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Dear fellow citizens, On Thursday, January 1st, 2026, Lebanon will be transfigured! Electricity will run 24/7, without generators or parallel subscriptions. All wrongdoers and the corrupt will be tried, from the smallest sparrow to the old crow, no matter how high its perch. The State will function— function in the true sense of the word, not extract . A State where the basic services of the Republic will be efficient rather than inoperative. At the same time, the remote pilots of the MKs will be technically unemployed, given that Hezbollah will be demilitarized north, east, and west of the Litani. The big Question—with a capital Q—is: how does this happen (even if on January 1st your head is still buried in the letter or the verb)? Simply because in Lebanon, every new year is a promise of a miracle, which is inevitably postponed to the following year. Now, wake up. Take two paracetamols and breathe! Thursday, January 1st, 2026 is only one second more than Wednesday, December 31st, 2025. One second. Not a rupture. Not a revolution. Not a “reset” or a “ctrl + alt + delete”. Now that the hangover is fading, you can frown again, as the reality is distressing: same system, same leaders, same lies—even though you shouted yourselves hoarse singing ABBA’s eternal hit at the psychological hour, which in Lebanon is rather the psychiatric hour, since everyone believes that the new year will be better. Nothing was fixed at midnight. Nothing was erased with the countdown. Lebanon obeys no calendar; it is frozen, a permanent Groundhog Day for almost forty years. Canal Plus has launched its new slogan: “Don’t entrust your imagination to just anyone.” I suggest you entrust your dreams to no one; otherwise, at best you risk the straitjacket, or at worst, being taken for fools—although it is better to be mistaken for the former than the latter, knowing that many of us, especially those who blindly follow the precepts of certain movements or parties, are not at risk of the straitjacket. So yes, happy new year. Happy continuity in disaster, and above all, see you next December 31st, to once again celebrate the passage of time, in a country whose inhabitants stubbornly refuse to move forward, frozen in the past and placing their faith in God or Allah—and soon, in Yahweh…

Somaliland's official recognition by Israel, announced last Friday by Benjamin Netanyahu, offers a new perspective on Red Sea security, the stability of the Horn of Africa, and global geopolitical balances. While the Israeli government intends to capitalize on the positive outcomes of its diplomacy, opinions diverge within the Hebrew State and worldwide. The territory of Somaliland, located in northwest Somalia, covers 175,000 km² and is populated by approximately five million inhabitants. It corresponds to the former colony of British Somaliland, while Italy had occupied the rest of the country. The territory declared its independence in 1991, while the Republic of Somalia plunged into chaos after the fall of the military regime of autocrat Siad Barre. Somaliland controls a strategic maritime facade on the Gulf of Aden, in the immediate vicinity of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a key passage connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Approximately 10% of global maritime trade transits through this area. Major strategic point For several years, this route has been weakened by attacks by Yemeni Houthis, supported by Iran, against commercial vessels, in a context of regional conflict expanded since the Gaza war. For proponents of recognition, this geographical factor is central. Israel, engaged on several security fronts, sees Somaliland as a potential platform for cooperation in intelligence, maritime surveillance, and the fight against asymmetric threats, particularly drones and missiles. Approximately 300 to 500 km from Houthi-controlled areas, the territory would offer a strategic depth similar to what Israel has developed with Azerbaijan vis-à-vis Iran. An Atlantic Council analysis revealed that traffic at Bab el-Mandeb dropped during the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, and the International Monetary Fund estimated that the volume of trade at Suez had decreased by approximately 50% in early 2024. Political stability Beyond its location, Somaliland is presented by its supporters as a regional exception. For over three decades, it has had its own institutions: an elected Parliament, currency, army, police, and civil administrations. It has organized several pluralistic elections, ensured peaceful transitions of power, and maintained relative stability, contrasting sharply with neighboring Somalia, which is plagued by the Islamist insurgency of Al-Shabab and chronic political fragmentation. Alignment with the West Israel also highlights Somaliland's political alignment. The authorities in Hargeisa, the capital of the secessionist region, have sent numerous signals to Western powers, the United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, and now Israel, while displaying their hostility to Chinese, Turkish, and Islamist influence in the region. In a context of increased rivalry between major powers over strategic maritime routes, ignoring a relatively stable and cooperative actor would, according to this interpretation, be a strategic oversight. This recognition is also perceived as a message to Washington. Several Israeli officials and analysts believe that the United States should follow Tel Aviv's example. They emphasize that America's commitment to the principle of a 'unified Somalia' no longer reflects realities on the ground, and that Somaliland's stability rests precisely on its separation from Mogadishu's dysfunctional political system. Somaliland officials have also offered the United States access to a strategic port and a Cold War-era airstrip in exchange for official recognition. Tribal system However, this optimistic reading is challenged by some. Many experts indeed believe that the Israeli decision carries major risks and could prove counterproductive. The first criticism concerns Somaliland's internal fragility. Despite its image of stability, the territory is marked by deep divisions. Clan affiliation plays a central role in politics, land ownership, and representation. Hybrid war On a strictly military level, critics deem the idea that Somaliland can alter the strategic balance against the Houthis as illusory. The latter have withstood years of Saudi and American airstrikes and continue to disrupt navigation with inexpensive