War in Ukraine: Russian Strategic Mistakes and Western Clumsiness (3/5)

The war in Ukraine continues to be at the center of a wide-ranging debate, fueled in part by near-daily bombardments targeting key nerve centers on both sides, and more specifically the Russian and Ukrainian capitals.

In order to better understand the various dimensions of this long-standing conflict, it is necessary to revisit the background and origins of what led to this (fratricidal?) war—by examining the motivations and aspirations of the different parties involved, including the West (the United States and Europe, extended to all NATO member states with the exception of Turkey), and by also recalling the early stages of the Russian offensive and the failed attempts to reach peace, or at least to open negotiations, bearing in mind that responsibility in this context is shared by many.

To fully grasp the ins and outs of the various aspects of the war in Ukraine, some fundamental questions should be raised from the outset. What do Russia and Ukraine represent for the West? What could be the concrete implications of a clear-cut victory by either of the two protagonists? And by the same token, what would the consequences be for the West and the Middle East?

In a series of five articles, Jean-Patrick Dayras, a rear admiral in the French Navy, sets out his vision and analysis of the issue.

Ukraine could have been a state associated with Europe without being a member, or a candidate for membership, let alone belonging to NATO. In this regard, blame can be directed at the United States and Europe, not forgetting Great Britain. At the Ukrainian level, regrettable mistakes were made toward the Russian-speaking population and in the eastern regions. A firm stance that demonstrated a constructive approach toward Russia, along with a desire to maintain close ties with a country where many Ukrainians live, could have smoothed things over and led to a partnership with both Europe and Russia. This is not certain, but it should have been attempted. Europeans, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine all bear a share of the responsibility—and all have lost.

Why could such an agreement not have succeeded? For the West, its posture has strengthened the BRICS+ and all the countries turning toward that association of states rather than toward the democracies seeking to forcibly impose their way of governing—and of governing the world.

Over time, three points deserve to be highlighted on the list of faults (not mistakes, but faults—implying culpability):

The Minsk 1 and 2 agreements, which were never implemented

Angela Merkel and François Hollande bear a significant share of responsibility in this regard. Following the Russian invasion, both Angela Merkel and François Hollande stated in interviews that the Minsk agreements were never, in their view, intended to be implemented, but rather served to buy Ukraine time to strengthen its military..

These statements sparked considerable controversy.

• For Russia, they were presented as proof that the agreements had never been negotiated in good faith.

• Merkel and Hollande responded that their goal had been to prevent a broader war in 2014–2015, and that the strengthening of Ukrainian capabilities had become a consequence of the absence of a lasting settlement, not the sole purpose of the agreements.

It is difficult to attribute the failure to implement Minsk solely to Hollande or Merkel. Their responsibility is generally analyzed as that of mediators who failed to ensure the agreements were upheld, rather than as primary decision-makers. The responsibilities most frequently highlighted concern the parties directly involved in the conflict—Ukraine, Russia, and the separatist authorities—who held incompatible interpretations of the order in which commitments were to be implemented.

Historians and specialists do not all agree on the interpretation of these statements. However, they generally agree that the Minsk agreements were extremely difficult to get off the ground, because the two sides disagreed on the sequence of their implementation: Ukraine wanted security and border control first, while Russia insisted on political reforms and the status of Donbass first.

Boris Johnson's conduct was not honorable

Reassuring Ukrainians by guaranteeing them full support along with the supply of weapons and ammunition ensuring a swift victory is a culpable act — even a deadly one. Negotiation is far preferable to war, less costly in human lives, shattered lives, destruction, financial cost, and the fierce hatred that lingers between two closely connected peoples.

This was foreseeable, as these consequences had already been clearly visible in the Balkans.

Russia's strategic blunders.

Russia clearly made what is known in geostrategic or war colleges as assumptions about the enemy — erroneous assumptions, in this case.

The entry into Ukraine, without a declaration of war, rallied the entire Ukrainian people, whose response stands as an example to be admired. Putin presumably believed the government would be overthrown or collapse on its own, allowing him to turn Ukraine into another Belarus subservient to Moscow.

Putin misread the nature of this war. It did not follow any sound military strategy. It was a political strategy — and a poor one — built on false assumptions: that a supposedly weak government, led by a man of communication with no great stature, would fall. Subsequent events proved that Zelensky was indeed firmly in American hands.

