How the State Became an Intermediary…

Access to the state in Lebanon no longer follows the direct path it ought to follow in any modern political system. A relationship that should rest on clearly defined rights and mutually acknowledged obligations has gradually transformed into a complex web of informal channels, in which the citizen no longer deals with the state directly, but with whoever 'grants access' to it. Yet the mutation has not stopped there, for intermediation has ceased to be a mere bridge between citizen and state and has become, in many cases, an outright substitute for it — through the construction of parallel structures that reproduce the state outside its own boundaries.

What we witness today goes well beyond conventional corruption. It is no longer a matter of transgressing existing rules, but of displacing them with others. The citizen no longer obtains what is rightfully his through institutional channels, but through an intermediary who redefines that right as a service, or through an alternative institution that arises outside the state while performing its functions. In this sense, the problem no longer lies solely in the weakness of the state, but in the emergence of a parallel cartel that acts in its place and reconfigures the relationship between citizen and authority.

This transformation did not occur overnight. It began with the methodical weakening of the state — through the paralysis of its institutions, the systematic delay of its services, and the progressive erosion of trust in it. Political forces then moved to fill this vacuum, not merely through mediation but by establishing alternative structures in the fields of health, education, and social services. Over time, the citizen ceased to turn to the state except as a secondary option, finding himself instead caught in a double dependency — torn between an intermediary who clears the way and a parallel institution that delivers the service.

Across different sectors, this same equation has reproduced itself. In essential services, the state is no longer the effective reference, having ceded its place to parallel cartels of production and distribution. In health care, access to treatment is no longer linked solely to official institutions, but to a web of support networks and substitute structures. In education, grant and assistance mechanisms have emerged outside the traditional institutional framework. And in the labour market, competence alone no longer determines opportunity, supplanted by membership in networks of influence.

In the financial sector, this mutation manifests with particular sharpness. The banking system has ceased to be a unified framework governed by legible rules, having become instead a space where personal relationships intertwine with legal provisions. During the crisis, not all depositors stood on equal footing in their ability to access their funds, and parallel channels emerged for managing transfers and settlements. The question was no longer what one had a right to, but who could effectively exercise that right. Money itself was thus transformed, passing from the status of a legal right to that of a privilege conditioned by influence.

Despite all this, the cartel did not impose itself by coercion alone, having prospered because it addressed a genuine need. In the absence of the state, the citizen seeks a swift solution rather than a protracted legal process. And as trust in institutions erodes, the personal relationship proves all the more effective. It is this dynamic that has allowed the parallel cartel not merely to survive, but to expand and entrench itself.

The result now exceeds the mere retreat of the state and touches upon the emergence of a full structural duality. The citizen lives between two systems — one official and weakened, the other parallel and at times more functional. Rights have not disappeared, but have split between these two systems, deepening dependency and hollowing out the very notion of citizenship.

What is most alarming in this picture is not the existence of intermediation itself, but the success of the substitute. When the parallel cartel proves faster and more present, the state is relegated to the rank of a secondary option. The problem no longer lies in the weakness of the state, but in the fact that it is not always perceived as a necessity by the citizen.

In this reality, the question is no longer how to reform the state, but whether the bond linking citizen to state still holds at all. Between an intermediary who connects the citizen to the state and substitute institutions that dispense with it altogether, a new model of governance is taking shape — one that no longer rests on the state alone, but on a plurality of power and service centres.

And here the real question surfaces: are we confronted with a weakened state striving to recover, or with a cartel that has succeeded in building its own substitute?