means. According to this analysis, only a ground campaign led by actors with structured armies and genuine political will could defeat them, capabilities that Somaliland does not possess. Host territory for Palestinians? This year, press reports indicated that the United States and Israel had approached Somaliland, among other countries, about hosting Palestinians from Gaza. Neither Somaliland, which at the time stated that no such discussions had taken place, nor Israel addressed this issue in their respective statements on Friday. Terrorist risk Another major risk concerns extremism. Al-Shabab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, immediately condemned the recognition and threatened to fight any Israeli attempt to 'use' Somaliland. Analysts fear that the strong anti-Israeli sentiment present in part of Somali society could be instrumentalized by Islamists to strengthen their recruitment and legitimacy, by presenting the Hargeisa government as an ally of 'Zionism' and a traitor to the Palestinian cause. All-out condemnations Diplomatically, the recognition has sparked a wave of condemnations. The African Union, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, as well as key countries like Egypt, Turkey, and China, have reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia's territorial integrity. Many African states, themselves facing secessionist claims, fear the creation of a precedent. Even the United States, despite being courted by Hargeisa, refused to follow Israel. Donald Trump publicly dismissed immediate recognition, highlighting the potential diplomatic isolation of such a move. Saudi Arabia, for its part, expressed its opposition, reducing the impact of this initiative on a possible extension of the Abraham Accords. On Saturday, Tehran denounced a "malicious maneuver by the Zionist regime" and a "plot to disintegrate" Somalia. Asked by the New York Post about potential recognition by Washington, the US president replied "no," refusing to follow his Israeli ally. He added: "we're going to look into it," before wondering: "Do people actually know what Somaliland is?"... Between geostrategic opportunity and destabilizing factor, the real effects of this decision can only be measured with the passage of time and regional dynamics.

Al-Qard Al-Hassan, formally registered as a charitable association, has increasingly assumed the role of a parallel financial institution in Lebanon since the country’s economic collapse began in late 2019. As the banking sector imploded and depositors lost access to their savings, the organisation stepped into an institutional vacuum. While its services address real needs in a context of state and financial failure, its growing footprint raises serious legal and systemic concerns. Founded during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Al-Qard Al-Hassan was registered in 1987 with the Ministry of Interior as a non-profit association. It remains legally governed by the 1909 Ottoman Law on Associations, which restricts activities to non-commercial, non-profit purposes. Yet in practice, the organisation regularly grants loans and manages gold-backed guarantees—activities that go well beyond its declared legal mandate. Banking functions without a banking licence Al-Qard Al-Hassan primarily provides dollar-denominated loans secured by gold deposits, whose value is assessed in advance with an added risk margin. Since 2020, it has also operated ATMs allowing withdrawals in Lebanese pounds and foreign currencies. These operations fall outside the prudential rules applied to licensed banks and raise questions about compliance with Lebanon’s foreign exchange and currency circulation laws. Under Lebanon’s 1963 Code of Money and Credit, the collection of funds, the granting of credit and the management of payment instruments are reserved exclusively for institutions licensed by the central bank, Banque du Liban. By performing these functions without authorisation, Al-Qard Al-Hassan operates in direct contradiction with the country’s banking legislation. In 2021, Banque du Liban responded by issuing Circular No. 170, banning all Lebanese banks and financial institutions from engaging—directly or indirectly—with Al-Qard Al-Hassan. The circular prohibits account openings, transfers, payment services and any similar transactions. While the measure implicitly acknowledges the organisation’s systemic relevance, it stops short of placing it under formal supervision. As a result, Al-Qard Al-Hassan remains active, but entirely outside the regulatory perimeter. The emergence of “Joud” This legal ambiguity has deepened with the emergence of a new entity, “Joud,” widely seen as a rebranding and structural fragmentation of Al-Qard Al-Hassan’s operations. Registered in 2025 in the Baabda and Nabatiyeh commercial registries, Joud reportedly conducts the same financial activities under a different legal identity. According to available information, the restructuring was designed internally to reduce legal exposure and complicate enforcement efforts. While the name change preserves symbolic continuity, it creates a formal legal break that fragments liability and makes judicial action more difficult. Reports indicate that the new entity’s bank accounts are held at Bank Saderat Iran in Lebanon. No supervision, no depositor protection Banque du Liban holds exclusive authority over monetary and financial regulation, including licensing, oversight and sanctions. These powers, however, do not extend to Al-Qard Al-Hassan or Joud, which are not subject to central bank circulars governing credit, liquidity or foreign currency operations. The absence of licensing also places these entities outside Lebanon’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework. Obligations related to customer due diligence, transaction monitoring and suspicious activity reporting—normally overseen by the Special Investigation Commission—do not apply. A systemic legal failure From a strictly legal perspective, the assessment is clear: Lebanon’s banking monopoly is being bypassed; central bank supervision is absent; the association’s legal status is incompatible with its activities; transparency and anti-money laundering safeguards do not apply; and depositors enjoy no formal protection. This case illustrates how a parallel financial actor can expand rapidly within a fragile institutional environment. It also highlights the urgency of reinforcing Lebanon’s legal and regulatory framework to protect savers and prevent further erosion of the country’s already weakened financial system.

