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Over the past twenty-four hours, a battery of indicators on the ground suggests that the war between Iran and the axis formed by Israel and the United States is on the verge of crossing a new threshold–an escalation from which Lebanon is not escaping. On the thirteen day of the military operation dubbed “Epic Fury” by US President Donald Trump, tensions have significantly surged across the dual Iran-Israel and Lebanon-Israel fronts, marked by a striking synchronicity between Hezbollah and Tehran. The overnight intensification of missile exchanges between Tehran and Tel Aviv–occurring just as Hezbollah announced on Wednesday evening the launch of Operation “Eaten Straw” (an allusion to Quranic account of Abraha’s army, decimated by clay stones dropped by birds)–is a direct consequence of rising hostilities around the strategic Strait of Hormuz. This flashpoint now threatens to become a decisive turning point in the ongoing conflict. For Washington, the security of tankers and merchant vessels transiting the strait remains a red line–one that Tehran has unhesitatingly crossed, sending global oil prices into a tailspin. It is a strategy that US President Donald Trump has warned against, yet one that Iran persists in wielding as a weapon to exert maximum pressure on him by destabilizing international market. Since Israel targeted fuel depots in Tehran last Sunday, the Mullahs’ regime has retaliated by striking oil fields and storage facilities across the Gulf states. Overnight Wednesday to Thursday, at least two tankers were attacked off the Iraqi coast, preceded hours earlier by a strike on a cargo ship. This volatile climate has prompted Gulf countries to slash their oil production by at least 10 million barrels per day, according to the International Energy Agency. The Mullahs’ regime, currently fighting for its very survival, is using every means at its disposal, declaring itself ready for a war of attrition. For now, however, this stance has failed to deter its adversaries, who remain resolute in seeing their military operation through to the end, as repeatedly affirmed by both Tel Aviv and Washington. So far, its strategy appears to have had been counterproductive. After blowing hot and cold over the past few days by suggesting that the war could end very soon, President Trump declared on Wednesday evening that Washington “must finish the job” in Iran, insisting there would be no “stopping halfway or leaving too early.” While he claimed that “Iran is close to defeat,” he remained elusive regarding the ultimate war aims: is the goal regime change– a possibility alluded to at the conflict’s outset–or merely the neutralization of the nuclear threat or Tehran’s capacity to develop ballistic missiles both of which pose a direct threat to the United States? His statement echoes that of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is more unequivocal regarding the war aims: the dismantling of the Mullahs’ regime due to the existential threat it poses to his country, and its military arm, Hezbollah. In this perspective, Tel Aviv is considering expanding its military operation in Lebanon. Its Defense Minister, Israel Katz, announced this on Thursday, the day after a restricted security council meeting was convened to discuss the following steps for the military engagement in Lebanon where, according to Tel Aviv media, the Israeli army occupies no longer five, but eighteen strategic points in view of a potential ground incursion. Israel Katz announced that an order has been given to the Israeli army to prepare to “extend its operations in Lebanon,” warning of a possible occupation of Lebanese territories to ensure the security of northern Israeli villages, should the government fail to end the Hezbollah’s bellicose activities. Israel also declared itself determined to act “everywhere in Lebanon, from the north to the south, including the Bekaa,” while the Lebanese government still struggles to curb the murderous and destructive madness of this organization. One week after its historic decision to ban Hezbollah’s paramilitary activities and initiate prosecutions against those launching missiles at Israel, the government has still not honored its commitment. Instead, it remains mired in managing the humanitarian crisis born from the hellish adventure into which Iran’s local agents have embarked Lebanon and the Lebanese people. The Council of Ministers, meeting on Thursday, thus decided to summon the Iranian Chargé d’Affaires to address the presence of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps representatives in Lebanon. Yet, there was not a single word regarding Hezbollah’s activities or the mission with which the army and security forces had been tasked to contain them. Return, therefore, to square one–that of the incapacity of a state which believes that Lebanon and the Lebanese have much to lose if it ventures onto this minefield, while the majority of Lebanese, across all affiliations, desire only one thing: to finish with Hezbollah and its criminal activities.

