Between Trump, Putin, Xi Jinping and Iran: A New Geopolitics Emerges (1/2)

Radical shifts are taking shape across a world that, over the past two decades, has seen the slow disintegration of the global order established after the Second World War, giving way to a new system now beginning to emerge on the horizon.

Since the start of his second term, and in line with his National Security Strategy (NSS 2025), President Donald Trump has redefined US priorities. First and foremost are domestic affairs – America First – and the American continent itself. As for the rest of the world, Europe, he argues, should takes responsibility for its own defense and no longer rely on the United States as it has done since 1945. In his view, Russia, despite its bellicose posture, is no longer considered a threat, having proven incapable of defeating Ukraine and incapable of invading Europe.

The US president also believes that military rivalry with China over Taiwan and the South China Sea does not preclude economic accommodation with Beijing. American consumers, after all, remain dependent on competitively priced Chinese goods, while Chinese industry urgently needs access to the US market, which represents roughly 25% of global demand. Beijing, in turn, seeks broader access to American technology.

As for China’s national strategy, it remains firmly centered on the Chinese Communist Party and its leader, Xi Jinping, who holds absolute authority. Its objective is to establish China as a global power and achieve self-sufficiency in key industrial inputs. While that goal has already been reached in several sectors, China still faces a critical shortfall in the domestic production of advanced semiconductors – particularly those used in artificial intelligence – which only the United States is currently able to supply.

At the same time, Xi Jinping is confronting a collapsing real estate sector, industrial overcapacity, and weakening domestic consumption, which is absorbing an ever smaller share of that surplus output, especially in electric vehicle and renewable energy. As a result, Beijing faces a dual imperative: reopening the U.S. market to Chinese industry and securing the continuity of supply chains dependent on the United States, notably in food products, semiconductors, oil and gas, Boeing aircraft, and high-tech goods.

The Russian and Iranian Cases

As for Vladimir Putin, he is dealing with slowing growth and acute labor shortages. His government has begun selling state assets and historic sites to generate revenue, avoid money printing, and prevent currency devaluation. Higher oil prices have benefited Russia in the context of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but even at maximum production they have not resolved the underlying economic strain – not least because the financing of the war in Ukraine has become increasingly burdensome.

Russian media are now openly reporting these difficulties. At the same time, morale among troops is declining, and the war – now dragging into its fourth year – is becoming increasingly unpopular. Putin is under growing internal and external pressure, particularly from President Trump, to bring the conflict to an end. He therefore needs an exit strategy.

Finally, Iran has been strangled by a naval blockade that has lasted for more than a month following the US-Israeli strikes of June 2025 and the February-April 2026 war. For President Trump, the Islamic Republic remains a major nuclear threat, an obstacle to Middle East stabilization, and a barrier to freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran, for its part, remains unwilling to accept a settlement on Washington’s terms.

An Entanglement of Interests on Iran

Russia and China are blocking a UN Security Council resolution demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while continuing to provide Tehran with military assistance in intelligence and technology. Russia supplies ammunition; China does not. Even so, this support remains carefully limited, designed to avoid direct confrontation with Washington.

There is no clear Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis. On the contrary, since April 2026, bilateral contacts have multiplied between the United States and each of these three countries separately. Negotiations between Trump and Putin are intensifying, the Trump-Xi Jinping summit was held in Beijing this week, and indirect talks between Washington and Tehran – mediated through Pakistan – continue despite Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the US naval blockade of Iranian ports. These channels operate independently of Moscow, while Beijing playing a discreet background role.

Negotiations Take Priority

It is increasingly clear that Trump, Xi Jinping, Putin and Khamenei all require negotiations, constrained as they are by mounting internal and external pressures. Each faces economic strain, alongside growing domestic criticism and political opposition.

In the United States, the central issue is the rising cost of living, driven by higher fuel prices and tariffs that have pushed up the cost of Chinese goods. In Russia and Iran, ongoing wars and sanctions weigh heavily on economies and supply chains.

China, meanwhile, is edging toward recession under the pressure of rising oil prices, rising demand for agricultural and high-tech imports, and the need to secure broader access to the American market.

Sketch of a Geopolitical Repositioning Between Trump and Putin

Trump invited Putin to Alaska in August 2025, offering the lifting of sanctions and the establishment of improved economic and energy relations in exchange for peace in Ukraine. Three months later, he came close to acknowledging Russian sovereignty over Ukrainian territories under occupation in his twenty-point peace plan. It is clear that he no longer fears Russia and is seeking to maintain a strategic balance between Moscow and Europe, with an end to the war in Ukraine seen as a prerequisite for that objective.

These economic and territorial incentives from Trump did not appear to sway Putin. However, on April 29, the Russian president unexpectedly called Trump, much to the surprise of the White House, and held a 90-minute conversation with him. The call came fifteen days before the Trump-Xi Jinping summit and points both to the internal difficulties facing Putin and to his concern over a potential Sino-American rapprochement that could leave Russia sidelined.

During the conversation, the Russian president primarily raised the revival of economic exchanges and energy cooperation between the two countries, which had been virtually shut down since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while noting that Trump has already begun reinitiating trade with Russia. Bilateral trade reached $4.4 billion in 2025, after falling to zero following 2022, compared with $37 billion in 2021.

Revelations by the Wall Street Journal in late 2025 reported a discreet project between Moscow and Washington involving large-scale American investment in Russia. During the aforementioned phone call, Trump persuaded Putin to agree to a brief ceasefire in Ukraine from May 9 to May 11, accompanied by the exchange of 1,000 prisoners on each side. He had hoped to extend the ceasefire, but hostilities resumed immediately upon its expiration. Despite intense fighting on the ground, Putin has recently shown notable flexibility: on May 9, during the Victory Day commemorations marking the end of the Second World War, he stated that the war in Ukraine was nearing its end and that he wanted to conclude it through negotiations involving the Europeans, signaling an openness to a new relationship with Europe.

A possible settlement in Ukraine will depend on the positioning of China and Europe, following the outcomes of the Trump-Xi Jinping summit and European reactions to Putin’s May 9 speech. He fears that a Washington-Beijing rapprochement could further isolate Moscow, which partly explains his recent opening toward Europe.