If artificial intelligence supplied the narrative fuel for the extraordinary market performance of 2025, liquidity supplied the oxygen. And while much attention focused on the policies of Western central banks, the most persistent — and ultimately destabilising — source of global liquidity came from elsewhere: Japan. For decades, Japan was treated as an anomaly — an economy trapped in deflation, operating under its own monetary logic and largely disconnected from global cycles. In 2025, that perception proved dangerously outdated. Japan did not merely remain accommodative; it became one of the principal enablers of global risk-taking. For years, the Bank of Japan accumulated trillions of dollars’ worth of bonds and equities on its balance sheet while holding interest rates near zero. Ultra-low Japanese rates and a steadily depreciating yen reignited and expanded the global carry trade. Capital borrowed cheaply in yen flowed into higher-yielding assets worldwide — equities, credit, private markets, and speculative investments — reinforcing risk appetite well beyond Japan’s borders. In effect, Japan exported liquidity to the global financial system at a time when other central banks were attempting, cautiously and inconsistently, to withdraw it. The yen carry trade became one of the most powerful vectors of rising asset prices in 2025, simultaneously driving higher equity valuations and higher leverage across the financial system. But Japan entered 2025 constrained by its own structural realities. With public debt exceeding 235% of GDP, a financial system dependent on ultra-low rates, and a fragile domestic bond market, the return of inflation and the prospect of sustained economic growth forced a strategic shift. In September 2025, the Bank of Japan formalised its decision to stop buying assets and became a net seller of bonds and equities. In December, it raised interest rates again, sending ultra-long bond yields to record highs. The implications were immediate and global: the yen carry trade was placed in grave danger — and, by extension, so were risk assets worldwide. While liquidity continued to inflate financial markets, the real economy was sending a very different signal. Commodities — the most tangible expression of supply, scarcity, and geopolitical tension — surged across the board. Energy, industrial metals, and strategic resources all advanced sharply, reflecting years of underinvestment, supply-chain fragmentation, and the rising costs of deglobalisation. This rise in commodities is not cyclical exuberance; it is structural stress. Unlike financial assets, commodities respond to physical constraints. They price geology, geopolitics, energy intensity, and time. The world entered 2025 with depleted inventories, fragmented supply chains, and intensifying strategic competition over resources — from critical metals to food and energy. In this environment, persistent liquidity collided with limited supply. The implication is critical: inflation risk has not disappeared — it is increasing. Yet markets throughout 2025 largely priced a return to disinflation and policy easing, even as input costs, commodity prices, and strategic resource pressures moved higher. This contradiction — easing financial conditions into rising real-economy constraints — is inherently unstable. It places central banks in an impossible position: tolerate inflation or risk destabilising markets addicted to liquidity. Bond markets may well force that choice in 2026. Japan’s role magnifies this risk. A further weakening of the yen would reinforce inflation through higher import and commodity prices. Conversely, any meaningful appreciation would risk a violent unwinding of carry trades, destabilising global asset prices. Either path carries consequences markets have yet to fully confront. Artificial intelligence and liquidity sustained the rally of 2025. Commodities are now questioning its sustainability. The crypto sphere — the purest expression of speculative excess — has already turned the corner, with Bitcoin down more than 35% from its October peak. History offers few examples in which prolonged monetary distortion, rising leverage, and tightening physical constraints resolve without volatility. The extraordinary trajectory of financial markets in 2025 may ultimately reveal less the birth of a new disruptive era than the excessive optimism that characterises investment bubbles.

