In Lebanon, One Form of Domination Replaces Another

One could almost believe that Lebanon has lived only according to the rhythm of foreign capitals: there was the Egyptian era under Nasser, the Palestinian era under the PLO, the Syrian era under the republican dynasty of the Assads, and, of course, the Iranian era, when Hezbollah took control through intermediaries. What makes the Lebanese experience particularly distinctive is that whenever the influence of one Arab or foreign regime began to fade or disappear, another quickly stepped in to replace it. As though it were only natural, since nature abhors a vacuum and our politicians have never wished to renounce servitude.

A Fate and a Curse

From one period to the next, the degree of constraint varied, for there is naturally a difference—not merely in degree but in nature—between military occupation or political subjugation on the one hand and simple diplomatic coordination on the other. The balance can tilt upward or downward depending on circumstances, unforeseen events and the unpredictable. Yet beyond these changing situations, one fact remains undeniable: our small country has had—and will unfortunately continue—to adapt to uncomfortable realities and bend to the wishes of states larger and more powerful than itself. "Finlandized" by the combined weight of history and geography, could Lebanon realistically aspire to anything more ambitious than the status of a client state or a satellite state?

That being said, let us imagine that time were to stand still and grant us, if only briefly, a respite from this far-from-fraternal foreign entanglement. Suppose Abdel Halim Khaddam had lost interest in our fate and allowed us a moment's breathing space. What would have become of us, poor souls, and what would we have done?

Our political elites would almost certainly have rushed, by sheer atavistic reflex, to another Arab or Western capital to beg for immediate intervention, financial assistance or even military support. They would have accepted every form of subordination that might enable them to settle scores with their local—or even municipal—rivals. In this game, no one was innocent: neither the party that sought assistance nor the one that provided it; neither the benefactor nor the beneficiary.

Abdel Hamid Ghaleb: A Reminder

A country's sovereignty can be measured by its willingness to expel an ambassador. On July 21, 1958, The New York Times reported that Abdel Hamid Ghaleb, ambassador of the United Arab Republic accredited to Beirut, had been declared persona non grata and ordered to leave Lebanon. He was accused of fomenting rebellion and supplying arms to the opposition against President Camille Chamoun's government.(1)

Indeed, Ghaleb had encouraged insurrection and civil disobedience throughout various parts of the country. Order was restored only after the landing of U.S. Marines and the election of General Fouad Chehab on July 31. The controversial ambassador did not resume his duties until early November of that same year,(2) after the new authorities embarked on a policy of genuine cooperation with the all-powerful Nasser.

Abdel Hamid Ghaleb normalized relations between Beirut and Cairo and strengthened Egypt's influence over Lebanese political life, prompting renewed accusations of direct interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. While remaining firmly within the Western orbit, Beirut nonetheless accommodated Nasser's regional interests.

Following Nasser's defeat in 1967 and his disappearance from the political scene in 1970, Lebanon moved from bad to worse. The years that followed became years of sorrow and suffering, during which the armed Palestinian resistance, the Syrian occupation and later Iranian domination each, in turn, violated Lebanon's sovereignty on a daily basis.

Thus, in absolute terms and for a very long time, Lebanon has been neither free, nor independent, nor sovereign, even if life in Beirut remained preferable to life in Damascus or Baghdad, where the Baath Party ruled in all its splendor, or in Tehran and Isfahan, where the mullahs could comfortably bask under the umbrella of Wilayat al-Faqih.

Will the Syrian Replace the Iranian?

It is generally accepted that a country is sovereign only if it is capable of slamming the door in the face of a foreign ambassador. In that respect, one could argue that the Aoun–Salam leadership asserted itself by "throwing out the window" the envoy of the Islamic Republic—that is, by withdrawing the accreditation of Mohammad Reza Shibani, the head of Iran's diplomatic mission.

But has anyone ever asked who is supposed to replace him?

Distancing Lebanon from the Islamic Republic is certainly commendable, but who is expected to fill the vacuum it leaves behind?

The welcome extended to the Syrian foreign minister in the city of Tripoli leaves room for doubt. Has Lebanon's Sunni community, after years of wandering, finally found a patron worthy of its expectations? Some believe so.

The problem is that Ahmad al-Sharaa has other priorities, foremost among them consolidating his authority in Damascus and across his fragmented country. It would be unwise for him to succumb to the temptation of opening a new Lebanese front. Even with Ankara's backing, he simply lacks the means to pursue an ambitious regional policy.

Let us find another solution!

(1) Sam Pope, "Envoy from Cairo Ousted by Beirut; Lebanese Say He Had Been Plotting with Rebels," The New York Times, July 21, 1958.

(2) Le Monde, "The UAR Ambassador to Lebanon Resumes His Duties," November 6, 1958.