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Homage

Lionel Messi or the Re-enchantment of the World

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By Michel Hajji Georgiou
Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix , Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix , thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer . And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina . Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
Analyze

Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
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By Mona Fayad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
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The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
Opinion

Portents of an Israeli-Turkish Clash in Syria

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By Youssef Mouawad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 13:25
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In 2010, Israel violently intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship chartered by a humanitarian NGO to bring aid to the Gaza Strip, which was under Israeli blockade at the time. This was the last straw, and the incident brought the simmering hostility between Erdogan's government and the Jewish state out into the open. (AFP)
The war has not yet ceased in our south, and already it threatens to break out among our neighbors. In other words, we live on borrowed time, lurching from one conflict to the next. And for good reason! The bombing of a Syrian base very nearly escalated into an all-out clash between Ankara and Tel Aviv. That was on August 18, and Benjamin Netanyahu didn't mince his words: his country would not tolerate a Turkish military foothold that could spread into southern Syria. The warning was all the more forceful given that eight strikes had targeted the Abu al-Dhuhur air base, just 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. It's worth recalling, too, that since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Erdogan has become the chief mentor of the new Syria under Ahmed al-Sharaa, helping rebuild its armed forces and turning it into a strategic partner. This is no longer Hafez al-Assad's Syria Was it this renewed tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv that prompted a meeting between Syria's top diplomat, Assaad Chaibani, and Mossad chief Roman Gofman, in Jordan on August 23? Yet this quiet parley did not spark outrage across the Arab world the way Anwar al-Sadat's surprise visit to Israel did in 1977. A taboo was officially broken—and indeed, who would have imagined such talks taking place under the Baathist regime? Israel might have been expected to welcome this, but contrary to expectations, it halted neither its airstrikes nor its territorial incursions, as seen on August 27 in Quneitra. The fact is, things have changed. Under Hafez al-Assad, Syria was a regional power that, while not exactly formidable, was feared by its immediate neighbors, Arab or otherwise. No one wanted to pick a fight with it, which allowed it to pursue, within certain limits, an assertive foreign policy that often bordered on provocation. As a result, thanks to the autonomy it exercised and the room to maneuver it granted itself, Syria had become, at least geographically, a buffer zone between an "Erdoganist" Turkey flaunting its unabashed brand of Islam on one side, and Israel, a state Jewish to its core, on the other. But now, in a country worn down by Baathist mismanagement and ravaged by years of civil war, Turkey has begun staking its claims—and will inevitably find itself face to face with an Israel that occupies part of Syrian territory. What can we expect? Given the outsized egos of both Netanyahu and Erdogan, and assuming both leaders remain in power, we should brace for an epic showdown across Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, or even other territories. This will be a fight of feints and dodges, of underhanded tactics as well as head-on attacks, close combat, and rising tensions right up to the breaking point. And this despite a September 2025 report from the Congressional Research Service concluding that direct confrontation between Turkey and Israel remains unlikely, precisely because both states are well aware of the cost such a war would entail. Still, in the realm of conflict studies, leaders and other elites don't always act rationally! All the more so since, in the eyes of Israeli observers, the slogan now popular in Anatolia—"Make Turkey great again"—hardly reassures the Zionist state. Washington will find it increasingly difficult to contain or keep apart two adversaries already gearing up for battle. Turkey, the new Iran? Yes, that's one hypothesis, but only in a face-off with Israel, since Syria has overnight become a zone where 'two security perimeters overlap' — the Turkish and the Israeli, the Muslim and the Jewish. And it can't be ruled out that Shiite militancy, that mobilizer of "proxies," might end up allying itself, even if only temporarily, with a 'Muslim Brotherhood version' of political Islam championed by Ankara! So we would have, against all odds, a Hezbollah backed by its former enemy, Ahmad al-Sharaa, an Islamist who emerged from Jabhat al-Nusra and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham! Against a common adversary, a reversal of alliances is always legitimate and opportune. But this would only be a tactical alliance, dictated by the exigencies of the moment, one that couldn't presume anything about the future. With Arab nationalism now out of the picture, Turkey won't settle for economically capturing the Syrian market of 25 million consumers: it will want to wield political influence in Damascus, and to that end will deploy its military and security apparatus. Since the shaky power of the Syrian president can't fulfill certain sovereign functions or oversee the various branches of the state, it will inevitably turn to the expertise of its northern neighbor. Does this mean Turkey will get sucked into the spiral of 'announced belligerence'? Everything points that way, and we can already see the early signs of a spiral reminiscent of the US involvement in Vietnam under Lyndon Johnson. Indeed, if the Syrian state intends to rebuild itself, it will first need an army capable of quelling the centrifugal tendencies of the Alawites, the Druze, and other factions calling for the country's breakup. And it's up to Ankara to provide that and to bolster the central authority based in Damascus. But Israel, which has gotten into bad habits in Syria and intends to keep its freedom of aerial action there, cannot tolerate an army built along NATO lines that could serve as a proxy for a neo-Ottoman venture. And Lebanon, from primary stage to secondary stage? A new stage is now set for a new script that will define new rules of the game! What will become of Hezbollah, caught in a trap? Well, in that scenario, it could benefit, even if only partly, from Damascus's logistical support — support it has sorely lacked since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. And perhaps, through a shift in the tectonic plates, Lebanon would move from being the initial stage to being merely a secondary stage of a regional conflict. But frankly, that would do us a lot of good!
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Out of Beirut… But Where To?