Analyses often miss the mark. We tend to drift into an excess of objectivity and a lack of imagination, or vice versa. At times, we even mistake our own desires for reality. It is a sobering fact that neither the most tragic events, nor their ultimate outcomes, were ever foreseen by even the most seasoned analysts. Only a few enlightened minds proved visionary, yet they were rarely heard within the high corridors of power, mired as they were in political, financial, and economic affairs. The Catalyst of the Two World Wars Few predicted the First World War. No belligerent truly desired it, especially following the various agreements and the carving up of global spheres of influence among the great powers of the era. Analysts, convinced that such a conflict could never be repeated and that Germany had been subdued for good, branded it the “War to End All Wars.” Twenty years later, Germany controlled Europe through a second, even more devastating conflict, and very nearly dominated the world were it not for American intervention. The key to the German renaissance and its military superiority lay in technology. The same was true on the eve of the First World War: the world was in the throes of an industrial and technological revolution. This shift birthed unprecedented weaponry–tanks, combat aircraft, all-metal naval fleets, oil-powered warships replacing coal, recoilless guns, and semi-automatic rifles. The arms race that followed acted, in turn, as the catalyst for both World Wars. The 21st Century: Weaponry Within Everyone’s Reach In terms of weaponry, the global landscape today is not so different from that of the early 20th century. The difference is that we have now entered the age of drones, smart missiles and shells of all kinds, high-precision radar, stealth aircraft and missiles, missile defense systems, nuclear weapons, combat robotics, electromagnetic tools, and cyber technologies. These capabilities are no longer the exclusive domain of the Great Powers; today, they are available to nations such as Ukraine, North Korea, and Iran. The accessibility of such technology encourages bellicose regimes to become more defiant, while providing relatively weaker nations, like Ukraine, with the resilience to resist far superior powers. No one foresaw the Hamas offensive from Gaza in October 2023. Bolstered by its locally-produced missiles and drones, its makeshift flying machines, and its technologically agile fighters, the movement was able to temporarily occupy southern Israel. On the eve of the current conflict, it seemed clear that Iran could no longer rely on its regional allies–notably Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Iraqi Hashed al-Shaabi–as these groups had been weakened by fifteen months of war with Israel. Furthermore, Tehran itself, having suffered significant damage to its military and nuclear potential during the “12-Day War” in June 2025, was considered neutralized–especially as it was then engaged in nuclear talks with the United States. These assumptions proved erroneous. While negotiating, Iran was simultaneously replenishing its own arsenal of drones–whose efficacy has been proven in Ukraine–alongside sophisticated ballistic missiles, high-precision cruise missiles, supersonic anti-ship missiles, hypersonic missiles, and multi-warhead missiles with a range exceeding 2,000 km. This buildup bolsters the regime’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and paralyze navigation in the Arabian Gulf. In the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran did not hesitate to sow naval mines in the Strait, leading to a devastating American strike on its navy to ensure free passage. Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have demonstrated their expertise in deploying a complex combination of surveillance radar, drones, suicide boat-drones, surface-to-sea missiles, midget submarines–of which Iran possesses at least 18, all notoriously difficult to detect–and the naval mines cited in recent US reports. Two Conditions to End the War The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Tehran is becoming a reality, despite the significant loss of the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities. The Iranians retain sufficient, if limited, technological means–such as mines and drones–to block the passage. Yet, keeping the Strait open remains a vital strategic interest for the United States. At this stage of the conflict, President Donald Trump’s future depends on his ability to safeguard this interest: if he appears deterred by Iran, it will trigger a global geopolitical earthquake and a political crisis within the United States. Another technological consideration with grave geopolitical repercussions: Iran, according to its own officials, continues to hold 460 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, well-shielded from American surveillance. The country still possesses centrifuges capable of enriching this uranium to 90%–the threshold for weaponization. The danger is not necessarily the launch of a nuclear bomb via an Iranian missile. Rather, it lies in the fact that Tehran–having previously sponsored terrorist attacks, being allied with militias experienced in such acts, and reportedly sheltering Al-Qaeda operatives–could, in a gesture of desperation, transfer these fissile materials to organizations that would use them for a new 9/11, even more devastating than the first. These factors make a “whimper” of an ending to this conflict unlikely. Iran is fighting for its survival, waging a psychological war to project an image of defiance and victory, while President Trump demands nothing less than Tehran’s total surrender. This conflict can only end in one of two ways: a total “Clausewitzian” victory by the United States–a costly endeavor by any measure–or negotiations that force Iran to relinquish its highly enriched fissile materials and dismantle the capabilities that threaten the global economy via the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In the meantime, the war grinds on, and Iran grows increasingly weak.

