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The abandonment of the Future Combat Air System — known by its French acronym SCAF — announced this week by France and Germany after years of tensions, represents far more than the failure of an industrial program. It exposes the deep contradictions now shaping the construction of an autonomous European defense capability, at the very moment when the continent is seeking to free itself from its strategic dependence on the United States. At the heart of this wreck lies a question that has never found a consensual answer: is Europe capable of producing, through a common effort, the instruments of its military sovereignty, or does it remain a juxtaposition of competing national interests? A Project Born of a Historic Ambition Officially launched in 2017 by France and Germany, and later joined by Spain, the SCAF was intended to become the cornerstone of European defense. The objective went far beyond the design of a simple fighter jet. The program aimed to create a “system of systems” combining a new-generation fighter, accompanying drones, advanced sensors, electronic warfare capabilities and a digital architecture allowing the battlefield to be permanently networked. In the minds of its promoters, the SCAF was meant to symbolize the emergence of European strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable world. Nearly a decade later, the assessment is harsh. Despite billions of euros committed to preliminary studies, the partners never managed to overcome their fundamental differences. The French in the Dock The failure of the program immediately reignited criticism of Dassault Aviation and its chairman and CEO, Éric Trappier. In some German and European political circles, the head of the French aircraft manufacturer is portrayed as one of the main figures responsible for the deadlock. His critics accuse him of defending an overly national vision of the program, incompatible with the logic of European cooperation. According to this interpretation, Dassault sought to retain exclusive control over the critical technologies of the future combat aircraft, refusing to genuinely share leadership with its German and Spanish partners. This criticism is all the sharper because the French group held a special position in the negotiations. Emmanuel Macron and Éric Trappier in front of a Rafale mock-up in Greek colors. (AFP) Unlike its partners, Dassault could point to recent and comprehensive experience in designing a modern combat aircraft: the Rafale. For many German actors, this expertise was used as an argument to impose an unbalanced relationship within the program. Dassault, however, rejects this interpretation. For several years, it has repeated that the problem is not European but industrial. According to the company, a fighter jet cannot be designed through constant compromises among several companies and several states. Its reasoning is simple: responsibility cannot be separated from authority. If a manufacturer is tasked with developing the main aircraft, it must also have the corresponding decision-making power. A computer-generated image of the SCAF bearing the roundels of the French Navy. From this perspective, the SCAF did not fail because of a lack of European spirit, but because of a governance structure unable to arbitrate between the partners’ contradictory requirements. Its supporters stress that the recent history of Europe’s defense industry is full of programs slowed down by political compromises, artificial workshare arrangements and national rivalries. They also point out that the Rafale, designed under French leadership, is now regarded as one of the continent’s main industrial and export successes. Two Irreconcilable Visions of Europe The debate over the SCAF in fact goes beyond Éric Trappier’s personality alone. Since the beginning of the program, two conceptions of European defense have been in conflict. The first, often associated with Berlin and the European institutions, favors the sharing of expertise, industrial integration and the pooling of technologies. A mock-up of the SCAF, which was to be produced through a partnership between France, Germany and Spain, while Dassault insisted on retaining prime contractor authority. (AFP) The second, more strongly defended in Paris, holds that cooperation must not lead to the dilution of strategic know-how or the loss of national sovereignty. This divergence is clearly reflected in operational requirements. France requires an aircraft capable of operating from aircraft carriers and taking part in the airborne component of its nuclear deterrent. Germany shares none of these constraints. As for Spain, it primarily seeks to preserve its place in the European aerospace industry, a presence confirmed by its participation in Airbus. From the outset, the project therefore carried ambitions that were sometimes incompatible. The Italian and British Choice of