Out of Beirut… But Where To?

By
Rabih Dandachli
Published

In a country burdened by an unprecedented economic collapse, a persistent financial crisis and a crumbling infrastructure, the resurrection of Kleyaat airport in northern Lebanon has the feel of a project carrying as many ambitions as questions. But beyond the political and media enthusiasm that has accompanied this initiative, a more fundamental question demands to be asked: does Kleyaat truly represent the most viable option for Lebanon, or has the real debate around a second airport in the country not yet begun? This is not about opposing the project as such. Having a second airport in Lebanon is no longer a luxury, but a national, security and economic necessity. The experience of recent years has shown with stark clarity how exposed the country becomes when it depends on a single airport, whether in times of war, security crises, or under the mounting operational pressure bearing down on Beirut airport. The principle commands near-universal agreement. The disagreement starts with a different question: why Kleyaat? And why now? Geographically, Kleyaat airport holds undeniable advantages. It has an existing runway, is located in a region desperately in need of development projects, and remains relatively close to the coast and the main road networks. But geography alone does not suffice to define national priorities. When a project of this scale is placed on the table in a state with limited resources, it becomes legitimate to ask whether the economic and strategic feasibility studies have genuinely weighed Kleyaat against other options that have been on the table for years — chief among them Rayak airport in the Bekaa. Rayak's proponents argue that this site would offer Lebanon an aerial gateway in the depth of the territory, removed from the coastline and the northern borders, and more naturally oriented toward the Arab hinterland. The Bekaa also forms a geographical hub connecting north to south and east to west, which would give any airport built in this region a national dimension capable of transcending regional considerations. On the other side, Kleyaat's advocates maintain that Lebanon does not merely need additional airport infrastructure, but a development project capable of breathing new life into a region weakened by decades of marginalization. The debate then shifts from an economic question to a political one: is the airport conceived to serve air transport, or to restore a development balance between the regions? The problem is that the Lebanese state has yet to offer a clear vision that answers this question. Airports are not simply runways, but components of a national strategy for transport, economy and investment. When countries that succeed build new airports, they do so within an integrated network encompassing ports, highways, industrial zones, logistics platforms and regional development plans. In Lebanon, the debate sometimes gives the impression of turning around the airport while setting aside everything that surrounds it. The question of the project's timing equally raises legitimate concerns. Lebanon today is not merely facing a transport crisis or congestion at Beirut airport, but a financial and structural crisis of rare depth. Public debt is heavy, foreign investment remains timid, and the major economic reforms are still stalled. In this context, the question is no longer only whether Lebanon needs a second airport, but whether this project represents the most urgent priority when set against the files of electricity, water, public transport and reconstruction. This is not to say the project is unnecessary. On the contrary, it may well figure among the most important strategic undertakings Lebanon will need over the coming decade. But its success will not be determined by the decision to resume operations: it will depend on its capacity to integrate into a comprehensive economic vision. This is where the core difficulty lies. Lebanon has a long history of projects conceived more as political symbols than as economic instruments. Competition between regions, confessions and political forces has more often than not taken precedence over purely technical and economic debate. It is therefore necessary, today, to ask the question plainly: did the choice of Kleyaat prevail because it is the best option for the country, or because it is the most compatible with the political balances currently in place? Kleyaat may indeed be the right project. And Rayak, or another site, could prove more relevant over the long term. But the real problem lies not in the name of the location — it lies in the absence of a serious national debate on the criteria of choice themselves. Countries do not build their airports on the basis of internal geopolitics alone, nor on balanced regional development alone, nor from isolated security considerations. They do so on the basis of a coherent vision that defines where Lebanon intends to stand economically in twenty or thirty years. This is why the debate around Kleyaat should not be confined to the number of flights, the volume of investments or the jobs expected. It is, in its deepest nature, a debate about the way Lebanon makes its decisions. Are major projects still built according to the logic of political balances and communal power-sharing, or has the country finally begun to embrace strategic planning?