“In every generation they rise to destroy us, and the Holy One, blessed be He, saves us from their hands.” — The Passover Haggadah The conflict currently pitting Israel against Iran and its proxies extends far beyond the military and geopolitical framework in which some persist in confining it. The semiology deployed by both parties — the names given to operations, the expressions chosen to announce or respond to them — reveals a battle that is eminently religious and metaphysical in character, in which each military act claims to inscribe itself within the order of scriptural fulfillment. Where military operation names ordinarily obey a logic of propaganda designed to impress the enemy, the rhetorical ornamentation here plays an entirely different role, standing at the very heart of the war apparatus. It constitutes its essence, helping to explain why this conflict unfolds on a register altogether different from strictly diachronic, historical time. At least four expressions have concentrated this logic since the fighting resumed its intensity: Al-Aasf Al-Ma'koul , the name given by Hezbollah on Wednesday to its missile operations; Al-Saa Saaein , the message broadcast in Arabic by the Israeli army as its reply; and, before that, Rising Lion and Roaring Lion , names of the two Israeli operations against Iran in 2025 and 2026. Each of these expressions summons a scriptural memory so precise, and so consciously chosen, that it is difficult to read them as mere military labels. “Al-Aasf al-Ma'koul” In designating the name Al-Aasf Al-Ma'koul to characterize its operations, Hezbollah draws from Surah 105 of the Quran — the Surah of the Elephant — which recounts the fate of Abraha, a Christian king of Yemen whose army had marched on Mecca to destroy the Kaaba. The divine punishment was total and of an almost aesthetic brutality in its radicality: the soldiers were reduced to the state of “devoured leaves”, of dry residue that the wind scatters leaving nothing behind, not even the dignity of a body to mourn. The reference is clear and direct, designed to fortify Hezbollah's public. The Islamist party plays explicitly on the register of instinctive and immediate collective memory, foregrounding a vengeful punitive character in the face of the harshness of the Israeli offensive. What deserves noting, beyond the notoriety of the reference, is the precision of the analogy it constructs. For Abraha was no ordinary enemy. He was a Christian allied with Byzantium, who believed himself the bearer of a civilizing mission and whose army possessed elephants — a symbol of technological power for the era. His defeat illustrates in the Quran that material force, however impressive, does not prevail against divine will. The parallel with Israel — a technologically advanced state, backed by the United States in its war against Iran — is constructed to be read effortlessly, as self-evident, in the circles where this discourse circulates. “Al-Saa Saaein” The Israeli reply is eloquent. By broadcasting in Arabic the message Al-Saa Saaein — “double the measure” —, the Israeli army chooses a classical Arabic expression that resonates simultaneously across several registers: that of the Arabic language itself, where the expression designates the principle of proportional or doubled retaliation; and the biblical register, where the Hebrew séah — linguistic and semantic cousin of the Arabic saa — runs through Scripture as a unit of measurement for grain but also, and above all, as a metaphor for divine retribution. Two punishments for one. This biblical root merits attention. Isaiah proclaims that Jerusalem has received double for all her sins (40:2). Jeremiah announces that God will render double to enemy nations (16:18). The Apocalypse of John reprises the same structure: “Render to her double according to her works” (18:6). And behind all these texts looms the Talmudic principle of middah keneged middah — «measure for measure» — a foundation of Jewish juridical and theological thought, according to which justice functions by returning exactly what was inflicted, or doubling it. In responding in Arabic to its adversaries within this shared scriptural register, the Israeli army is in effect saying: we know your texts, we know their equivalents in ours, and it is in this common depth that we answer you. Metaphysical and eschatological war in all its splendor, compounded by an archetypal mimetic violence that corresponds perfectly to the model defined by René Girard. The maneuver does not seek to escape the framework proposed by the adversary but to occupy it from within and reverse its logic — which is, as experts would agree, in a war of signs, the most effective form of counter-attack. “Rising Lion”, “Roaring Lion” The name given to the operation against Iran's nuclear program on June 13, 2025 — Rising Lion, the Lion that Rises — already found its direct scriptural origin in the oracle of Balaam, in the book of Numbers (24:8-9). The scene constitutes in itself a narrative device of remarkable coherence: Balaam was a foreign seer summoned by Balak, king of Moab, to curse Israel. Three times he attempted it, three times his