On a tactical level, it was no more impressive. The massive deployment of tanks required fuel and ammunition resupply. Clearly, those needs were not met. This is the classic case of 'logistics will follow.' No — logistics must at least keep pace, and ideally lead the way. The United States understood this well and demonstrated it, notably during the liberation of Kuwait.

The drone threat was underestimated, if not outright ignored. The Russians were fighting against a country that, though invaded, was highly industrialized, with skilled and resourceful people — as they proved. This was no longer the Great Patriotic War that had been widely publicized for decades and instilled in young Russians from the earliest age. It was a different kind of war, with nothing patriotic about it.

For the Ukrainians, however, it was exactly that — a patriotic war: their country was invaded, their land occupied, their homes and cities destroyed, their women raped, wounded, or killed, as were their children. They were fighting on their own soil, for their homeland, their country, and their loved ones.

The government did not fall; it is still in place, even if it is not best positioned to enter into peace negotiations. It may be time to consider bringing in a new leader and a new team for Ukraine, with a different vision for their future, while remaining firmly determined to negotiate hard against Putin. Preconditions for entering negotiations are very often guaranteed roadblocks leading to failure. This is indeed the case here.

Other responsibilities contributing to the prolongation of the war:

The highly (overly) active political maneuvering of the Baltic states and Poland in particular — even though the latter has recently been revising its position — directed at European countries and the European Commission under the "orders" of a woman who does not live up to expectations in her role: Mrs. Von der Leyen.

The funding of Ukraine by the United States and Europe — some of which may be diverted from its intended purpose — and increasingly by Europe alone as the US steps back from resolving this conflict, is fueling the continuation of the war and Ukrainian resistance, and therefore Ukrainian demands. Mr. Zelensky tugs at European heads of state and government by the sleeve, sometimes in a threatening tone, to secure ever more costly handouts for Europe and for France.

What is not being addressed:

Politicians, in Europe as elsewhere, do not particularly appreciate having their weaknesses or their abuses of power and influence over their constituents' conscience called out. From Maidan onward, one was expected to support Ukraine — those poor Ukrainians suffering under the Russian yoke, especially the young. What a convenient sales pitch: to claim that young people are oppressed by a regime, as if being young automatically conferred intelligence and a clear understanding of the world.

In France, we might recall the sorry and disheartening episode of May 1968, so heavy with consequences that persist to this day: the beginning of the erosion of the state, of authority — especially paternal authority — then of the family; of the school system, inevitably, and of the work ethic. Unfortunately, Western politicians, particularly in Western Europe, appeal to emotion and sentimentality. Everything that happens must be interpreted, seen, and judged through the lens of feelings. In 2014, even more so in 2022, and today more than ever, the mantra must be: 'I love Ukraine; I love Ukrainians. Russians are savages, rapists, killers.' As if all wars and all armies did not share similar traits, to varying degrees, of course.

Are the French supposed to love Zelensky? They do, apparently. Politicians, television studio strategists, and mainstream media say so and repeat it endlessly. What exactly is so lovable about Mr. Zelensky? More so than Putin? No — one should love neither Mr. Putin (obviously) nor the Russians (but why are they to be shunned?). They are all corrupt. Need we be reminded that in 2014, Ukraine was considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and that this problem is far from having been eradicated? So we are supposed to love those whom the West enables to survive, yet who divert a portion of the aid. Others have emigrated to Europe and are waiting for hostilities to end before returning to Ukraine once peace is secured.

The West conducts geopolitics through emotion — at least through the emotions of its population. But that is not a sound mode of reasoning, reflection, or analysis. That is not how relations between nations should be shaped. Countries have no friends, only interests. It is by that measure that our leaders must determine their positions and their relationships with their counterparts.

The West conducts geopolitics through emotion. Putin certainly does not — nor, for that matter, does Zelensky. The latter has frequently behaved in an authoritarian and demanding manner toward Europe and its member states, who are expected to meet his every demand.

Next article

The impact of a Ukrainian or Russian victory (4/5)

Also worth reading on the same topic

How the West chose Ukraine (1/5)

War in Ukraine: the failure of the first peace efforts (2/5)