Hezbollah Disarmament Urged by G7

Hezbollah Disarmament Urged by G7

By
Taline Becharraoui
Published

Since a ceasefire in Lebanon was mentioned in the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States – the text of which was released by the State Department on Wednesday evening (see below) – speculation has been rife over what developments may in the country in the short term. Not only does the ceasefire remain extremely fragile, but uncertainty also surrounds a possible Israeli troop withdrawal and the central issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament. While the party and its Iranian backers have already declared “victory” following the conclusion of the framework agreement, several developments on Wednesday cast doubt on that narrative advanced by the Iranian camp. The first came from the G7 leaders, gathered in Evian, France. In a joint statement, the leaders of the world’s major powers called for an “immediate and durable” ceasefire in Lebanon. They also expressed support for efforts by the Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah and ensure that the Lebanese state retains sole authority over weapons. The G7 statement further reiterated “the threats posed by Iran to the region,” stressing that Teheran “must never acquire a nuclear weapon.” The document also welcomed the framework agreement reached between the United States and Iran, which notably provides for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. It further highlighted the role that Britain and France could play in mine-clearance operations and in facilitating the reopening of the strategic waterway. Another sign came from President Joseph Aoun’s renewed commitment to freeing Lebanon from Iranian influence. The Lebanese president left little doubt on Wednesday, stressing that Lebanon was pursuing a path “independent” of the agreement reached between Washington and Tehran. Aoun spoke of the “assurances” given to the Lebanese state regarding the direct negotiations it has been holding with Israel in Washington since early April. The next round of talks is due to take place on June 23-25. The Lebanese state is “conducting the negotiations,” is “master of its own decisions,” and “no one can take its place,” the president said in a statement. The comments appeared to be a response to Hezbollah officials who had swiftly urged him to abandon the direct talks with Israel, arguing that Lebanon would be better off relying on Iran to plead its case. The president also made a point of thanking all those helping Lebanon secure a ceasefire, including Iran, in a move that reflected a degree of flexibility and a desire to build internal consensus, while remaining consistent in his position on Lebanese sovereignty. Aoun in Washington? It should be noted in this context that President Donald Trump said during the day, on the sidelines of his visit to France, that President Aoun would travel to Washington “within two weeks.” A senior US official also indicated that Aoun’s visit to Washington would likely take place by mid-July. Reiterating his administration’s determination to establishing “peace in Lebanon,” the U.S. president stressed the need to “settle the Hezbollah issue one way or another.” He again pressed the point that “Syria will play a positive role in countering Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Late in the evening, a U.S. source told Al-Hadath television that “the decision on war and peace in Lebanon must rest with the legitimate government,” adding that “we have made it clear to Lebanon that safeguarding its sovereignty and regional stability requires the state’s to hold a monopoly on arms.” Separately, a senior U.S. administration official told MTV that “the agreement does not impose an immediate, comprehensive ceasefire in Lebanon at any price.” “Iran must rein in Hezbollah and prevent it from attacking Israel,” the official said, adding that “if Hezbollah attacks Israel, Israel reserves the right to respond militarily.” It should also be noted in this context that, according to AFP-reported information, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam could be received in Paris on Thursday by French President Emmanuel Macron. A diplomatic source at the G7, cited by AFP, said Macron and Salam are expected to discuss the “implementation of the G7 communiqué” on Lebanon. Amnesty International and Israel’s occupation Meanwhile, fighting continues in southern Lebanon and appears to be intensifying, particularly around the Ali Taher hill, a strategic position on the heights overlooking Nabatieh that Israeli forces have been attempting to capture for several days. On the political front, calls in Israeli continue for Israeli forces not to withdraw from the occupied territories. Far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said that the Israeli military would not withdraw from Lebanon “either by Friday or afterwards,” in reference to the Iran-U.S. framework agreement set to be signed in Geneva on Friday. A report published by international human rights NGO Amnesty International accused Israel of committing “war crimes” through the systematic use of forced displacement, saying that Israeli forces currently occupy nearly 6% of Lebanese territory. The Iranian military also intervened again in Lebanon on Wednesday, threatening Israel with a “severe response” if Israeli strikes do not stop. Meanwhile, Hezbollah also continued its attacks: late in the afternoon, the Israeli army reported that five of its soldiers were wounded in a drone strike on one of its vehicles in Nabatieh. “If they don’t behave…” The Iran file followed Donald Trump to the G7 meeting in France. While the U.S. president succeeded in bringing forward the conclusion of a deal with Iran ahead of the summit – seeking to claim a diplomatic win before his European allies, with whom relations have been more than strained since the start of his second term – he nonetheless faced a serie of press questions that drew at times sharp responses. He made clear from the outset that the agreement was “a memorandum of understanding” rather than a final deal, during a joint press conference with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. “And if the deal doesn’t satisfy me, if the Iranians don’t behave properly, we will go back to dropping bombs over their heads,” he added. He nonetheless described the document as “very solid.” The remarks were significant just two days before the agreement is due to be signed in Geneva. Trump was on the defensive when questioned about the $300 billion in investments reportedly pledged to Iran. He insisted the United States would “not invest ten cents” in Iran as long as the country does not comply with all the terms of the agreement, stressing that no money would be spent in Iran until further notice. According to leaked media reports, the memorandum of understanding states that the United States “and its regional partners” commit to drawing up a reconstruction and development plan for Iran, with financing of “at least $300 billion.” On reconstruction funding in a region battered by the conflict, China on Wednesday pledged to assist not only Iran – as it has already done – but also Lebanon. Is China seeking to expand its footprint in the region? There has so far been no reaction from Lebanese authorities. At sea in the Gulf, Iranian oil tankers had already crossed beyond the blockade zone on Wednesday morning. Text of US-Iran memorandum of understanding released by US The following is the text of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding, as read out by a senior US official to reporters on Wednesday: "The United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran have jointly agreed in good faith on (a date yet to be determined, the official said), on the following: "Paragraph 1 - The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war, by signing this MOU, declare an immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph. "Paragraph 2 - The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. "Paragraph 3 - The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days extendable with mutual consent. "Paragraph 4 - Immediately upon the signing of this MOU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal. "Paragraph 5 - Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states, in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz. "Paragraph 6 - The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers, and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America. "Paragraph 7 - The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions termination issue above mentioned, and express their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them. "Paragraph 8 - The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in Paragraph 7, with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the IAEA. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear needs, based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues above mentioned, and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiation in order to achieve mutual agreement on them. "Paragraph 9 - Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions, and will not deploy additional forces in the region. "Paragraph 10 - The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MOU, and until the termination of sanctions, US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc. "Paragraph 11 - The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly. "Paragraph 12 - The United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this MOU and the future compliance of the final deal. "Paragraph 13 - After signing this MOU and subject to the beginning of the implementation of Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of this MOU, and the continuing implementation of these measures, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will start negotiations regarding the final deal exclusively on the other paragraphs. "Paragraph 14 - The final deal will be endorsed by a binding UNSC resolution."