As the holidays come to an end, anxiety once again settles over the Lebanese, crystallizing around a question that has become existential: is Lebanon heading toward a new war, or will the country remain trapped in a fragile truce, liable to collapse at any moment? Yet this question, as crucial as it is, no longer suffices on its own. Behind it looms a deeper, more perilous one: if military initiative comes from the Israeli side, and Hezbollah has refrained from responding since the ceasefire, is this a sign of incapacity or of choice? And who, in the first place, holds the right to decide matters of war and peace in Lebanon? Lebanon today is not living through an all-out war, but neither is it enjoying genuine peace. It is stuck in a dangerous gray zone, where de-escalation does not amount to stability, and escalation falls short of a full-scale explosion. This gray zone, which the Lebanese have grown accustomed to, silently drains the country and keeps it suspended in a constant state of waiting for whatever may come from outside. On the ground, there is no denying that southern Lebanon remains an open arena. Israeli violations continue in various forms, from targeted strikes to carefully calibrated military and security messages. Israel, in this context, is not waging a comprehensive war; rather, it is pursuing a policy of testing limits: testing the adversary’s ability to respond, the boundaries of its patience, and the possibility of imposing new rules of engagement through faits accomplis. Conversely, Hezbollah’s refusal to engage in a broad response since the ceasefire has emerged as a central element in public debate. Some interpret this behavior as weakness or incapacity, but such a reading is overly simplistic, to the point of being misleading. Has the party, in terms of military and organizational capabilities, suddenly lost its ability to respond or to take the initiative? Has its structure disintegrated? Has its weaponry vanished? Has its deployment ceased to exist? These questions alone make it impossible to reduce the situation to mere military incapacity. The fundamental distinction here lies between capability and decision. War is not a technical matter; it is, above all, a political choice. Hezbollah’s stance at this stage appears as a decision to wait, not a decision to confront. This restraint is governed by clear regional considerations. The party is part of a broader axis led by Iran, and this axis does not see any interest, at present, in igniting the Lebanese front. The priority, until further notice, is to manage the conflict rather than expand it, to regulate engagement rather than break it, and to use arenas as instruments of political pressure rather than as fields of military resolution. Alongside the regional factor stands the internal Lebanese factor, which is no less significant. Any large-scale war would exact its cost from a country already in collapse: a paralyzed economy, an absent state, dismantled institutions, and a society exhausted to the point of near helplessness. Hezbollah, whatever its regional calculations may be, is fully aware that a new war would place it in confrontation not only with Israel, but also with a Lebanese reality incapable of bearing further destruction, and perhaps even with its own supportive environment. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that this restraint carries a political and moral price. The continuation of Israeli strikes without a clear response raises serious questions about the very notion of deterrence and weakens the narrative of a “balance of terror.” It also deepens the Lebanese sense that their country is exposed, that military decision-making is detached from the state, yet simultaneously subject to no national accountability. As for talk of peace, it too requires careful scrutiny. What Lebanon is experiencing is not peace born of a settlement or an agreement; it is a peace of necessity. A de-escalation imposed by regional and international balances, not by a sovereign Lebanese will. By its nature, this kind of peace is fragile, because it is tied to the calculations of others rather than to the interests of the Lebanese state or its stability. Here lies the core dilemma: Lebanon is neither a decisive actor in war nor in peace. It is an arena upon which conflicts are managed, not a state seated at the decision-making table. It lacks the ability to impose its conditions, and even to protect itself politically before it can do so militarily. This absence is the real danger, and it is what renders the question of war or peace incomplete unless it is linked to the rebuilding of the state and its role. After the holidays, in all likelihood, we will not witness a full-scale war, nor will we live in a stable peace. We will remain in the same gray zone: no war that is resolved, and no peace that is built. Israel tests and pressures, Hezbollah “contains and waits,” and Lebanon pays the price of waiting. The issue is not whether Hezbollah is capable of responding or not, nor whether Israel will escalate today or tomorrow. The deeper question is this: how long will decisions of war and peace remain outside the framework of the Lebanese state? For without a capable state, Lebanon will remain suspended between a postponed war and a fragile peace, hostage to balances it does not control, and a society that merely hopes that “the worst does not happen,” rather than aspiring to a secure and stable future.