GCAP The United Kingdom and Italy have already taken another path. They made a different bet. Contrary to some common assumptions, Rome did not reject European cooperation. It simply favored another model of partnership. Together with the United Kingdom, Italy is now taking part in the Global Combat Air Programme, or GCAP, which Japan has also joined. More pragmatic, the British and the Italians joined forces with the Japanese to produce their “NGF,” or “New Generation Fighter.” This choice rests on several factors. First, the historical ties between the British and Italian defense industries have been particularly strong since the Eurofighter era, the joint fighter produced with Germany that enjoyed a certain degree of export success. It should not be forgotten that Italy, through Leonardo, is linked to the British giant British Aerospace, or BAE, in the production of weapons systems and aircraft construction. Leonardo also inherits a long-standing collaboration between Agusta and Westland, two British firms specializing in helicopters. Then, Rome feared it would occupy only a marginal position in a program dominated by France and Germany. Finally, Japan’s arrival profoundly changed the economic equation. It brought additional funding, advanced technological expertise and access to a major market. In the eyes of many Italian officials, GCAP offered more industrial influence and greater commercial prospects than the SCAF. Europe Facing the Trump Paradox The failure of the SCAF comes in a particularly sensitive context. For several years, and even more so since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, European leaders have insisted on the need to strengthen their strategic autonomy. The American F-35, shown here in its short take-off and vertical landing version. Uncertainty surrounding the American commitment to NATO has pushed many governments to increase military spending and to call for a more integrated European industry. Yet the abandonment of Europe’s main aerospace program produces exactly the opposite effect. Instead of converging toward a common platform, Europeans now find themselves divided between several competing projects. Industrial fragmentation risks leading to duplicated investments, scattered resources and, paradoxically, prolonged dependence on American systems such as the F-35, already chosen by several European countries, including Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands. The Problem May Not Be Dassault It is tempting to look for a single culprit behind the failure of the program. Yet a broader analysis leads to a different conclusion. The SCAF reveals above all the structural limits of European cooperation in defense. Unlike the United States, Europe has neither a federal government capable of imposing arbitration, nor a single military doctrine, nor a main customer comparable to the Pentagon. Each European state retains its own strategic priorities, industrial interests and budgetary constraints. In this context, the disagreements between Dassault, Airbus, Paris and Berlin appear less as an anomaly than as the symptom of a deeper problem. Nor should it be ignored that Europe has already traveled a long road toward technological autonomy. Earlier bilateral cooperation projects proved to be commercial and technological successes: the Franco-British Concorde, Jaguar and Lynx and Gazelle helicopters, as well as the Franco-German Alpha Jet trainer aircraft, used by the Patrouille de France. The examples are numerous. The Eurofighter Typhoon already offered an alternative to the Rafale. The result of cooperation between London, Berlin, Rome and Madrid, it enjoyed solid export performance. But the real commercial and industrial success remains Airbus, the European consortium that not only broke the near-monopoly of the United States in civil aviation — excluding the USSR, of course — but also surpassed today’s only current civil competitor, the American company Boeing. Airbus could never have come into being without a common European political decision. The project remains a milestone in European integration, on the same level as the Maastricht Treaty or the creation of the euro. Alas, history will remember that alongside these successful partnerships, others never moved beyond preliminary negotiations. A Lesson for the Future History may remember that the SCAF did not fail because it lacked funding or technology. It failed because its promoters never managed to answer a fundamental question: who was actually supposed to lead the program, and in whose interest? The industrial players defended their expertise. Governments protected their national interests. Political leaders invoked Europe while pursuing sometimes contradictory objectives. Taken separately, each of these behaviors may appear rational. Collectively, they led to the abandonment of the very project that was supposed to strengthen the continent’s strategic integration