When the Hezb Recruits Children and Justifies It...

When the Hezb Recruits Children and Justifies It...

By
Mona Fayad
Published

When Hezbollah, or those orbiting within its sphere, are questioned about their practice of recruiting children — a category that UNICEF defines precisely, through the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as any human being under the age of eighteen — the answer invariably moves between a few registers: they claim the children want it themselves, that they are mature enough, or that it is perfectly normal and consistent with the practice of every revolution in history. A rosary of references then unspools, carrying us back several centuries. We find ourselves, at once, mired in countless fallacies. To begin with, the definition of age categories is not a fixed datum: it shifts across eras. It is worth consulting Ariès’s encyclopedic work on childhood in particular, and the Annales School more broadly. Childhood as a concept did not exist in the Middle Ages; the child was treated as a small adult. There was no clear boundary between the world of children and the world of adults — not in upbringing, not in clothing, not in play. Early integration into the adult world was the norm, and it was within that framework that their enlistment in wars was considered “acceptable.” But norms and concepts transform over time, which means that what was once held to be “natural” may become morally and legally inadmissible in another era. We know well that child labor was commonplace during the Industrial Revolution, and that it persists today in the most impoverished countries. Yet this has not prevented the international recognition of children’s rights and their need for protection and care on every level — educational, medical, and psychological — so as to support children in growing and flourishing in a healthy way. History itself thus demonstrates that societies abandon practices they once considered “normal.” It is within this logic that UNICEF made its legal determination, through the Convention on the Rights of the Child: every human being under the age of eighteen is a child. This is not a cultural opinion open to interpretation, but an international standard and a legal rule that imposes binding obligations, and underpins the policies of states and organizations alike. As for the argument drawn from revolutions, it is no less fallacious. Revolutions did indeed use children, but child labor was also acceptable at the time, the absence of education was unremarkable, slavery was legal, the deprivation of women’s rights was not only widespread but ordinary, and systematic violence was equally the norm. Does any of this make these things acceptable today? Of course not. There is another fallacy into which they sink: measuring the present by the standards of the past — a practice they extend, moreover, to every domain — while simultaneously availing themselves of the most advanced products of modern technology, from drones to digital media to smartphones, which we know facilitated the pager operation whose consequences are by now well known. One cannot live by the technology of the twenty-first century and justify one’s social practices by the standards of the Middle Ages. What they are actually doing is a redefinition of childhood: they drain the word of its contemporary meaning and replace it with an elastic definition — “aware,” “ready,” “mature” — in the service of policies dictated by their employer, Iran. They dismantle the definition of childhood in order to reconstruct it according to their needs. They convert the child from a “subject of protection” into an “instrument of conflict,” in direct contradiction and violation of developmental psychology, international law, and the whole of contemporary ethics. To invoke historical practices in order to justify the recruitment of children today is to deliberately ignore the evolution of human values and standards — just as one cannot justify slavery, child labor, or the oppression of women by arguing that they were once widespread. The existence of something in the past confers no legitimacy upon it in the present; otherwise, we would have to accept slavery and the dispossession of women of their rights. The problem does not lie in history itself, but in the attempt to instrumentalize it in order to justify what is no longer tolerable today. Everything they do amounts not to any kind of “fidelity to origins,” but to utilitarian selectivity and the projection of rules onto a reality governed by entirely different rules — in other words, they mix distinct normative frameworks in a manner that appears arbitrary but is in fact systematically calculated. One cannot live by the technology of the twenty-first century and justify one’s conduct by the standards of the Middle Ages. And if a concept has evolved, one cannot regress to earlier stages to legitimize the practices of today. What is actually happening is the stripping away of the child’s legal minority, his transformation into a “little fighter,” on the pretext that he is sufficiently “aware” of what he is doing — and it is precisely this mechanism that deprives him of the legal protection to which he is entitled. These same actors invoke international law when it serves them, and ignore it when it does not. They appeal to it when speaking of the rights of peoples, of aggression, of sovereignty… This is not a principled stance, but an instrumental use of norms, which we might name plainly: normative selectivity, or utilitarian double standards, exercised through the manipulation of concepts. The question is not what happened in the past, but what standards we adopt today, and whether we apply them consistently or use them selectively according to the interest of the moment — invoked when they serve the position, set aside when they do not, with the fundamental concepts redefined as needs require.

Is a Cultural Policy Possible in Lebanon? (2/2)

Is a Cultural Policy Possible in Lebanon? (2/2)

