "for whom dialogue is the only possible way out of the state of neither war nor peace in which Iran finds itself." This was an indirect call to follow the path laid out by the Iranian leader who was killed last February in an Israeli-American strike on Tehran. Free rein in Lebanon On the Lebanese front, however, there is no indication that Hezbollah will heed Pezeshkian's words, as the group takes its orders directly from the Pasdaran. Further rocket fire toward Israel could prove costly, however, as the Israeli military now has free rein to respond immediately with strikes on the southern suburbs, without consulting political authorities. This decision, taken on Monday by the restricted military cabinet, shows that the logic of immediate military response is currently prevailing, without necessarily having any influence on the processes already underway. It is as though each side is testing the other's red lines. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun thus reaffirmed on Wednesday his determination to "go all the way" in direct negotiations with Israel. On the ground in Lebanon, military operations remained limited on Wednesday to the south of the country, where the Israeli army killed two individuals by targeting their vehicle in Sidon. The two have yet to be identified. In Kfarchouba, it "abducted two men who had approached the area where Israeli soldiers are conducting operations (...) and took them to Israel for questioning," according to a statement sent to AFP.

It is once again the familiar stop-start pattern of diplomacy in the Iran conflict. After recent statements by American officials suggesting – yet again – the imminent prospect of a “deal” with the Islamic Republic, fresh storm clouds gathered on Tuesday evening. Late in the evening, President Donald Trump said he had received a report from U.S. military command indicating that Iranian fire had brought down an American Apache helicopter on Monday night in the Strait of Hormuz, while it was conducting a patrol in the area. The pilot and co-pilot were rescued unharmed by U.S. military teams after a two-hour search operation. “The United States must respond to this attack,” the White House chief said. Shortly after Mr. Trump’s statement, American officials told The New York Times that “it is not clear whether negotiations with Iran will resume following President Trump’s announcement that he is committed to retaliating for the helicopter crash.” In concrete terms, the American response to Monday evening’s Iranian attack is very likely to be limited, both in scope and duration. It would nonetheless help sustain, and possibly intensify, the climate of tension and mistrust that has come to define the Iran conflict. That tension was reflected in remarks made 48 hours ago by Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Iranian parliament (who heads the negotiating team with Washington), who not only stressed that the Islamic Republic “does not trust the United States” but also, bluntly – and not for the first time – described the United Sates as an “enemy.” In any case, all indications suggest that the Trump administration has no intention, at least in the current context, of engaging in a new large-scale confrontation with Iran. This is what likely led Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to say, during the latest meeting of the restricted security cabinet, that Israel “may be forced to face Iran alone.” Mr. Netanyahu also noted that “the battle with the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah” is not over. Joseph Aoun Takes a Harder Line on Iran On the military front, the Israeli air force operations continued at pace on Monday, with raids targeting Hezbollah positions and ammunition depots in several villages in southern Lebanon. At the same time, the Israeli army said it had killed a Hezbollah militiaman who had crossed the border from Lebanon and who, it said, appeared to have intended to infiltrate a locality in northern Israel. In parallel, Israeli forces issued an evacuation order for the city of Tyre on Monday, including the Christian quarter, where armed elements linked to the pro-Iranian party have reportedly taken position. In this context, Christian political figures issued an urgent appeal for the demilitarization of the area. On the political front, the Lebanese presidency published a transcript of the second part of President Joseph Aoun’s interview with CNN. The head of state reiterated his criticism of Iran’s conduct in Lebanon, stressing that Beirut seeks to maintain cordial relations with Tehran “but on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,” while accusing the Iranian regime of “interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs.” Regarding Hezbollah, President Aoun said “it is time for the state to replace militias,” arguing that the Shiite community “is tired” and must be offered an alternative “through strong public institutions.” Addressing the issue of the party’s weapons, Mr. Aoun said that “the war in Lebanon should have ended in 2000” following Israel’s complete withdrawal from the security zone it controlled in southern Lebanon. He pointed out that, after this withdrawal, Hezbollah “made strategic mistakes.” Referring also to direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, President Aoun reaffirmed the Lebanese authorities’ desire to bring a definitive end to the state of war between the two countries.

It is astonishing, puzzling, disconcerting – even strange and paradoxical – that one still encounters today the same reductive, partisan narratives, published by an agenda-driven press and amplified across social media, at a time when the country is facing critical developments both domestically and internationally, and when its fate has been sorely tested for decades. Regrettably, this is hardly a first. We are witnessing media manipulation aimed at creating a diversion and deflecting attention from the pressing issues of the day – chief among them a merciless war that is dragging the country towards total destruction and plunging it into an unprecedented socioeconomic and financial abyss. This entire saga, which in the end is hardly surprising, has a distinctly familiar ring to it. It is a resounding, well-rehearsed refrain, reflecting an unmistakable determination to undermine and destroy through relentless repetition the reputation of former Banque du Liban Governor Riad Salameh and his brother Raja. And once again, the story is seasoned with fresh references to HSBC’s role. Riad Salameh is thus cast as the man responsible for the collapse and breakdown of Lebanon’s financial and economic system. It is easy enough, indeed, to bombard public opinion with this refrain after years of media manipulation on the Lebanese political stage concerning the billions of dollars squandered – and perhaps misappropriated – through government ministries under resolutions adopted by successive cabinets, approved by Parliament, and then, alas, all too often forgotten. In this bleak and murky climate, which often borders on obsession, little seems capable of stirring either concern or even measured thought, so thoroughly are minds held captive by their own fixations. The French daily Le Monde , citing Riad Salameh’s lawyers, reports that he was able to acquire his real estate holdings thanks the substantial income he earned while serving as a financial adviser at Merrill Lynch, prior to his appointment as Governor of the Banque du Liban. Yet this detail, as reported by the French newspaper, vanishes into thin air, like autumn leaves falling to the ground. The same applies when the former governor’s lawyer submits documented evidence to the courts, establishing the origin and provenance of the funds behind his various investments. Should we not, at the very least, allow justice to take its course before rushing to level baseless accusations? Speaking of justice, is it not, in fact, striking that this emblematic institution of the state refrains from prosecuting certain political leaders and party chiefs who bear heavy responsibility – and this is no secret to anyone – for failures in security management, in the administration of justice, and in state spending on social welfare, electricity, and education? This, not to mention certain fictitious civil or religious associations, or the billions of dollars that have evaporated in subsidies for fuel, wheat, and other foodstuffs. Let us not, therefore, be taken in by this media manipulation or by the deliberate choice of this disingenuous political timing, which is – it bears repeating – anything but coincidental. If the purpose of blaming a senior official is to bring drown upon him the wrath of heaven and international sanctions, let us at least have the courage and the decency to acknowledge that Riad Salameh is the ONLY person, to this day, to have paid the price. And even then, he is far from out of the woods. Let us therefore leave it to justice to do its work and render its judgment in a calm and orderly environment, without depriving the former governor of his right to defend himself. To close this chapter on a humble note, it would be fitting to recall a well-known saying: “ If you seek to see the speck in your neighbor’s eye, you must first have the honesty to see the plank in your own.” It is fair to say that this saying merits reflection today. *Antoine Menassa is the President and Founder of the Association of Lebanese Businessmen in France (HALFA – Association des hommes d’affaires libanais en France) .