and power. At a time when Europeans are questioning their security in an increasingly unstable international environment, the failure of the SCAF is a severe warning. It is a reminder that common defense cannot rest solely on political declarations. It also requires a shared willingness to give up part of one’s national prerogatives in favor of a collective objective. More than the Ukrainian conflict and the Russian threat, more than the economic crisis and the scarcity of funds, more than the unfounded Euroscepticism of a few radical leaders, it may ultimately have been this willingness that was missing. The Consequences for the Middle East The failure of the SCAF is not only a setback for Europe’s defense industry. It could also have significant repercussions in the Middle East, a region that remains one of the world’s main markets for fighter aircraft. For two decades, the Gulf states and several Levantine countries have played an essential role in the commercial success of the European aerospace industry. Rafale sales to Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates helped ensure the long-term viability of the French sector. For its part, the Eurofighter notably equips Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Facing Europe and America, China is catching up technologically as best it can and has managed to produce a stealth aircraft, the Chengdu J-20, “Mighty Dragon,” for its People’s Liberation Army. The SCAF was supposed to allow Europe to preserve this presence over the long term by offering, by the 2040-2050 horizon, a platform capable of competing with future American and Asian systems. Its abandonment now opens a period of uncertainty. On the one hand, France may be tempted to continue developing the Rafale family alone, or to develop a national successor. Such an option would preserve its strategic autonomy but would mechanically reduce the economies of scale that a common European program would have provided. On the other hand, the GCAP, led by the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, could establish itself as Europe’s main next-generation competitor. The Gulf monarchies, historically close to London and already users of the Eurofighter, will closely follow the development of this program. This fragmentation, however, could weaken Europe’s overall position vis-à-vis the United States. The F-35 currently enjoys a considerable advantage: it is produced in large numbers, backed by the world’s leading military power and integrated into a vast operational ecosystem shared by many Western allies. The more Europeans divide themselves between several competing programs, the harder it becomes to rival that critical mass. Another major competitor: Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57. A few countries, such as Algeria or India, ventured into this project, which remains essentially at the trial stage. For Middle Eastern countries, this situation could result in greater diversification of suppliers. Some will continue to favor American systems, others will place their bets on European platforms, while a few actors may be tempted, in the longer term, to explore emerging alternatives from Asia, as China and South Korea have begun acquiring new stealth technologies and the alloys used in engine design. Beyond commercial considerations, the disappearance of the SCAF raises a broader question: what place does Europe intend to occupy in the Middle East’s security architecture over the coming decades? The export of a fighter aircraft is never merely an industrial transaction. It creates lasting partnerships, logistical dependencies, cooperation in training, maintenance and intelligence, and sometimes even strategic alignment. Decisions regarding sources of arms procurement are an eminently strategic exercise. The American F-35, for example, was first exported to Israel, the United States’ main ally, while Turkey was excluded from the project — and therefore from the supply of components — and deprived of its $1.4 billion prepayment, because Mr. Erdogan chose to acquire the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. By giving up its main joint aerospace project, Europe therefore risks losing more than an industrial program. It could lose part of its ability to exert political influence in a region where competition among great powers continues to intensify. The main handicap for the Russians and the Chinese remains their technological deficit. It is especially visible in electronics and engines. In this photo, the black smoke emitted by the engines of this Su-57 betrays a design dating back to the 1960s.