mouth, despite himself and against his will, pronounced a blessing. It is in this third forced blessing that the verse is found: “He couches, he lies down like a lion, like a lioness; who will rouse him?” This narrative device accomplishes something theologically singular: it has the invincibility of Israel attested by the very mouth of the enemy who wished to curse it. Far from being proclaimed by those who possess it, power imposes itself on those who hoped to deny it. Better still, through them. To name a military operation after this verse is, therefore, to summon this precise archetype: we were lying down, we are rising, and it is for our enemies themselves to acknowledge that none can prevent us. It was Benjamin Netanyahu who declared that he personally chose the name of the operation in reference to this prophecy. The fact that the head of government publicly assumes reading his action within the register of biblical fulfillment speaks volumes about the prophetic reach he wishes to give to the war — no doubt to legitimize it religiously — but also about the moment Israel is traversing and about the way its leaders conceive, or at least present, their relationship to history. One must add a layer of reading that has been little highlighted: the lion before a rising sun was the emblem of imperial Iran, the one on Persian flags before 1979. In naming its operation thus, Israel kills two birds with one stone. It addresses its own citizens with a biblical reference — and simultaneously sends Iranians a message that invokes their own national memory, specifically that of the royal Persia erased by the Islamic Republic. It says, implicitly, that the lion rises not against Iran but against the mullahs' regime, and that something of ancient Persia perhaps stands on this side of the border. Semiotic warfare here reaches its paroxysm. Staggering. The textual inclusion with Jacob's blessing to his son Judah in Genesis (49:9) — “Judah is a lion's cub [...] he crouches, he lies down like a lion; who will rouse him?” — creates a prophetic continuity embracing the entire Torah: the lion of Judah is the royal lineage, it is Jerusalem whose coat of arms still bears the passant lion, it is in the Christian tradition the «Lion of the tribe of Judah» of the Apocalypse (5:5), the one who rises after having seemed vanquished. This symbolism activates the notion of a power held in reserve that chooses its moment — the crouching lion is not a weak lion, it is a lion that waits, ready to spring upon its prey in due time. It is hardly surprising, in this context, that the new Israeli offensive should be titled “Roaring Lion”. Roaring Lion — in Hebrew Sha'agat Ha'Ari — is thus the second of its kind within a deliberate sequence, a narrative progression drawn directly from biblical leonine symbolism. Balaam's crouching lion rises, then roars before striking. The roar, in the prophets, is not a metaphor for anger: it is the harbinger of the divine act itself. Amos 3:8: “The lion has roared; who will not fear?” Joel 4:16: “The Lord will roar from Zion.” Netanyahu has constructed a sequence in two scriptural acts. The common thread? The punitive, vindicative expedition. And millennialism. Purim and the Deliverance of the Jewish People The temporal dimension of these events also deserves particular attention. The exchanges of missiles and messages unfold in the days immediately following Purim, celebrated this year on March 2 and 3, 2026. The coincidence alone would merit pause, concentrating as it does within a few days the entire paradox of the Persian-Israeli relationship. Purim commemorates the deliverance of the Jewish people from an extermination project devised by Haman, minister of the Persian king Ahasuerus — a project aimed at “destroying, killing and annihilating all Jews, young and old, women and children, in a single day”, in the very terms of the Book of Esther. The story takes place in Shushan, present-day Susa, in Iran. The festival thus refers not to some vague Oriental reminiscence, but to nothing less than a threat of annihilation emanating from Persia itself, foiled by a woman's cunning and turned against its instigator. Haman is hanged on the gallows he had prepared for Mordecai. The narrative structure is that of the perfect reversal — and it is precisely for this reason that Purim is called the Festival of Lots: Haman had drawn lots to choose the date of the massacre, and it is that very lot which turned against him. That hostilities resume with renewed intensity in the week following this festival — whose narrative has staged, for twenty-five centuries, Jewish survival in the face of a Persian threat — may not be the fruit of deliberate calculation. But in a conflict where both parties have demonstrated such refined mastery of religious semiology, the hypothesis of chance is the least convincing. And even if it were chance, those reading these events from within the concerned traditions will not fail to interpret it as a sign — which, in the realm of eschatological wars, amounts to exactly the same thing. What the calendar adds to the picture is a depth that ordinary geopolitical analyses struggle