Youssef Mouawad

Who ever said Hezbollah thrived only on skirmishes and armed conflict? Since the 1990s, it has been steadily “Lebanonizing” itself—smoothing its rough edges, choosing the language of compromise. Or at least pretending to, simply to muddy the waters. At the outset—at the moment of its creation—Hezbollah made no effort to hide its hand. It openly proclaimed its ambition to establish a regime modeled word for word on Khomeini’s. From there, it distanced itself entirely from the Lebanese political sphere, dismissing it as an unworthy arena fit only for unbelievers. But then, reconsidering its approach, it embarked—cleverly and deliberately—on a long-term project to burrow into the Lebanese state apparatus. So much so that by 2005 it had secured a fatwa from Sheikh Afif al-Nabulsi legitimizing its participation in government.

Who can believe that the Shiite community—especially that of South Lebanon—will withstand this perfidious war of attrition? Day after day, Israeli strikes taunt it, challenge it to retaliate, and impose a hellish pace. If, at the outset, Hezbollah’s restraint was synonymous with self-control, that is no longer the case. And the Party of God can no longer claim to be exercising self-discipline after a year of provocation. Hence the question of whether it will finally choose the path of confrontation or yield to the demands of disarmament ? Will the perseverance of the israeli army ultimately overcome the legendary patience of civilians? For discontent is rising among an exasperated Twelver population. Worked up to a fever pitch, it sees no way out of this conflict, nor any benefit in it. And who could still deceive it when the evidence is so clear: the day after October 7, it was sacrificed on the altar of Palestine, and now, a year later, it is immolated on the altar of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The jugular vein that once supplied it with weapons and ammunition has been severed. And yet, Hezbollah refuses to abide by the commitments made in its name through Nabih Berri. Because it does not believe it has been defeated—and because the fertile ground of the South, where it took root, has not contradicted that belief. To be perfectly frank, a handful of dissenting and comforting Shiite voices are hardly enough to bring it back to reason. Though the party of the mullahs has taken a beating, it has not abandoned the fight. It has gone underground to preserve the core of its forces. According to certain sources, it has even rebuilt its military capabilities. In other words, it is recovering. At the same time, it has worn down Western diplomacy, which is openly hostile to it. It can therefore savor its victory. Playing the card of “strategic patience,” learned from seasoned masters, it has created such a diplomatic mess that France has once again rushed to Lebanon’s bedside—to untangle the knot.

Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi and former ambassador Simon Karam—Lebanon’s representative at the meetings of the ceasefire supervision mechanism with Israel—clearly unsettle pro-Hezbollah circles because they herald the long-overdue return of external sovereignty. That sovereignty means a state’s refusal to submit to any higher authority and its recognition by other states as an equal. Youssef Raggi and Simon Karam come at exactly the right moment—at a time when most Lebanese have grown disillusioned with everything. Many now look back with nostalgia to the period preceding the 1975 civil war, that blessed era when the Lebanese state was master in its own house, exercising both external and internal sovereignty—that is, exclusive authority over its territory and population.

Yahya Sinwar died without laying down his arms. For some who praise him, this fugitive fought with pride until his last breath. He may now serve as a model to emulate for Hezbollah’s fighters. Like him—and before him—there was Saddam Hussein, unflinching before the gallows. And with that, you expect Hezbollah to surrender its weapons and submit to conditions imposed upon him… Living Dangerously Al-silah zinat al-rijal (that is, “weapons are the adornment of men”), a slogan repeated in South Lebanon, a region where a whole generation has tasted the brotherhood of arms. Military operations have given combatants a taste for the “heroic life,” an addiction one does not escape unscathed. An addiction the majority of Lebanese do not share. Moreover, the emblematic figure of al-Hussein, who fell with weapons in hand, makes any idea of capitulation odious, if not impious.

Even under heavy bombardment, even upon being chased by Syrian revenge or international justice, Hezbollah’s zealots will never dissolve into the national melting pot. They will not behave like the partisans of the Amal Movement, who are so typically Lebanese in their flaws, their rhetoric, their compromises and convenient settlements. And there is indeed some reason for that, as our contemporary history offers a precedent that still raises doubts. No one has forgotten what happened to the Lebanese Forces upon accepting the Taif Agreement and laying down their arms. They paid the heavy price: their leader was imprisoned, and their cadres were persecuted and even liquidated.

What a source of concern—and even of irritation—for Roman authorities, these Eastern Catholics do indeed generate! Had they vanished from the Levant, diplomatic relations between Rome and the Muslim countries of the Eastern Mediterranean would have been far smoother. That being said , things were never simple for Vatican diplomacy, on dealing deal with the Maronite community. Very early on, the Maronites asserted themselves politically as an autonomous entity rooted in a mountain stronghold, and what is more they never hesitated in insisting upon their distinctiveness. This set them apart from the other Christian communities of Syria and Iraq, which had long submitted to the rule of the majority and produced, for the most part, quiet individuals and compliant citizens.