Iran and Lebanon: two theaters, the same war?

President Donald Trump's various statements and U-turns will alter relations with the Europeans, NATO, and US allies. They will trigger reactions from Pacific and Middle Eastern countries. Westerners are advocating moderation and want to assume a role in securing the Strait of Hormuz after the cessation of hostilities. Will the United States be sidelined in the region?

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a military operation against Iran without prior notification to the heads of state and government of Western countries and NATO members. In the aftermath, however, US President Donald Trump requested their support, notably for securing the Strait of Hormuz, but also to provide direct backing to American operations.

However, the vast majority of heads of state and government rejected this request.

President Trump's reaction was clear, although incoherent at times. Denouncing a "gross mistake" and "cowardice," he asserted that he did not need them and would act alone, being "the strongest in the world." He even mentioned a possible disengagement from NATO, thus brandishing the threat of relieving himself of his membership duties, as stipulated in Article 5 of the organization's treaty. He also mentioned the possibility of partially withdrawing American troops stationed in Europe. For him, deprived of the United States, it would be a "paper tiger." To properly frame the meaning of his statements, he said he blamed the allies for not supporting the United States in times of crisis and for taking advantage of a one-way alliance. Consequently, why should he automatically guarantee their defense?

All these criticisms did not prevent him later from requesting the participation of Europeans in the naval blockade he imposed on Iranian ports.

After expressing their refusal, successively, some countries banned their airspace to American aircraft participating in military operations against Iran.

A defensive and non-aggressive action

In his statements, President Trump therefore lacks consistency. A need for support, or even active participation, is followed by a contemptuous lack of interest and the assertion that the United States is capable of winning this war alone.

The concept of war is thus the subject of debate. According to Donald Trump, NATO members should respect their obligations in accordance with the founding treaty. Except that he himself started this war, incited by Israel, which thus becomes a co-belligerent. He is therefore the aggressor.

However, the transatlantic organization is "defensive." In this specific case, Article 5 therefore does not apply. The text in question stipulates that an armed attack against one or more members in Europe or North America is considered an aggression against all, which justifies military intervention or collective defensive action.

And if NATO has ever intervened, it was only on the basis of a UN mandate.

The President of the United States actually expected active support from his allies, without however placing it within the formal framework of the transatlantic Alliance.

However, this situation has had the effect of raising a doubt about the reliability of the declared and formalized American guarantees, where the United States plays a protective role.

NATO countries and Europeans are not the only ones expressing these doubts. Other Pacific countries, primarily Japan, Australia, and South Korea, can now only doubt the assured American support in the event of a Chinese intervention. To these countries are added Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the coastal states of the Arab-Persian Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.

When a head of state, "primus inter pares" within NATO, triggers a conflict that could lead to a world war, he cannot ask the members of the concerned organization to support him and actively participate, blindly, in military operations.

From all this, it becomes clear that the members of the Alliance, despite the lack of unanimity and some disagreements, are rallying around a single position adhered to by several Pacific countries. The project of ensuring the security of the Strait of Hormuz after the cessation of hostilities thus brings together many of them.

Throughout the world, including in the Near and Middle East, and therefore in Lebanon, the restraint of Russia and China is appreciated. However, it would be naive to believe that they are not acting behind the scenes according to their own interests. But their position, similar to that of the Europeans and the allies of the United States, marked by non-participation in military operations, distances the risk of a drift towards a global-scale confrontation.

The general line adopted by European governments, NATO countries, and the main concerned Pacific countries is to be approved, certainly, without forgetting nevertheless their principled commitment to securing the Strait of Hormuz. This should, however, be extended to the Arabian Sea and the Arab-Persian Gulf, and then to the Red Sea. Should this happen, there would be reason to commend their wisdom. One question remains: Is it illusory, or even utopian, to think that this common attitude could be taken into consideration by the Iranians during eventual peace talks?

One might be tempted to see, in Lebanon, the extension of the same conflict: the protagonists seem, at first glance, identical. On one side, Hezbollah remote-controlled by Iran; Israel as the master of the game; and, in the background, the United States which, for the time being, positions itself as a moderator. On the other, Iran, a central actor whatever one says; the United States, other masters of the game; and Israel which, from initial instigator, then reined in, has become a follower.

However, perspectives differ significantly regarding the evolution of these two theaters. One remains within a strictly regional framework while the other takes on a global dimension. One excludes Europe, and especially France. The other marginalizes, for now, Europe and the envisioned coalition of about forty countries, including several from the Pacific.

The Iranian problem seems insoluble as long as the - justified - demands of the United States go against those firmly defended by the Revolutionary Guards, now masters of the country.

Beyond these demands, which are for the moment irreconcilable, Donald Trump's behavior in terms of analysis, diplomacy, and mastery of negotiations of this nature seems far removed from what this kind of situation would require. He seems, for the time being, to limit himself to the use of violence.

If he maintains this attitude, it would not be ruled out to see the Russians and the Chinese intervene. What follows will largely depend on the choices he makes: regarding the evolution of the crisis, the conduct of international affairs, or the settlement of disputes between countries.

It is quite possible that Donald Trump wins. But at the cost of what sacrifices? Who and what will he sacrifice before November? In the long term, Iran could appear as the true winner. On the scale of risks, the probable outweighs the possible.

Could a profound questioning of the reliability of American protection by the Gulf countries result in a replacement of American bases? But by which protector? China and Russia would benefit from it.

If France decides to support Lebanon with the firmness shown by its president, it will have to do so with conviction and determination. Half-measures no longer have a place in such a context.

It is therefore a matter of two different wars whose resolutions must be coordinated. One could be treated in isolation, the other not. Will President Trump take this into account during the final "round" of negotiations with the Revolutionary Guards?

"What has changed the most over there is not China, it is not Russia, it is Europe: it has ceased to count there" (A. Malraux).

Rather than having eyes only for Ukraine and approaching the Middle East solely from the angle of the price of oil, Europeans, especially France, should set themselves the ambition of promoting a "firm peace" in Lebanon.