The End of Iran, Oscillating Between State and Revolution

We have long lived under the shadow of the imagined power of Iranian propaganda — or let us say, the propaganda of the Axis of Resistance — which had made Iran into a great, cohesive, and untouchable power. Events have shown that there is a vast gulf between actual power and narrative power. This had already happened with Hezbollah: many had believed in the image of its absolute supremacy.

Iran deceived us, through its followers and its media army — disguised television channels, paid journalists, digital influencers of every kind, and others — by propagating its fictional narrative about: the image of technological supremacy, and the image of powerful allies who support it (China, Russia), thus fashioning in public opinion the image of an "unbreakable axis."

Iran had forgotten that, in the international system, alliances are not ideological but transactional. And that China and Russia act according to their own calculations, not according to the desires of Iran's rulers with their revolutionary ideology.

Iran's policies had succeeded in the past, when it was betting on buying time, deferring deadlines, manipulating its adversaries, evading responsibility for the crimes committed by its proxy arms, and making promises and pledges only to renege on them. Iran had forgotten that it would never have been able to continue with these policies had they not, in some way, suited American and Israeli policy.

The question that imposes itself: is Iran truly a state?

If we take the classical definition of the state — monopoly on violence, centralization of decision-making, sovereignty over territory —, Iran is a state of complete structure. But if we take the definition of the modern state as a rational-bureaucratic institution with a centralized decision-making process subject to accountability, whose purpose is to secure the interests of its citizens, then the matter is different and complex.

If we invoke Max Weber's analysis of the monopoly on legitimate violence, we find that Iran, as a state, monopolizes violence, but that legitimacy within it is divided between: republican institutions, accompanied by a revolutionary and supra-constitutional structure (the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij...), meaning that the regime carries two natures: State + Revolution. And this is what generates a permanent tension between the two.

And then, when revolutions transform into states, they confront a dilemma: to remain a "permanent revolution" or to become a "normal state"?

The Iranian regime has not resolved this question since 1979. It employs the discourse of the state, then behaves like a transnational movement. From here arises the resemblance of the regime's behavior to that of its party: not because Iran is not a state, but because it keeps the doctrinal element above the logic of the state, and the protection of the regime is the "most obligatory of obligations." The state says: we are a sovereign entity; but the Revolution says: we are a project that transcends borders. This duality prevents complete stability.

What Iran practices in its dealings with its surroundings and the world is a form of guerrilla warfare equipped with ballistic missiles, conducted through proxies distributed across the countries of the region, and based on the conduct of "asymmetric warfare." This is the logic of revolutionary movements.

For the classical state responds directly, through its army, within clear equations. The proxy model, by contrast, generates a deliberate fog that renders it capable of disavowing its actions. But fog is a double-edged weapon: when it is pierced, it turns into confusion within the leadership and contradiction in the messages.

In addition to all of this, Iran has turned a blind eye to its own interior and its needs. Many analyses of Iran focus on missiles and ideological alliances, in total disregard of the Iranian interior, its divisions and its peoples, the rebellion of women, the aspirations of a different young generation, economic exhaustion, and a shaken legitimacy.

A powerful state is measured not only by its arsenal, but by its capacity to integrate its society.

The historical narrative has turned into a burden, transformed from a resource into a constraint in which the regime has imprisoned itself.

The historical narrative granted the regime meaning, allowed for continuity, and preserved its religious-sectarian identity, through recourse to perpetual mobilization.

But it was transformed over time into a constraint, because it prevented any reassessment, treated every retreat as treason, and proceeded to sanctify its symbols and policies, elevating them above lived reality, instead of subjecting them to debate and reassessment according to the needs of society.

Thus the Revolution has turned into a burden that Iranian society can no longer bear. And the decision has been taken to dispense with the services of this regime.