to grasp: that the confrontation surpasses the conflict between two states or two ideologies and pits against each other two wounded memories, whose dates of commemoration overlap with a tragic precision. The Persia that was the empire of Haman is today the empire of Khamenei — and Purim, which celebrated an ancient victory over an ancient enemy, finds itself celebrating, in this new context, something that is not yet resolved. The Shadow of Armageddon What sets this conflict apart from ordinary wars — and this may be its most troubling characteristic for anyone still hoping for a political resolution — is that its principal protagonists do not reason in terms of tactical victory or negotiable balance of power, but in terms of historical finality and eschatological fulfillment. Khamenei's theocracy is architectured around the doctrine of the Mahdi, the hidden twelfth imam whose return will bring history to an end. According to anthropological readings of this tradition, this return is conditioned by a preceding great chaos, so that the destruction of Israel goes beyond a mere political objective, insofar as it is presented as a theological condition for eschatological fulfillment, an investment in an end of times whose promoters hope to accelerate the advent. In national-religious Judaism, and even more so in the currents of American evangelism that constitute a decisive support base for Israel, current events are often read through the prism of Ezekiel 38-39 — the prophecy of Gog and Magog, a coalition of nations from the North and East that rises against Israel gathered in its land, and whose defeat manifests divine glory before all nations. What makes this collision of two eschatologies so perilous is what Hannah Arendt would no doubt have recognized as the fundamental temptation of the political thinker turned prophet: to exit the domain of human action — irreversible certainly, but unpredictable and plural, always open to the unexpected — and enter that of necessity, where everything is already written and the actor's role is simply to conform. A war experienced as the fulfillment of a written destiny knows neither limit nor compromise, because stopping before the prophetic term would be to betray the prophecy itself. This is no doubt, in another language and with other references, what Pascal glimpsed in his time: the man who believes he acts in the name of God is capable of the extremities that the merely selfish man would never reach, because the selfish man, at least, still has something to lose. The Middle East now faces two eschatologies acting as two forces launched toward each other with the intent of total annihilation. The mastery of sacred texts has not been placed at the service of peace, which is also present in those same texts, but at the service of war. The same Numbers that contain the lion's oracle also contain prescriptions on mercy. The same Quran that evokes the devoured straw is traversed by verses on reconciliation. The choice of texts is therefore also a choice about what one wishes those texts to be — and that choice belongs entirely to the men who make it. The oracle of Balaam is perhaps, in this perspective, the most accurate image of the situation. Balaam had come to curse and he blessed — not out of virtue, but because something in the reality before him resisted the malediction he was commanded to pronounce. But the oracle also contains a question that no one ever asks seriously enough: “Who will rouse the lion?” — a rhetorical question in the text, meaning that none can, but which in the reality of the current conflict designates precisely what the belligerents are doing, each in their own way: provoking the adversary's lion, compelling it to rise, and finding themselves then in the position of those who have set in motion a movement they no longer control. Which is not without evoking another religious symbol, Armageddon, the end of times, common to both traditions at war, each seeing in it the sign of a return — whether of the Demiurge, whether of the Mahdi. Unfortunately for those who watch, powerless and beneath a deluge of fire, this epic struggle outside of time between two millenarian deliriums. Bibliography AMIR-MOEZZI, Mohammad Ali, Le guide divin dans le shî'isme originel (Verdier, 1992). AMIR-MOEZZI, Mohammad Ali, La religion discrète (Vrin, 2006). ARENDT, Hannah, La condition de l'homme moderne (Calmann-Lévy, 1961). ARENDT, Hannah, Les origines du totalitarisme (Seuil, 1972). BARTHES, Roland, Mythologies (Seuil, 1957). CAMERON, Averil & CONRAD, Lawrence (éd.), The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East (Darwin Press, 1992). CORBIN, Henry, En Islam iranien (4 vol., Gallimard, 1971-1972). FILIU, Jean-Pierre, L’Apocalypse dans l’islam (Fayard, 2008). HOROWITZ, Elliott, Reckless Rites: Purim and the Legacy of Jewish Violence (Princeton University Press, 2006). KHOSROKHAVAR, Farhad, Quand Al-Qaïda parle (Grasset, 2006). KHOSROKHAVAR, Farhad, L'Islamisme et la mort – Le martyre révolutionnaire en Iran (L'Harmattan, 1995). NEHER, André, L'essence du prophétisme (PUF, 1955). SCHOLEM, Gershom, Le messianisme juif (Calmann-Lévy, 1974).