To illustrate his point and give it a biblical dimension, Pope Leo XIV uses, in his encyclical Magnifica humanitas on the digital age and Artificial Intelligence (AI), a metaphor: humanity must choose between building a new “Tower of Babel” or building the “Holy City.” The story of the Tower of Babel is a biblical episode from the Book of Genesis. Shortly after the Flood, while all human beings spoke the same language, they set out to build a city and a tower whose top would reach the heavens, in order to make a name for themselves. Then God confused their language so that they could no longer understand one another, and scattered them over the face of the earth (Genesis 11:1-9). The myth proved remarkably fertile in the history of ideas and inspired reflections on the origin of linguistic diversity, the power of collective effort, the sin of pride, the totalization of knowledge, and more. The theme of the “Holy City,” introduced in the Book of Nehemiah, closes the New Testament and occupies a central place in the work of Saint Augustine. The Holy City symbolizes everything that is humanly and divinely possible and desirable: peace, justice, relations of friendship between Christ and his saints, doctrinal fidelity, and so on. For the Christian faith, it is up to humanity to rise above itself in order to build this City, following the major orientations of the Church’s social doctrine. The irresponsibility of “Realpolitik” Yet, describing the world in which we live, Leo XIV observes that, far from all the promises nations made after the Second World War, and the cry of “Never again war” that Europe had proclaimed, “the logic of armed balance and deterrence seems to be returning and imposing itself.” “But unlike the bipolar scenario of the Cold War,” the Pope adds, “the multiplication of actors and fronts of conflict today makes this logic increasingly fragile. The intensification of confrontations leads to asymmetric and ‘hybrid’ wars, waged also on the economic, financial and digital fronts, with the use of disinformation and campaigns that fuel fear in order to influence public opinion. In many countries, including countries of the Global South, the increase in military spending is presented as the only response to an uncertain future or to perceived threats, while the real cost is borne by the poorest, who see resources allocated to health, education and social services reduced. “Behind all this,” Leo XIV insists, “lies a false ‘realism,’ based not only on the well-established logic of force, but also on a cultural and anthropological conviction, as though war were inevitably part of human nature. It has always been so, people say, except for brief interludes, and it will always be so! The problem is therefore no longer peace, which has been lost as a reference point in the international landscape, but how and when to act militarily, while claiming that it would be irresponsible not to prepare for inevitable confrontation. What is truly irresponsible is Realpolitik, this form of political ‘realism’ that sows in consciences and in culture resignation to inevitable war, and that considers peace and dialogue to be utopian or irrational positions that ignore the risks at stake.” (§205) The mode of production of the digital economy On another level, Leo XIV elaborates on the mode of production of the digital economy. It rests, he says, “on the silent labor of millions of human beings, employed in activities that are barely visible but essential: data labeling, content moderation — often of very harmful content — and model training. In many cases, these are young people, mostly women, who work laboriously for poverty wages. To this invisible fatigue is added another, even more brutal one: the extraction of the resources needed to produce the devices and microprocessors on which AI depends.” “In certain regions of the world,” the Sovereign Pontiff stresses, “children and adolescents work, in dangerous conditions, crushing the materials from which rare earths are extracted. Bodies marked, mutilated, used so that the flow of computation may never be interrupted. In addition, criminal networks use online platforms, messaging systems, anonymous payments and profiling techniques to recruit, control and move victims of trafficking, often minors, turning men and women into ‘data’ to be tracked and ‘packages’ to be moved within the same digital circuits that sustain a large part of the global economy.” He adds: “This reality deeply challenges the moral conscience of our time. It is not enough to invoke efficiency, nor to celebrate the benefits of innovation, if they rest on a chain of exploitation that remains deliberately invisible.” Peace, the fruit of justice and charity For Pope Prevost, “peace is not a naïve hope nor a mere absence of war,” but “the fruit, always possible, of justice and charity.” Illustrating this statement, Leo cites J.R.R. Tolkien, the great British Catholic writer of the 20th century, who describes our responsibility through the words of Gandalf, one of the protagonists of The Lord of the Rings trilogy: “It is not our part, however, to master all the tides of the world, but to do what is in us for the succor of those years wherein we are set, uprooting the evil in the fields that we know, so that those who live after may have clean earth to till.” For us, whose arable lands and olive groves are sprayed with glyphosate and phosphorus, these words should resonate particularly strongly. Next article: Against the post-humanist illusion, the capacity for relationship and love (3/3) Read also on the same theme: Leo XIV’s Magnifica humanitas, a Foundational Text on AI (1/3)