By
Fabienne Touma
Published

In a previous article, we noted that despite the succession of crises that have beset Lebanon, the country’s artistic scene has continued to display remarkable resilience, both at home and abroad. Exhibitions, festivals, gallery openings, new institutions and heritage initiatives: art and culture linked to Lebanon have never entirely disappeared, despite formidable challenges. On the contrary, they now appear to be regaining momentum, contributing to the emergence of a form of cultural diplomacy on the international stage and offering a glimpse of what could become a distinct cultural policy for the Land of the Cedars. But can this truly be described as a cultural policy? The question is worth asking at a time when Lebanon’s Ministry of Culture is stepping up its efforts and signaling its intention to reposition culture as a vital sector in the country’s development. Broadly speaking, a cultural policy encompasses the measures adopted by public authorities to support artistic creation, safeguard heritage, widen access to culture, foster inclusion and ensure a degree of territorial equity. It requires a coherent national vision, as well as mechanisms capable of sustaining cultural action over the long term. Yet a closer look at Lebanon’s current cultural landscape reveals a striking reality: much is happening, but most initiatives remain concentrated in Beirut. This centralization should not, however, overshadow the renewed dynamism emerging in the country. The reopening of the Empire Cinema in Tripoli, for example, is a significant development in this regard. Beyond restoring a cultural venue, it is helping to revive a piece of the city’s collective memory and reclame the place Tripoli once held in the history of Lebanese cinema. Other initiatives also reflect the revival of cultural activity beyond Beirut. In Zahle, the planned museum dedicated to Saïd Akl reflects a broader effort to strengthen cultural infrastructure across the country. In Tyre, the restoration of former cinemas, such as the Rivoli, is helping to recreate spaces for social. interaction and dialogue – an important development in a context still marked by the traumas of recent conflicts. In the Chouf, heritage projects centered on Deir el-Qamar and Beiteddine, alongside the growth of artists’ residencies, are likewise contributing to a stronger cultural presence throughout the country. The same can be said of the festivals held across Lebanon: Byblos, Cedars, Jounieh, Baalbeck and Beiteddine. While these initiatives are sometimes more fragmented and less visible than those taking place in Beirut, they serve as a reminder that Lebanon’s cultural vitality extends far beyond the capital. Building a Cultural Ecosystem Despite these efforts at decentralization, the country’s main exhibition venues, major cultural institutions and most funding remain concentrated in Beirut. New galleries continue to open, institutions are being restructured, and others are gradually resuming their activities. Recent examples include the Beirut Cinematheque, Cinema Metropolis and, soon, the Grand Theatre of Beirut. At the same time, the Ministry of Culture has revived a number of events and heritage-related projects. Yet the issues raised over the past several years – many of them identified in reports issued by the Ministry of Culture itself – remain as relevant as ever. How can one speak of a genuine national cultural policy when problems relating to transportation, cultural mediation, language barriers and access to the regions remain largely unaddressed? It may be worth approaching the situation from a different angle. The same recent reports from the Ministry of Culture – particularly those devoted to the cultural and creative industries and the Visual Arts Forum – suggest that the current objective may not yet be about establishing a conventional cultural policy, but rather a strategic approach. The priority appears to lie elsewhere: building the foundations of a genuine cultural ecosystem capable of becoming a full-fledged player in the cultural economy. The challenge is to turn the resilience of artists and cultural institutions into sustainable development, jobs and economic growth. Yet this ambition also reveals a reality that is often overlooked: the problem facing Lebanon’s cultural sector is not a lack of actors, since structures already exist. In the field of visual arts, for instance, the Association of Lebanese Painters and Sculptors, as well as the Syndicate of Visual Artists, are officially recognized. And yet many artists are unaware of how they function, or