A serious escalation occurred on Wednesday evening between Israel and Hezbollah. The pro-Iranian party launched nearly 200 rockets in a few minutes against northern Israel and Galilee earlier in the evening. The Israeli air force was quick to retaliate by carrying out a series of particularly violent raids against the southern suburbs, which were quickly covered in thick clouds of black smoke. Following the escalation initiated by Hezbollah, Israeli sources indicated late in the evening (Beirut time) that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was examining with his staff the possibility of expanding the ground intervention into Lebanon. In this context, an Israeli security source stated on Wednesday evening that the United States could participate in air raids « in Baalbek and the Beqaa ». The same source specified that « the military operation will not stop at the Litani ». « We will act from South to North, and all targets are legitimate », added the Israeli source. Iran and Hezbollah stigmatized at the UN On the political-diplomatic front, the Arabic-language channel al-Hadath reported a statement by a senior military advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution who promised to « destroy Israel ». These remarks undoubtedly reflect a desire for a reckless escalation on the part of the mullahs' regime. In New York, the behavior of the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah was severely and unanimously condemned. At the end of an extraordinary meeting dedicated to the war in Iran and the situation in Lebanon, the Security Council thus approved a resolution presented by Jordan and the Gulf States condemning Iranian attacks against Gulf countries. The UN resolution demands « an immediate halt to Iranian attacks ». Earlier on Wednesday afternoon, the French ambassador to the UN had read out a statement, in the presence of European Union ambassadors, calling Hezbollah's entry into war against Israel « irresponsible ». The French ambassador added that the pro-Iranian party must « cease its attacks against Israel and hand over its weapons to the Lebanese government ». In the same vein, the President of the French Senate, Gérard Larcher (a great friend of Lebanon for many years), stressed that France must help the Lebanese authorities disarm Hezbollah, which « does not defend Lebanon, but serves Iran's interests », he noted. For her part, the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political Affairs condemned, during the Security Council meeting, Hezbollah's attitude, noting that this party « refused to cooperate with the Lebanese government to restore the sovereignty of the State and apply the decision on the monopoly of weapons ». As for Israel's ambassador to the UN, he presented Lebanon with a choice that leaves no room for procrastination. « The Lebanese government, » he declared, « is faced with the following alternative: either it dismantles Hezbollah's military apparatus, or we will do it ourselves »… It should also be noted that, concomitantly with the flare-up between Israel and Hezbollah, a major development occurred in Iran over the last twenty-four hours. An Iranian news agency thus indicated « that at least ten members of the security forces were killed during clashes with armed elements in Tehran ». No further details could be obtained regarding the scope of this incident.