At the very moment that a conference was being held in Paris at the French National Assembly, giving a voice to our free Shiite fellow citizens*, a village in southern Lebanon, perched 180 meters above sea level, was making itself remembered. On Friday, June 5, a spirit of defiance arose in Baysarieh: a scuffle broke out between local residents - mostly Twelver Shiites and supporters of Nabih Berri - and Hezbollah militants who wanted to install rocket launchers in the middle of the village. The Lebanese Army had to intervene to separate the opposing sides and restore order. A video captured the collective clash which, in a supreme irony, took place in a street adorned with pistachio-green banners bearing the colors of the Amal Movement! The incident occurred at the very moment when the Emergency Operations Center of the Ministry of Public Health informed us that Lebanon had suffered 3,558 deaths and 10,870 injuries since March 2, the date on which Hezbollah reignited the fuse, supposedly to avenge the execution of Iran’s Supreme Leader. Some will say that this is not too high a price to pay for the Iranian support that contributed to the liberation of South Lebanon and to that of Al-Aqsa Mosque. Exasperation Is Spreading Baysarieh, however, was not the only entity to rear up in protest across the country. At the same time, as though they had coordinated their actions, the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister “mutinied” against Hezbollah’s prevailing narrative. Joseph Aoun told CNN that Iran had no right to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip, that Naim Qassem did not represent Lebanon, and that the only sensible option was negotiation to bring a definitive end to the state of hostility between Lebanon and Israel. Nawaf Salam, for his part, pushed back by reminding everyone that Lebanon was not a battlefield where others could settle their scores and that the people of the South should not have to pay the price of “calculations over which they have no control.” Under the circumstances, all that remained was for Speaker Nabih Berri to speak out. Yet we shall draw a veil over his remarks, dictated as they are by the reverential fear that Hezbollah inspires in him. In any case, Baysarieh has already spoken on his behalf, in the name of the Amal Movement and of all Shiites outraged by the absurdity of the continuing fighting and by the monopolization of power by the Iranian-backed militia. As elsewhere throughout Lebanon, exasperation is spreading and becoming widespread in the face of destruction and population displacement. The seemingly immovable Nabih Berri may refuse to endorse the agreement reached in Washington, but his electoral base no longer appears willing to bear the cost of Naim Qassem’s reckless adventures. Waiting So Long Before Overturning the Table! Until recently, Lebanon’s official circles had remained discreet. One had to be careful not to offend the Resistance; it was to be handled with kid gloves. Out of respect and consideration for Hezbollah’s sacrifices, one was not supposed to tarnish its image as a liberator. But suddenly, a paradigm shift! The narrative is no longer the same. It is as though an “epistemological break” had occurred - that is, a radical change in the way reality is perceived, breaking with the previous discourse and the clichés imposed upon us by the Iranian party and its enforcers. This change alone is a sign of liberation, for over many years the Executive had adopted Hezbollah’s rhetoric as its own. As a result, our republican state resembled more a Commedia dell’arte performance than a serious polity. Our leaders had become little more than grimacers and actors, laboring to defend the theses of the Party of God - theses they inwardly rejected. So, to hell with the delicacy that has long surrounded the issue of direct negotiations with Israel. Tensions will evidently rise another notch, and a process of emancipation will begin. It may go so far as to officially compile and publish the list of serial crimes committed by the Party of God. Thank you, Baysarieh; thank you, Palais Bourbon. The fear that Hezbollah once instilled in its own community, as well as in certain political circles, no longer prevails. *Conference: “Lebanon Between Peace and War: State Legitimacy and the Role of Civil Society,” French National Assembly, Paris, June 5, 2026. The speakers, who held Hezbollah and the Iranian “holy alliance” responsible for the current catastrophe, called for the restoration of the rule of law.

