Lebanon and the Triple Grip

Lebanese people often repeat a formula that has become almost axiomatic in describing their crisis: Lebanon is trapped between an "extremist" triad, doctrinal and religious in nature, embodied by Israel, Iran and the United States of America. This expression condenses a profound sense of siege and pressure, and reflects a popular awareness that the country's fate is no longer shaped from within alone. Yet the strength of this narrative lies in its simplicity, while its weakness lies in the risk of concealing the complexity of reality and the multiplicity of its layers.

In practice, these three powers cannot be placed in the same category under the heading of "religious extremism" without falling into oversimplification. Religion does play a varying role in the policies of these actors, but it is neither the sole factor nor, in some cases, even the primary one. The more appropriate approach is to understand each party within its own structure, and then to read how these structures intersect on the Lebanese scene.

In the case of Israel, the religious dimension manifests clearly in the rise of religious nationalist currents that lend the conflict a doctrinal character, particularly in matters of land and identity. Yet despite this presence, the Israeli establishment remains in its essence governed by a rigorous security doctrine. Lebanon, in this vision, is not a religious arena so much as a potential source of threat, especially given Hezbollah's existence as a military force operating outside state authority. Israel's conduct toward Lebanon is therefore better understood from the angle of deterrence and risk management than from that of a strictly religious project.

Iran, for its part, presents a different model, one in which the religious and the political are structurally intertwined. The regime rests on the authority of the wilayat al-faqih, which makes religious ideology an integral component of decision-making. In this context, support for Hezbollah becomes an extension of a broader vision holding that the conflict in the region is not a mere rivalry between states, but a confrontation with doctrinal and political dimensions. To confine the Iranian role to this framework alone, however, would be to overlook an essential dimension: Tehran also operates according to a logic of interests, using this ideology as a tool for consolidating its regional influence.

The United States, by contrast, appears relatively removed from this religious classification. It is a state founded on a secular system that does not invoke religion as an official reference point for its foreign policy. This does not mean religious influence is entirely absent; certain currents, such as evangelical conservatives, do play a role in shaping particular positions, especially regarding Israel. But the fundamental determinant of American policy remains pragmatism: protection of interests, ensuring the stability of allies, and balancing the influence of adversaries, chief among them Iran.

It thus becomes clear that "religious extremism" is not an equal common denominator among these powers, but rather an element present to varying degrees, sometimes deployed as a tool of mobilisation or justification. The more accurate formulation would be that Lebanon stands at the intersection of three major projects: a security project led by Israel, an ideological project led by Iran, and a project of global influence led by the United States. These projects do not operate in isolation from one another; they intersect and collide, leaving the Lebanese scene exposed to constant tensions.

Focusing on these external projects, important as it is, remains incomplete without pausing to consider the internal factor. Lebanon did not become an open arena solely because of the strength of external actors, but also because of the weakness within. The Lebanese state has suffered for decades from a structural crisis manifested in the absence of a monopoly on arms, the fragmentation of political decision-making, and the persistence of a confessional system that deepens divisions rather than addressing them.

The confessional communities have often become channels of connection to the outside, to the point where each regional axis now has its extensions within Lebanon. This reality was not imposed entirely from without; internal forces contributed to it, seeing in alliance with these powers a means of strengthening their position domestically. In this way, the local and the regional became intertwined, and the state lost its capacity to act as arbiter among its own constituents.

Within this framework, the formula "Lebanon is trapped between an extremist triad" becomes an expression of a consequence rather than an explanation of a cause. It describes a state of siege, but does not explain why Lebanon became susceptible to that siege in the first place. The deeper reason lies in the absence of a unifying national project capable of redefining the relationship between the state and its citizens, and between Lebanon and its surrounding environment.

The way out of this reality passes not only through a change in the behaviour of external powers (which lies beyond Lebanon's capacity), but begins with rebuilding from within. This requires fundamental steps: re-establishing the concept of sovereignty by confining arms to the hands of the state, so as to reunify the security decision; reforming the political system toward reducing confessionalism and strengthening citizenship, thereby reducing susceptibility to external polarisation; building strong and transparent institutions that restore citizens' confidence and limit dependence on traditional networks of loyalty; adopting a balanced foreign policy that seeks to reduce engagement in axis conflicts rather than aligning fully with any one of them.

In the end, Lebanon cannot insulate itself from its regional and international environment, but it can limit that environment's hold over it. The difference between "arena" and "state" does not lie in geographic position, but in the capacity to manage that position. And when Lebanon comes to possess that capacity, the simplistic narratives, including the narrative of the "extremist triad", will lose much of their force, because they will no longer reflect an imposed reality, but a stage that has been left behind.