For the past week, a new war – the fifth in 34 years – has pitted Israel against Hezbollah. It is yet another war that the Lebanese people never wanted. All the agreements that ended the previous four wars proved to be little more than temporary truces, exploited by Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand and by Israel on the other to prepare for the next round of fighting. All of this unfolded under the watchful eye of the Assad regimes, father and son, and of Lebanese presidents and governments beholden to Damascus or Tehran, particularly during the tenures of Hraoui, Lahoud, and Michel Aoun. The costs of these wars have been paid dearly, willingly by Hezbollah’s unconditional supporters, under the numbing effect of ideology; reluctantly by other Lebanese; and by Arab countries that financed reconstruction for both humanitarian and geopolitical reasons. The same scenario has therefore repeated itself for four decades: war, ceasefire, rhetoric of victory, the deterioration of Lebanon’s political authority, Hezbollah’s preparations for endless wars, mutual deception, and then war again. A proverb drawn from popular wisdom says that “a donkey does not stumble twice on the same stone.” It is clear that President Joseph Aoun–who, under Article 49 of the Constitution, also serves as the supreme commander of the armed forces–and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and his government, who appoint not only the army commander but also all senior officers in the military and security institutions, constitute the first executive authority since 1990 to benefit from regional and international conditions conductive to reclaiming the sovereignty lost since 1968. They also enjoy unprecedented domestic support, as well as tangible Arab and international opportunities. In November 2024, after 13 months of war, Hezbollah was the party seeking a ceasefire with Israel, with Nabih Berri leading the negotiations. The Mikati government agreed to the ceasefire only after being “authorized” to do so by Hezbollah. Thus, the very party requesting the ceasefire subtly portrayed itself as having accepted it magnanimously–while proclaiming victory and orchestrating a staggering campaign of denial. For the past 15 months, the new president, the prime minister, and members of the government have been manipulated by Hezbollah–either knowingly or through a disarming display of incapacity. From the outset, Hezbollah has renounced its commitments to implement Resolution 1701, with the backing of Nabih Berri. The “divine party” used these fifteen months to reorganize itself with the help of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, under the watchful–or willfully blind–eye of the executive branch, without any mitigating circumstances. It exploited the blindness and short-sightedness of the sovereigntist parties, who were too preoccupied with legislative elections and competing over the division of parliamentary seats–seats that, in any case, made little difference in the face of strategic events, as demonstrated by the notably “brilliant” absence of the parliamentary Defense Committee. This reorganization of the “Party of God” is now on full display, as if time has stood still since November 27, 2024. Our army suffers the consequences of the government’s inaction–or, one might say, the complicity of a significant part of the executive branch with Hezbollah–putting its credibility squarely at risk. The forceful decisions aimed at disarming Hezbollah, taken in August 2025, eight months after President J. Aoun’s inauguration and following the Salam government’s vote of confidence, gradually unraveled in the face of Hezbollah’s favorite pastime: patient and cunning tergiversation. The army took time to present its plan for southern Litani, and its implementation dragged on. Today, all of this lies completely discredited, with the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Litani having returned to the status quo. In this context, a pressing question emerges: the president and the Council of Ministers had approved both the plan and its execution in southern Litani, raising no objections or comments on the timeline–despite clear warnings from international bodies regarding Hezbollah’s reorganization and Israel’s impatience. Yet willful deafness prevailed. Obviously, the plan for northern Litani has become a complete joke–unless a miracle occurs. In this situation, who is to blame? The president? The prime minister? The government? The executive branch as a whole? Our army? It must be emphasized that the executive holds full authority over the armed forces. Yet the unfortunate custom in Lebanon since 1968 has been to make the troops bear the consequences of the executive’s inaction and political deadlocks. In 1973, after clashes between our army and the PLO in Saida, the officers responsible for southern Lebanon were transferred. In 1975, the executive’s inaction and the slide toward internal war led to the replacement of the army’s chief of staff, General Iskandar Ghanem. In 1984, fighting between our army on one side and the militias of the Amal Movement, the PSP, the PLA (Palestine Liberation Army), and the Syrian occupation forces on the other led to the dismissal of the army’s chief of staff, General Ibrahim Tannous… Returning to our current situation, which bears no resemblance to previous ones, a vertical divide now separates Hezbollah and its supporters on one side, and all other Lebanese on the other, with Nabih Berri and his Amal Movement caught in evasive maneuvering. Two options present themselves: traditional inaction, or its opposite. In the case of inaction, the executive and legislative branches would become mere decoration, with nothing left to negotiate with Arab or international bodies–let alone with Israel. Conversely, if the executive chooses to act, unanimous Arab support is almost certain, regardless of the decision, especially given that Iran is currently attacking Arab countries strategically. European and American backing would also likely be assured–a rare occurrence, given that divisions between Washington and the EU are felt everywhere, except on Lebanon. When the executive acts unambiguously, and when the president fulfills his role as supreme commander of the armed forces–taking matters into its own hands through the Higher Defense Council and supervising the troops’ every action on a daily basis–the forces will perform, as they have consistently done since 2000. When the troops’ mission is politically secured, even without full consensus, the results will almost certainly be tangible. As for the parliamentary Defense Committee, it could at least, even without unanimity, hold both the executive and the military accountable, ensuring that those responsible are made to answer for their actions. Action, even with its uncertainties, is far less risky than inaction–especially when the region’s dinosaurs are at war. During World War II, Switzerland, although neutral and largely Germanophile, declared general mobilization, prevented Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy from using its territory or communicating through it, and established a military strategy to defend the mountain stronghold at the heart of the country. A similar strategy is certainly feasible in Lebanon, and without question, it is the executive–not the military–that must take responsibility for it. On this point, I quote Georges Clémenceau, physician and journalist, nicknamed “The Tiger,” Prime Minister and architect of France’s victory in World War I: “War is too important a matter to be entrusted to the military!”