Is the transitional 'memorandum of understanding' intended to end the war between the United States and Iran really close to being finalized? The triumphalist announcement made by President Donald Trump about an 'imminent deal' with Iran has already been undermined by 'leaks' in Iranian state-controlled media, which continue to proclaim that the Islamic Republic got everything it was seeking: control of the Strait of Hormuz, the immediate release of frozen funds, the lifting of sanctions, and American investment to revive the Iranian economy… A post by Trump on his social media platform abruptly set the record straight. However, it seems unlikely that this will prevent a deal from being reached — a view reinforced Friday evening by an announcement from the Pakistani mediator, who officially confirmed that the two sides had reached an agreement. So what happened during this long day? Friday in the Levant began under the most promising of signs. 'We have just reached a very good agreement to end the war with Iran, and once the documents are finalized — which should happen within the next few days — we will probably have a signing, perhaps in Europe,' President Trump declared from the Oval Office, as reported by AFP. This announcement by Donald Trump, which has a familiar ring to it, generated enormous ink — in both the American and Iranian press. As for the former, it widely reported that the deal would be signed soon: Bloomberg News wrote that the document would be signed at the G7 summit in Geneva, Switzerland, on Sunday. According to Axios, Vice President JD Vance's visit to Switzerland is already being arranged in anticipation of the signing. The American outlet highlighted both the Qatari and Pakistani mediation efforts that apparently made this breakthrough possible. Indeed, still according to Axios, the Qatari mediator signed the 'agreement in principle' with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran. The American and Iranian versions The Iranian press, true to its habits as regime-controlled media, did echo the strong possibility of an imminent deal — but went into considerable detail about what the terms of the truce would supposedly be. According to these outlets, Iran would have secured continued control over the Strait of Hormuz, the release of its frozen assets (figures of $24 billion, or at least half that amount, are being floated), the lifting of sanctions and the American blockade on ports, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region bordering Iran, as well as the right to continue uranium enrichment. According to the Mehr news agency, ballistic missiles are not mentioned in the text, and the framework agreement allows a six-month period to reach a final deal. Reports coming out of Tehran also indicated that a final decision had not yet been made by Iranian authorities, denying that the signing had been scheduled for Sunday. It was these media 'leaks' that proved to be the fly in the ointment, triggering Donald Trump's fury on his Truth Social platform. 'The conditions the Iranians leaked to their media have nothing to do with the terms of the deal we reached,' he thundered, stating that 'the Iranians are very dishonorable' and that it is impossible to negotiate in good faith with them. 'They had better correct course, and fast!' he also wrote. A U.S. administration official laid out Washington's position to the al-Hadath network's correspondent: no funds will be released until the agreement is implemented, enriched uranium will be removed from Iranian territory, and nuclear facilities will be fully dismantled. Another key clause, according to the Saudi network, will require Iran to stop funding proxies in the region — a matter of significant concern for Lebanon. The source confirmed that Iran has agreed to these terms. Netanyahu: Iran Will Not Get the Bomb Against the backdrop of statements regarding a potential deal to be signed soon between Washington and Tehran — a process from which Tel Aviv has been notably excluded — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was quick to declare that he was "in full agreement" with Donald Trump that Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon, adding that this would not happen "as long as he remains Prime Minister." Meanwhile, fighting in southern Lebanon continued on Friday with the same intensity between the Israeli army and Hezbollah. According to al-Hadath, the Israelis announced that they had seized control of all the hills overlooking the strategic city of Nabatieh in southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah continues its attacks, including through the use of drones. The fate of this front has been in question ever since talk of an imminent deal on the Iranian regional front began. On one hand, reports in Iranian media insist that any potential agreement would include a clause calling for a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon. On the other hand, Israeli sources have reportedly stated that a deal between Iran and the United States would not cover the Lebanese front, "given that Israeli authorities are engaged in direct talks with Lebanese authorities in a separate process in Washington," pan-Arab media noted. The question remained open on Friday in Lebanon, especially since the ceasefire in Iran in early April did not automatically lead to a similar measure in Lebanon — bearing in mind that ceasefires reached through direct negotiations have not fared much better. What is clear, however, is that this forthcoming agreement is already fueling domestic controversy. Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah voices have already begun adopting a triumphalist tone. MP Hassan Fadlallah, in his characteristically provocative manner, rushed to declare that a deal "will have repercussions" for Lebanon, "whether Lebanese officials accept it or not." The lawmaker was invoking his party's go-to argument that only a ceasefire negotiated by Iran stands any real chance of success. He also took a swipe at President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, suggesting they have been "exploited" by Washington. Admittedly, Hassan Fadlallah appeared to soften his stance somewhat by stating that "Iran does not seek to replace the Lebanese state." Such remarks nonetheless drew a response from Prime Minister Salam, who accused the Islamic Republic of trying to demonstrate that it holds decision-making power in Lebanon. The debate over Iran's role in Lebanon, exercised through its local ally, shows no signs of dying down. Yet Washington sources, cited by several media outlets, continue to stress the American president's determination to keep the two files separate. This point will be one to watch in the coming days, in light of regional developments. New Saudi Arabian Ambassador Official Lebanon, for its part, continues to pursue a path of rapprochement with its Arab neighbors, long neglected. Beyond Saudi Arabia's decision, made the day before, to reopen its market to Lebanese agricultural products — which is expected to have a major impact on Lebanon's agricultural sector — noteworthy as well is the visit of Saudi envoy to Lebanon Yazid bin Farhan to President Aoun at the Baabda Palace on Thursday evening. The new Saudi ambassador, meanwhile, arrived in Beirut on Friday. Another major story this Friday: after a lengthy controversy surrounding a possible Syrian intervention in Lebanon to dismantle Hezbollah — following remarks made by Donald Trump on the subject — Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa categorically denied any involvement by his country in Lebanon's internal affairs.

