Iran and Lebanon: Two Fronts, One War?
The conflicting statements and abrupt reversals by President Donald Trump are set to reshape relations with Europe, NATO and America’s allies. They are also likely to trigger reactions from countries in the Pacific and the Middle East that once viewed U.S. protection as credible. The West is playing for moderation and seeking a role in securing the Strait of Hormuz once hostilities end. Will the United States find itself sidelined in the region in favor of another, unlikely protector? And will Lebanon’s settlement be brokered by France – with or without Europe?
Following the U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026 – an operation about which neither Western and European leaders nor governments, nor NATO officials, had been informed – President Donald Trump called on them to back him by helping safeguard security in the Strait of Hormuz and by providing direct support for U.S. operations. Most heads of state and governments declined.
Trump’s response was unequivocal, if deeply inconsistent. After denouncing the refusal as a “gross mistake” and branding European countries as cowards, he insisted that the United States did not need them and would act alone as “the strongest nation in the world.” Escalating his rhetoric further, he declared that NATO without the United States would be nothing more than a “paper tiger.” He even raised the prospect of disengaging from the alliance, implicitly threatening to free Washington from its obligations under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. To remove any ambiguity from his remarks, Trump argued that America’s allies failed to stand by the United States in times of crisis while continuing to benefit from what he described as a one-sided alliance. Why, he asked, should Washington automatically guarantee their defense?
He then set out his threats – a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Europe – and his demands for support (participation in the naval blockade against Iran). After publicly rejecting the proposal, several countries barred American aircraft involved in military operations against Iran from using their airspace.
Lack of coherence
In his statements, President Trump lacks coherence. A call for support – even for active participation – is followed by a dismissive show of indifference, as the United States, “the strongest country in the world,” is capable of winning this war alone. The notion of war thus emerges, a case in which, the U.S. president argues, NATO members are bound to fulfil their obligations under the founding treaty. Yet it was he who triggered this war – encouraged by Israel, a co-belligerent. He is therefore the aggressor. The transatlantic organization has a “defensive” function. In this specific case, Article 5 does not apply. When it has intervened, it has done so only under a United Nations mandate.
Suddenly, the President of the United States judges that NATO has no role to play in acting and seeks to keep it out of this conflict, while at the same time exerting renewed pressure on allies and declaring that he will act alone because he can. In reality, he seeks the participatory support of his allies without that support being provided under the NATO framework.
As a result, everywhere the United States plays a protective role, doubts arise over the reliability of its declared and formalized security guarantees. NATO members and Europeans are not the only ones questioning them. Pacific countries – Japan, Australia and South Korea in particular – can now only doubt the promised support in the event of Chinese intervention. To these countries are added Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.
When a head of state – primus inter pares within NATO – triggers a conflict that could escalate into a world war, he cannot expect the members of the organization to follow him, support him, and take part in military operations blindly. Nor can he, after having treated them in an offensive, vulgar and hurtful manner – he is addressing elected officials, and therefore the peoples they represent – then declare in a contemptuous tone that he can act alone and does not need them.
In any case, it must be emphasized that NATO members, even if they do not speak with a single voice and even if there have been some disagreements, are broadly aligned – not in a fully unified position, but on a similar wavelength – and are joined by Pacific countries. The project of ensuring security in the Strait of Hormuz after the cessation of hostilities brings many of them together.
The entire world, including the Near and Middle East – and therefore Lebanon – can take note of the restraint shown by Russia and China. It would be naïve to think they are not acting behind the scenes in line with their own interests. But their position, similar to that of Europeans and U.S. allies, in refraining from participating in military operations, reduces the risk of a slide into a confrontation of truly global scale.
We can only endorse the general position adopted by European governments, NATO member states, and the main concerned Pacific countries, while nevertheless noting their principled commitment to ensuring security in the Strait of Hormuz – a commitment that it would be desirable to extend to the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and then to the entire Red Sea. If that were the case, we could only welcome their wisdom. Would it be illusory, or even utopian, to think that such a common stance might be taken into account by the Iranians during peace negotiations?
One might think that, in Lebanon, it is the same war. At first glance, the protagonists appear identical. On one side, Hezbollah, remotely controlled by Iran, with Israel as the key player and, behind it, the United States, which for now positions itself as a moderating force. On the other side, Iran, the true key player, the United States as another key player, and Israel, which – after acting an unsuccessful instigator and then being reined in – has become a follower. But the differences are significant when it comes to the future of these two theatres. One is regional, the other global. One excludes Europe, and above all France. The other currently excludes Europe and the envisaged coalition of some forty countries – including Pacific states.
The Iranian issue appears insoluble, so much so that the – justified – demands of the United States run counter to those firmly defended by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, now the country’s dominant force. Beyond these currently incompatible demands, Donald Trump’s approach in terms of analysis, diplomacy and negotiating skill falls far short of what would be required. He has nothing to offer other than violence. If he does so, one should beware of Russian and Chinese involvement. Going forward, the behavior and decisions he is likely to take will have consequences for the conduct of international affairs and for the settlement of disputes between states.
Donald Trump may well prevail. But at the cost of what abandonments? Whom and what would he sacrifice before November? It is likely that the real long-term winner will be Iran. On the risk scale, the probable outweighs the possible. Could a deep questioning of the reliability of U.S. protection by Gulf countries lead to the replacement of American bases? By which protector? China and Russia would stand to benefit.
If France decides to support Lebanon in the firm stance now embodied by its president, it will have to do so with conviction and determination. Half-measures no longer have a place.
These are therefore two different wars, whose resolutions must be coordinated. One could be addressed in isolation; the other cannot. Will President Trump take this into account in the final “round” of negotiations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps?
“What has changed most over there is not China, it is not Russia, it is Europe: it has stopped counting” (The Conquerors, postface – André Malraux). Rather than looking at Ukraine through rose-tinted glasses and focusing solely on oil prices when it comes to the Middle East, Europeans and France should aspire to promote a “firm peace” in Lebanon.