The population of Lebanon, as well as the populations of the Levant, Gulf, and Middle Eastern countries, are subjected to a veritable Scottish shower (a sudden reversal of fortune). On the one hand, rumors suggest an upcoming end to hostilities on the Iranian front (without encompassing Lebanon), but at the same time, a clear escalation in military operations is perceptible. Wednesday, March 11, and the night of March 10, were marked by an intensification of raids and missile fire in more than one direction. Israeli aviation thus continued its intensive raids on the night of March 10 against the nerve centers and infrastructure of the Iranian regime in Tehran, and against the southern suburbs of Beirut and several villages in South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley. Missiles were also launched against positions of the Kurdish Iranian opposition in Iraq, while the US-Israeli coalition air force launched raids against the offices of the pro-Iranian Iraqi militia, “El Hashed al-Shaabi” (“Popular Mobilization”), and Iraqi Hezbollah, stationed in Iraq. Several missile alerts were also reported on Wednesday in Dubai and Doha, notably. On Tuesday night, the Israeli navy targeted an apartment in the Aïcha Bakkar neighborhood of West Beirut. The IDF stated that a leader and an office of the Sunni fundamentalist organization “El Jamaa el Islamiya” were targeted by the strike, which reportedly killed four people. Further south, about forty Israeli armored vehicles reportedly took up positions in the southern region, particularly near Taybeh, which could be a precursor to a prolonged Israeli army presence in the South to impose a “buffer zone” aimed at reducing the threat to northern Israeli villages. In this regard, the Israeli General Staff reportedly sent reinforcements to the border with Lebanon, including a significant commando unit. Diplomatic pressures Faced with the resurgence of tension on the ground, Lebanon is subject to increased diplomatic pressures. The French ambassador to the UN thus read a statement, in the presence of the ambassadors of the European Union, calling Hezbollah's entry into war against Israel “irresponsible.” The French ambassador added that the pro-Iranian party must “cease its attacks against Israel and hand over its weapons to the Lebanese government.” In the same vein, the president of the French Senate, Gérard Larcher (a great friend of Lebanon for many years), emphasized that France must help the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah, which “does not defend Lebanon, but serves Iran's interests,” he noted. For her part, the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political Affairs criticized, during a Security Council meeting (Wednesday afternoon) dedicated to Lebanon, Hezbollah's attitude, noting that this party “refused to cooperate with the Lebanese government to restore the state's sovereignty and implement the decision on the monopoly of arms.” As for Israel's ambassador to the UN, he presented Lebanon with a choice that leaves no room for hesitation. “The Lebanese government,” he declared, “is faced with the following alternative: either it dismantles Hezbollah's military apparatus, or we will do it ourselves”… What about the Strait of Hormuz and Mojtaba Khamenei In parallel with this tension on the now traditional “fronts,” a new flashpoint has emerged in recent days: the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards do not hide their desire to close this strategic maritime passage, even threatening to mine it. President Donald Trump was quick to react to these threats, unequivocally stating that any attempt to mine this strait would lead to a particularly firm response from the American army. In this context, the US Navy continued the systematic destruction of the Iranian military fleet, and sixteen mine-laying vessels were sunk. At the political, or global geostrategic, level, the attention of regional and international powers is currently focused on the configuration of the new political power in Tehran after the designation of a new Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Ali Khamenei, who was killed during the first Israeli air raids in Tehran on February 28. It is confirmed by various converging sources that Mojtaba Khamenei was injured during the first raids on February 28. Contradictory information is circulating in the media regarding the severity of his injuries and his health status. The new Leader would have been practically imposed by the Revolutionary Guards (the Pasdaran), which could reflect a hardening of the mullahs' regime towards the West, and particularly the United States. In any event, it will be necessary to wait for Mojtaba Khamenei to publicly state his major political and strategic choices to determine the course that events might take, both concerning the outcome of the war and the future of Iran and the entire region.