The world today seems caught between the fever of the World Cup and the social media posts of American President Donald Trump, with all the immediate repercussions these carry for the violent swings in oil and gold prices, and for the considerable profits reaped by the speculations tied to them. Yet this media “noise” conceals behind it shifts that are deeper and more consequential, manifest in the redrawing of the network of regional and international alliances, driven by the accelerating fallout from the confrontation underway between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran and its ramifications on the other. The Arab partners of the United States in the Middle East have thus begun reassessing their strategic positioning and their traditional alliances, even if the contours of these reconfigurations have not yet fully taken shape. The United Arab Emirates is adopting a firmer stance towards Iran, while continuing to strengthen its ties with both Israel and India; Saudi Arabia, for its part, has activated a closer defence cooperation with Pakistan, intensifying at the same time its political and security coordination with Turkey and Egypt. In the face of these developments, the expression “New Middle East”, which gained wide currency in recent years, no longer seems capable of accurately capturing the emerging reality, nor of encompassing the new strategic alliances that are reshaping the region’s security architecture and its balances of power. The traditional conception of this “New Middle East” has thus been overtaken by the facts now taking hold. While these strategic transformations await clearer definition, global markets continue to be agitated by speculations and political declarations that have become capable of shifting capital and fortunes within minutes. And in the meantime, the poor and developing countries continue to bear the heaviest price of these disruptions. Every rise in energy or food prices, every upheaval in global markets, lands directly on the lives of citizens in these countries, who find themselves at the mercy of decisions and events over which they have no influence whatsoever. It is here that the need asserts itself to reconsider the development models in place, and to work earnestly towards achieving the highest possible degree of self-sufficiency in food, energy and production, drawing on the strengthening of national unity and the combined efforts of all the children of the nation, whether they live at home or are settled in the furthest corners of the world. Experience has shown that the states which succeeded in building the foundations of their own strength were the most capable of weathering global crises, and the most able to defend their national interests with genuine independence. And in the end, it is popular wisdom that gives the most fitting expression to this truth: “If you want something done, do it yourself.” The nations that rely on their own capacities and invest in the talents of their people are the best placed to protect their future and to safeguard the independence of their economic and political decision-making.

