“All Roads Lead to Rome”...

The saying “All roads lead to Rome” is one of the most famous expressions in political history and the history of civilizations. It was not merely a literary metaphor, but a description of the reality of the Roman Empire, which built an extensive road network that made Rome its political, military and economic center, with all the major roads leading to the capital. From the Middle Ages onward, the phrase became a proverb meaning that a variety of means does not necessarily alter the final outcome, and that different paths may lead to the same destination.

Lebanon today may offer a contemporary political illustration of that saying. Since the end of the latest war, speeches and slogans have multiplied, as have the options being proposed. Yet one question remains: does Lebanon truly have several strategic choices, or do they all, one way or another, ultimately lead to the negotiating table?

This article neither advocates negotiations nor opposes them, nor does it seek to justify any particular political choice. It simply attempts to read reality as it is, away from slogans and political passions, and to ask a straightforward question: does Lebanon still have any strategic option that does not, in the end, pass through negotiations?

From War to Politics

In international relations, wars are not ends in themselves. They are often a means of reshaping the balance of power in preparation for negotiations. Wars rarely end in absolute victory. More often than not, their outcomes are translated at the negotiating table, whether through direct or indirect talks.

In Lebanon’s case, the latest war has produced a new reality shaped by several factors:

• Israel’s reoccupation of parts of Lebanese territory;

• growing international pressure to implement Resolution 1701 and other relevant international resolutions;

• the linking of reconstruction to a new political and security process concerning weapons outside the authority of the state;

• profound regional transformations that have redrawn the balance of power and shaken many of the assumptions that shaped the region over the past two decades.

All of this has brought Lebanon face to face with a challenge that can no longer be deferred.

What Options Does Lebanon Have?

On the surface, the options appear numerous. But once examined more closely, they prove far less diverse than they seem.

First: The Military Resistance Option

One camp believes that continuing military action provides an alternative to any negotiating track.

But this option runs up against several realities:

• a clear imbalance of power;

• a human and economic cost that Lebanon can scarcely afford;

• the absence of international support for an open confrontation;

• the domestic need to rebuild the state and its institutions.

Continuing the confrontation, therefore, does not eliminate negotiations. It merely delays them or alters their terms.

Second: Waiting

Others are betting on regional or international changes that might eventually offer Lebanon more favorable conditions.

But waiting is not a policy in itself. It amounts to suspending a decision. Meanwhile, realities continue to change, balances of power shift, and new facts on the ground become entrenched, only to become part of any future settlement.

Third: Internationalizing the Crisis

Some call for placing the entire file in the hands of the United Nations or international powers.

Yet even the most internationalized conflicts have never been resolved by international resolutions alone. Their implementation and translation into reality have ultimately required negotiations among the parties concerned.

Fourth: Indirect Negotiations

This is a model Lebanon has experienced on several occasions, whether through the armistice agreement, negotiations over the maritime boundary, or American and international mediation.

This option allows understandings to be reached without requiring either side to assume the full political cost of direct contact with the other.

Fifth: Direct Negotiations

This is the most politically sensitive option. Yet it remains a possibility if the parties come to believe that mediation is no longer sufficient to achieve the objectives they seek.

The Negotiations Everyone Refuses to Acknowledge

The actors most adamantly opposed to talking about negotiations appear, in fact, to be among those most closely tied to their outcome.

Hezbollah, which rejects any discussion of direct Lebanese negotiations with Israel, is now part of a regional equation that extends far beyond Lebanon’s borders. Many of its strategic calculations today appear linked to the outcome of negotiations between Iran and the United States. The future of sanctions, the nuclear program and Iran’s regional role are all factors that directly or indirectly affect Hezbollah’s position and choices.

This means that even if Hezbollah is not sitting at the negotiating table, it is waiting for the results and basing much of its calculations on them. Rejecting negotiations in Beirut does not mean rejecting negotiations altogether. It simply means that the negotiating venue has shifted to another capital and to a different dossier.

Israel, despite its military superiority, faces a similar dilemma. Military force can destroy or weaken an adversary’s military capabilities, but it cannot by itself produce lasting stability along the northern border.

Ultimately, Israel needs arrangements that can guarantee the security of its northern settlements, enable their residents to return, and prevent the threat from re-emerging. Whatever name is given to such arrangements, they cannot be achieved through force alone. They will require political or security understandings, direct or indirect, with the Lebanese state or through international mediation.

In other words, despite their different rhetoric, both sides are moving within the same negotiating framework, even if they are not sitting at the same table.

Hezbollah is waiting for the outcome of Iranian-American negotiations, while Israel is seeking negotiated arrangements that can secure its northern front. Both understand that war alone cannot produce a sustainable outcome.

Is There Any Real Alternative to Negotiations?

This is where the central paradox lies.

After examining the various scenarios, it becomes clear that the real divide is not between negotiations and no negotiations, but between the form, timing and level of negotiations.

War can be a means of improving negotiating terms.

Deterrence is also an instrument of negotiation.

Mediation is itself a form of negotiation.

International resolutions require negotiations to be implemented.

And waiting is, ultimately, nothing more than postponing negotiations.

Even the continuation of occupation or limited clashes cannot constitute a permanent solution. They are merely transitional phases that sooner or later end in some form of settlement.

The real question, therefore, is no longer: will there be negotiations? Rather: what kind of negotiations? Who will represent Lebanon? And what cards will it have to play?

What Does This Mean for Lebanon?

The fundamental issue is not the principle of negotiations itself, but the Lebanese state’s readiness for them.

States are not judged only by their ability to enter negotiations, but also by their ability to define their objectives before taking a seat at the table.

What does Lebanon want to recover?

What are its priorities?

What can it accept?

And what can it not concede?

The answers to these questions are what determine the outcome of any negotiating process, not the mere fact that negotiations take place.

A state that enters negotiations united and capable of defining a national position becomes a partner in shaping the settlement. A divided state, by contrast, becomes an arena where settlements crafted by others are played out.

Perhaps the saying “All roads lead to Rome” is no longer merely a description of the Roman road network, but an unusually accurate description of Lebanon’s current situation.

The paths differ, the slogans change and the rhetoric shifts, but the outcome appears to remain the same.

Hezbollah, despite rejecting negotiations with Israel, is waiting for the results of other negotiations that will determine a significant part of its future. Israel, despite its military superiority, is also seeking negotiated arrangements capable of providing the security that force alone has failed to guarantee. And the Lebanese state, however much it tries to postpone the issue, will eventually find itself confronting the same question.

The question is no longer: will Lebanon negotiate?

It is now: how will it negotiate? Who will negotiate on its behalf? On the basis of what national vision? And will it enter negotiations as a state that is master of its own decisions, or as an arena where the negotiations of others intersect?

For in politics, as in history, the issue is not simply that all roads lead to Rome. It is knowing why you are taking a particular road, and having the ability and courage to set your own destination before others choose it for you.