War in Ukraine: the failure of the first peace efforts 2/5
The war in Ukraine continues to be at the center of a wide-ranging debate, fueled in part by near-daily bombardments targeting key nerve centers on both sides—most notably the Russian and Ukrainian capitals.
To better understand the various dimensions of this long-standing conflict, it is necessary to revisit the background and origins of what has led to this (fratricidal?) war, by examining the motivations and aspirations of the different parties involved—particularly the West (the United States and Europe, extended to all NATO member states with the exception of Turkey)—and by recalling the early stages of the Russian offensive and the failed attempts to achieve peace, or at least negotiations, bearing in mind that responsibility in this context is shared by many.
To fully grasp the ins and outs of the various aspects of the war in Ukraine, some fundamental questions should be raised from the outset. What do Russia and Ukraine represent for the West? What could be the concrete consequences of a clear-cut victory by either of the two protagonists? And by extension, what would the implications be for the West and the Middle East?
In a series of five articles, our contributor Jean-Patrick Dayras, a rear admiral in the French Navy, presents his vision and analysis of the issue.
Jean-Patrick Dayras, Rear Admiral (ret.)
On the very day Russia invaded Ukraine, February 22, 2022, many French and European citizens displayed Ukrainian flags (including in the Azores!) and volunteered to take in refugees or even offer language classes to help them learn to speak the language of their host country. It would have been interesting to ask these people, who were making a political statement, to locate Ukraine on a map and explain what had happened over the previous ten years (2013–2022) among Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. Such remarks, however, are not welcome in certain circles in France.
EU Membership
Just a few days after the Russian invasion, Ukraine officially applied for membership in the European Union.
On June 17, 2022, the European Commission recommended granting Ukraine the status of candidate country. For what reason? To what end? No one will ever truly know.
On June 23, 2022, the heads of state and government of the 27 member states, meeting at the European Council, unanimously decided to grant Ukraine official candidate status for membership in the European Union.
On December 14, 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations, and on June 25, 2024, those negotiations were officially launched.
What civil servant or corporate employee wouldn't have dreamed of a promotion bringing such a rapid and advantageous change in status? This wouldn't just be climbing the social ladder—not even a social elevator—but a social interplanetary rocket!
Compare this with other candidate countries that are not yet members of the European Union. Opening of negotiation processes: Turkey 1999; North Macedonia 2005; Montenegro 2010; Serbia 2012; Albania 2014; Moldova 2022; Bosnia-Herzegovina 2022; Georgia 2023. Kosovo applied for membership in 2022 but has not yet been granted official candidate status.
Why such haste? Was it not possible to support Ukraine without rolling out such a promising—perhaps overly promising—red carpet?
The least one can say is that candidate countries are not being treated equally. Ukraine is a country that was highly corrupt and remains so. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Ukraine 142nd in the world in 2014 and 116th in 2022 (Russia's scores are similar). In the Western press, Russia is portrayed as a corrupt state. Ukraine's corruption, meanwhile, goes largely unmentioned.
The peace project under Turkey's auspices
In spring 2022, peace was not far off. The door was left ajar from the very start of the war. Turkey played an important diplomatic role, even though it did not manage to secure a lasting peace agreement.
Turkey held a unique position: a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it maintained good relations with Ukraine (drone sales and military cooperation) while keeping close ties with Russia on geopolitical (Syria) and economic grounds. Turkey was one of the few states able to speak simultaneously to Moscow and Kyiv. It hosted the main peace negotiations in March 2022 and facilitated the grain export agreement.
The March 2022 negotiations
Turkey hosted a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers in Antalya on 10 March 2022, as well as more substantial negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul on 29 March 2022, which outlined:
A neutral status for Ukraine (renouncing NATO membership).
Security guarantees provided by several states in exchange for this neutrality.
The withdrawal of Russian forces from certain areas.
The deferral of discussions on the status of Crimea.
Research by historians and scholars shows that a draft agreement existed, but that many essential issues remained unresolved, including the status of occupied territories, security guarantees, the timetable for military withdrawals, and the future size of the Ukrainian army.
Ukraine's military successes around Kyiv led Ukrainian leaders to believe a stronger position could be achieved on the battlefield. For its part, Russia maintained demands that Ukraine considered unacceptable.
Boris Johnson's role
Boris Johnson allegedly discouraged Ukraine from concluding an agreement. This claim remains disputed. Nevertheless, it was clearly reported by numerous newspapers and by well-informed, credible commentators. Boris Johnson has not denied it. His role in the failure of the peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, conducted under Turkish mediation in spring 2022, is one of the most debated topics of the war.
On 9 April 2022, Boris Johnson traveled to Kyiv. According to anonymous sources cited by the Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda, he reportedly conveyed two main messages: that Vladimir Putin should not be considered a reliable negotiating partner; and that Western powers were not prepared to guarantee any agreement reached with Russia on the terms then being discussed.
This account is the basis for the claim that Johnson sabotaged the prospective deal. He was publicly expressing skepticism about the possibility of negotiating with Putin and advocating for the continuation of Western military support for Ukraine. There is no established proof that a final peace agreement was ready to be signed and was called off solely because of his intervention. Nonetheless, President Zelensky's position changed dramatically.
The strengths of both countries
What can these two countries bring to Europe?
Ukraine has some of the most productive agricultural land in the world, growing wheat, corn, barley, sunflowers, and rapeseed. It also holds significant mineral resources, including some that are critical for the development of modern technologies: iron, manganese, titanium, uranium, graphite, and lithium. Its industry is highly capable in sectors such as steel, metallurgy, railway construction, aeronautics, space, and shipbuilding. On top of that, Ukraine has a remarkable nuclear power generation capacity, natural gas resources, and an extensive pipeline network connecting Russia to Europe. Furthermore, Ukraine is a strategically vital territory bridging Europe and Russia, with access to the Black Sea — essential for grain exports and of major military significance.
As for Russia, it is endowed with vast natural resources, including oil and natural gas, as well as mineral wealth such as coal, nickel, palladium, platinum, gold, diamonds, copper, and aluminum. Beyond holding the world's largest forested area, it also benefits from an agricultural sector that gives it a major export advantage, producing wheat, barley, and vegetable oils.
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The War in Ukraine: Russian Strategic Blunders and Western Missteps (3/5)
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