The year 2025 was distinctly Moroccan. It marked Morocco’s victory in the war it had endured for half a century, ever since it peacefully recovered its Saharan provinces from the former Spanish colonizer. Why did that war occur? And why did it continue for half a century? Why was the Algerian regime never able to acknowledge that the war of attrition it waged against Morocco, using an instrument called the Polisario, was nothing more than an overt war that would sooner or later turn against it? A series of questions reveals, among other things, Morocco’s resilience in the face of the challenges it confronted, as well as the fact that the Sahara issue has always been a national cause, one that touches every citizen of the Kingdom at the core. Morocco’s victory, enshrined by 2025 as a Moroccan year, was formalized through a decision issued by the United Nations Security Council under Resolution 2797. The resolution confirmed what was already established. It affirmed the “Moroccan identity of the Sahara,” and its sovereignty over it, and stipulated that the autonomy initiative proposed by King Mohammed VI in 2007 constitutes “the basis” for any negotiations concerning the Sahara. It also emphasized that the other party in this fabricated conflict is Algeria, which can no longer hide behind the Polisario, despite all attempts to deny this reality. From the outset, the Arab Gulf states have taken a clear position on the Sahara issue and its Moroccan identity. The most recent Gulf Cooperation Council summit reinforced the link between Arab security and the Moroccan nature of the Sahara. The final communiqué of the summit held in Manama affirmed “the Moroccan character of the Sahara and support for the autonomy initiative to resolve the Moroccan Sahara issue.” In its concluding statement, the Council welcomed Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on October 31, 2025, considering this initiative “an important step toward reaching a realistic and implementable solution.” It also praised King Mohammed VI’s decision to submit the initiative to the Security Council and to designate October 31 of each year as a national holiday known as the “Unity Day.” The Gulf Cooperation Council states supported Morocco and its national cause at an early stage. There is a deep-seated belief within the Council that the territorial integrity of Morocco is an inseparable component of overall Arab security, particularly since all attempts to undermine the Moroccan nature of the Sahara were aimed at creating a favorable environment for intensifying the activities of terrorist and extremist organizations of all kinds in the Sahel region, stretching from the coasts of Mauritania to southern Sudan. The latest Gulf summit communiqué was not the first of its kind. Similar statements had preceded it. What distinguishes this one, however, is its reference to Security Council Resolution 2797 and to the designation of the date of its adoption as a Moroccan national holiday. This underscores the depth of relations between Morocco and the Arab Gulf states, as well as an acute awareness of the importance of blocking any organization, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah backed by Iran, from exploiting the Polisario front. It was no secret that Polisario elements had received training in Lebanon and Syria in the use of drones during the period preceding the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the collapse of the Hezb. This is not merely about the successes Morocco has achieved on all fronts since the Green March of November 1975, but also about the existence of a consistent Moroccan policy with interconnected phases. That policy began by fortifying the Sahara through the construction of a series of walls and natural barriers that enabled its inhabitants to live in safety. This policy was crowned in 2025 by the adoption of Resolution 2797, which neither Russia nor China opposed. This reflects the networks of relations that Mohammed VI has built worldwide. Countries such as Russia and China are not charitable organizations; they are states driven by their interests. Two countries holding veto power on the Security Council would not have abstained from voting had they not had genuine interests in Morocco. Morocco has succeeded in establishing itself as a regional and international player. Among the most significant steps taken by Mohammed VI were breakthroughs in Africa. These were not limited to Francophone African countries; Morocco also made inroads into Anglophone African states. One cannot underestimate the nature of Moroccan investments on the African continent, which are based on mutual benefits, including chemical fertilizer production plants leveraging Moroccan phosphate, the construction of schools and hospitals, and the promotion of moderate Islam. Morocco has developed the Sahara to serve as Africa’s Atlantic gateway. In this context, the growing role of the port of Dakhla must be highlighted, as it prepares to play a major role in linking Africa with the American continent. Moreover, no impartial observer can overlook the importance of the oil and gas pipeline currently under construction, which crosses several countries starting from Nigeria. The fundamental question remains: what is the secret of Morocco’s victory? It lies in the relationship between the Throne and the people, a relationship based on mutual trust that enabled Morocco to defend its Sahara while continuing its development. Morocco now enjoys advanced infrastructure, particularly regarding its railway network connecting cities and regions. Most importantly, there are no taboos in Morocco. This means there is no shame in publicly discussing any problems that may arise, such as crises in education or healthcare that can trigger protests. In short, Morocco is a country reconciled with itself, enabling it to confront challenges, including those imposed by nature, such as droughts or earthquakes. All of this takes place away from demagoguery and empty posturing, through the continued pursuit of development and reconstruction in a country that possesses a clear vision: the vision of King Mohammed VI, based on investing in the Moroccan human being, who remains the country’s true wealth.