even of their existence. The issue, then, is not so much the absence of organizations, but rather their limited visibility, their low level of activity, or their difficulty in bringing the profession together. A Shortage of Support This issue also arises in the music and performing arts sector. Many Lebanese musicians and singers now choose to deposit or register their works with France’s SACEM, for instance, rather than rely on existing mechanisms in Lebanon. This often reflects a lack of information, but also the limited visibility of local systems for protecting and managing rights. More broadly, Lebanon’s cultural sector suffers from a shortage of support in the field of intellectual property. While France has well-established bodies such as SACEM for authors and composers, SACD for playwrights and audiovisual creators, SPEDIDAM for performing artists, and INPI for industrial property matters, their Lebanese counterparts remain largely unknown to the public and sometimes even to professionals in the sector. Lebanon does, however, have an Intellectual Property Office attached to the Ministry of Economy, responsible for copyright, trademarks and patents. The challenge therefore lies less in the complete absence of such mechanisms than in their visibility, accessibility and uptake by cultural actors themselves. The situation is similar when it comes to the professional status of artists. Many work without contracts, social protection or a clear understanding of their rights. Issues related to intellectual property, copyright and legal protection mechanisms often remain poorly understood. Many Lebanese artists face difficulties abroad simply due to a limited legal knowledge or a poor understanding of intellectual property frameworks – situations that could often have been avoided through better training. Recent reports have highlighted a number of issues: the absence of professional status for artists; a lack of coordination between institutions; insufficient funding mechanisms; difficulties related to heritage protection; and the excessive centralization of cultural activity. They also set out a number of concrete measures: strengthening existing organizations; training professionals; safeguarding archives; supporting creation; developing the cultural and creative industries; and improving the legal recognition of actors in the sector. This is why the professionalization of the sector now appears to be a key priority. Training artists in their rights, as well as training cultural professionals in the realities of the sector, has become essential. In this regard, several initiatives already exist. Among them, the Master’s program in event management at Saint Joseph University – the only one of its kind in Lebanon – contributes to the training of future cultural professionals by covering project management, cultural management, mediation, communication, and broader cultural policy issues. Similarly, ESA Business School offers programs in cultural management and arts administration that also cover legal, contractual and cultural economics dimensions. Culture Back in Motion This is essential. Beyond artistic creation, there is also a need to train those who will one day build the institutions, projects and frameworks capable of sustainably supporting the sector’s development. This vision also aligns with the approach currently being promoted by the Minister of Culture, Ghassan Salamé, who is seeking to restore culture to a central place in the country’s reconstruction agenda, both within Lebanon and across the diaspora and among international partners. The foundations are therefore already in place. What is emerging today is less a fully developed cultural policy than a strategy aimed at structuring a sector that has long been driven almost exclusively by the commitment and resilience of those involved. A genuine cultural policy may come later. It will likely not follow a European or French model but rather take shape in a form adapted to Lebanon’s institutional realities, its diversity, and the essential role played by private, associative and academic initiatives. One thing is nevertheless certain: culture is once again in motion in Lebanon. And while artists must continue to create, it is equally important to train those who will be responsible for organizing, mediating, managing and transmitting this culture in the future. For the rebuilding of a sustainable cultural sector depends as much on artistic output as on the structures that allow it to exist and endure. Read also: Lebanese cultural diplomacy: between influence, solidarity and resistance (1/2)