Amid the political and media clamour surrounding the ongoing negotiations between Lebanon and Israel under American sponsorship, many are absorbed by the traditional question: does Israel want peace? Are we standing before a new phase in relations between the two countries, or merely facing security arrangements imposed by the balance of power that emerged from the war? But the truth is that this question, however important, is not the most important one for Lebanon. The fundamental question today does not concern what Israel wants, but what Lebanon has managed to reclaim for itself after long decades of confiscation of its national decision-making. For the first time in many years, Lebanon is not sitting at the negotiating table as a battlefield or a bargaining chip in the hands of others, but as a state representing itself. And this shift, in and of itself, constitutes the most significant political event in everything that is currently unfolding. The Lebanese have unfortunately grown accustomed to seeing their country serve as part of other people's wars. They have grown accustomed to seeing the existential dossiers of war, peace, sovereignty and security managed outside legitimate institutions, and to seeing the state reduced to a mere witness to decisions taken elsewhere. During many periods of our recent history, it was not Lebanon that negotiated — Lebanon was the very object of negotiation. And the Lebanese always paid the price. The price of wars whose timing they had not decided. The price of settlements in whose drafting they had not participated. The price of regional conflicts that had turned their homeland into a mailbox for other people's military and political messages. Today, for the first time in a long while, the picture seems different. Not because Israel has suddenly changed, nor because the region has become more peaceful, but because the Lebanese state has begun to reclaim a fundamental sovereign right: the right to speak in Lebanon's name. Lebanese may diverge on the details of the negotiations. Positions may differ on certain clauses, orientations or priorities — and that is something natural and healthy in any democratic society. But what ought to be the subject of national consensus is that the Lebanese decision has returned to constitutional institutions, and that it is the state that manages this dossier on behalf of all Lebanese. This is precisely where the real value of the current process lies. For states are not measured solely by the extent of their territory, the size of their population or the volume of their economy, but by their capacity to hold the monopoly on sovereign decision-making. And sovereignty is not a slogan raised on ceremonial occasions — it is a daily practice that begins with the mastery of the right to decide on war and peace, and ends with the state's capacity to speak on behalf of its citizens on the international stage. From this standpoint, the debate over Israel's intentions becomes less important than the debate over how to protect Lebanon's newly acquired gain. Yes, Israel seeks to defend its security interests — this is a reality that needs no discovery. Every state negotiates from its own interests, seeks its own security and stability, and attempts to obtain as much as possible. But the question that should occupy the Lebanese is this: has Lebanon finally become capable of defending its national interests through its legitimate institutions? If the answer is yes, then we stand before a historical turning point that transcends the results of the negotiations themselves. Agreements can succeed or fail. Understandings can be implemented or stumble. But the recovery by the state of its natural role remains a long-term strategic gain. Lebanon paid an exorbitant price when the decision over war and peace left the state's institutions. It paid a heavier price still when Lebanese priorities became entangled with regional agendas. And it paid an immense price when the fate of the Lebanese became bound to calculations that bore no relation to the Lebanese national interest. This is why the real challenge today lies not only in reaching the best possible agreement, but in preventing any return to the past — that is to say, in preventing the decision from being wrested from the state once again and returned to the spheres of influence, the axes and the external conflicts. What would be most dangerous is for the debate over the negotiations to transform into a new internal confrontation among the Lebanese. For past experience has shown that internal division has always been the door through which the outside world infiltrated the national decision. When institutions converge around the superior Lebanese interest, however, Lebanon becomes more resilient in the face of pressure and better able to defend its rights. What Lebanon needs today is not merely a truce on its borders, but a truce with its own political history — a history built on the duality of decision-making. It needs not only security arrangements, but the consolidation of the principle that the state alone is the ultimate reference point in the great national causes. This is the true meaning of the citizenship state for which we struggle — a state that is not reduced to a sect, a party or an axis. A state in which all citizens are equal before the law, all forces are subject to institutions, and all sovereign decisions emanate solely from legitimate authority. For without a state, there is no citizenship. And without sovereignty, there is no state. And there is no sovereignty when decision-making is scattered among multiple centres of power. This is why the political value of the current negotiations lies not only in the understandings or agreements they may produce, but in the fact that they reflect the beginning of Lebanon's transition from the position of a battlefield to that of a state — from the position of the recipient to that of a partner, and from the position of a bargaining chip to that of the one who holds the cards. And it is this turning point that must be preserved, whatever developments may come. If the last century was marked by the Lebanese struggle over the identity of the state, the coming phase must be that of reclaiming the state itself — a state strong through its institutions, free in its decision, sovereign over its territory, one in whose name only those elected by the Lebanese and empowered by the Constitution to represent the Lebanese Republic may speak. The road will perhaps not be easy, and it will no doubt be strewn with obstacles, pressures and challenges. But what has been achieved thus far deserves to be preserved. For nations are built not only through military victories or political agreements, but through the construction of institutions and the recovery of national decision-making. And in the end, while the Lebanese may diverge on the results of the negotiations, they should not diverge on a single truth: the Lebanon that negotiates for itself is worth a thousand times the Lebanon on whose behalf others negotiate.