US–Iran: For Tehran, fall in line – or else…

US–Iran: For Tehran, fall in line – or else…

By
LevantTime .
Published

The defining feature of this round of talks and negotiations set in motion earlier this week by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran is, without question, “suspense.” The formal launch of the process is scheduled for Friday in Switzerland, with the participation, among others, of US Vice President JD Vance and the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament – who also leads Iran’s negotiating team – Mohammad Ghalibaf. At this stage, suspense centers on the content of the memorandum of understanding agreed between Washington and Tehran. Only the Iranian “version” of the document has been made public. It is clearly one-sided, appearing to reflect primarily the demands of the Iranian regime. On the American side, officials say the framework agreement will be released to the media on Friday, after the official signing ceremony. From the outset, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Tuesday that the bilateral negotiations, expected to last 60 days and be renewable, will focus on the nuclear issue and sanctions. This is where a second layer of suspense emerges, given the sharply divergent positions of the two sides on the core disputes that divide them. In an interview with the New York Times , U.S. President Donald Trump clarified the American position, as it is expected to take shape gradually over the course of the talks. He said that if the Iranian regime continues to execute dissidents, he would suspend the unfreezing of Iranian assets, estimated at $24 billion. More broadly, Trump made clear that there would be no lifting of sanctions or release of frozen assets unless Teheran fully complies with and implements its commitments. The “guardian of the Middle East” Stepping up his warnings against the Islamic Republic, U.S. President Donald Trump has revived the threat of military action and strikes on Iranian infrastructure if a final agreement on the nuclear program is not reached. Pressing the point further, he said bluntly that if such a deal is not approved, the United States would, in that case, assume the role of “guardian of the Middle East,” in return for what he described as 20 per cent of the region’s revenues. On Lebanon, the White House chief made what could be seen as a diplomatic misstep, saying in another interview that he was considering proposing that Israel allow Syrian President Ahmed Sharaa to take charge of dealing with Hezbollah in Lebanon. “He might be able to do it better than Israel,” Trump added. The Syrian president swiftly rejected the idea, saying there could be no question of Syrian forces intervening in Lebanon. Four drone strikes in southern Lebanon Meanwhile, Israeli officials have reiterated over the past 48 hours that the army will not withdraw from Lebanese territory until the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons has been resolved. Until then, military operations continue in southern Lebanon, albeit at a lower intensity than before the announcement of the memorandum of understanding. Israeli forces have concentrated their strikes in the Nabatiyeh sector, particularly around the strategic hill of Ali Taher. Separately, the Israeli military carried out four drone strikes on Tuesday against vehicles in the Mayfadoun and Choukine area, in the Nabatiyeh district. The targeted attacks killed four people and left several others wounded.

Against the Post-Humanist Illusion, the Bonding Capacity

Against the Post-Humanist Illusion, the Bonding Capacity

By
Fady Noun
Published

Against the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions and the return of power politics to international affairs, Leo XIV emerges as a as a prominent warning voice against the technological illusion embraced by parts of the Silicon Valley elite. Their ambition is to use artificial intelligence (AI) to transcend human limitations and propel humanity toward transhumanism and post-humanism. Such Promethean aspirations – to overcome the limits of the human condition – betray a hostility not only toward the world itself, but toward the very notion of a Creator. The encyclical offers a direct response: “Humanity – magnificent yet wounded – must neither be replaced nor surpassed. It may embrace technological progress to alleviate suffering and open new possibilities,” provided it does not abandon what fundamentally defines it: its capacity for relationship and love (editor’s note: emphasis added). At this point, a decisive question arises: if there is such a thing as a genuine “beyond the human,” where is it to be found? The Christian faith answers by pointing to “a fulfillment that does not arise from technological self-deification, but from the action of God’s grace received in Christ.” The encyclical also stresses that artificial intelligence is not morally neutral. It remains shaped by the biases of its designers. Its very design depends on ethical choices, values and underlying economic models, making a high degree of discernment essential for users. This is because the danger of reification mentioned above is one of the major challenges posed by AI to its users: Leo XIV warns of the risk of reducing the human person to a mere set of quantifiable data and measurable performance indicators. The encyclical also denounces digital colonialism, warning of the massive concentration of power and digital resources in the hands of a handful of private transnational corporations, creating new forms of servitude and opening up a space for the predatory extraction of peoples’ data. A simple exploration of the web is enough to reveal the existence of data-harvesting robots, scrapers and crawlers that collect even our most insignificant online exchanges. In direct continuity with the contemporary development of Catholic Social Teaching initiated by Pope Francis, Magnifica Humanitas goes a step further by reaffirming the move beyond the classical theory of “just war”. Faced with the development of autonomous weapons and military targeting algorithms, it insists that entrusting irreversible lethal decisions to machines irreparably breaks the chain of moral responsibility in armed conflict. It therefore calls for a global “algorithmic disarmament”. Against Autonomous Weapons The Pope says he has heard from scientists and engineers, political leaders, civil servants, parents and teachers, as well as other voices described as “deeply troubling,” regarding “increasingly autonomous weapons systems that are practically beyond any form of human control.” He also says he has received “highly concerning reports of algorithms capable of restricting access to healthcare, employment and security on the basis of data tainted by prejudice and injustice.” He expresses his distress at the “silence of those who have no voice in decision-making processes – decisions that risk generating new forms of exclusion and suffering.” Disarming AI From this exercise in listening has emerged a “troubling conviction,” expressed in Magnifica Humanitas : the need “to awaken consciences and indicate the path forward for humanity.” “Artificial intelligence must be disarmed.” On this point, it is worth noting that California, home to major US technology companies including Google, Meta, OpenAI (ChatGPT) and Anthropic, passed a major AI regulatory law on Monday 29 September 2025. The law imposes transparency requirements on developers of the most advanced models, obliging them to publish their safety protocols and to report serious incidents. The legislation also requires companies to disclose dangerous deceptive behaviors by AI systems during testing. For instance, if a model lies about the effectiveness of safeguards designed to prevent it from assisting in the development of biological or nuclear weapons, developers must report the incident if it significantly increases the risk of harm. “Internal reports from leading AI companies point to worrying progress across all categories of threats,” a Californian state-appointed think tank said in June 2025, as it refined the bill under the guidance of Stanford University experts, sometimes referred to as the “godmother of AI.” Magnifica Humanitas comes at a time when tens of billions of dollars in AI investment are flowing into Silicon Valley, even as concerns mount over the potential misuse of the most advanced systems. The encyclical was presented at a session attended by Christopher Olah, co-founder of Anthropic, which last April declined to release its most powerful model, Claude Mythos, publicly. The encyclical considers it too dangerous – in terms of cybersecurity, weapons development, and its broader social and labor impact – to be deployed without strict safeguards. Magnifica Humanitas , an encyclical to be read without delay. Read also: – Leo XIV’s encyclical on AI: Tower of Babel or Holy City (2/3) – The Encyclical “Magnifica Humanitas” by Leo XIV, a foundational text on AI (1/3)

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